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Abstract of the Thesis 
 
 
This thesis analyses the organisational response to resurgent tuberculosis (TB) across 
London. Tuberculosis in modern London reached its lowest recorded rate in 1987, but 
since that time there have been almost annual year on year increases, with the rate 
climbing by 50% between 1999 and 2009 alone. The rate of drug resistant TB is also 
increasing at a worrying pace. 
This research uses a novel complexity theory approach to analysis but empirically finds 
that positive features of complexity theory were crowded out by an embedded New 
Public Management paradigm. This study is qualitative and narrative-based, using 
complexity theory as the main theoretical framework, but also applies the theory of 
professional dominance and the paradigm of New Public Management (NPM) as 
possible alternatives. Institutionalism/archetype theory and Kingdon’s (1995) theory 
of public policy development are also introduced to help theorise the findings. 
This research found that complexity theory offers a useful, but partial, means of 
understanding the system responsible for TB control in London. Self-organisation, the 
key feature of complexity theory, was evident, but often resulted in maintaining the 
status quo and resisting change, in addition to infrequently resulting in innovation. The 
effects of highly embedded NPM practices and principles were wide-spread and 
powerful; its relentless preoccupation with risk aversion and control may have 
thwarted potentially positive benefits from self-organisation at the system level. 
Further, extensive NPM-inspired fragmentation almost eliminated co-adaptation 
(another complexity theory precept) by the TB control system to its changing 
environment, and reduced system fitness and robustness.  
TB control was also found to occupy a lowly place in terms of public health priorities. 
Finally, and rather surprisingly, there was little evidence of professional (medical) 
dominance observed. Medical consultants, stretched for time and faced with competing 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Background and Context  
This thesis analyses the organisational response to resurgent tuberculosis (TB) across 
London. The incidence of this ancient disease, once thought close to eradication, has 
been on a relentless rise in London for over two decades. Starting in the post-war era, 
TB rates in the UK, including London, steadily declined; but in 1987 this trend 
surprisingly reversed. Since that time, there have been almost consistent year-on-year 
increases in the numbers of Londoners developing active tuberculosis. 
Global TB rates peaked in 2002 and have been on a slow but steady downward 
trajectory since that time (World Health Organization 2011). This means most large 
cities in the world have also seen their TB rates fall, so London’s inability to mirror this 
trend is puzzling and has serious consequences for those who are infected with the 
disease. Rates in New York City, for instance, have fallen by 82% since reaching their 
peak in 1992, and Barcelona reduced its TB rate by 65% between 1991-2008. In 
London, since 1987, TB rates have increased by approximately 100%. Of particular 
concern are the small, yet relentless, increases in the rates of drug-resistant TB. 
The Nature of TB Services in London 
There are approximately 70 different entities involved with TB control across London, 
but there is no central co-ordinating function in place. The system is highly fragmented, 
with TB services delivered by approximately 31 different TB clinics. These clinics house 
dozens of different employers (mainly different acute trusts and Primary Care Trusts), 
and even within the same clinic, nurses and doctors are sometimes employed by two or 
three different organisations. In addition, the clinics regularly interact with a variety of 
external entities which are also implicated in controlling TB in London. Some of these 
additional TB control system stakeholders include microbiology laboratories, members 
of the Find & Treat team (outreach workers), privatised prisoner transportation 
services (when prisoners infected with TB need to visit a clinic), and Health Protection 
Agency officials. The result is numerous relationships and dynamics at play across the 
system, rendering it a useful site to undertake a complexity theory study.  
TB infection rates vary widely across the city, as will be discussed in Chapter Two. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, there is considerable inconsistency across the clinics in 
terms of service delivery, both in the quality and the nature of the services provided.  
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Overall, the TB control system in London has been highly reticent to adopt successful 
approaches used in other jurisdictions, or even those piloted within London itself. The 
system has largely been unable to adapt to the current reality of high levels of TB 
infection in the city. Since (quiet) acknowledgement in the mid-1990s that TB was 
indeed a problem in London, the issue has been studied extensively, resulting in dozens 
of recommendations for action. However, little change has been observed in how the 
TB control system responds, and rates continue to climb. Despite being extensively 
studied – 14 reports examining TB control in London have been produced since 1996 – 
the resurgence of this serious, communicable disease occupies a lowly place on the 
public health policy agenda in London.  
It is important to acknowledge the broader environmental context in which the above 
scenario has been unfolding; namely, within a healthcare system which has been 
heavily influenced by decades of New Public Management reforms. These reforms have 
been significant and London’s TB control system has not been immune from their 
impact; on the contrary, they have exerted considerable influence on how the system 
has responded. 
It is useful, therefore, to understand why and how the organisational response to TB 
control in London has struggled and met with only limited success. Complexity theory 
is used in this research to try and explain this phenomenon. Other theoretical 
frameworks (professional dominance, New Public Management and Kingdon’s [1995] 
theory on public policy agenda setting) are also introduced, although complexity theory 
comprises the primary theoretical focus of the research. 
Gaps to be Filled by this Research 
This research is complexity theory-led and seeks to respond to three particular gaps 
identified in the complexity theory literature: 
1. A general lack of complexity theory-informed empirical research; 
2. A need for such research analysing the management of complex organisational 
phenomena, notably including epidemics; and, 
3. A significant lack of research which highlights the important role played by the 
macro context of the political economy (here embedded New Public 




The research also fills an important and relevant health policy empirical gap, in that TB 
control in London, while well studied from epidemiological and sociological 
perspectives, has not been analysed organisationally.  
 
This thesis uses (mostly) case-based, longitudinal, qualitative research to analyse 
London’s TB control system and its organisational response to resurgent TB infection 
in the city. As noted, its primary conceptual framework is complexity theory, but it also 
applies two other less novel, and better established perspectives – the theory of 
professional (medical) dominance and the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm, 
as alternative templates. Complexity theory was chosen because of its focus on the 
importance and role of multiple relationships and dynamics within a system and its 
capacity to recognise the “dynamic connections between population health, health 
policy and health care” (Curtis & Riva 2009:519). Professional dominance and NPM 
were chosen as alternatives because they have both been widely, and successfully, 
applied within healthcare research as explanatory frameworks for a variety of 
observed phenomena. As with complexity theory, professional dominance and NPM 
also lend themselves to a system-level study, another important consideration here.  
As a result of induction, it later became necessary to add a fourth theoretical 
framework; namely, Kingdon’s (1995) theory of public policy development and agenda 
setting. This key inductive finding, which is discussed at length in Chapter Seven, 
concerns the low policy priority attached to TB control in London. Kingdon’s theory 
explains why and how some “conditions” become “problems” which find a place on the 
public policy agenda and are addressed by policy makers, whilst others do not. This 
seemed a particularly valuable and relevant framework to analyse and theorise how 
and why TB control has no place on London’s public health policy agenda.  
This finding also necessitated the addition of the fifth research question, as seen below. 
Research Questions 
This research addresses the following questions: 
1. What is the nature of the organisational response to resurgent TB in London? 
2. What is the contribution of complexity theory features (and/or professional 
dominance and/or New Public Management features) in analysing the 
organisational response to this phenomenon? 
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3. Why does the organisational response to resurgent TB in London illustrate 
these features?, i.e., what are the mechanisms and structures which explain this 
organisational response? 
4. Does complexity theory provide a theoretical basis for understanding the role 
of the New Public Management paradigm and practices within this case? 
5. What perspective might Kingdon’s (1995) theory of public policy development 
offer on TB control in London? 
The table which follows provides an overview of these questions, along with why they 
were developed for this research and the research strategy used to address each. 
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FIGURE 1: OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS, RESEARCH STRATEGIES AND JUSTIFICATIONS 
Research Question Research Strategy 
Used 
Justification/Objective 
What is the nature of the 
organisational response to 




To develop a deep understanding of the 
organising principles and practices 
which characterise London’s TB control 
system, as required to identify 
components of each of the three 
theoretical frameworks used in the 
research 
To map and understand, holistically, the 
relationships and dynamics within 
London’s TB control system, as required 
by a complexity theory study 
To identify the potential causal effects of 
these relationships 
To address the gap in research 
examining London’s response to TB at 
the system level 
What is the contribution of 
complexity theory features 
(and/or professional 
dominance and/or New Public 
Management features) in 
analysing the organisational 
response to this phenomenon? 
 
Retroduction To identify the extent to which each of 
the three theories can be used to 
understand TB control in London  
To respond to the broadly 
acknowledged dearth of empirically 
based complexity theory research 
To mitigate the potential risk of using 
only one theoretical framework (i.e., 
complexity theory), thereby imposing 
that theory, a priori, on the data, as 
either NPM or Professional Dominance 
might offer strong(er) explanatory 
power than complexity theory. 
To build on the well-established 
research approach of using three 
competing theoretical frameworks in a 
single research study 
Why does the organisational 
response to resurgent TB in 
London illustrate these 
features?, i.e., what are the 
mechanisms and structures 
which explain this 
organisational response? 
 
Retroduction Identifying these mechanisms and 
structures is vital if causal relationships 
and organising practices are to be 
revealed and understood. This is 
important for complexity theory 
research and to identify NPM-based 
organising principles.  
To understand the macro context in 
which the system operates, as indicated 
by complexity theory 
 
Does complexity theory provide 
a theoretical basis for 
understanding the role of the 
New Public Management 
paradigm and practices within 
this case? 
 
Retroduction To understand the role of the macro 
context in which the TB control system 
operates, as indicated by complexity 
theory.  
To understand the interplay between 
complexity theory and NPM, including 
the extent of NPM embeddedness 
What perspective might 
Kingdon’s (1995) theory of 
public policy development offer 




To understand and theorise the low 
policy priority accorded to TB control in 
London, which emerged as a key 
inductive finding from the research. 
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Importance of the Research 
That one of the world’s leading cities is unable to execute a successful organisational 
and public health response to the resurgence of tuberculosis, despite the successes of 
other western cities in doing so, is a topic deserving of analysis. And although this 
thesis does not aim to develop prescriptive findings, the resulting analyses should 
prove helpful to healthcare and policy officials in London. On a more general level, this 
research responds to the well documented dearth of empirically informed complexity 
theory research, including within healthcare. This thesis also contributes to a 
developing body of complexity theory based perspectives within the public 
management literature, particularly through a critique of embedded NPM practices 
found within the UK healthcare system.  
Summary of Key Findings 
This research found empirical evidence in support of indicators of complexity theory-
based organising within London’s TB control system. However, some of these precepts 
manifested themselves in a negative manner, helping to explain the inertia which 
seems to have gripped the system for so long. This is seen as due to the strong and on-
going influence within the UK healthcare sector from deeply embedded NPM-inspired 
principles. The research also found that medical consultants exercised limited influence 
and power over the organisational response to TB in London, despite being virtually 
universally identified by research respondents as (potentially) the dominant force 
within the TB control system. This unexpected finding of weak professional dominance 
was also attributed to the ongoing influence of NPM.  
Finally, an inductive analysis of the collected data suggested tuberculosis control in 
London is a very low priority on both the general healthcare and the public health 
agendas. A health problem has not become a health issue, or in the language of Kingdon 
(1995), an identified condition has not become a problem. This situation is surprising 
given the communicable nature of TB and the growing incidence of drug resistant TB. 
However, the harsh “real politik” of the situation means there is little upside for key 
players and entities within the system to expend political capital in pushing TB control 
up the health policy agenda and advancing the necessary reforms to improve the 
current system. 
Structure of the Thesis 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 
Two sets the overall context in which this research has been undertaken. It tells the 
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policy story of TB in London and offers a historical and epidemiological overview of the 
disease. The chapter offers comparative data on tuberculosis in other large cities, 
examines factors underlying continued high TB rates in London, and concludes with a 
discussion regarding the very serious issue of drug resistant TB.  
Chapters Three and Four introduce readers to the three initial theoretical frameworks 
used in the research: complexity theory, professional dominance and New Public 
Management (NPM). The chapters critically review the literatures underpinning these 
frameworks, and the major tenets of each framework are discussed. Chapter Three 
focuses solely on complexity theory, the main conceptual framework used, and, as it is a 
relatively new and novel theory (or, more accurately, a group of theories), readers are 
provided with a “primer” on the subject. Gaps in the literature which are filled by this 
research are identified, and five key elements from the theory are derived for 
operational application. Chapter Four analyses professional dominance and NPM, the 
secondary, competing frameworks used in this thesis. As with Chapter Three, five 
“signs and symptoms” derived from each of these two literatures are identified for 
operationalisation. Kingdon’s (1995) theory of public policy agenda setting is also 
introduced, as it will be used to later in the thesis to theorise a key inductive finding 
from the research, the low policy priority accorded to TB control in London. 
Chapter Five presents a methodological discussion on the chosen research paradigm 
(critical realism), the research strategy applied (case study) and the resulting 
methodological implications for data collection and analyses. It is recognised that the 
combination of complexity theory and critical realism, whilst a well-supported pairing 
in the literature, represents a departure from many traditional designs. The chapter 
discusses this combination and resulting methodological implications.  
Chapters Six and Seven contain the empirical findings from this research. Chapter Six 
provides an analytic history of the overall organisational and management response to 
London’s TB epidemic, along with a comparator case study contrasting New York City’s 
response to its recent TB epidemic with London’s response.  Chapter Seven provides 
three additional “mini” yet strategically important case studies derived from collected 
data, each offering a distinct narrative and perspective on London’s TB control system. 
The objective is to provide highly contextualised and detailed renderings of different 
aspects of the TB control system in action. This chapter also presents the empirical 
findings, which emerged inductively, regarding the low policy priority associated with 
TB control in London. 
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Chapter Eight contains a detailed theoretical elaboration on the research, in which the 
empirical findings presented in the previous two chapters are more fully theorised. The 
chapter discusses the observed interaction between complexity theory and NPM, or 
specifically, the impact of embedded NPM features (particularly quasi-markets, 
managerialism and a need for control) within UK healthcare on some complexity 
theory-based features (especially self-organisation, emergent innovation and co-
adaptation) as apparent within London’s TB control system. A contribution to 
knowledge arising from this research is identified in terms of the negative impact of 
embedded NPM reforms. Continuing with theoretical conceptualisation, Chapter Eight 
also focuses on a major inductive finding cited previously– the remarkably low priority 
accorded to TB control in London and the resulting implications. Kindgon’s (1995) 
theory of public policy development and agenda setting is introduced as a tool for 
understanding and explaining this phenomenon. The complexity theory concepts of 
self-organisation and the importance of historicity/initial conditions are re-introduced 
to augment the analysis. A second theoretical contribution is thereby defined. 
The thesis concludes with Chapter Nine, a summary of the main findings of the 
research, implications for public policy, and some suggestions for future research. 
Reflections on the thesis are also offered.  
Concluding Remarks and Overall Contribution 
This thesis seeks to fill identified theoretical and empirical gaps in the existing bodies 
of knowledge with regard to both complexity theory and the organisational functioning 
of London’s TB control system. It is proposed that complexity theory offers a useful and 
interesting, though partial, tool, for understanding the organisational response in 
London to resurgent tuberculosis. Complexity theory’s explanatory power was 
enhanced when the broader environmental context in which the healthcare system 
operates was also considered. Specifically, understanding the functioning of London’s 
TB control system was improved when the contextual factors wrought by a deeply 
embedded New Public Management paradigm were factored into the theoretical 
analysis. This is the first major theoretical contribution of the thesis. 
Although this research is mostly deductive, a major inductive finding emerged: TB 
ranks very lowly as a priority issue for current health policy, rendering its successful 
control almost impossible. Despite the communicable nature of the disease and an 
alarming recent rise in drug-resistant TB rates, the current healthcare system’s 
response might be described as a well-informed gamble that the disease will not “jump 
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the fence” into mainstream London society. Kingdon’s (1995) model of public policy 
development proved valuable for theorising this finding, and by introducing the 
complexity theory concepts of self-organisation and historicity, Kingdon’s model was 
developed. This addition to Kingdon’s theory represents the second major theoretical 
contribution of this thesis. 
While the TB epidemic in London has been studied from an epidemiological and 
sociological perspective, to the best of our knowledge there is no prior, in-depth, 
system-wide organisational analysis. This is the empirical and policy related 
contribution of the thesis. 
Having presented an overview of the research and the organisation of the thesis, the 
next chapter offers readers “the story of TB in London”, providing important context 








CHAPTER TWO: Tuberculosis in London: its history and 
management 
 
This chapter sets the overall context for this research, including a brief discussion of 
the history of tuberculosis, an epidemiological overview of TB in London and the 
modern history of TB control efforts in the city, placing them within a broad 
international perspective. Following this is an overview of London’s system of TB 
control today, with a particular focus on the turbulent environment and structure 
within which TB is managed. 
Historical Overview 
In The White Plague: Tuberculosis, Man and Society, René and Jean Dubos provide a 
fascinating social and historical account of tuberculosis,  noting the disease has been 
endemic to London for centuries (Dubos and Dubos 1953:6-8). By the 11th century, TB 
was a sufficiently serious problem that Edward the Confessor, following in the 
footsteps of French Kings, claimed the power of “the touch” for English monarchs to 
cure tuberculosis.  This “cure” was subsequently used for centuries, with “the largest 
number of persons applying to be touched... in 1684, when many of them were 
trampled to death in attempting to reach the hand of the king “(Dubos and Dubos 
1953:8). After a brief lull in its virulence starting in the early 18th century, TB roared 
back with a vengeance a few decades later (Dubos and Dubos 1953:8). At the end of the 
18th, and the first-half of the 19th centuries, aided by the appalling living and working 
conditions of the Industrial Revolution, “the White Plague” threatened “the very 
survival of the European race” (Dubos and Dubos 1953:10). Indeed, by the early 19th 
century virtually every citizen in London was infected by mycobacterium tuberculosis, 
as “the prevalence of TB infection neared 100 percent” (Gandy 2003:15), with nearly 
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half of London’s population having active TB disease (Dubos and Dubos 1953:9).   
Friedrich Engels in 1845 described it thus: 
The flushed appearance of many of the passers-by in the streets of London 
indicates to what an extent the polluted atmosphere of the capital, particularly 
in the workers’ quarters, fosters the prevalence of consumption (quoted in 
Gandy and Zumla 2003:7) 
Gradually, over the decades which followed, improved nutrition and housing conditions 
helped dramatically reduce TB rates and associated deaths in the UK. TB rates began to 
decline in 1913 and continued to do so until 1987 when, much to everyone’s surprise, 
the decline ended (McEvoy & Maguire 1995). Until the mid-1980s, public health 
officials around the world spoke of being on the brink of “eradicating” TB. However, 
today terms such as “containment” and “control” convey a new understanding and 
approach in the global battle against tuberculosis. In 2000, Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland, 
then Director-General of the WHO, observed:   
...with the development of new TB drugs and improved living conditions 
due to socio-economic development, TB disappeared in the lives and 
minds of many. We thought we had conquered TB - that it would soon 
be a disease of the past. But, today we are faced with a global epidemic 
that is killing more people that at any point in its history. 
As the 20th century drew to a close, and again today, London is battling to control this 
ancient and deadly disease. Mycobacterium tuberculosis is a formidable foe, seemingly 
oblivious, in its own fight for survival, to improved treatments, vaccines and living 
standards. As will be demonstrated in the coming pages, “the White Plague” once again 
poses significant public health challenges for London, particularly in terms of stopping 
latent infections becoming active and in controlling the onward transmission of active 
disease. Once diagnosed, TB patients in London receive world-class treatment and most 
go on to lead lives free from the disease and its complications. The challenge lies as 
much in improving diagnosis and screening as with treating active TB. But how to do 
this continues to elude London’s TB control system. 
Epidemiological Overview 
Today, one-third of the world’s population is infected with the bacteria responsible for 
TB (Dye et al., 1999), and although most people will never develop active disease, the 
World Health Organization estimates that in 2010, TB was the cause of death for 1.3-1.6 
million people worldwide, second only to HIV/AIDS in global mortality (World Health 
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Organization 2011). In modern-day London approximately 300 people still die every 
year from the disease (NHS Londona 2011). Global incidence rates of TB peaked in 
2002, and while the decline since then has been slow, the rate of new infections 
continues to trend downward, largely due to dramatic improvements in TB control and 
treatment in China (World Health Organization 2011). 
In London, TB rates reached their lowest recorded levels in 1987 (McEvoy & Maguire 
1995, Pearson et al 1996) but the number of cases increased by 34% between 1987 
and 1993 (McEvoy & Maguire 1995), and by 71% between 1988 and 1998 (Rose et al 
2001). Today, over 50 people develop TB in London every week (Story and Citron 
2003), more than become infected with HIV (NHS London 2011 a). Since 1987 there 
have been almost constant year-on-year increases in TB rates. By 2010, the rate of new 
TB infections in London, the incidence rate, was 42.6/100,000, “a slight decrease of 
3.6% compared to 2009”, (Health Protection Agency 2011 a), but by 2011 the rate rose 
again to 44.9/100,000, an 8% increase from 2010 , with 3588 new cases reported (see 
Figure 2). This represents the highest number of new cases reported in a single year 
since rates started climbing again in 1988 (Health Protection Agency 2012 
a,f).
 











So whilst the global incidence of TB has been falling steadily since 2002, in London the 
incidence rate has increased by 11% since that year (from 40.5/100,000 in 2002 to 
44.9/100,000 in 2011), securing London’s dubious distinction as the TB capital of the 
western world. 
 
FIGURE 3: TB CASES IN LONDON, 1988-2011 (DATA COMPILED FROM VARIOUS HPA REPORTS)  
These pan-London incidence figures hide striking variations amongst TB rates within 
the city, as can be seen in Figure 4. The Borough of Newham, for example, had an 
incidence rate in 2011 of 137/100,000, while Havering’s rate was 8.6/100,000 (Health 
Protection Agency 2012c). In contrast, TB incidence in India was 185/100,000 in 2010 
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FIGURE 4: TB INFECTION RATES BY BOROUGH (HEALTH PROTECTION AGENCY 2012 A, SLIDE 34) 
 
The variation in incidence rates amongst Boroughs contributes to the inconsistent 
service levels across London and to the overall fragmentation of the system, and adds 
to the difficulty of developing a pan-London TB control program. As will be discussed in 
later chapters, this research identifies fragmentation within the TB system in London 
as a significant barrier to success in controlling the disease. Whilst some of the 
challenges are due the high levels of migration to London from countries with high 
rates of TB infection, managerial decisions and the New Public Management doctrine 
within the NHS also contribute. 
A Brief Comparison with Other Large Cities 
 
As can be seen in Figure 5, below, even though many major urban centres in Europe 
have high levels of migration, most have been more successful in controlling their 
recently resurgent TB than has London. Whilst 95% of all immigrants to Spain come 
from countries with high incidences of TB (Pina et al 2008), and Barcelona has similar 
challenges to London with high rates of TB infection amongst its homeless and drug-
using populations (Solsona et al 2001), TB rates in that city fell from 68.7/100,000 to 
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30/100,000 between 1991-2008, a 77.5% drop. Researchers attribute Barcelona’s 
success to high treatment completion rates (95% in Barcelona versus 86% in London), 
vastly increased use of Directly Observed Therapy amongst high risk patient groups 
(from 0% to 48%) and aggressive case management resulting in a dramatic 81% 
decrease in the number of “lost” patients (Rodrigo et al 2001).   
 
FIGURE 5: TREND TB INCIDENCE IN EU CITIES (HEALTH PROTECTION AGENCY 2011 B) 
Perhaps the most relevant comparator with London, however, is New York City, as will 
be discussed in detail in Chapter Six. In 2011, the latest year for which data is available, 
that city’s TB incidence rate was 8.5/100,000, less than one-quarter of London’s rate 
(New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 2012). This is the lowest 
rate since the city began recording such data in 1897(New York City Department of 
Health 2012) and represents an 82% decline from 1992, when the city launched an 
aggressive TB control and treatment initiative. During this same period, London’s 
incidence rate has more than doubled (Anderson et al 2007) (see Figure 6). With 
similar populations of approximately 8 million, the most recent data show 689 new 
cases of TB reported in New York City in 2011 (New York City Department of Health 
and Mental Hygiene 2012) and 3588 cases in London during that same year (HPA 
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2012f). The reasons for this discrepancy, it will be argued in Chapter Six, are largely 
organisational. However, any “knowledge transfer” related to TB control between the 
two cities has been limited despite New York’s approach being widely analysed by 
scholars and readily available to London policy makers (Coker 1998, 2000, Frieden et 
al 1995, Hayward and Coker 1998). More recently, there appears to be a greater 
openness to adopting some of the strategies and tactics used in New York City following 
the commissioning of the 2010 London TB Service Review and Health Needs 
Assessment. 
 
FIGURE6: TB INCIDENCE RATES IN LONDON VS. NEW YORK CITY, 1982-2008 (HEALTH PROTECTION 
AGENCY 2011 B) 
 
Factors Associated with Developing Active Tuberculosis 
Disease 
Social Inequality 
Factors associated with developing active TB infection in London include social 
inequality and whether a person is a migrant with minority ethnic status. The 
marginalised character of affected populations also affects the priority ascribed to TB 
compared to competing public health issues. As will be highlighted in Chapter Eight, 
this inability of TB to find a place on the public policy agenda has been a significant 
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factor in allowing the TB epidemic to continue unabated for so long. Although there are 
now more new TB cases annually in London than new HIV cases (3302 new TB cases 
vs. 2626 new HIV cases in 2010 [NHS London 2011a]), TB has never secured the 
resources or public policy support of HIV. (This issue will be revisited in Chapter 
Eight.)  
 
Sociologist and complexity theorist David Byrne (1998) examines TB as a nested and 
complex social problem in the UK and New York highlighting the long-acknowledged 
relationship between TB and social inequalities, especially poor housing and 
inadequate nutrition. With regard to the UK in the early 20th century, he observes  
seeing your loved ones dying of TB in the inter-war years was a radicalising 
process. It made people truly hate inequality. It played a part in developing the 
grass roots of the socialist project, particularly for women. It led to communal 
level action around housing provision and was plainly one of the factors in 
leading to a Labour victory in 1945 (p.111).  
 
However, the capacity of TB to fuel political action in the modern-day UK was short-
lived. As the face of today’s typical TB patient changed, literally, (from white and UK-
born to usually non-Caucasian and migrant), policymakers and decision makers in 
London have been able to largely ignore the disease, it is argued here.  
 TB has long been a disease of the poor and marginalised, and remains so (Ormerod et 
al 1994, Grange et al 2001, Gandy & Zumla 2002). Homelessness, illicit drug use and a 
history of imprisonment are all risk factors for contracting TB, and research has shown 
that TB is not effectively controlled amongst homeless people, prisoners and problem 
drug users in London (Story et al 2007). Whilst these groups comprise approximately 
17% of the total TB patient population, they account for 50% of all infectious and drug 
resistant TB in London. When TB treatment is administered incorrectly or when the 
entire course of therapy is not completed, drug resistant TB may develop resulting in 
more complications for patients and higher rates of mortality. It is also more than 18 
times more costly to treat than non-drug resistant TB - £1100 per patient versus 
£18,500 (NHS 2011a:9). This means it is vital that patients with so-called “chaotic 
lifestyles” be effectively treated and cured.  
Migration 
But within London, migrants arriving from countries with high incidence rates of TB 
comprise the majority of the city’s TB caseload. Data indicate that in 2010 this group 
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accounted for 84% of all new TB cases, a figure largely unchanged over the past decade 
(Health Protection Agency, 2011 a).  Figure 7 below illustrates the relative proportion 
of UK born to non-UK born TB patients in London between 2004-2009. 
 
FIGURE 7: TB CASE NUMBERS AND RATES BY PLACE OF BIRTH, 2004-2009 (HEALTH PROTECTION 
AGENCY 2011 A) 
 
More specifically, five countries of origin account for 62 per cent of all TB cases in the 
UK (Figure 8). The data also reveal that a majority of these migrants were resident in 
the UK for five or more years before developing active TB, suggesting the deterioration 
in new arrivals’ health status after relocating to the UK is a significant factor. 
  
FIGURE 8: MOST COMMON COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN FOR TB PATIENTS IN THE UK (HEALTH PROTECTION 
AGENCY 2011 B) 
 
Focusing excessively on migration ignores two important and related facts. First, global 
travel is at unprecedented levels and many people travel from the UK to areas where 
TB rates are high, returning home to the UK as carriers. Second, owing to London’s own 
endemic TB, there is a significant risk that TB infection can also be acquired from 
Londoners (Story and Citron 2003:151-152):  
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this state of affairs makes paradoxical the current regulations governing the 
requirement for immigrants (from high incidence countries) to undergo TB 
screening on entering the UK...this seems ironic when many will end up living in 
areas of London where rates of disease are twice that in their countries of 
origin.  
 
The Health Protection Agency makes a similar point, albeit without the irony:  
While the majority of cases continue to occur in people who were born in high 
incidence countries rates among the UK born have not decreased in recent 
years, and cases continue to occur in young children, suggesting transmission 
within the UK is not under control.” (Health Protection Agencya 2011:21)  
 
Factors Underlying Continuing High TB Rates in London : 
Ineffective Screening and Unclear Policy Regarding Prophylactic 
Treatment   
The communicable nature of TB brings with it a public health imperative not associated 
with many other illnesses. As noted by an infectious diseases consultant interviewed 
for this research, HIV is also communicable, but you have to do more than breathe in 
order to acquire that infection. Whilst most TB is brought into London in an inactive 
state by migrants, this does not preclude the importance of identifying active cases of 
TB, especially pulmonary disease (non-pulmonary TB is not contagious, but is still 
serious and can be fatal). Identifying active TB and initiating treatment is important for 
the health and well being of the TB sufferer and reduces onward transmission of the 
disease. However, a program of active case finding in London brings with it the 
associated political problem of inevitably higher TB rates being recorded. A former 
Department of Health (DH) official interviewed for this research noted: 
If they want to reduce the real number of people contracting tuberculosis, 
well...they need to do proactive things, which will result in higher numbers and 
somebody has got to be big enough and brave enough to go to the minister and 
say “this has to happen.”  
 
Screening for TB has proven challenging for the NHS. Port of entry screening within the 
migrant population is particularly difficult. The UK Border Agency announced in May 
2012 that it will be replacing the current scheme of randomly x-raying at airports new 
arrivals from high TB incidence countries, with a system whereby such migrants must 
prove they are TB-free before being granted travel visas for the UK. This shifts the cost 
of screening away from the UK taxpayer to the potential migrant, the angle used to 
promote the policy change within the UK, and is consistent with the approach used for 
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decades in Canada and the USA. Although TB screening initiatives are not limited to 
port-of-entry, such schemes have formed the basis of both the UK’s and London’s 
screening programs. GPs and primary care facilities could play an important role in 
screening for TB amongst Londoners, both newly arrived and longstanding, but to date 
this approach has been extremely limited. A 2-year pilot project in Hackney 
demonstrated that screening at the GP level could enhance the detection and early 
treatment of TB (Griffiths et al 2007).  However, despite showing promise and success, 
this has not yet been replicated elsewhere in the city.  
Related to the issue of screening is that of identifying TB infection quickly once patients 
become ill or display symptoms of the disease. During this research numerous 
anecdotes were shared about patients waiting for months for a TB diagnosis from their 
GP, or even having to return to their country of origin in order to receive a diagnosis. 
Where once medical trainees were taught to always think of TB as a potential diagnosis 
when a patient presented with a baffling set of symptoms, this is no longer the case. 
Institutional memory and expertise regarding TB and its treatment is a casualty of 
once-declining TB rates and a lack of recognition within the medical community that 
the problem has returned to London. A respondent observed: 
when I was training it was, when you had a differential diagnosis, TB was 
always one of the diseases, because it could cause symptoms in any part of the 
body. And so you always had TB as one of the options. Whereas now, most of 
them (medical trainees) haven't seen it, haven't been taught about it in their 
training and aren't aware. (Former TB consultant) 
Limited awareness of TB (both its symptoms and prevalence in London) amongst the 
medical profession has recently been acknowledged as a problem and the NHS has 
engaged the charity TB Alert to undertake a national educational campaign for 
healthcare professionals. The charity also works to raise awareness and reduce the 
stigma associated with the disease amongst many migrant communities with high 
incidence rates, encouraging potential TB patients to be tested for the disease. 
Drug Resistant TB: A Serious and Growing Concern 
Inadequate, incorrect, or incomplete treatment of TB also complicates TB control 
efforts. When patients do not finish their course of TB treatment, which typically takes 
six months, but can take up to 12 or even 18 months in complicated cases, or if they are 
prescribed an inappropriate or incorrect course of pharmacotherapy, risk of 
developing drug resistant TB increases. Full and appropriate treatment completion is 
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therefore essential. However, treatment completion has long been a challenge for those 
treating TB:  
How could this happen in our developed nation in modern times when we 
know how to treat individuals with tuberculosis, when we know how to prevent 
the disease from developing in those infected, when we understand how drug 
resistance is acquired by the tubercle bacillus and how to prevent its 
emergence? Tuberculosis is back because we have ignored the lessons we 
learned years ago. Those lessons taught us that the only way to control 
tuberculosis was to ensure that those infected completed an effective course of 
therapy (Dunlap & Bailey 1993:332-333). 
 
 Multi-drug resistant TB (MDRTB) is particularly serious because it is more lethal than 
mono or fully drug-sensitive TB. As discussed earlier, treatment for drug resistant TB is 
also significantly more expensive, typically lasting  at least 18 months, and uses a more 
complicated and expensive pharmacological regime than does fully drug sensitive TB. 
Lengthy hospital stays also lead to higher in-patient costs. If TB is adequately managed 
and controlled amongst all segments of the patient population, MDRTB is not a 
problem.  Consequently, MDRTB is interesting from an organisational perspective as it 
represents a failure of the TB control system (Nathanson et al 2010).  
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, drug resistant TB rates have been increasing in London. By 
2009 the rate of drug resistance rose to include 10% of all TB cases (Figure 9), 
exceeding by 33% the target (7%) set by the UK’s Chief Medical Officer (Department of 
Health 2004). Most worrying is the three-fold increase in MDRTB, from 1% to 1.6% 
over the past ten years (see Figure 9).  Amongst the one in ten TB cases in London with 
drug resistant TB, a history of UK imprisonment, homelessness and drug use are major 




FIGURE 9: TB DRUG RESISTANCE IN LONDON (SOURCE: HEALTH PROTECTION AGENCY 2011B) 
 
Since 2000, London has been battling an outbreak of isoniazid-resistant TB, with 
limited success. This outbreak was originally centred on a group of patients, many of 
whom had at been inmates at HMP Pentonville, but has since spread within London and 
to other parts of the UK. The inability of London’s TB control system to bring this 
outbreak under control will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has told the story of TB in London, providing a brief historical overview of 
the disease, but with a focus on the epidemiology of its recent resurgence and the broad 
organisational response to this epidemic. Some argue that TB in London is an 
“imported” problem, because most of the cases occur amongst migrants from Asia and 
Africa, inferring that lowering migration rates would reduce TB rates. The situation is 
not that clear cut, however, as most migrants are resident in the UK for more than five 
years before developing active TB disease. Furthermore, London faces challenges in 
managing the onward transmission of the disease within the country, agreeing 
protocols regarding screening and the prophylactic treatment of latent TB, and 
containing an alarming increase of drug resistant TB, much of which is found within a 
subpopulation of white, UK-born citizens. Increased global movement amongst citizens 
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between both high and low TB-incidence areas means controlling modern day TB is 
only partly related to controlling migration.  For a myriad of reasons, 25 years after TB 
rates started to climb in London, the city continues to struggle with managing the 
resurgence of the disease. Notably, other major Western cities around the world have 
succeeded in bringing their resurgent TB under control.  
The objective of this chapter was to provide the context for the empirical portion of this 
research and to set the stage for the reminder of the discussion. In the chapters which 
follow the literatures relevant to this thesis will be reviewed, starting in the next 






















This thesis explores the extent to which complexity theory is useful as a tool for 
understanding the organisational response to resurgent tuberculosis across London 
compared to the longer established theories of professional dominance and New Public 
Management. In order to provide the academic context in which research questions 
were formulated and subsequently addressed (Murray 2011:124), the next two 
chapters review the literatures relevant for undertaking a complexity theory-based, 
organisational study on the system in London responsible for managing TB. This 
chapter critically reviews the complexity theory literature and the next chapter 
discusses literatures related to the professional dominance and New Public 
Management models, the secondary theoretical models used in this research. 
The purpose of the “literature review” is to give “an account of the work that has gone 
before” (Murray 2011:124). More specifically, this chapter focuses on earlier 
complexity theory research and: 
a) provides readers with a brief history and “primer” on complexity theory, mostly 
in relation to the social sciences, but extending to more general complexity 
theory concepts as required; 
b) provides “an overview of the ‘big issues’” (Murray 2011: 126) in complexity 
theory, including areas which are contested; 
c) identifies gaps in the existing complexity theory literature to which this 
research responds; 
d) discusses applications of complexity theory to healthcare; and, 
e) discusses why certain complexity theory concepts have been used in this study 
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A Brief Historical Overview of Complexity Theory  
Complexity theory is perhaps better thought of in the plural, as “complexity theories” 
(Burnes 2005:73) and most accurately conceptualised as a research program 
comprising insights from an array of social, natural and physical sciences. Rather than a 
unified and agreed upon theory (Lissack 1999) in the manner of structuration theory 
or the theory of relativity, for example, complexity theory is “an emerging approach or 
framework...a set of theoretical and conceptual tools; not a single theory to be adopted 
holistically” (Walby 2007:456).   “Complexity theory does not render past paradigms 
obsolete. Instead it goes a step beyond these paradigms while remaining 
complementary to them” (Chiles et al 2004:501). 
Fundamentally, complexity theory explores relationships “within and among systems” 
(Zimmerman 1999:69) and how these relationships give rise to collective behaviours, 
patterns, tendencies, and outcomes (Burton 2002:2, Manson 2001, MacIntosh and 
MacLean 1999, 2001, Levin 2002). In the case of complex systems, these behaviours 
and their resulting outcomes are conceived of as non-linear, unpredictable beyond the 
short term, and emergent in nature. For many complexity theorists, micro-level 
relationships are of more interest than events (Drazin & Sandelands 1992, Stacey et al 
2000: 128, Stacey 2003: 237-238, 277-278, 281-283).  
Whilst acknowledging significant differences in opinion and belief amongst researchers 
working within the complexity field, two definitions from a social science (rather than a 
pure or natural science) perspective provide useful and non-controversial descriptions 
of complexity theory and complex systems:  
the interdisciplinary understanding of reality as composed of complex open 
systems with emergent properties and transformational potential. A crucial 
corollary of complexity theory is that knowledge is inherently local rather 
than universal. Complexity science is inherently dynamic. It is concerned 
with the description and explanation of change… (Byrne 2005:97) 
and 
A complex system is a system (whole) comprised of numerous interacting 
entities (parts), each of which is behaving in its local context according to some 
rule(s), law(s) or force(s). In responding to their own particular local contexts, 
these individual parts can, despite acting in parallel without explicit inter-part 
coordination or communication, cause the system as a whole to display 
emergent patterns—orderly phenomena and properties—at the global or 




The roots of complexity theory are found in the pure sciences of mathematics and 
physics; specifically, in efforts starting in the late 1970’s to understand weather 
patterns (Burnes 2005, Murray 1998), and with a 1980 research paper by physicist 
Hermann Haken which explored the concept of “self-organisation”. This early work 
attracted the attention of other scientists, with Ilya Prigogine, a Belgian physical 
chemist, winning a Nobel Prize in 1977 for developing the complexity theory concept of 
“dissipative structures” which  detailed how (non-human) systems dissipate useless 
energy (entropy) arising from self-organisation amongst constituent components, 
resulting in both transformation and order emerging within the system. Around the 
same time, researchers working in the natural sciences, especially ecologists and 
biologists, became interested in discovering how aspects of what eventually became 
known as complexity theory could help them solve puzzles within their fields, 
especially in relation to evolution and adaptation. Eigen (1971) concluded that physics-
inspired laws of linearity and cause and effect could not explain the origins of life. 
Rather, he wrote,  
What is required in order to solve such a problem of interplay between cause 
and effect is a theory of self-organization which can be applied to molecular 
systems...We may envisage that such a process of molecular self-organization 
includes many random events...What really matters is how certain such random 
effects are able to feed back to their origin...Under certain external conditions 
such a multiple interplay between cause and effect may build up to a 
macroscopic functional organization, which includes self-reproduction, 
selection and evolution to a level of sophistication where the system can escape 
the prerequisites of its origin and change the environment to its own advantage 
(Eigen 1971: 467). 
 
As will become evident later, Eigen draws upon the key aspects of what is now known 
as complexity theory – self-organisation, feedback loops and adaptation - in his efforts 
to understand how life began and how it evolves at the molecular level. Subsequently, 
Kaufman’s (1993) The Origins of Order: Self-Organisation and Selection in Evolution 
continued this line of investigation, becoming a standard reference for much 
complexity theory research in organisation studies. 
Social science, and management in particular, often borrow and adapt ideas and 
concepts from other disciplines. Early strategic management research relied heavily on 
work originating within War Studies (and still does), starting with The Art of War, 
written over 2000 years ago by Chinese military general and strategist, Sun Tzu. 
Operations management and management control theories draw heavily upon research 
from cybernetics (Otley 1995, Kirk 1995), as it was cybernetics which eventually gave 
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rise to systems theory, including soft systems theory.1  Organisation theorists and 
strategists have frequently called upon Darwin’s “survival of the fittest” and theories of 
evolution to explain organisation ecology, change and fitness (Pascale 1999, Levinthal 
1997, White et al 1997, McKelvey 1997). Likewise, economics borrows extensively 
from research by psychologists (Camerer et al 1997, DeBondt & Thaler 1985, 
Kahneman & Tversky 1979), and for over a century it has drawn upon the work of 
biologists (Witt 2006), with a journal, The Journal of Evolutionary Economics, devoted 
to the inter-disciplinary field (including a 2006 special issue dedicated to studying the 
intersection between evolutionary theories and economics). 
The interest in complexity theory within management studies, especially organisation 
theory and strategic management, arose from dissatisfaction with the reductionist, 
Newtonian-inspired approach to interpreting organisations and a sense that this 
method had become inadequate and outdated (Stacey et al 2000: 3-9, Tsoukas 1998, 
Macguire & McKelvey 1999, Leifer 1989, Plsek & Greenhalgh 2001). The term 
“Newtonian” is generally taken to apply “to everything that dealt with a system of laws 
and with equilibrium”, and in organisation theory, for instance, gave rise to the 
“machine age” and Weber’s ideal form, bureaucracy, a desire to  determine underlying 
rules of order and a quest for control (Leifer 1989:901). However, such positivist, 
functionalist approaches to studying complex organisations seem insufficient to 
advance knowledge in today’s globally inter-connected and complex world (Andriani, 
2001, Bettis and Prahalad, 1995, Godfrey & Hill, 1995, Stacey, 1995, Urry, 2005, Wicks 
& Freeman, 1998). They lack the capacity to address paradox, a key aspect of modern 
organisations, leading to puzzles such as why managers, who are paid “to be in charge... 
find it difficult to stay in control...and (why they) sense the importance of difference but 
experience the pressure to conform” (Stacey et al 2000:5). Also, traditional approaches 
have often produced unsatisfactory models and explanations of organisational change 
“with many studies reporting a very high failure rate, sometimes 80%” (Burnes 
2005:73). 
The unsuitability of positivism and functionalism in relation to this research will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five, but a sense has emerged that researchers 
need theories which are complex enough to accommodate, amongst other things, an 
organisation’s history, politics, context and novelty (Emirbayer 1997, Burnes 2005). 
Identifying cause and effect relationships within organisations has always been 
                                           
1
 WR Ashby, the “father” of cybernetics is also responsible for the “law of requisite” variety, a 
concept which became important in complexity theory, as will be discussed below. 
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difficult, but it has been made more so by the emergence of modern, lateral organising 
forms, many of which comprise multiple components that are often geographically 
dispersed, functionally diverse, and which are themselves often dynamic, independent 
organisations. Chief among these organising forms are networks, both geographic and 
(increasingly) virtual, for example, Silicone Valley and eBay, respectively (Andriani 
2001). Nonetheless, the impact of Newtonian thinking has been profound. Its 
unflinching belief in the powers of equilibrium and control underpin the predominant 
perception that systems and organisations exist naturally in a state of equilibrium and 
that through strategic planning and effective management practices, one may exercise 
control over these systems (Dooley et al 1995). The dominance of the Newtonian 
paradigm is also seen in the ongoing reliance in public management research on 
statistical methods of analyses developed before the turn of the 20th century (Weber 
2005).  
The standard logico-scientific approach has undeniably served the physical and natural 
sciences well, in part because research in these fields often focuses on closed, 
controllable systems. However, for the behaviours of the open, complex systems which 
characterise the world of human organisations, replete as they are with actors’ free will 
and perceptions, the logico-scientific approach falls short as a tool of description and 
explanation (Stacey et al 2000:3-9, Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001). Indeed, this need to 
support nuanced and complex description and explanation underlies the persistent 
interest by social scientists in using complexity theory. Despite the challenges inherent 
in transposing complexity theory from the physical and natural sciences onto a social 
science platform, social scientists persist in seeking new models and means of 
understanding the increasingly complex social and organisational world. 
The Complexity Theory Research Program 
Arguably, interest in complexity theory in the study and practice of management was 
ignited with the introduction of the phrase “edge of chaos”, to describe a precarious and 
challenging organisational state from which often complex behaviours and novel 
outputs were theorised to emerge. “Edge of chaos” organisations are in a state far from 
equilibrium, but somehow survive, seemingly in contravention of Newtonian science.  
The phrase itself emerged in the mid-late 90s (MacIntosh et al, 2006:128), in the 
context of a recently ended economic recession, and rapid rates of globalisation and 
technological developments. Overall, it was an era when change was occurring at a pace 
previously unknown to managers and management researchers. The term resonated 
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both in business schools and in practice, subsequently capturing a place in the 
management lexicon and promoting further research in the field.  
There is now a significant and varied body of complexity theory literature relevant to 
the social sciences: from a mathematical or modelling perspective (Goldspink 2002, 
Holland, 1992, Moldoveanu & Bauer, 2004, Agar 2002, Leykum et al 2007); through the 
paradigm of chaos theory (Levy, 1994, Thiétart & Forgues, 1995); or from views rooted 
in quantum mechanics (McKelvey 2003, Gell-Mann 1994). Specific to organisation 
studies, a community of researchers is producing a growing body of literature applying 
complexity theory to an array of organisational issues, with a journal, Emergence: 
Complexity & Organization (E:CO), devoted to the study and application of complexity 
theory in organisations. Special issues on complexity theory have been published by the 
journals Organization (1999), Journal of Organization Change Management (2000, 
2002), Journal of Social Issues (2001), Public Administration Quarterly (2005), Public 
Management Review (2008) and Social Science and Medicine (2012). Other disciplines 
within the field of general management studies have also shown interest including: 
strategic management (Eisenhardt & Brown 1998, Axelrod & Cohen 2000, Pascale et al 
2000, Rivkin 2000, Robson et al 2008, Boisot 2003, Boisot & Child 1999, Katsikias & 
Bello 2008, Stacey 1995); leadership (Hazy et al 2007, Wheatley 1992, 1999); change 
management (Beinhocker 1999, Glenn & Malott 2004, Houchin & MacLean 2005, 
MacIntosh & MacLean 1999, 2001, Styhre 2002); management consulting (Griffin et al 
1998); technology development (Brown & Eisenhardt 1997); organisational learning 
(Sterman 1994, Espejo 2003); and, organisational culture (Frank & Fahrbach 1999).  
Public management researchers came to complexity theory research later than their 
counterparts in both general management studies and healthcare studies. A Google 
Scholar title search using the search terms “public management”, “public sector”, 
“public administration” AND “complexity theory” yielded no results for the years 
leading up to 1999, although there were five pertinent publications identified which did 
not use the term “complexity theory” in their titles2. A further Google Scholar search in 
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 These were: Wright C, Shevchuk L (1994), “Knowledge, chaos and public policy”, Realistic 
Evaluation;  Koehler GA (1997), What Disaster Response Management Can Learn from Chaos Theory: 
Conference Proceedings, Demchak CC (1995), “Complex Adaptive Systems, Chaos, and Contemporary 
Policymaking”, Policy Studies Journal; Morçöl G (1997), “A Meno Paradox for Public Administration: 
Have We Acquired a Radically New Knowledge from the ’New Sciences’?, Administrative Theory & 
Praxis; and, Newell WH, Meek JW (1997), “What Can Public Administration Learn from Complex 




which these search terms were not limited to the title field yielded 281 results 
(including the five cited above), the vast majority of which were either irrelevant (i.e., 
the term “complexity theory” was mentioned at some point in the text) or had only a 
minor focus on complexity theory. By contrast a similar search on Google Scholar using 
the terms “management”, “organization” AND “complexity theory” yielded 3250 results. 
From 2000 onward, however, interest by public management scholars in complexity 
theory started to grow, and since the mid-2000s a steady and growing stream of 
research has emerged.  
Some of this research has been valuable in informing this thesis. Houchin and MacLean 
(2005) apply four complexity theory precepts at an organisational level within a public 
sector setting and conclude that organisations may not be naturally complex adaptive 
systems, but rather may tend toward order and hierarchy, in order to reduce anxiety 
levels. Undertaken in the UK, in a strong NPM context, it studies the change arising from 
the introduction of a newly devolved “quango”. Rhodes and McKechnie (2003) argue 
complexity theory is a useful analytic tool for responding to NPM-inspired complexity 
(citing the emergence of networks as one response to this complexity) within public 
services systems. Their longitudinal, processual, case study at the system level (the 
public housing system in Dublin) illustrates how NPM concepts such as managerialism, 
privatisation and decentralisation can be understood with a complexity theory 
framework, highlighting the importance of adaptation by agents within a system. 
Crucially, they suggest researchers “look for the ways in which public service systems 
are creating ‘order’...and how this affects...overall performance” (p.79). Boons et al 
(2009) and Rhodes et al (2011) offer useful theoretical guidance for researchers using 
complexity theory within public management research. They emphasize the 
importance of acknowledging the broader environmental context in which public 
management-complexity theory research is undertaken (Rhodes 2011) and note how 
the status-quo can be reinforced via self-organising behaviours within the public sector 
(Boons et al 2009). 
There is also a significant body of complexity theory research within healthcare, 
reviewed below. However, despite the varied and growing body of complexity theory 
research, many of the puzzles and promise which originally motivated scholars in this 
“ultimate interdisciplinary science” remain (McKelvey 1997:371).  
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The Appeal of Complexity Theory 
In spite of limitations, organisation theorists and managers have traditionally tried to 
control systems and processes by relying on relevant laws of cause and effect within 
the dominant organisational science paradigm (Donaldson 1985, Dooley 1995). 
Although experience suggests that their ability to predict outcomes is limited, there 
remains a real human need to find patterns and certainty (Proulx & Heine 2008). By 
identifying what causes something to happen, people want to predict and control what 
happens. Complexity theorists often also try to identify causal structures and 
mechanisms within organisations. However, they do not hold the view that causality is 
linear or predictable, and focus on identifying systems’ “general tendencies” instead of 
isolating rigid laws of cause and effect (Danermark et al 2002:74).  
Another explanation for the appeal of complexity theory lies in social sciences’ search 
for credibility and recognition by drawing on “real” sciences (Byrne 1995). Rooted in 
the pure and natural sciences, “complexity science” as it was commonly referred to in 
the 1980s and 1990s, was seen as having the potential to bring some long-sought 
authority to social science research and perhaps also respect from other researchers. In 
addition, the ease with which some complexity theory concepts can be applied, 
metaphorically at least, to organisational and social systems adds to the appeal. 
Common parlance, for example, often conflates the idea of self-directed and 
empowered teams with the concept of self-organisation; and the popular management 
books and articles which enthusiastically embraced the complexity theory term “edge 
of chaos” often display little understanding of its original meaning and origins.  
 
Whilst some have suggested that the rising interest in complexity theory corresponds 
with the fall of Newtonian-style thinking, others posit this is a “straw argument” 
maintaining that organisation theorists had abandoned a purely mechanistic view of 
organisations long ago and that the real question for organisation theorists is whether 
organisations are systems or not (MacIntosh et al 2006:116,123-124). While an 
interesting issue, it is beyond the scope of this research which takes the position that 
organisations are indeed systems, usually complex systems.    
Complexity Theory and Healthcare 
Complexity theory has established a significant presence in healthcare research as 
healthcare systems are widely regarded as complex systems (Anderson et al 2005, 
Axelrod & Cohen 2000:75-77, 83-84, Begun et al 2005, Byrne 1998:105-120, Curtis & 
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Riva 2009, Plsek 2001:309-321, Sweeney & Griffiths 2002, Trochim 2006). 
Understanding how promoting complex organisational behaviours can enhance 
healthcare innovation, safety, quality, effectiveness and reform are of particular 
interest (Arndt & Bigelow, 2000, Anderson 2003, Glouberman & Zimmerman, 2002, 
Leykum, et al, 2007, Plsek & Wilson 2001, Sarra 2005, Simmons 2003, Zimmerman, 
1999). In contrast to traditional models, such as New Public Management and 
professional dominance, used to explain healthcare organisations, complexity theory 
places emphasis on understanding micro-level relationships (Drazin & Sandelands, 
1992), since “health care depends largely on productive interaction” (Plsek & Wilson 
2001:746). Further, complexity theory assumes systems are considerably less linear 
and rational when compared with the intellectual groundings of NPM and professional 
dominance models.  
Related to this is complexity theory’s capacity to acknowledge and accommodate the 
role played by anxiety within an organisation, by viewing it as a source, or cause, of 
disequilibrium (Houchin & MacLean 2005). Complexity theorists have also noted that 
anxiety often manifests as an apparent resistance to change and innovation (Plsek & 
Wilson 2001, Plsek 2001), an oft-cited challenge by healthcare reformers. The 
complexity theory perspective on patient safety and care quality issues is particularly 
relevant. Whereas the traditional medical system views patient safety as stemming 
from the individual healthcare professional’s responsibility to “do no harm”, complexity 
theory sees safety as a system property (Plsek & Wilson 2001). The authors note that 
healthcare leaders should promote the development of systems which both reduce 
variation (e.g. ensure physicians always prescribe aspirin following heart attacks) and 
have space for innovations to emerge, including recognising unexpected instances of 
positive variations arising from routine processes (also known as “positive deviance”). 
In contrast to mechanical systems (airplanes) which are characterised by 
predictability,  complex adaptive systems (healthcare systems) have the potential to 
produce emergent novelty and innovation, although “(s)uch behavior can be for better 
or for worse; that is, it can manifest itself as either innovation or error” (Plsek 
2001:310). 
Amongst the best known complexity theory researchers in healthcare are Plsek and 
Greenhalgh, who edited (and contributed to) a series of four papers on complexity 
theory and healthcare in the British Medical Journal in 2001. The papers emphasised 
the need for medicine to move away from strictly linear, cause and effect thinking and 
to embrace unpredictably, the need for flexibility, the role of the unknown, and the 
43 
 
importance of holism and relationships in clinical practice (Plsek & Greenhalgh 2001). 
In addition, Plsek (2001) wrote a short, but well cited appendix, “Redesigning Health 
Care with Insights from the Science of Complex Adaptive Systems”, to the influential 
American book Crossing the Quality Chasm, which presents a clear and compelling case 
supporting complexity theory’s value in bringing change and improvement to 
healthcare. 
Within healthcare, complexity theorists have shown particular interest in primary care. 
Griffiths (2002) argues that complexity theory is well placed to inform and improve 
primary care research because it accounts for interaction, feedback loops, history and 
environment (physical, psychological, social) – all important aspects of a general 
practice consultation. Complexity theory offers clinicians a means of making sense of 
the everyday paradoxes of general practice through “its focus on multiple interactions 
and context rather than on single cause-effect mechanisms” (Litaker et al, 2006:S33). A 
large-scale quantitative, logarithmic study of consultation patterns in primary care, 
concluded “the complex system, comprising patients and their primary healthcare 
providers, itself strongly influences its own consultation rates”, and cautions against 
the uninformed use of “reductive performance measures” when planning primary care 
reform (Love and Burton, 2005:352).  
Finally, and of particular significance for this research, complexity theory recognizes 
“the recursive and dynamic connections between population health, health policy and 
health care” (Curtis and Riva 2009:519).  Or, with specific regard to the study of 
epidemics, such as resurgent TB in London, “research cannot do without an integrated 
view of the complex system of determinants as well as the methods and techniques of 
nonlinear dynamics3” (Philippe & Mansi 1998:604). However, despite significant 
scholarly interest within healthcare management, as within the broader social sciences, 
there remains a significant shortage of complexity theory informed empirical research, 
including at the system level, the level at which this research has been undertaken. This 
will be discussed in more detail, toward the end of this chapter. 
So complexity theory is a highly diverse field of study. This research, as with most 
existing research in the field, will necessarily focus on selected aspects of the theory 
(MacIntosh & MacLean 2001) potentially relevant to the subject of study – London’s TB 
control system – and those which could be observed within the time and resource 
                                           
3
 The term “nonlinear dynamics” was sometimes used in earlier complexity theory research 
synonymously with “complexity theory”. 
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constraints of PhD research. The section which follows presents a general overview of 
the widely accepted features of complex systems, as derived from a broad reading of 
complexity theory literature within the social sciences, especially healthcare and 
organisation theory, and more limited reading from within the pure and natural 
sciences. These features are relevant to this research and form the basis for the 
theoretical discussions which follow later in Chapters Eight and Nine. As mentioned 
earlier, debates continue about exactly what constitutes complexity theory and 
complex systems. Nonetheless, there is broad agreement amongst scholars on the 
importance of a number of concepts within the field, and five of these ideas are 
discussed below, starting with a rather detailed discussion on self-organisation and 
emergence, the two basic building blocks of complexity theory.   
Generally Agreed Features of Complex Systems 
1. Self-Organisation and Emergence 
The concept of self-organisation is fundamental to complexity theory, and is “at the 
core of the difference those speaking of complexity are trying to draw attention to” 
(MacIntosh et al 2006:289). Self-organisation is the singular, defining feature of the 
complexity program of research. However, as with most aspects of complexity theory, 
the “hows and whys” of self-organisation remain contested. Complexity theorists 
debate how self-organisation occurs, how self-organised systems function and the 
impact of these self-organising systems on the broader systems of which they are parts.  
 
“Emergence” is the other concept considered vital to the complexity theory framework. 
Self-organisation leads to the emergence of unpredictable behaviours, outputs, 
outcomes, innovations, or novel responses (Arndt & Bigelow 2000, Fuller & Moran 
2001, Lissak 1999, Reitsma 2003, Stacey 1995, Goldstein 2000, Stacey 2000: 8, 106-
123). “Emergence is the process that creates new order together with self-
organisation”, and “in a human system tends to create irreversible structures or ideas, 
relationship and organisational forms which become part of the history” (Mitleton-
Kelly 2003:21). Emergent outputs are “irreducible to (their) underlying components 
and cannot be predicted linearly by considering the sum of the parts that constitute its 
underlying blocks” (Philipe & Mansi 1998:595). In other words, the sum of an emergent 
output is greater than its parts. Some authors (Goldstein 1999, 2000), however, 
downplay the role of unpredictability within emergence, claiming much of what 
emerges from self-organisation actually is predictable, albeit within fairly broad 
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parameters.  As well, self-organisation does not invariably result in emergent outputs; 
systems can self-organise without producing novelty (Serugendo et al 2006). 
 
In the section below self-organisation and emergence are discussed in tandem, as 
disentangling them conceptually is difficult and would needlessly complicate the 
discussion.  
Self-organisation is concerned with the creation of internal order within a system or 
sub-system, often in response to perturbations in the external environment. Rhodes & 
McKechnie (2003:79) define order as “a stable pattern of relationships among 
elements of the system”, a useful perspective for this research. One of the pioneering 
scholars in the study of self-organisation, physicist Hermann Haken, wrote in the 
landmark 1980 paper “Synergetics”:    
 
On the macroscopic level collective modes appear which define the order of the 
total system. The quantities describing these collective modes are called order 
parameters. Such order parameters can be material, such as the amplitude of a 
physical wave, but equally well immaterial, such as ideas or symbols describing 
certain configurations (modes). On the other hand once these order parameters 
are established they prescribe the actions of the subsystems... (Haken 
1980:123). 
  
The “order parameters” described by Haken are dynamic and iterative, changing the 
system of which they are a part while also being changed by the system. The result is a 
form of stability brought to the system by the “order parameters”.  
 
Discussing Haken’s work some 30 years later, Goldstein et al (2010:88), highlight the 
“constraints that are placed on the system” from its external environment as it self-
organises. This observation is consistent with Stacey’s (1996:179-182) description of 
the importance of “control parameters” in self-organising systems, as discussed more 
below. More generally it supports the argument that the context in which complex 
systems exist, and where self-organisation occurs, is fundamental to understanding the 
behaviour of the system and to applying a complexity theory framework. This is 
another key aspect of this research which will be discussed in more detail. 
 
“Self-organization is the process by which agents in a system interact with each other 
according to their own local rules of behaviour without any overall blueprint telling 
them what they are to accomplish or how they are to do it” (Stacey, 1996:290).  A 
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complex, self-organising system has “little or nothing in the way of a central control” 
(Holland 1992). In other words, there is no “big plan” (Begun et al 2003:280).  Or, 
“(t)here is control, but no one is ‘in control’” (Stacey. 1996:204).  Paley (2011) claims 
that actors in self-organising systems also lack a conscious intention or motivation to 
organise in a certain manner, a fact which he argues is sorely overlooked by most 
complexity theory researchers. Paley’s constitutes the most “conservative” definition of 
self-organisation. 
 
 Stacey also stresses the importance of self-organisation in establishing “the overall 
pattern of relationships that is organising itself at the same time as the nature of the 
agents is changing” (2003:333). This emphasis on the relationship between self-
organisation and the emergence of patterns is echoed by others: “(s)elf-organisation, 
emergence and the creation of new order are three of the key characteristics of 
complex systems” (Mitleton-Kelly 2003:19). Goldstein (2000:14) discusses emergence 
and self-organisation and refers to “a pattern that exhibits a type of coherence not 
found among the interactional agents alone.” McKelvey concurs: 
Management writers mostly emphasize chaos and complexity theories as a 
means of better understanding the behavior of firms facing uncertain, 
nonlinear, rapidly changing environments... This view is somewhat off the 
track...Going back to the roots of complexity science in Prigogine’s work, we see 
more accurately that complexity science is fundamentally aimed at explaining 
order creation (McKelvey 2003:6) 
Public management researchers adopt a slightly different perspective, defining self-
organisation as “the ability of actors and organizations as well as larger systems to 
maintain or change their structure and strategy by themselves, without external 
control, and to resist externally induced change.” (Boons et al 2009:234-235, emphasis 
added). Furthermore: 
1. Self organisation is a driving force of governance processes that sheds light on 
why governmental steering ambitions often fail. 
2. Self organisation causes processes to follow unanticipated trajectories. Self 
organisation stems from the free choices of people in charge often oriented at 
maintaining their position and stability, but occasionally oriented at change and 
adjustment to new demands or circumstances. 
3. Self organisation can and often will be driven by the ambition or need to 
survive (often this is called self-interest…), but also by the ambition to 
contribute to and have an impact on a larger system (often this is called public 
interest…). (Boons et al 2009: 235-236) 
47 
 
Public management scholarship in complexity theory lacks the rosier view often 
presented in both general management and healthcare research. That systems might 
self-organise to resist change or maintain current structures is a notion which receives 
scant attention in the general management literature and may be a reflection of the 
professional experiences and biases of public management scholars. However, it is 
related to another complexity theory concept which receives slightly more attention in 
the broader literature, namely the concept that systems do not always self-organise to 
positive effect or with beneficial outcomes. Self-organisation, or what McKelvey 
(2003:10) refers to as “entanglement”, can produce “compromised...fragile...or 
maladaptive” results for an organisation and “the creation of efficacious emergent 
complexity” is not assured by the mere existence of self-organisation. As he notes, this 
argument was largely lost in management research, and indeed in much of the 
complexity theory research within the broader social sciences. 
Similarly: 
 
Amid all the hoopla surrounding self-organization and emergence, it is often 
assumed that they are necessarily a good thing, that systems exhibiting them 
are significantly better off, or, at least, that something problematic in these 
systems is markedly ameliorated. To be sure, the tendency to emphasize the 
beneficial nature of emergence seems to be a taken-for-granted attitude in 
complexity science.... A similar bias for believing that self- organization and 
emergence are nothing but advantageous for a complex system can also be seen 
in organizational applications (Goldstein 2000:18).  
 
The former Yugoslavia self-organised along the lines of ongoing ethnic tensions, with 
outcomes “fraught with emergent political structures” that are far from positive 
(Goldstein 2000:19).  
 
Three additional, often overlooked, features of self-organisation include:  
 Outcomes are co-created by all agents within a system. Everything everyone 
does, including doing nothing, might have an impact. 
 There is no requirement for democracy or consensus within self-organising 
systems, but the tension between co-operation and competition is important. 
 There is no requirement for empowerment of lower-ranking members for 
systems to self-organise, nor for more powerful members to lose their power 




Why and How Self-Organisation Occurs 
Scholars believe self-organisation is a response to a system finding itself far from 
equilibrium, usually arising from an external perturbation or some other source of 
instability. As Dooley (1997:87) explains, “(i)t is at these far-from-equilibrium 
conditions that complex systems can spontaneously evolve new and more complex 
structures of order. The system does so through self-organization...” This lies at the 
heart of Prigogine’s Nobel Prize winning concept of “dissipative structures” mentioned 
earlier: that systems “may pass through states of instability and reach critical 
bifurcation points where they spontaneously self-organize to produce a different 
structure or behaviour that cannot be predicted from a knowledge of the previous 
state” (Burnes 2005:78). 
The concept of dissipative structures calls into question whether an organisation or 
system can actually exist at the (in)famous “edge of chaos”. No scholarly agreement 
exists on whether such a state exists, despite the phrase’s success in capturing the 
imaginations of many. Moreover, “at the edge of chaos” implies that a firm is “hanging 
about” in that state, and that it is possible, and desirable, to stay poised between a state 
of equilibrium and disequilibrium (MacIntosh et al, 2006:128). Some argue that 
organisations such as Toyota and GE keep themselves in such a state by fostering high 
performance – and high anxiety - work environments. In their own research, MacIntosh 
and MacLean (1999), and Leifer before them (1989), adopt a view closer to that of 
Prigogine, arguing that both equilibrium and disequilibrium can exist within 
organisations and that organisations bifurcate, or switch, between the two states, in a 
sort of “punctuated equilibrium”, to borrow a term from evolutionary biology. It is 
during this bifurcation phase that complex and innovative behaviours can emerge. But 
MacIntosh and MacLean (1999) argue that hovering “at the edge of chaos”, between 
equilibrium and disequilibrium, is not possible or desirable beyond the very short term 
(MacIntosh et al 2006:128-129). In practical terms this is significant as the actions 
required to keep an organisation “at the edge of chaos” are presumably different and of 
longer duration than those required to provoke a state of disequilibrium, and then 
waiting to reap the potential benefits of any self-organised response. 
Whilst the manner in which self-organisation and emergence occur is of great interest 
and debate, it is agreed that self-organisation occurs locally, at the micro level, and the 
resulting micro-level structures give rise to meso and macro level order (Chiles 2004). 
How systems self-organise varies, but self-organisation is important as it is often 
49 
 
regarded as the source of causality – good or bad - within organisations (Stacey et al 
2000:127-129).  
 
Self-organisation may also contribute to the roles and relative importance of 
exploration versus exploitation within systems; specifically, systems’ ability to find an 
appropriate balance between “exploitation” (doing more of what it does well) and 
“exploration” (trying, discovering, or creating – e.g. innovating) (Holland 1992, Axelrod 
& Cohen 2000:43-45). Finally, and crucially, self-organisation is believed to occur in the 
absence of a single, formal leader (Drazin & Sandelands 1992), although this does not 
necessarily mean an absence of accountability for the performance of the 
organisation/system (Houchin & MacLean 2005, Holland 1992).  
 
Some authors argue that successful self-organising requires the “right” number of ties, 
information flow and informal connections amongst members of the system: too few 
ties and the system becomes moribund/overly stable; too many ties and it becomes 
chaotic (Begun et al 2003, Stacey 1996:180-181). Other scholars believe that that it is 
the intensity of the ties which matters (Axelrod & Cohen 2000), or that the strength or 
weakness of these ties is of less importance than their absolute number (Stacey 1996). 
Still others argue that it is the combination of factors that matters, that the right 
number of the right kind of ties, along with the right type and amount of tension within 
the system are necessary if self-organisation is to result in positive emergence and 
innovation (McKelvey 2003). Feedback loops, particularly positive feedback loops 
which introduce new elements or schema into already unstable systems, are another 
important source of iterative changes and adaptations within self-organising systems 
(Arndt & Bigelow 2000, Levin 2002, Tsoukas 1998). Positive feedback loops can lead to 
increased diversity or variety within a system (Leifer 1989), whilst also providing 
capacity for the system to manage more diversity. (Negative feedback loops, on the 
other hand, are concerned with returning a system to, or maintaining, its original state 
of equilibrium, such as a thermostat in a heating system.)  
 
Some researchers speculate that self-organisation may occur by means of the relentless 
application of a small number of rigorously followed, simple, non-negotiable rules 
within a network of agents (Holland 1992, Brown & Eisenhardt 1997, Drazin & 
Sandelands 1992, Rhodes & McKechnie 2003, MacInitosh et al 2007, Phelan 1999). 
However, not all complexity theory researchers accept this, viewing self-organising 
behaviours more loosely, as manifesting in patterns, tendencies, or order, but not 
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reducible to rules (Zimmerman 1999, Cilliers 1998:107). Indeed the underlying logic of 
the “simple rules” argument is reductionist at its core and contrary to the views of 
complexity researchers who believe that complex systems and behaviours are 
ultimately non-reducible to their constituent parts (the view espoused by this 
research). These two “competing” schools will be discussed later in this chapter.  
 
Boundaries and Parameters of Control in Self -Organising Systems 
Within self-organising systems there are parameters which dictate how agents behave. 
Stacey (1996:204) argues that human nature is such that people want to “belong”, so 
they act in ways that ensure their continued membership in the self-organising group. 
This behavioural constraint does not come from an individual within the group, but 
rather from the group itself. This aspect of self-organisation results in much of the 
stability seen in organisations, and prevents self-organising systems becoming 
anarchic, with individual agents doing what they please; in other words, “(t)he system 
and its agents are emerging together, simultaneously constraining and being 
constrained by each other” (Stacey 2003:333). These constraints can include, for 
example, resource allocations, operating procedures, hierarchical structures, conferred 
legitimacy from the top, and vision and mission statements (Stacey 2003: 334).  
Agents in self-organising systems respond to others “according to their own capacity to 
respond”, including all of the enablers and constraints which result from each 
individual’s base of organisational knowledge, understanding and power (Stacey 2003: 
333). This means that agents interact, i.e., form ties, with greater or lesser numbers of 
other agents and with those at greater or lesser distance. For example, if a CEO gives an 
order and all employees respond by following the same plan of action, there is no self-
organisation. But if agents in a system “responded according to their own local 
capacities, and their responses had some effect on the CEO, leading to further 
responses from the CEO, then this would be self-organisation”. This demonstrates that 
reflexivity and iterative change are important aspects of self-organising systems 
(Stacey 2003:334). This reflexive interaction between actors and organisational 
constraints is partly why it is so difficult to predict organisational outcomes beyond the 
short-term. It is impossible to know where or how this dialectic will end as all agents 
are changing, and being changed by, the dialogue (Stacey 2003:335).  
The emergent outcomes, both good and bad, ultimately wrought by self-organisation 
occur when an organisation is in a state of disequilibrium, either existing at the “edge of 
chaos” or immediately after an organisation reaches a critical bifurcation point. As 
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mentioned earlier, reaching this point requires that the various “control parameters” 
within the system, or organisation, undergo some form of change or alteration, the 
most significant of which occur within the organisation’s “shadow” system, or via its 
grapevine. These control parameters include: 
 The rate of information flow 
o If the information flow is fast, it is more difficult for the organisation to 
keep information flow within the legitimate organisation and it starts 
flowing through the shadow organisation, or grapevine. At some point 
the information flow becomes too heavy even for this system to manage 
and the organisation tips “into the unstable zone”.   
 The degree of diversity 
o Somewhere between anarchy and excessive conformity, an organisation 
“has enough diversity to provoke learning”. 
 The richness of connectivity (or the nature and number of “ties” within the 
organisation)  
o As noted earlier, “few connections bring stability and many bring 
instability”. Strong emotional ties amongst members of a system may 
lead to increased confidence, less anxiety and more openness to change 
than would be the case if the system were characterised by high anxiety. 
On the other hand, where ties are weak, there may be more contact with 
other parts of the broader system, leading to more variety being 
“imported”. This, however, may lead to instability and/or “too much 
variety for effective learning”.  At some point, between weak and strong, 
many and few ties, “the network is likely to produce great variety in 
behaviour”. 
 The level of contained anxiety  
o If a system is characterised by too much anxiety, creative work is not 
possible. If there is too little tension, however, people “resist change in a 
very effective manner”. If a system is part of a broader organisation or 
society, which is “punishing, insecure, or highly pressurised” the system 
will respond by creating “anxiety-containing structures at the expense 
of organizational creativity”. 
 The degree of power differentials  
o In a system where power is concentrated at the top, the shadow system 
is relatively inactive and the system is stable. If power is equally 
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distributed across a system, however, there may be a power vacuum 
which can throw the shadow system, and the broader organisation, into 
disarray. It is theorised that in between these two states is where 
creativity happens (Stacey 1996: 179-182).  
Research into self-organisation has evolved since the early 1990s when complexity 
theory in management studies first gained prominence. For instance, it had become 
commonplace to equate self-organisation with the absence of hierarchy or any manner 
of a command and control structure, with arguments that such a “laissez-faire” 
approach was a prerequisite for the emergence of innovation or novelty (Goldstein et al 
2010:4).  Scholars, especially those writing in the last decade, are more likely now to 
criticise such an approach as “facile”:  
Rigorous complexity science research has borne out the opposite conclusion, 
namely, that any positive result from the emergence of innovation requires 
both bottom-up and top-down influences from proactive leadership events. In 
contrast, tearing down hierarchical structures can easily lead to a morass of 
unanticipated outcomes, many of which are much worse than what existed 
before (Goldstein et al 2010: 4-5).  
This observation will be shown to be of particular relevance to this research.  
2. Non-linearity 
Complexity theorists are interested in identifying and understanding the unpredictable, 
often non-linear, responses to instability or change exhibited by systems and which 
cannot be explained with Newtonian cause and effect theory. Non-linearity is often 
responsible for novel, emergent outcomes, because in the presence of purely linear 
cause and effect behaviours there can be no unpredictable outcomes. Within a complex 
system, non-linear outcomes arise “because each component interacts with others via a 
web of feedback loops” (Grobman 2005:358). Consequently, small degrees of 
turbulence can produce an unexpectedly large impact, while large disturbances may be 
barely felt (Arndt & Bigelow, 2000, Chiles 1994, Cooksey 2001, Holland 1992, Manson 
2001, Plsek 2001, Sarra 2005, Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001, Tsoukas, 1998). Within the field 
of epidemiology an example can be seen with the introduction of crack cocaine into the 
street heroin market and how it unexpectedly changed the nature of the drug using 
population, the pattern of street drug use, and the entire dynamic of the illicit market 
for heroin (Agar 1999). (Incidentally, some clinicians interviewed for this research 
believe crack cocaine also increased TB rates in London by increasing the homeless 
population and the number of people with compromised immune systems.) In 
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organisation theory and within the healthcare sector in particular, an example of non-
linearity can be found in the massive amount of public resources routinely invested in 
various healthcare reform initiatives with seemingly little apparent improvement or 
change (Plsek 2001).  
3. Co-evolution and Co-adaptation  
Complex systems co-adapt as part of the order creation function inherent in self-
organisation. Adaptation is defined as “the changes made by agents in response to the 
actions of other participants, environmental conditions or emergent system 
characteristics” (Rhodes et al 2011:14). Co-adaptation is important because it 
increases system fitness: if organisations succumb to their natural temptation to 
decrease or resist change, thereby reinforcing a state of equilibrium, they will become 
increasingly misaligned with their environment, unable to cope with the next inevitable 
round of change, and will eventually decline (Leifer 1989). Inherent in the concept of 
co-adaptation is the idea that “systems change their rules of interaction...without 
(necessarily) knowing what the system as a whole is doing”; therefore co-adaption can 
be “self-repairing and self-maintaining”, (Mitleton-Kelly 2003:6).  Mutual adaptation 
can be “conflictual as well as more harmonious”, an aspect often overlooked (Walby, 
2007:463).  
 “Evolution” and “adaptation” are both concepts rooted firmly in the sciences of biology 
and ecology, and both phenomena can only occur within ecosystems. Consequently, the 
nature of the ecosystem of which a complex system is a part is key to potential co-
evolution and adaption (Mitleton-Kelley 2003). Within an ecosystem all entities are 
interdependent and the ecosystem “provides sustenance and support for life...When 
firms and institutions cease to function like a community or social ecosystem, they may 
break down. Some of the most successful organisations nurture their community or 
social ecosystem” (Mitleton-Kelly 2003:9-10). Interdependence is a relevant concept to 
this research as the interdependence of sub-systems within the broader TB control 
system in London is not obvious. 
Elements within a system, as well as the system itself, can co-evolve, with a distinction 
between “co-evolution with” and “adaption to a changing environment” (Mitleton-Kelly 
2003:7). Co-evolution happens over the longer-term, whilst adaptation within or 
between systems can occur more quickly.  In an organisational context, the rate at 
which co-evolution occurs is of interest because of its applicability to knowledge 
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transfer and the sharing of best practice. These concepts will be expanded upon in later 
chapters.  
4. History, Sensitivity to Initial Conditions and Environmental Context 
Complexity theory is greatly concerned with history, because of the importance it 
places on the role of evolution in systems, particularly in natural or physical systems 
(Mitleton-Kelly 2003). An organisation’s history is not only an irreversible reality, but 
the system’s initial conditions, as determined by this history, are responsible for the 
system’s current and future behaviours and outputs. “(O)ur previous inter-actions have 
brought about what we currently experience”, observed Tsoukas (1998:302). A 
system’s history also “shapes individual and organizational schema (mental models, or 
“world-view”) and schema in turn constrain what is seen and not seen, what is 
important and what is not” (Zimmerman & Dooley 2002:70). Further, understanding 
how a system reached its current state “is required in order to specify possible future 
states” (Rhodes & McKechnie 2003:79), albeit within the confines of complexity 
theory’s conviction that organisational futures are largely unknown or unknowable. 
However, whilst “(h)istory is highly relevant, (it is) not necessarily deterministic”, 
allowing for the emergence of novelty or other unpredictable organisational outcomes 
(Begun et al 2003:264).  In practical terms, the outcomes produced by a system may be 
less a reflection of chance or serendipity and more a manifestation of a series of 
decisions taken in the past, including decisions to maintain the status quo. “(B)ut 
before the decision is finalised, the alternatives are sources of innovation” (Mitleton-
Kelly 2003:13). 
 
Recognising a system’s initial conditions at the outset is an important component of 
complexity theory research (Agar 1999, 2002, Byrne 2005, Cooksey 2001, Curtis & Riva 
2009, Fuller & Moran 2001, Holland 1992, Tsoukas, 1998). A system’s response to 
perturbations in these initial conditions may reflect the system’s degree of robustness 
and flexibility (Drazin & Sandelands 1992), and the non-linearity which characterises 
complex systems means that a system’s initial conditions can have an inordinate impact 
on outcomes (Houchin & MacLean 2005). However, as Rhodes & McKechnie (2003:60) 
observe, clearly defining “the state of the system”, especially in a public administration 
context, is very challenging.  
A system’s initial conditions and history reflect the broader environmental context of 
which the system is a part. Acknowledging the role played by context when 
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undertaking a complexity theory analysis of a system is important (Byrne 1998:47, 
Marion & Bacon 2000). A complex system’s context or “conditions”, affect its ability “to 
support connectivity and interdependence to facilitate emergence and self-
organisation” (Mitleton-Kelly 2003:21). Rhodes et al (2011:8-11) recount the necessity 
of updating their earlier complex systems model specifically to include environmental 












FIGURE 10: KEY FEATURES OF A COMPLEXITY THEORY ANALYSIS, HIGHLIGHTING THE IMPORTANCE OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT (SOURCE: ADAPTED FROM RHODES ET AL 2011, P. 11) 
 
5. “Requisite Variety”, or Diversity, Within the System 
Complex systems are composed of diverse elements. Ashby’s (1956) Law of Requisite 
Variety, proposes that a system’s internal variety, or diversity, should roughly match 
the environmental constraints (or complexities) under which it operates if the system 
is to survive. Boisot (2003) observes this is also the case within organisations, 
something which the strategic planning function should reflect. In the case of human or 
social systems this means diversity in such aspects as the personal backgrounds, world 
views, mental schema and experiences of system members. Within complex systems, 
such diversity enhances the capacity of a system to manage complex and varied 
challenges and day-to-day realities (Leifer 1989, Axelrod & Cohen 2000), contributing 
to the system’s robustness. Diversity is valued because it provides a wide range of 
















likely it is that (at least) one option will become viable in “furthering the adaptability of 
the whole” (Goldstein et al 2010:179). 
The preceding section presented an overview of the key, and most widely accepted, 
attributes of complexity theory and complex systems. The next section will discuss an 
apparent ontological divide between complexity theory researchers and whether it is 
important. 
Complexity Theory:  An Ontological House Divided? 
Perhaps owing to its “importation” from the pure and natural sciences, as opposed to 
having arisen organically from within the social sciences, there is an often unspoken 
divergence amongst management scholars on the issue of teleology in complexity 
theory research. Specifically, the grounding assumptions and ontological beliefs of 
researchers divide along the lines of whether they view systems as ultimately moving 
toward a pre-determined, or formative, destiny, or toward an indeterminate, 
transformative, destiny (Stacey et al 2000:14, MacIntosh et al 2006).  
A variation of this debate asks whether mathematical/physical domains and social 
domains are ontologically incommensurate, “not allow(ing) us to make simple 
conceptual shifts between these domains of reality” (Introna 2003:207). Complexity 
theory as applied in the mathematical and physical domain assumes “an a priori logic 
or set of operations that fundamentally constitute the system, independently of us and 
that only need to be unravelled” for us to understand and control the system (Introna 
2003:209). Social systems, however, “are socially constructed and historically 
emerging” and are the result of their histories and the reflexivity of their members 
(Introna 2003). These systems are constantly changing as a result of human agency and 
the interaction of this agency with the systems’ social structures; they are emergent, 
and their future state is unknowable. 
These polarities might be characterised as “the Sante Fe school” versus “the 
transformative school”, or following Houchin and MacLean (2005), as the “rules-based” 
and “connectionist” approaches respectively.  Complexity theorists associated with the 
Sante Fe Institute in New Mexico, USA are among the world’s best established 
researchers working within complexity theory. Their approach is almost invariably 
quantitative, including the limited work they do within the human and social sciences. 
They rely heavily on computational and mathematical modelling, even when studying 
human systems. As with all complexity scientists, they recognize the importance of 
57 
 
relationships within systems and the principles of emergence and self-organisation, 
along with the related phenomena of non-linearity, historicity, diversity and co-
adaptation. However, their work is premised on the belief that a system’s functioning is 
ultimately reducible to its constituent parts, regardless how lengthy or arduous an 
undertaking this reductive process may be. In the end, theirs is a search for 
predictability, effective intervention, and, ultimately, control. One of the commercial 
spin-offs from the Santa Fe Institute is the firm Prediction, which tries to forecast 
financial markets’ movements (Thrift 1999).  Well-known complexity scholars whose 
work is often associated with this approach include Bill McKelvey, Peter Allen, John 
Holland, and Murray Gell-Man.  
Contrasted with the Sante Fe school is what might be called the “transformative 
school”. Complexity theorists associated with this stream, many of them based in the 
United Kingdom, are unconcerned with predictability and less concerned with control. 
They are more focused on understanding the nature of the relationships, or ties, 
between agents in a system, the general tendencies of a system which result from these 
ties (as opposed to law-like rules), and with identifying potential sources of novelty, 
change and innovation. These scholars explore the impact of human agency and 
reflexivity on the systems they study, and the extent to which systems and their 
components co-adapt and co-evolve. Prominent researchers within this field include 
Ralph Stacey, Robert MacIntosh, Donald MacLean, Kevin Dooley, Stewart Kaufman, 
Brenda Zimmerman, and Ilya Prigogine. This thesis is grounded in this, 
“transformative”, tradition. 
Walby (2007:456) argues compellingly that this divide, whilst significant, “should not 
be exaggerated” or “overstated”. The divergence between the two schools could 
helpfully be understood, she writes, as the Sante Fe school researchers focusing on 
dissecting and understanding the internal machinations of systems, whilst those 
working within the other school are more preoccupied with external relations. This 
further validates the importance which is placed on context and the external influences 
which must be acknowledged when a complexity theory approach is applied in 
analysing London’s TB control system. Levin (2002:17) highlights an interesting aspect 
of the debate: “the central problem is to develop... appropriate... mechanics that allows 
one to separate the knowable unknown from the truly unknowable.” The issue, then, 
may be whether the existence of “the truly unknowable” is accepted by researchers in 
both schools.   
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Murray (2003:410) offers an alternative model for capturing the “contrasting insights 
into complexity”, although he notes that complexity researchers themselves “do not 
always appear to be aware of the distinction.” He characterizes the two divergent 
narratives found within the complexity theory literature as the “molecular” view and 
the “network” view. The molecular view, he says, might be conceived simplistically as 
corresponding to the reductionist, positivist school of complexity theory, with the 
network view more closely aligned with an interpretivist approach. His categories do 
not correspond perfectly with the “Santa Fe” versus “transformative” schools 
distinction outlined above, but are relevant. The major difference with Murray’s 
perspective may be that it focuses more on researchers’ differing perspectives on the 
roles and impact of ties and interactions within a complex system, rather than the 
extent to which researchers differ on the issue of teleology. His views are presented, in 
a modified form, in Figure 11. 
 
 Molecular View  Network View  
Basis of existence and 
mode of self-
organisation 
 Simple underlying rules  
 Bifurcation 
 Dissipative system 
 Strong and weak 
interactions, negative and 
positive feedback loops at 
play  
 Evolution and emergence 
 Edge of chaos 
Nature of system 
trajectory/path 
 System progresses along an 
(ultimately) pre-determined 
trajectory/path 
 Apparent, but not actual, 
unpredictability 
 Above interactions alter a 
system’s trajectory, or even 
create a new one 
 Outcomes unpredictable 
beyond short-term 
Nature of System’s 
Fitness 
 System fitness is a function of 
the “rules and processes 
inherent in the system” 
 System fitness is determined 
by the degree and nature of 
coupling between units.  
 Optimal fitness lies between 
units being too loosely and 
too tightly coupled 
Secondary Complexity Theory Concepts Not Addressed by This 
Research  
Just as there are differences in approaches to complexity theory, there are different 
dimensions that are included or excluded in complexity research. The next section 
discusses some “secondary” complexity theory concepts which are not addressed by 
this research. Specifically, the discussion focuses on specific modes of self-organisation 
and the role of system trajectories (or “attractors”, in the language of complexity). 
Again, the lack of a commonly accepted definition of complexity theory means that this 





list could surely be judged as incomplete. Nonetheless, it seems important to 
acknowledge widely-discussed complexity theory concepts excluded here.  
Specific modes of self-organisation 
The concept of self-organisation is not only at the root of complexity theory, but a vast 
literature has been produced examining it many facets, often in minute detail. Some 
aspects of self-organisation are contested, particularly concepts detailing the means by 
which self-organisation occurs. An example was cited earlier whereby some 
researchers believe organisational complexity could be unravelled by revealing a small 
set of simple rules which govern self-organisation, whilst other researchers believe this 
to be a futile exercise inconsistent with the anti-reductionist thrust of some complexity 
theory research. This section highlights a number of modes of self-organisation which 
have been identified in the literature, but which are not applied in this study, often 
because operationalising such concepts is both beyond the scope of this research and 
inconsistent with its ontological affiliation with the “transformative school” of 
complexity theory. 
 
Owing to complexity theory’s roots in the pure and natural sciences, many of the 
specific modes of self-organising behaviours which have been detailed in the literature 
arise from research conducted in laboratories or via computer simulation. Worked 
examples and empirical evidence supporting their existence in open, social systems is 
uncommon, but researchers like McKelvey (1995) and others associated with the Sante 
Fe Institute have attempted such work, and Anderson (1999) highlights some further 
examples. Generally, identifying the specific means of self-organisation within a system 
at the individual agent level requires the researcher to (a) take a long-term view of the 
system, analysing it over an extended period of time and using finely grained data to 
discern the patterns which characterise the self-organising system, and (b) to have 
access to a significant volume of quantitative data, often longitudinal survey data, and 
appropriate computing techniques and technologies to analyse this data. For instance, 
whilst Prigogine’s dissipative structures research informs much of what we know 
about self-organisation, applying this knowledge to identify specific modes of self-
organisation in social systems requires significant volumes of data to feed modelling 
simulations. The output of such models may well be worthwhile - representations of 
how systems evolve over time and how they appeared in the past (Drazin & Sandelands 
1992) – but this mode of research is not obviously accessible to much of what is done 




Dissipative structures, discussed earlier in this chapter, allow complex systems to 
import energy from the outside and then transform it (or “dissipate” it) in order to self-
organise and make themselves more robust and viable. Through this dissipated energy, 
“bifurcation” is made possible, whereby systems switch between states of equilibrium 
and disequilibrium, or, some researchers argue, pose themselves “at the edge of chaos” 
(Axelrod & Cohen 2000, Brown & Eisenhardt 1997, Leifer 1989, MacIntosh & MacLean 
1999).Two of the specific means by which self-organisation occurs within dissipated 
structures are known as “chemical clocks” and “cellular automata”. Both of these 
important concepts refer to computer models which require the researcher to input 
significant amounts of detailed data along with “if-then” decision rules. The output is 
models showing exactly when a bifurcation occurred in a system, in the case of 
chemical clocks, or the impact of changing the nature of interactions amongst agents in 
a self-organising system, in the case of cellular automata. So whilst Prigogine’s work 
has formed the basis of much complexity theory research within social science (Byrne 
2006, Leifer 1989, MacIntosh & MacLean 1999, Pascale 1999), to be properly applied it 
requires significant amounts of longitudinal data, often collected by means associated 
with quantitative research. There remains disagreement within the literature as to 
whether it is possible for bifurcation points to be identified within social systems, with 
some scholars arguing it simply cannot be done (Johnson & Burton 1994, Gould 1987). 
Consequently, testing for the above means of self-organisation is beyond the scope of 
this work, although explicating such concepts may indeed have added to the value of 
this research. 
 
The concept of “phase space” as a means of understanding self-organising behaviour is 
an abstract but important concept in the literature. But it, too, is most effectively 
applied using computer-based simulations or regression modelling (McKelvey 1995). 
Its objective is to identify “all the possible states – or phases – that the system can 
occupy” (Ramalingam & Jones 2008:31). These potential states are then represented 
graphically or in tabular form, providing potential intelligence as to when, for example, 
it might be most beneficial to intervene in a system to produce a desired outcome. 
Again, it is easy to see that building such a graphic model would require the input of 
significant quantities of finely detailed data. The collection of such data within many 
social settings would be difficult, including the system under study in this research; 




In general, computer and modelling-based research is misaligned with this narrative-
based study of the “system of systems” which comprises London’s TB control system. 
And further, such an approach would not assist with this research’s objective of 
capturing the essence and richness of the relationships under study, and the context in 
which these relationships occur. 
 
The situation is similar with another well-documented means of explaining self-
organisation, the development of fractal structures within a system. The term “fractal” 
was created by mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot in the mid-1970s and refers to 
consistently recurring and similar shapes in groupings or forms that can be observed at 
all scales, or levels, of an object or system. Although the concept of fractals is firmly 
rooted in mathematics, geometry in particular, it has also been applied in social science 
to describe repeating, similar patterns observed across levels of a system (Plsek 2001, 
Thrift 1999).  As well as being a means of self-organising, the presence of fractal 
structures within an organisation, usually in the form of teams or work groups, is seen 
as a means of ensuring the application of whatever small set of simple rules 
characterises a complex system. As with the other modes of self-organisation outlined 
in this section, identifying the presence of fractal structures in the London TB control 
system was not possible because of lack of access to the fine grained data required for 
such an analysis, coupled with the sheer quantity of data which would be generated by 
the approximately 70 components which comprise the London TB control system. 
 
The concept that the repeated and rigorous application of a few simple rules within a 
complex system can lead to self-organisation is another well-known complexity theory 
concept, as mentioned earlier (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, Drazin & Sandelands 1992, 
MacIntosh et al 2003, MacLean & Burns 2007, Phelan 1999, Plsek 2001). Two examples 
often cited in support of the “simple rules” argument are that of jazz ensembles (play in 
the same key, in a certain pre-determined sequence) and flocks of birds (stay in the 
same direction, keep a certain distance between you and other flock members, and 
always move toward the centre of the flock). The concept is clear and it is appealing in 
its simplicity and elegance. Furthermore, two from among the small number of 
empirically informed social science studies using a complexity theory framework 
(Brown& Eisenhardt 1997, Houchin & MacLean 2005) both uncover evidence of the 




Nonetheless, a decision was taken against using the simple rules concept within this 
research. In the end, the search for rules is a reductionist exercise and contrary to the 
ontological underpinnings of this research, even if the rules do allow for some bounded 
emergence to occur within a system (Byrne 20054). However, as also noted earlier, this 
research avoids such reductionist thinking and rather embraces the necessity of 
understanding local level actions and interactions amongst members of a system as a 
means of understanding self-organisation. This research shares Cilliers’ (1998:107) 
view that “(i)n our analysis of complex systems ... we must avoid the trap of trying to 
find master keys. Because of the mechanisms by which complex systems structure 
themselves, single principles provide inadequate descriptions.”  
 
The final mode of self-organisation which is not developed by this research is that of 
“attractors” and “strange attractors”. As with the theories and modes of self-
organisation discussed above, the attractor/strange attractor concept comes to the 
social sciences from the pure sciences. A frequently used image of the strange attractor 
concept is Lorenz’s butterfly attractor graphic, shown below in Figure 12, developed 
during his work as an atmospheric scientist studying the complexities of weather 
forecasting (Murray 1998). (Lorenz is also credited with developing the “butterfly 
effect” theory of weather whereby it is said that a butterfly flapping its wings in Brazil 
can cause a tornado in Texas, but this is only tangentially related to the original 
butterfly attractor concept [Murray 1998, Ramalingam & Jones 2008].)  
 
 
FIGURE 12: LORENZ’S “BUTTERFLY ATTRACTOR” 
 
                                           
4
 Byrne further argues that the search for rules is motivated by the desire for credibility by 
organisational complexity researchers with colleagues working in the pure and natural sciences. 
Rules, he argues, can have the same status as “laws”, thereby enhancing the credibility of the 
research and researchers identifying them. 
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The theory of attractors, when applied within the social sciences, holds that although 
complex, open systems can appear to behave randomly, or even chaotically, they are in 
fact moving in a pattern, always within a specific range, and according to many 
researchers, toward a pre-determined state (Murray 2003, Byrne 2005). As 
Ramalingam & Jones (2008:38) observe, “this ‘narrowness of repertoire’ is at the heart 
of order hidden in complexity”. The pattern and range may be exceedingly difficult to 
discern in the absence of computer simulation, and in fact the attractor concept was 
developed only once technology advanced to the point where such simulation was 
possible. Again, ontologically this concept is at odds with that adopted by this research 
as it is reductionist and deterministic. It implies that with enough data the researcher 
can come to know a system’s end state (and, ultimately, control it via effective 
interventions).  
 
The preceding section outlined a number of complexity theory concepts, mostly related 
to specific modes of self-organisation and all of them important, which are not included 
in this research. The reasons behind excluding these concepts were also discussed. 
Having offered this comprehensive review of key complexity theory precepts and 
literature, the next section focuses on the gaps identified in this literature and explains 
how this research responds to them.  
Gaps in the Complexity Theory Literature to be Filled by this 
Research 
As demonstrated, interest in extending the study of complexity theory beyond the pure 
and natural sciences, where it finds its roots, has been growing since the mid-1980s. In 
academic terms complexity theory remains a young field, with researchers from the 
social and human sciences displaying ongoing interest in whether this “new science” 
can be used as a means of increasing knowledge and generating new insights within 
their various disciplines. In management studies, despite a sizeable and growing body 
of complexity theory research, there is still a lack of consensus amongst researchers 
regarding its potential to inform or augment management research.   
This research addresses three gaps in the complexity theory literature within the social 
sciences, including management and healthcare studies:  
1. A general lack of complexity theory-informed empirical research 
2. A need for research analysing the management of complex organisational 
phenomena such as the case examined here, of an epidemic, and 
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3. A distinct shortage of research which analyses the important role played by the 
macro context or the “meta meta aggregate” (Marion and Bacon 1999) in which 
complex systems operate. 
 
First, the significant and persisting lack of empirical research employing complexity 
theory within the social sciences is widely noted (Carapiet & Harris 2007, Chiles 2004, 
Houchin & MacLean 2005, Johnson & Burton 1994, Lissack 1999). Related to this is the 
need for further evidence that complexity theory-based studies can be successfully 
operationalised in the field. The vast majority of complexity theory research published 
within the social sciences, including management studies and healthcare, is conceptual 
and non-empirical. This is a significant shortcoming in terms of establishing the 
credibility and utility of complexity theory as a tool for generating knowledge outside 
of closed laboratory systems or via computer-generated simulations. The limited 
empirical work which has been done by management scholars is mostly high-calibre 
and often qualitative, retrospective and longitudinal in nature. Three studies in 
particular - Brown & Eisenhardt 1997, Chiles 2004 and Houchin & MacLean 2005, serve 
as useful methodological guides and templates for this research. 
There are a number of other complexity theory case studies found in the management 
literature (MacIntosh & MacLean 1999 and 2001, Axelrod & Cohen 2000, Pascale & 
Milleman 2000), but whilst interesting and informative, most lack rigorously collected, 
longitudinal data, with empirical shortcomings noted by some of the authors 
themselves (MacIntosh & MacLean 1999, 2001). The research often applies complexity 
theory to situations as a retrospective tool of analysis, but rarely are empirical studies 
designed and executed as dedicated complexity theory research. Authors often select 
scenarios/cases, real or imagined, and then (a) apply complexity theory concepts and 
describe how these scenarios might be seen as exhibiting complexity theory attributes, 
or (b) argue, hypothetically, how improvements could be made to the situation if 
complexity theory concepts were applied (Lewin & Regine 2003).  
It should also be noted that in the late 1990’s the UK’s Engineering and Physical Science 
Research Council (EPSRC) funded multi-year complexity theory studies in 
collaboration with the London School of Economics’ Complexity Research Programme. 
These projects were entitled “Implications of Theories of Complexity for Co-Evolution 
of Business Process and Information Systems Development” and “Enabling The 
Integration Of Diverse Socio-Cultural And Technical Systems Within A Turbulent Social 
Ecosystem”. This research was not able to locate any peer-reviewed publications 
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arising from these grants, nor were any final reports submitted to the EPSRC accessible 
to this research. However, a short case study discussing an international bank’s use of 
complexity theory in upgrading its IT system, found in Mitleton-Kelly (2003) may have 
resulted from these projects.   
Within healthcare research, again, empirical complexity theory research is limited. As 
with management studies, it often veers into the sort of hypothetical “scenario 
imagining” highlighted above, whereby researchers speculate on how complexity 
theory might explain a variety of situations or bring potential improvements. 
Sometimes it also describes how situations could be portrayed as exhibiting properties 
consistent with complexity theory concepts (Arndt & Bigelow 2000, Hassey 2002, Holt 
2002, Kernick 2002: 93-121, Begun et al 2003, Litaker et al 2006, Plsek & Wilson 2001, 
Plsek & Greenhalgh 2001, Kernick 2006, Miller et al 1998). Other complexity research 
in healthcare employs quantitative analyses to illustrate various complexity theory 
concepts (Begun & Luke 2001, Anderson et al 2003, Leykum et al 2007, Love & Burton 
2005), or is modelling-based (Agar & Wilson 2002, Papadopoulos et al 2001). Perhaps 
in response to this dearth of empirical research, the journal Social Science and Medicine 
produced a Special Issue on complexity theory in healthcare in 2012, with four 
empirical, complexity-based healthcare studies resulting (and briefly highlighted next). 
Nonetheless, “purpose-built” empirical complexity theory studies in healthcare are 
uncommon.  
Exceptions to the above include: Zimmerman (1999); Simmons (2003); Marion & 
Bacon (2000); Dattée & Barlow (2010); Rhodes et al (2011); Essen & Lindblad (2012); 
Xiao et al (2012); Hannigan (2012); and, Trenholm & Ferlie (2012). Each of these 
papers will be highlighted briefly below.  
Zimmerman (1999) presents three short, high-level “stories” from three different US 
healthcare settings to illustrate how complexity theory-inspired change initiatives were 
successfully implemented. She argues for greater use of complexity theory concepts 
within healthcare. Simmons (2003) discusses how the Welsh Public Health Laboratory 
Service made some limited use of complexity theory concepts when developing its 
communicable diseases managed care network, but the scope of the Welsh project 
seems to have been limited to the implementation of a new IT system. Marion & 
Bacon’s (1999) research focused on organisational extinction using three American 
healthcare organisations: two eldercare organisations and one organisation focused on 
general healthcare issues. The authors used complexity theory to demonstrate how the 
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organisations adapted to their respective environments, or not. Dattée & Barlow 
(2010) provide mini case studies of five health boards in Scotland which were 
undertaking improvements to their delivery of “unscheduled care”, but the actual 
application of complexity theory is limited. Rhodes et al (2011) produced a book-length 
complexity theory-led study on the implementation of a healthcare information system 
in Ireland. This research is perhaps the most detailed and well-worked example of 
complexity theory research to date, especially in a public management context, and has 
been helpful in informing this research (despite its self-proclaimed ontological leanings 
toward the “Sante Fe school”). 
Writing within the Social Science and Medicine special issue, Essen & Lindblad (2012) 
apply a dissipative structures model to understanding the success of 19 years’ of 
ongoing, incremental improvements within rheumatology services in Sweden. Xiao et al 
(2012) apply a complexity lens in their analysis of the design and implementation of 
China’s new “national essential drugs policy”.  Hannigan (2012) used a mental health 
setting in Wales for his complexity theory study, looking at connections at multiple 
levels of organisation within health and social care and emphasising the intended and 
unintended consequences when a new community-based role was introduced. 
Trenholm & Ferlie (2012) used a complexity theory lens to analyse TB across London, 
concluding it offered a useful, but partial means of understanding the resurgence of the 
disease and that the analyses was enhanced when features of the macro context were 
considered. This paper is found in Appendix A. 
Second, there are calls for further empirical research from a complexity theory 
perspective into the management and understanding of social and organisational 
phenomena. Complex social and organisational phenomena may take the form of 
problems, challenges or tasks: raising a child; responding to a humanitarian crisis; or 
managing an epidemic or infectious diseases, including tuberculosis. Researchers 
noting the persistent lack of empirical research in this area, and usually calling for 
more, include Agar (1998), Agar and Wilson (2002), Byrne (1998), Gatrell (2005), 
Dean (1997), Tennison (2002), and Trochim et al (2006). Gatrell (2005:2667) argues 
that the complexity theory concept that systems may be far from equilibrium means 
that “the emergence and resurgence of particular diseases needs to be set in the wider 
context of changes that are economic, political and social...A good example would be 
Lyme disease...other examples (include) TB and HIV/AIDS...”. Tennison (2002:85) 
discusses “the dangers of the appearance and reappearance of new and old health 
problems, such as tuberculosis...” and goes on to argue for “(m)ore study of healthcare 
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management by complexity methods and use of healthcare management case studies to 
elucidate complexity and identify possible tools to enhance management effectiveness” 
(2002:87). Researchers, therefore, have called for a complexity theory informed 
understanding of both tuberculosis as a phenomenon and its management. This 
research responds to that call. 
The third gap addressed by this study is the lack of complexity theory research 
acknowledging the vital role played by the macro-context in which complex systems 
operate. This wider organisational and policy context is vital and needs to be 
incorporated fully in analysis (Byrne 1998:47, Marion & Bacon 1999). Even at the 
micro level, Mitleton-Kelly (2003:21) highlights the importance of context in 
facilitating positive, emergent results from self-organisation, noting such outcomes “are 
often blocked or restricted…by complicated” administrative practices. Begun et al 
(2003) allude to the importance of context in their brief discussion of how the Brazilian 
healthcare system tackled AIDS. Marion & Bacon (1999) also highlight the importance 
of the “meta-meta aggregate” context in their research into organisational extinction 
conducted within a complexity theory framework, but they do not fully operationalise 
the concept. This research, on the other hand, provides a major worked example. 
 
The foregoing overview of complexity theory included a review of its literature, 
ongoing debates and differences amongst scholars within the field, and the limitations 
arising from this research in addressing certain aspects of complexity theory. Drawing 
on this discussion, the section below outlines the complexity theory concepts which 
will be operationalised in this research, along with a brief explanation as to why these 
particular aspects of the theory have been selected.  
Features of Complexity Theory to be Operationalised in this 
Research 
Following the preceding review of complexity theory literature, the complexity theory 
model operationalised in this research is based on the following five concepts:  
1. self-organisation leading to emergent outcomes; 
2. non-linear responses to environmental disturbances; 
3. the role of historicity, sensitivity to initial conditions and context; 
4. co-evolution and co-adaptation within the system; and, 
5. the extent and nature of diversity within the system.  
 
This research focuses on these aspects of complexity theory for the following reasons: 
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A. They are amongst those most frequently cited in the organisational complexity 
theory literature and are broadly accepted. 
B. Based on a review of the tuberculosis management literature, these concepts 
will be helpful in analysing the system responsible for TB control in London.  
C. They are consistent with this research’s position regarding the teleology of 
systems, namely that systems are not moving toward a particular pre-
determined destiny or outcome. The position adopted by this research is that a 
system’s future state is indeterminate, sometimes changes mid-course and may 
be transformed. 
D. Issues of simple pragmatics, including limits to available data and the dictates 
imposed by scarce resources - an inevitable constraint of independent PhD 
research. 
 
Methodological challenges associated with this research are discussed in Chapter Five. 
However, based on the review of the literature, and the five features of complexity 
theory of interest as defined above, below are suggested ways in which these elements 
might be explored in this research: 
1. Self-Organisation: Is there evidence of groups of actors within London’s TB 
control system coming together, on their own, and, by so doing, producing 
novel, emergent outcomes?  
2. Non-Linear Responses: Over the 25 years since TB rates in London started to 
rise, has the system or any of its components produced any unexpected or 
unpredictable responses? 
3. The Role of Historicity, Sensitivity to Initial Conditions and Context: To what 
extent is London’s TB control system impacted by the broader environmental 
context in which it operates? Is there evidence that actors within the system are 
aware of and impacted by the system’s history?  
4. Co-Adaptation Within The System: Is there evidence that the approach to TB 
control in London has changed as the nature of the TB problem has changed, at 
either the micro or macro levels?  
5. Diversity Within The System: Is there diversity in terms of world views and 
professional experiences amongst actors within the system? 
Concluding Comments  
The approach to complexity theory espoused by this research aims to avoid the trap of 
“simplistic complexity” highlighted by Byrne (2005:97) whereby complexity 
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researchers, rather ironically, fall back on reductionist, cause and effect ways of 
thinking and avoid “engaging with complex complexity” (2005:96). This may arise from 
complexity theory challenging the traditional and often unarticulated view that 
organisations can be studied as objectified systems populated by managers (and 
researchers) who are rational agents able to make the “right” choices about how to 
manipulate their organisations (Stacey et al 2000:7,56-60). Other scholars have noted 
this as part of a larger tendency in which organisation theorists try to make their field 
more “scientific”, and in so doing, avoid both the complexity inherent in organisations 
and constructing theories which are not clearly defined (Bouchikhi 1998). To avoid 
such pitfalls, “(w)e should rather be sensitive to complex and self-organizing 
interactions and appreciate the play of patterns that perpetually transforms the system 
itself as well as the environment in which it operates.' (Cilliers 1998:107). For 
healthcare reformers and managers, this sounds a cautionary note against engaging in 
excessive organisational control (Trenholm & Ferlie 2012), and encourages them to 
accept and leverage the possibilities arising from unpredicted, yet potentially positive, 
organisational responses (Plsek & Greenhalgh 2001, Plsek & Wilson 2001). 
The next chapter will review the literatures relevant to the two alternative frameworks 






CHAPTER FOUR: Critical Review of Professional Dominance, 




As discussed in the previous chapter, this thesis uses complexity theory as its primary 
tool of analysis, but it also applies two other secondary, explanatory frameworks: 
professional dominance and New Public Management (NPM). Having just reviewed the 
complexity theory literature, this chapter reviews the literatures related to these two 
competing theoretical models. The chapter opens with a discussion of the theory of 
professional dominance and reviews its related literature along with that related to 
NPM. The remainder of the chapter introduces readers to a particular literature on 
public policy development, specifically Kingdon’s (1995) theory on public policy 
development. This literature is reviewed and discussed as it is applied later in this 
thesis to theorise the important inductive finding related to the low priority accorded 
to TB control in London.  
The Professional Dominance Literature 
This discussion starts by briefly reviewing the origins and history of the theory of 
professional dominance, followed by an overview of the key concepts which define the 
theory. It then reviews contested areas within the literature, and specifically whether 
or not the theory has been usurped, or at least weakened, by social and political 
developments in recent decades. The impact and interplay of NPM organising 
principles on the theory will also be explored. Because the theory of professional 
dominance was ultimately found by this research to lack explanatory power, the 
discussion which follows is abbreviated relative to the overview of New Public 
Management which follows it. 
Brief Historical Overview 
The concept of “professional dominance”, and medical dominance in particular, 
originated with Eliot Freidson’s 1970 challenge to medical sociologist Talcott Parson’s 
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widely accepted research into the norms and behaviours of professionals, including 
clinicians (Light & Levine 1988). Parson’s research came to be viewed as outdated, 
with its premise of “the enlightened paternalism of doctoring” (Hafferty & Light 
1995:134). In contrast, Freidson argued that clinicians dominate other professions in 
the medical field by maintaining “professional dominance”, a special legitimated 
autonomy controlling the nature, terms and structure of their work (Barnett et al 1998, 
Freidson 1994:114-116). Since such autonomy must be granted, rather than taken, it is 
premised on a quid pro quo between the medical profession and the public; namely, the 
medical profession will self-regulate in accordance with the highest of ethical codes and 
in the absence of self-interest (Wolinsky1988).   
Underscoring the success of physicians in securing this privileged occupational 
position, the entire healthcare system is such that “(h)ealth services are organized 
around professional authority, and their basic structure is constituted by the 
dominance of a single professional (the doctor) over a variety of other subordinate 
occupations” (Freidson 1970:xi). The result is a “division of labour strictly governed by 
hierarchical authority”.  
Freidson (1994:116-117) notes that the likelihood of new professions now gaining the 
sort of power and autonomy currently enjoyed by the medical establishment, even 
professions which are characterized by similar levels of education and training, is 
extremely low. Once managerial control is firmly ensconced, for example within the 
state-run healthcare sector, management and the broader organisational machine, not 
the workers, define and control the nature and specifics of jobs and tasks.  
Features of the Professional Dominance Model 
 
The relationship between the patient or client and the professional is based largely on 
trust. By assuming the responsibilities arising from risk management and the 
accompanying patient/client trust, “professionals are rewarded with authority, 
privileged rewards and higher status” (Evetts 2003:400). Referring specifically to 
physicians, Allsop (2006:445) highlights the importance of the “cultural authority” and 
“privileged social status” accorded the profession. Professionalism, then, is used as a 
mechanism of social control by members of professional groups; or, more positively, as 
a means of imparting civility and stability in social systems (Evetts 2003).  
Professionalism exists when 
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...an organized occupation gains the power to determine who is qualified to 
perform a defined set of tasks, to prevent all others from performing that work, 
and to control the criteria by which to evaluate performance...(thereby 
creating) the circumstances under which its members are free of control by 
those who employ them (Freidson 2001:12). 
This assumes that the work undertaken by professionals is so specialised that it 
excludes all but those with the required training and experience (as decided upon and 
enforced by the professionals themselves) and that the work cannot be commoditised 
or standardised (Freidson 2001:17, 84, 92-93). This “monopoly” is essential to 
professionalism; consequently there will always be conflicts with the logic of free 
markets and competition (and hence, with NPM) (Freidson 2000:3).  
The impact of professional dominance, including medical dominance, has been 
analysed at the organisational level.  Hospitals are comprised of a strong core of 
professionals and organized as “professional bureaucracies“ with complex, stable 
environments, featuring high levels of decentralisation, with only a small role for 
managers, but with a significant need for support staff (i.e., hospitals include many 
more allied health professionals and administrative support workers than doctors) 
(Mintzberg 1983:189-213).  Members of professional bureaucracies often have less 
loyalty to the organisation than to their profession (p.208).  With respect to medicine, 
Mintzberg notes medical consultants perform largely standardised work, despite its 
complexity, and these standards are set, and perpetuated, by the profession itself, 
thereby enhancing the profession’s autonomy (Mintzberg 1983:190-192,197).  
Professional bureaucracies present exceptional management challenges. Professional 
administrators working within these organisations are not powerless, but neither can 
they impose solutions. And while, individually, these administrators might be more 
powerful than individual professionals, they “can be easily overwhelmed by the 
collective power of the professionals” (Mintzberg 1983:200). Management is also 
challenged by professionals, especially medical professionals’ proclivity for 
independent working and an aversion to embracing directives resulting in change or 
new ways of working (Mintzberg 1983:190, 209, 213).  
The State of the Professional Dominance Model Today  
Over the past two decades or so, the professional dominance model, and the medical 
dominance model in particular, have been criticized on several fronts owing largely to 
three, late-20th century developments: 
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1. a potential de-professionalisation or “proletarianisation” of the profession; 
2. a general increase in government involvement and regulation in medicine along 
with the increased power for HMOs as healthcare purchasers in the US; and, 
3. the rise of the New Public Management doctrine, particularly the increasing 
influence of managers and the introduction of quasi-markets into healthcare. 
 
De-professionalisation or proletarianisation 
The “de-professionalisation or “proletarianisation” of the medical profession refers to 
developments eroding the control of clinicians over the conditions, structures and 
boundaries of their work, including how they are remunerated (Barnett et al 1998, 
Light & Levine 1988, McKinlay 1988, Wolinksy 1988). Technological advances enabling 
enhanced surveillance of resource use, along with the application of clinical practice 
guidelines, treatment protocols and evidence-based medicine  are drivers (Hafferty & 
Light 1995, Barnett et al 1998), although recent research suggests physicians are 
ignoring, or resisting, such guidelines (McDonald et al 2006). However, the very 
existence of such officially sanctioned guidance speaks to a shift away from the once 
unquestioned status of clinician autonomy. 
 
Increased government involvement and regulation 
An overall increase in government involvement and regulation in medicine has reduced 
the domination of the medical profession. This occurs largely in response to two 
developments: (a) medicine’s inability or unwillingness to control upwardly spiralling 
healthcare costs (Hafferty & Light 1995, Allsop 2006), and (b) revelations of medical 
incompetence, self-interest and mismanagement, all of which are seen to weaken the 
social contract between the public and physicians (Barnett et al 1998, Allsop 2006).  
Moran (2003:82-83) observes that the UK medical profession has been self-regulating 
since the founding of the General Medical Council in 1858, but towards the end of the 
20th century cracks began to appear within the profession itself regarding aspects of 
this self-regulation, accompanied by highly publicised scandals about the behaviour of 
doctors. Moran argues that the compact between doctors and government at the 
founding of the NHS has collapsed, owing to various economic crises, starting in the 




Further, today’s public exhibits significant consumerist tendencies, having grown 
accustomed to unprecedented levels of choice in both goods and services offered them. 
This “consumerism”, combined with an increasingly educated public less inclined 
toward deference to the medical profession, has given rise to growing patient advocacy 
and demands. This, in turn, has provided “some legitimate basis from which otherwise 
powerless managers can attempt to exercise control over powerful medical 
professionals” (McDonald et al 2006:197).  
The rise of the New Public Management doctrine and its impact 
on the medical profession 
New Public Management (NPM) inspired governments are placing new demands on the 
medical profession. Criticisms of large, powerful bureaucracies with their largely 
professionalised workforce, combined with a desire to make the welfare state smaller 
via privatisation and to give greater prominence to private sector-style management 
techniques, have fuelled NPM. This also involves seeking ways to control professionals, 
a group regarded with some wariness by NPM adherents (Sehested 2002) because of 
their power as producers of public goods. Both medical dominance, and professional 
dominance more generally, have been undermined by NPM principles, although there is 
debate regarding the extent of this (Allsop 2006, Ferlie et al 1996:166, McNulty & Ferlie 
2002:9, Harrison & Ahmad 2000). The introduction of “managerialism”, enhanced 
powers for managers relative to physicians, and the introduction of quasi-markets 
focused on performance and measurement (Ferlie et al 1996:11,165-194), have 
combined in an assault on various medical monopolies (Allsop 2006).  
NPM doctrine is based on the belief that applying private sector approaches will result 
in enhanced system efficiencies, leading to better value in care (Barnett et al 1998). 
Within the medical profession, for instance, the use of previously unknown phenomena 
such as clinician performance evaluation is an example of how this drive for better 
value has manifested (Hafferty & Light 1995).  
Contracting-out services to privately run companies is another example of how medical 
professionals are impacted by NPM (Ferlie at al 1996:173). An empirical study on the 
establishment of “independent sector treatment centres” (ISTC), public-private 
partnership facilities which have assumed responsibility for the delivery of certain 
basic NHS services, shows a range of effects, including the potential for “a rise in 
transactional professional employment... rather than ongoing relationships” (Bishop & 
Waring 2011: 326). This could change the current social contract with clinicians, 
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including weakening their professional status and driving more intra-profession 
competition. 
The introduction of NPM-inspired quasi-markets in the NHS has increased 
fragmentation within the healthcare system, and, among other things, has created a 
system of contractually mandated targets and performance standards for medical 
professionals. Medical dominance has been impacted, usually negatively, by quasi-
market reforms (Ferlie et al 1996:176-178, Harrison & Ahmad 2000, Allsop 2006). The 
combination of contracting out (c.f. Bishop & Waring 2011), a shift of power from high-
status, high-earning hospital consultants to GPs (via GP fund holding and latterly, PCTs 
and Clinical Commissioning Groups), and the creation of hybrid clinician-managers5, 
have combined to change the nature of power sharing between clinicians and the state 
and amongst physicians themselves (Ferlie et al 1996:166-178 
Medical Autonomy in the NPM state 
The concept of professional autonomy (along with the idea of controlling the work of 
others) is central to the professional dominance model. Within NPM-based regimes, 
professional autonomy takes three main forms: political; economic; and, technical 
(Ferlie et al 1996:169). Political autonomy refers to the profession’s right to make 
policy decisions, economic autonomy refers to their right to set their own standards of 
remuneration, and technical autonomy means the profession sets its own professional 
standards and controls the performance of its members. These three forms of 
autonomy apply, albeit within some boundaries, to physicians.  Similarly, the medical 
profession remains self-regulating, although there have been concessions to permit 
more lay scrutiny following high profile clinical debacles (i.e., Bristol Royal Infirmary 
and Royal Liverpool Infirmary) and clinical practice and prescribing guidelines are now 
accepted as the norm.  
The government’s failure to consult physicians prior to introducing quasi-market 
reforms in the NHS in the early 1990s represented an important break in the 
longstanding tradition of “consensus politics” which had come to characterise the 
relationship between UK doctors and the state (Allsop 2006:446). This threatened 
                                           
5
 Although this may also be a way of wresting some control back from managers (Ferlie et al 
1996:182-183,193-194, Allsop 2006, Hartley 2002). Harrison & Ahamad (2000) and Harrison & 
Dowswell (2002) do not accept this assertion and see the rise of clinical directors as a further assault 
on medical dominance, by augmenting the management function.  
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physicians’ traditional role as key players in policy formulation6 (Ferlie et al 1996:176). 
Doctors also lost some of their power to act as “gatekeepers” and rationers of health 
services, with managers and commissioners assuming much of this power.  
Medical autonomy occurs at three distinct levels: micro, meso and macro. Some 
maintain that it “is hardly contentious” (Harrison & Ahmad 2000:129) to claim a 
decline occurred in medical autonomy and dominance from 1975 to 2000, observing 
that this decline has been greatest at the micro level where individual physicians 
exercise clinical discretion. “New institutions of clinical governance”(p.135) such asthe 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) are evidence of this argument These 
organisations contributed to a lessening of autonomy for physicians at the micro-level. 
“The boundaries around clinical decision making have become more permeable”, 
evidenced by increased input and participation from external stakeholders such as 
consumers, lawyers and healthcare managers (Allsop, 2006:453). More than 15 years’ 
worth of government sanctioned initiatives designed to enhance patient involvement in 
the NHS have led to “a wider questioning of professional dominance. With this comes a 
growing recognition that the role of the patient is changing from one which is as a 
passive recipient to one as informed partner” (Peckham et al 2005:226). 
At the meso level, medical autonomy was less impacted, but starting with Conservative 
governments from the early 1980s,“(t)he piecemeal dismantling of some of the 
unilateral rights conferred on medicine as part of its corporatist relationship with the 
state has...continued” (Harrison & Ahmad 2000:137). At the macro level, which 
concerns the impact of changes to the “biomedical model” (as opposed to a public 
health model) on medical autonomy, the authors conclude there has been virtually no 
change 
Concluding Observations Regarding Professional Dominance 
Debate continues about the impact of recent political and social developments on 
medical dominance, and indeed on the professional dominance model more generally. 
However, for the most part, the debate is not about whether these models have been 
                                           
6
 The recent – and largely futile - outcry from the BMA and various medical Royal Colleges against 
the 2011 health and social care reforms, the profession’s initial loss of policy making power, and the 
government’s disinterest in reaching consensus with the medical profession, indicate this loss of 
policy influence continues. This latest “defeat” follows other earlier, and equally important, 
government initiatives opposed by the British medical establishment. These include the creation of 
the NHS itself in 1948 and the implementation of the 1983 Griffith’s Report recommendation to 
replace “consensus management” within the NHS with general management and general managers 
(Harrison & Ahmad 2000). 
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impacted, but rather the extent and nature of the impact (for example, Ferlie et al 1996, 
Waring & Currie 2009, Allsop 2006, Freidson 2001, Currie et al 2012).  
Freidson, arguably the “father” of the professional dominance model, is highly sceptical, 
perhaps even hostile, toward claims regarding the potential demise of the model, citing 
an absence of empirical support and a lack of analytical consistency in the research 
(Freidson 1994:118-199, Freidson 2001). Other scholars agree, although their 
arguments are more nuanced, concluding generally that medical dominance still exists, 
even if there has been some multi-directional power-shifting and loss of power at the 
level of individual physicians (Ferlie et al 1996:191-193, McNulty & Ferlie 2002:50-
51,342, Allsop 2006).  Currie et al (2012) found clear and recent support for the robust 
nature of medical dominance. Whilst strongly asserting that medical dominance has 
significantly declined over the past 35 or so years, others concede that  the changes 
have not always been clear cut or linear (Harrison & Ahmad 2000; Harrison & 
Dowswell 2002But few would agree that medicine has seen the extent of 
proletarianisation, de-professionalisation or overall loss of power and autonomy 
anticipated by early “anti-professional dominance theory” proponents.  
Within the NHS, there are indications that medical dominance, in its traditional sense, 
has suffered a net decline after three decades of NPM orientated governments. While 
the medical profession remains the dominant force within healthcare, the profession is 
no longer immune to NPM-inspired democratic, cost-saving and consumer-led 
initiatives.   
Having just provided a critical review of the professional and medical dominance 
literature, including a review of the debate amongst scholars regarding the current 
veracity of the professional dominance model, the discussion now turns to the third 
theoretical framework used in this thesis, New Public Management.  
 
New Public Management 
The third conceptual framework employed in this research is New Public Management 
(NPM). The review of NPM literature begins with a brief history of NPM, followed by a 
review of the key NPM principles and a discussion of areas of dispute, or contest, 
particularly whether a “post-NPM” era has now taken hold. Extensive fragmentation, 
excessive focus on control and risk-aversion, and managerialism all flow from the 
imposition of NPM and are issues of relevance to this study.  
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A Brief Historical Overview of NPM 
Similar to “complexity theory”, “New Public Management” is best conceived as a 
collection of ideas, or “a shorthand name for the set of broadly similar administrative 
doctrines” which found favour with bureaucratic reformers starting in the late 1970s 
(Hood 1991:3). NPM advocates believe government is improved when it becomes more 
business-like in its approach to service delivery.  
The core... ideology...is that public sector provision was inefficient and 
often ineffective; that it led to neither cost containment nor to quality 
improvement...and that, if left unchecked, it would see unacceptable 
growth in tax bills...and declining standards of public services. (Dawson 
& Dargie 2001:34). 
The term “NPM” refers to significant, indeed transformative, change brought to public 
sector management practices following Margaret Thatcher’s 1979 election victory in 
the UK. But NPM-style governing also attracted wide followings in the US, Australia and 
New Zealand starting from the early 1980s.  Within the UK, NPM continued to find 
broad political support with the subsequent elections of both the Conservative Prime 
Minister John Major and his Labour successors, Prime Ministers Blair and Brown. The 
Coalition Government, in place at the time of writing, continues to carry the NPM torch. 
Political and party ideology does not explain widespread acceptance of NPM by 
governments from across the political spectrum (such as Sweden’s social democratic 
government) or recent history in the UK (Hood 1995). Diefenbach (2009a:892) 
describes NPM as “an increasingly global phenomenon”, spreading beyond its Western 
roots to developing countries in Asia and Africa. 
The result of over 35 years of NPM-friendly government in the UK is deeply embedded 
features of the doctrine within the public sector and public services delivery. Nowhere 
is this more marked than within healthcare, which has long been seen as a “high 
impact” sector for implementing NPM ideas (McNulty & Ferlie 2002:53). This enduring 
nature of NPM within the healthcare sector has had a considerable impact on TB 
control in London.  
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Key Features of NPM 
Whilst there is no single, universally agreed definition of NPM, Ferlie et al (1996:10-
14), present four models of the doctrine, representing its evolution over time (see 






place by mid-1990s) 




 Increased focus on: 
o Financial 
control 
o Target setting 
& monitoring 
o Audit function 
o Role and rights 
of consumers  
 Reduced power for 
professionals, 
including power of 
self-regulation 
 Enhanced power 
and authority for 
managers 
 Increased degree of 
management 
hierarchy 




 Creation of 
autonomous 
business units 














role for networks 
and strategic 
alliances 
 Focus on 
organisation 








leadership, or a 
“bottom up” 
approach, i.e., a 
learning 
organisation 





 Increased focus 
on local users 
and citizens 
 Focus on 
“quality”, 
including using 
such tools as 
Total Quality 
Management 




re: role of market 
in public sector 





FIGURE 13 – FOUR MODELS OF THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT (ADOPTED FROM FERLIE 
ET AL 1996:10-14, MCNULTY & FERLIE 2002:343-347) 
Four key changes which have been observed in the UK after the advent in 1979 of NPM-
friendly governments include: 
1. The privatisation of previously government controlled economic activity 
2. “Managerialisation” and marketisation of social policy functions 
3. Widespread use of audit, performance measurement, and increased central 
controls  
4. An increased focus on change management initiatives, including more focus on 




This research found evidence of all four of these changes within London’s TB control 
system. Two of them - managerialisation and an increased preoccupation with control – 
are particularly relevant and discussed in greater detail, below.  
Drawing on Hood (1991), Dawson and Dargie (2001:38) highlight a fundamental 
contradiction embodied by NPM. By promoting both marketisation and the 
implementation of private-sector management techniques like performance 
management, NPM draws  
(o)n two competing conceptual frameworks. One akin to 
managerialism...supported the introduction of private sector practices...The 
other, with its emphasis on markets, derived from variants of public choice, 
rational choice and ‘new institutional’ economics.  
This has resulted in decentralization and competition operating alongside the 
centralizing tendencies of many private sector management techniques.  
Hood (1991) offers another widely accepted perspective on NPM, summarised in the 
form of seven key NPM doctrines, as shown below. 




Active, visible, discretionary control of 
organisations from named persons “at 
the top”, ‘free to manage’ 
Accountability requires clear 
assignment of responsibility 




and measures of 
performance 
Defining goals, targets, usually in 
quantitative terms, especially for 
professional services 
Accountability requires clear 
statement of goals; also 
important for efficiency 
3 
Greater emphasis on 
output controls 
Resources allocations and rewards 
linked to measured performance 





Break-up of formerly monolithic units, 
more corporatized units around 
products, decentralised one-line 
budgets, arms-length relationships 
Purchaser-provider splits, 
‘manageable’ units, efficiency 
gains via contracts both within 
the public service and 
externally 
5 
Shift to greater 
competition 
Term contracts and public tendering Rivalry seen as key to lowering 





Move away from military-style public 
service ethic, more hiring flexibility, 
more use of PR/communications to 
general public 
Need for “proven” private 
sector management tools 
7 




Cost cutting, resisting union demands, 
limiting “compliance costs” for 
business 
Need to control public sector 
spending and “do more with 
less” 
FIGURE 14: DOCTRINAL COMPONENTS OF NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT (SOURCE: HOOD 1991) 
Clearly there is significant overlap between the elements of NPM identified by Ferlie et 
al (1996) and Hood (1991). Those common elements of most relevance to this research 
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are discussed in greater detail below. As will become evident to readers, some of the 
categories overlap and creating neat distinctions amongst them was not feasible.  
Key Precepts in NPM  
Quasi-Markets 
The introduction of quasi-markets within the public sector provided the scaffolding for 
most other NPM concepts. These “internal markets” lie at the heart of NPM and reflect 
most clearly the doctrine’s desire to make government more business-like and to bring 
its operations more closely in line with those of the private sector. Quasi-markets are 
seen as a means of instilling discipline and rigour in a system which, neo-Liberals 
argue, lacks both.  Quasi-markets aim to increase quality and cut costs across the public 
service; they also complement another key NPM principle, a preoccupation with 
performance measurement (McNulty & Ferlie 2002:6-57).  
Dawson & Dargie (2001:35) observe that the term “quasi” is important because it 
speaks to two significant limits imposed upon the market mechanism - limits, “rarely, if 
at all, found in the private sector”. First, the total size of the market is decided by 
government via the funding it makes available to a sector or programme. Unlike true 
markets, quasi-markets can never grow as a result of successes, nor shrink as a result 
of failures. This means “firms” competing within the market are involved in a “zero sum 
game” whereby any increase in market share comes “at the expense of other players” 
(Dawson & Dargie 2001:36). Market exit and failure, key to the functioning of “real” 
markets, is exceedingly difficult in many public sector settings, especially when it 
comes to the healthcare sector and closing poorly performing hospitals (Ferlie et al 
1996:59). Second, government dictates permissible activities for organisations 
operating within the quasi-market. For example, NHS trusts were forbidden from 
selling services to private individuals (a rule which has since been significantly relaxed 
with some Foundation trusts now permitted to earn up to 30% of their income from 
private patients7). Quasi-markets are “highly internally regulated. The centre retained 
formidable powers of regulation, rule-setting and appointment to key posts” (Ferlie et 
al 1996:58). 
                                           
7
 For example, the Royal Marsden NHS Foundation Trust’s “Forward Plan Strategy Document for Plan 
for y/e 31 March 2012 (and 2013, 2014)”, as submitted to the Foundation Trust regulatory agency, 
Monitor, refers to “A new marketing plan focused on the capture of new private markets both within 
the UK and overseas” with the objective of increasing private income by £9m in 2012.   
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An overview of NHS reforms focusing on the introduction of the internal market around 
1989 notes three official reasons for its adoption: (a) “to achieve ‘better value for 
money’”; (b) to increase NHS staff responsiveness to patient needs’; and, (c) to enhance 
the variety of services available to patients, whilst allowing them to choose amongst 
these services (Allen 2009:374).  However, as these measures were introduced into a 
well-established “hierarchical public organisation” (the NHS was created in 1948), 
ensuring success of such radical, and private-sector inspired, reforms, was never going 
to be easy (Allen 2009:374). Empirical evidence shows limited increases in efficiency 
wrought by the introduction of the internal market, yet successive governments 
continue to support it. Despite softer rhetoric on NHS marketisation from Labour Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, and some effort to reintroduce elements of co-operation along 
with competition during his time in government, the NHS quasi-market remained 
firmly in place during Blair’s tenure. In fact, Allen argues, there were efforts to 
strengthen the internal market, particularly in terms of enhancing the “supply side” of 
the competition equation.8 The Coalition government’s recent health and social care 
legislation further entrenches market principles and marketisation, although this 
initiative, too, sought to reiterate the value of co-operation (without offering concrete 
measures on how to do so). In sum, the NHS internal market is alive and thriving (in 
concept, if not always in execution).  
Before the advent of internal markets, government bureaucrats working within (and 
sustaining) hierarchical structures and organisations, developed policy and planned 
how public funds would be allocated to support various government priorities and to 
deliver public services. With NPM and quasi-markets, governments often use public 
funds to purchase services for the public from private, non-profit or voluntary sector 
organisations (McNulty & Ferlie 2002:56). This system of “contracting-out” requires 
government to enter into often complicated, lengthy and performance-driven 
contractual agreements with its various service providers. Once contracting-out 
becomes the norm, the fundamental relationship between government and citizen 
changes to one more akin to principal-agent as opposed to the traditional trustee-
beneficiary relationship. “Low-trust arms’-length contract relationships” can make it 
more difficult for governments “to retain the capacity to negotiate across 
                                           
8
 Allen (2009) notes one of the objectives of enhancing the number and diversity of healthcare 
providers is giving “suppliers” the “freedom to innovate and improve services”. This will be shown as 




organizational frontiers without massive transaction costs” (Dunleavy & Hood 
1994:12).  
The quasi-market mechanism splits the purchaser and provider, often leading once 
vertically integrated organisations and departments to become disaggregated, with 
their formerly integrated functions, like purchasing and providing, becoming separate 
(McNulty & Ferlie 2002:56).  Within the NHS, the creation of Primary Care Trusts 
(PCTs) which employ “commissioners” to negotiate for and “purchase” healthcare 
services for residents living within the geographical boundaries of the PCT is an 
example of this split9. These services are purchased from various healthcare 
“providers”, such as hospitals (often NHS Foundation Trusts, another spawn of NPM), 
GP practices, voluntary groups, social enterprises or privately held companies. 
Providers are meant to compete against each other, driving costs down for the 
purchaser (ultimately, the taxpayer, whose agent is the PCT), while “market forces” are 
meant to ensure sufficient levels of quality and value in the services provided.   
The disaggregation which flows from quasi-markets often “hollows out”, via 
downsizing, formerly strong and powerful line departments within government, 
severely reducing or eliminating their policy making cores (Dunleavy 1995). 
Sometimes arms-length, stand alone agencies are created during this process. This type 
of disaggregation can lead to “the erosion of central government’s long-look or 
planning capability”, accompanied by the risk of “large policy fiascos” (Dunleavy & 
Hood 1994:11). As will be discussed later, the Department of Health’s TB policy making 
function has been effectively eliminated through downsizing and the creation of the 
(officially) arms-length Health Protection Agency (thereby further fragmenting the 
system).  
Managerialism  
Managerialism, or the shift whereby public sector “administrators” become more 
directive and “managerial” is another key component of NPM. Former private sector 
CEOs, often charismatic and with strong leadership skills, are recruited to support 
these newly empowered managers in carrying out their enhanced roles (McNulty & 
Ferlie 2002:58). Power shifts towards managers who set targets and monitor employee 
performance (Ferlie et al 1996:11), and often away from professionals, including 
medical professionals. Whilst managerialism has significantly impacted professionals, it 
                                           
9




has also privileged the management function above other functions within government. 
Strong and effective managers are vital to support many NPM objectives, including the 
quasi-markets discussed above, and to meet the associated demands for strong 
contracting skills. The disaggregation of line departments into quasi-autonomous 
agencies, or into separate purchasing and providing functions, also requires strong 
managers to oversee contracting and other processes. This more formal, business-like 
approach replaced the traditional public administration method of relying on personal 
relationships across or between departments to meet policy objectives.  
Another implication flowing from the managerialisation of the public service is “bureau 
shaping” in which senior (and self-interested) managers institute NPM-type reforms 
such as severe cost cutting, contracting-out, or “hiving off” difficult frontline work to 
newly spun-off (i.e., disaggregated) organisations or decentralised, localised “branch 
offices”. Effectively, they construct “small, high-powered strategic agencies divorced 
from all the messy problems of implementing policy on the ground” (Dunleavy & Hood 
1994:12).  
Managers in Healthcare 
As discussed previously, medical autonomy and dominance within the NHS has 
changed as a result of NPM. This is part of a wider re-distribution of power within the 
healthcare system (Ferlie et al 1996:108,182-183). Power has not only shifted from the 
medical profession to managers, but, has also shifted within the medical profession. 
The creation in the early 1990s of GP Fund Holders and the recent move to create 
Clinical Commissioning Groups shifts power towards GPs and away from hospital 
consultants. Managerialisation within the NHS has produced so-called “hybrids” known 
as Clinical Directors, clinicians who become managers (McNulty & Ferlie 2002:59). 
Although government has invested considerable sums in training and supporting these 
clinician-managers, evidence to date is mixed on their success, at least in terms of 
wresting power from the medical profession (McNulty & Ferlie 2002:342). However, 
incumbents in these roles start to identify more closely with their management 
colleagues than with their medical colleagues (Hartley 2002). The response by the 
medical profession to these on-going, NPM-driven changes is best described as 
“adaptation” (Ferlie et al 1996:190). 
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Within London’s TB control system, whilst doctors were perceived as influential, there 
was little evidence of them exerting influence compared to managers, as will be 
discussed more Chapter Seven. 
Risk Aversion and Control  
Another important NPM feature is its relentless focus on measurement, audit and 
targets, as a means of control. Goodin et al (2006:14-15), invoking the widely cited 
“steering not rowing” description of NPM, note that “performance standards” assist 
public servants by defining the outcomes expected from their work. This approach is 
not new. In the feudal system tax collection was contracted to nobles under strictly 
stated terms. And Plato’s avowedly authoritarian Republic provided “the earliest 
images of the steering state. This concept of ’steering’ “helps explain much of the 
fixation of the new public management on monitoring and control” (Goodin et al 
2006:14-15).  
Public servants working under NPM regimes face unprecedented levels of performance 
evaluations, goal and target measurement and audit. The “practices of accounting and 
auditing (play) a central role in operationalizing the administrative ideals that 
constitute the NPM” (Power 1997:44). The advent of NPM ushered in a change in the 
very meaning of the term “audit”, from a “Victorian concern with...ensuring that 
spending could be accounted for, to a wider concern with the dominant themes of the 
new public management, such as efficiency and effectiveness” (Moran 2003:153). The 
erosion in central capabilities flowing from disaggregation and hollowing-out demands 
an increased role for the audit function and enhanced measurement systems (Power 
1997:44). NPM-led systems use the information created for, and by, systems of 
accounting and audit to exercise and try maintain control wherever possible (and 
perhaps even when it is isn’t possible), eroding the traditional level of trust placed in 
civil servants as agents of public service (Christensen 2009). Others see these systems 
as a means to “satisfy the need to connect internal organizational arrangements to 
public ideals” (Power 1997:10).  
The use of audit has also become a means of defining performance measures, although 
often it is not obvious what these measures should be. Consequently efficiency and 
effectiveness is “not so much verified as constructed around the audit process itself” 
(Power 1997:51), where “organizations must be changed to make them auditable” in 
order to support NPM priorities. In other words, the tail wags the dog in the name of 
feeding the NPM cause.  
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“Power to the Patients” 
NPM can be conceived as a web with key features intricately and closely connected and 
supporting each other, as seen with the role of “consumers”, including patients, in an 
NPM context. This perception of patient involvement and their role as “consumers” 
arises naturally in a healthcare system where governments embrace a doctrine - NPM - 
suspicious of “big government” and which is focused on pushing political power down 
to local levels. Further, the infrastructure needed to enable patient empowerment 
programs is supported by the localism and performance-managed culture promoted by 
NPM. 
Measurement and evaluation tools are used to support this increased involvement and 
focus on the users, or consumers, of public services. Emphasis is placed on consumer 
“choice and quality” in the services being offered, although there is some evidence that 
this is less the case in healthcare than with other public services such as education  
(McNulty & Ferlie 2002:57-58). Engaging or contracting out to the third or voluntary 
sectors in delivering services once provided by the public sector is intended to enhance 
responsiveness to consumers of public services while potentially lowering delivery 
costs. This “inter-sectoral blurring”, reflected in the rise in both public-private and 
public-third sector partnerships (Ferlie & Steane 2002, Newman 2001:24), is a feature 
of later iterations of NPM and is found in London’s TB control system, as will be 
discussed later.  
Although there have been ongoing decentralisation initiatives within the NHS since its 
inception, efforts to enhance patient involvement intensified in the early 1990s. Often 
there is an inherent contradiction in decentralisation schemes which require, and are 
accompanied by, centralisation, or re-centralisation, programmes. Highly decentralised 
patient involvement initiatives, operationalised at the local level, are the result of top-
down, central government programs, for example of lay appointees to NHS boards 
requiring the approval of the central NHS Appointments Commission (Peckham et al, 
2005). Arguably, this underscores the interconnectedness of NPM concepts and “is 
perhaps as much at the mercy of the increasing tendency for governments to define the 
outputs through performance targets, national service frameworks and central 
regulatory functions as any other aspect of the NHS.” (p.227)  
Having reviewed the major components of NPM, it is useful to analyse them from an 
organisational theory perspective.  Diefenbach (2009) suggests that NPM doctrine can 
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be theorised as impacting five specific areas of organisational practice, as summarised 
below in Figure 15.   
Area Element 
Business environment and 
strategic objectives 
 Challenging external environment calls for new strategies, 
including market orientation 
 Increased focus on efficiency, customer needs, cost cutting, 
competition, privatisation, outsourcing 
Organizational structures 
and processes 
 Decentralisation, less hierarchy 
 Focus on process and standardisation 
Performance management 
and measurement systems 
 Systematic measurement and monitoring of individual and 
organisational performance via targets and performance 
indicators 
Management and managers  A “management culture” emerges, resulting in new types of 
managerial posts and privileging management over other 
competencies 
Employees and corporate 
culture 
 “Leadership” valued 
 Employees expected to become more “business-like”, 
maybe entrepreneurial 
FIGURE 15: BASIC ORGANISATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS AND CORE ELEMENTS OF NEW PUBLIC 
MANAGEMENT (MODIFIED FROM DIEFENBACH 2009) 
Decentralisation? Fragmentation? 
With its enthusiasm for localism, NPM naturally leads to high levels of operational 
decentralisation, but this is partially offset by strongly centralised steering initiatives 
such as incentives and contracts. In practice, the outcome of “decentralisation” cannot 
be easily distinguished from the less desirable concept of “fragmentation”, and perhaps 
they are best thought of as having a causal relationship; the former contributes to the 
latter. Whilst decentralisation as a concept is widely embraced as a positive approach 
to governing, there is a long history of debating the relative merits of centralisation 
versus decentralisation. NPM advocates favour decentralisation as it often (though not 
always) equates with smaller, less powerful organisations and because it may promote 
localisation, bringing public servants closer to those they serve. This, it can be argued, 
fosters local innovation, responsiveness and employee motivation10 (Pollitt 2005:372-
374,378, Allen 2006).  
“Agencification”, defined as “transferring as many government activities as possible 
into agency-type organizations” is an important tool for decentralisers (Pollitt et al 
                                           
10
 Allen argues that within the NHS empirical evidence is equivocal as to whether decentralisation 
increases responsiveness beyond certain groups and whether employee morale has been improved. 
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2004:3). Advocates argue it improves efficiency and management and “place(s) 
services closer to citizens, reduce(s) political meddling, and enable(s) ministers to 
concentrate on the big policy issues”. Detractors, on the other hand, fear agencies feed 
public sector fragmentation by stripping out ministries’ policy making capacity and 
becoming larger and more powerful than the departments from which they sprang   
(pp.3-4). In the UK, 75% of the public sector workforce plies its trade in agencies (p.6), 
reflecting the degree of decentralisation in its public service. The UK healthcare system 
is rife with agencification, in bodies such as NHS Pensions, the National Patient Safety 
Agency, the National Treatment Agency, various regulatory agencies, such as the 
Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency and, of particular relevance to 
this research, the Health Protection Agency. 
Dunleavy et al (2005), however, argue that the UK is belatedly rolling back its extensive 
agencification program, aided by significant developments in digitization technologies. 
These authors cite examples of “policy disasters” and how they have led to “re-
assimilations of agencies into cohesive departmental groups” (p.481), even within 
high-NPM states such as the US and the UK.  Examples include the creation of the US 
Department of Homeland Security and the UK Department of Work and Pensions. With 
the 2010 election of the Coalition government in this UK, the trend toward 
agencification roll-back has been accelerated.  
 Despite evidence of agencification losing some of its appeal, it undoubtedly remains 
popular in many countries. Pollitt et al (2004:13-17) ask (a) why agencies have become 
so popular with governments and (b) how governments can best steer them to (c) 
maximise their potential, by enlisting economic, social science, and interpretive/social 
constructivist theories to answer these questions. Cost efficiency is rarely the sole 
reason for establishing an agency, and other, often political influences are paramount 
(including the delegation of blame, as will be discussed below). Agencification may be a 
fad (p.16), but as to why agencies have become so popular, Pollitt et al concede ‘there 
have been lots of different reasons and in many cases we don’t have a very clear idea of 
which were the most influential’ (p.21). With regard to the steering issue, they 
conclude that governments find it difficult to strike the right balance between “active 
steering (desirable) and micromanagement (undesirable)” (p.22). Perhaps not 
surprisingly, “the proposition that turning a function over from a government 
bureaucracy to an agency generally leads to enhanced efficiency is not proven”, 
although there are notable instances where enhancements are clear (p.23). Contra 
Dunleavy & Hood (2005), one of Pollitt et al’s (2004) main conclusions validates the 
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enduring nature of at least some NPM reforms: “if there is a trend – allowing for some 
counter examples - it does seem to be in the general direction of more management 
autonomy and more and more sophisticated performance measurement for 
disaggregated executive bodies” (p.246). 
Decentralisation drives can also result in a “hollowing-out” of policy making capacity 
within formerly powerful line departments, with previously vertically integrated 
ministries, such as the Department of Health, disaggregated into separate purchasing 
and providing functions and silo-like executive agencies (Dunleavy 1995). Once this 
strategic and policy core is eroded, departments risk becoming unable “to hold their 
own”, or maintain an appropriate balance in the relationship with newly devolved 
agencies (Pollitt et al 2004). Once lost, such institutional capacity is difficult to recoup. 
On a more philosophical note, Pollitt (2005:381) contends that disaggregation and the 
“hollowing-out” of central government departments is inconsistent with the current 
interest in “joined-up” working in government. In the absence of a centralised co-
ordinating or strategic function, (often the consequence of departmental hollowing-
out), it is difficult to facilitate and ensure “joined-up” working amongst disparate 
components in a disaggregated system. As will be discussed later, TB control in London 
is plagued by the effects of disjointed, non-adaptive work practices across the system, 
often flowing from just such disaggregation and hollowing-out. 
For most of its history, the NHS has been characterised as a blend of centralisation 
(parliamentary accountability, national funding) and decentralisation (localised 
decision making and implementation), but the relative balance between the two has 
often shifted with changes in government, or within the same government (i.e., the 
Blair government) (Allen 2006). Peckham et al (2005:223), following Butler (1992), 
observe “it is unclear whether the NHS is a central service that is locally managed or a 
local service operating within central guidelines.”  
However, taken in their totality, decentralisation initiatives combined with other NPM 
programmes, can have the effect of fragmenting public services, including healthcare. 
Decentralisation also makes it easier for governments to shift blame (Allen 2006;  
Pollitt 2005:381), and can lead to an “erstwhile anarchy of competing separate 
initiatives” (Dunleavy et al 2005:482). Diffuse and decentralised systems are complex 
and ordinary people may find it more difficult to hold government to account for 
perceived injustices. Allen (2006) (following Powell 1998) observes that devolving 
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responsibility without power results in the devolution of blame, along with the 
devolution of service delivery, from higher to ever lower levels of government.  
The system responsible for TB control in London can be characterised as highly 
decentralised, as seen in Chapter Two (with 31 TB clinics amongst the 70-odd 
components comprising the system) and deeply fragmented, as later chapters will 
explore in more detail. 
NPM and Public Health 
NPM principles adopted within the NHS have presented difficulties for the field of 
public health. Whilst a combination of centralisation-decentralisation could, in theory, 
be helpful for sound public health practice, it is difficult to strike an appropriate 
balance. A heavy focus on decentralisation, especially when it results in fragmentation, 
is the antithesis to the holistic and systemic approach advocated by public health 
specialists and raises significant concerns regarding the equity of service provision. 
Increased localism can, and does, lead to an unequal distribution of public goods and 
services: “Autonomous local services are more prone to inequities – both intentional 
and unintentional”(Pollitt 2005:381). As mentioned above, decentralisation makes it 
more difficult for people to understand which public officials should be held to account 
for injustices when systems are diffuse and complex (Allen 2006).  
NPM-inspired “bureau shaping” can also negatively impact public health programmes 
as “policy elites” may be motivated to promote “welfare reducing privatization” 
initiatives in order to “reshape public sector organizations into the format which suits” 
their personal motivations for professional advancement (Dunleavy and Hood 
1994:12). Associated costs are often “borne by other less powerful interests, 
typically...hard-to-serve clients” (p.12). Many of these “hard-to-serve clients” would 
surely be well represented amongst the ranks of those requiring the most public health 
intervention, including TB services. 
NPM relentlessly focuses on measurement, a concept which, outside of epidemiology, 
has long been problematic for public health. The effectiveness of many policies cannot 
easily be evaluated with the quantitatively based auditing and accounting approaches 
favoured by NPM (Power 1997:51). Bureau-shaping public managers are aided by 
“accounting frameworks which focus on a narrow range of costs that are readily 
captured...while ignoring more diffuse costs or changes in service quality which cannot 
be so easily quantified” (Dunleavy & Hood 1994:12). For instance, calculating cost-
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savings generated by ill-health prevention initiatives or health improvement marketing 
campaigns is notoriously difficult (e.g., the potential savings to the NHS from instituting 
a universal anti-TB vaccine, or proactively treating latent TB).  Consequently, valuable 
public health initiatives are difficult to justify and vulnerable to elimination in the name 
of NPM-inspired cost cutting. 
Concluding Remarks Regarding NPM 
At its root NPM is positivist, reductionist and linear, grounded in the conviction that it 
is both possible and desirable to control organisational outcomes. And with respect to 
healthcare, at least, “this omnipotent idea of control remains a fantasy much beloved” 
of those charged with NHS modernisation (Sarra 2005:181). This belief in linearity and 
control assumes various guises, owing in part to the differences among the four models 
of NPM (Ferlie et al 1996), as outlined earlier. But regardless of which form it adopts, 
the NPM model stands in considerable contrast to the complexity theory model with 
which it is being compared in this research.  
As outlined above, the imposition of NPM values within the NHS, and within the public 
sector more generally, brings challenges to healthcare providers and members of the 
public service. But even its detractors, and within academia they are legion, concede 
that it has also brought some benefits (Diefenbach 2009). These benefits include 
greater awareness of the concept of value and the need to respect tax payers’ money, 
and more sensitivity to consumer/patient needs. However, “hard”, or quantifiable, 
gains to the system arising from NPM are more nebulous (Pollitt et al 2004:23). Allen 
(2009) notes that high transaction and contracting costs, combined with a loss of 
“donated labour” supplied from committed public servants, can largely offset potential 
cost savings generated by cost cutting, efficiency drives and contracting-out. At the 
same time, she observes, there is empirical evidence showing some degradation in the 
quality of public services delivered by private providers particularly “where for profit 
providers with strong incentives to cut costs are used” (Allen 2009:384).  
Researchers have noted inherent contradictions contained within, and nurtured by, 
NPM: 
o Organisational capacity for change along with standardisation and 
formalisation 




o More management layers (to accommodate more managers and fragmentation) 
and claims to eschew hierarchy 
o  Empowerment as well as “taylorised” processes and surveillance and control 
systems 
o An expectation of entrepreneurial behaviour along with close performance 
management (Diefenbach 2009). 
With respect to the NHS, Allen (2009:386) sums up these incongruities as “an 
accumulation of contradictory organisational effects, making the NHS both more 
bureaucratised and more marketised”. 
 
Towards Operationalising the Research 
Deriving the professional dominance and NPM concepts used in this 
research from the literature 
As with complexity theory, there are no universally accepted definitions of either 
professional dominance or NPM. Consequently, in order to collect empirical evidence it 
was necessary to identify concepts particular to each of the theories which could be 
observed (or identified) during data collection. The section below identifies five such 
precepts from each of the theories of professional dominance and NPM which appear 
widely in the literatures, and are largely uncontested. These concepts are considered 
particularly relevant to the study of the NHS generally and London’s TB control system 
in particular. 
The five aspects of the theory of professional dominance operationalised in this 
research are:   
1. Autonomy, or occupational self-direction and standard-setting, based on 
superior authority and complex knowledge of subject (Freidson 1970). This 
autonomy is granted and guaranteed by both the legal system and social 
contract, and underlies professions’ abilities to self-regulate (Barnett et al 1998, 
Hafferty & Light 1995, Light et al 1986, Wolinsky 1988) 
2. Control over the work of others in the same domain (Freidson 1970:130-132), 
indicating a power imbalance and inferring the presence of at least some 
hierarchy (Light et al 1986) 
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3. Social and cultural deference to professionals, in this case, physicians. 
(Interestingly, while culture is “fundamental” to deference, authors note that 
deference could quite easily morph into wariness, making this feature less 
concrete and certain than others in the model [Light et al 1986]. ) 
4. Authority and hierarchy - where professionals (physicians) do take orders, it is 
from other professionals (physicians) (Freidson 1985) 
5. Control over resource allocation (Barnett et al 1998, Light & Levine 1986) 
The five aspects of NPM which have been surfaced from the literature review and for 
which evidence has been sought empirically are: 
1. “Managerialism” whereby managers assume greater influence and become 
more directive, often using targets and performance management tools. (Ferlie 
et al 1996:11,108,182-183, Diefenbach 2009) 
2. Quasi-markets which are introduced with the any or all of the following results: 
markets, not planning, are used to allocate resources; contracts replace 
hierarchies as the basis of relationships; and line departments are 
disaggregated into purchasing and providing functions or arms-length agencies, 
with a resulting erosion of policy making capacity and/or agencification. 
(McNulty & Ferlie 2002:56, Dunleavy 1995,Allen 2009) 
3. Focus on measurement, risk management and control. (McNulty & Ferlie 
2002:66-57, Moran 2003:153) 
4. Enhanced focus on the “rights” and role of the “consumer”, i.e., greater patient 
involvement. (McNulty & Ferlie 2002:57-58) 
5. Pressure for reform originating from the top and pushed downward with 
persistence and in a staged manner.(Ferlie et al 1996:10-14, Diefenbach 2009) 
Methodological challenges associated with this research are defined in the next 
chapter. However, based on the review of the literature, and the ten features of 
professional dominance and NPM of interest, as defined above, ways in which these 
elements might be explored are here suggested. 
Professional Dominance 
o Autonomy: Do consultants treating TB act in a self-directed manner? Do they 
collaborate with others? 
o Control: Within multidisciplinary treatment teams who exercises ultimate 
control and decision-making within the clinic? 
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o Deference: During meetings and other encounters, do non-physicians 
demonstrate deference toward consultants, and do these physicians dominate 
meetings and other encounters?  
o Authority: Despite an acknowledged increase in the role and power of 
managers within the NHS, who makes final decisions and how is authority 
exercised?  
o Resource Control: Who controls the allocation of resources? 
NPM 
o Managerialsm: Do managers exercise significant influence and control over the 
way in which the TB control system functions, including over-ruling TB 
consultants? 
o Quasi-markets: Is there a rigorous contracting function in place between the 
purchasers and providers of TB services? Is there evidence of new agencies 
operating within the TB control system? Contracting out? 
o Control and Measurement: Are there defined performance measures and 
targets in place for TB service providers and managers? Are sanctions imposed 
if targets are not met? 
o Consumerism: Do current and former TB patients, or their advocates, play a 
significant role within London’s TB control system? 
Top-down pressure: Is senior NHS London and/or the Department of Health 
management active within London’s TB control system, pushing for reform and 
improvement? 
Having provided a critical overview of the two alternative theories to complexity 
theory applied retroductively in this research, the remainder of the chapter will discuss 
Kingdon’s (1995) theory on public policy development and agenda setting. This theory 
and related literature is introduced in response to the major inductive finding of this 
research – the low policy priority accorded to TB control in London – and will be 
revisited in Chapter Eight to facilitate a theorisation of this finding.  
Kingdon’s (1995) Theory on Public Policy Development 
Kingdon (1995) helps to conceptualise the scant interest in TB control in London in the 
midst of a resurgence of the disease, as will be shown in Chapter Eight .  His model 
seeks “to understand why some subjects become prominent on the policy agenda, and 
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others do not” (p.3). Kingdon concludes that three separate streams - problems, 
policies, and politics - must develop and then come together for public policy to be 
made and enacted (p.85). Each of these streams is described briefly, below.  
Kingdon’s Problems, Policies and Politics 
 
Problems 
Kingdon distinguishes “problems” from “conditions”, claiming “(c)onditions become 
defined as problems when we come to believe that we should do something about 
them” (p.109). He observes that problems are often identified in various ways, such as 
via routine monitoring by government officials, particularly when this monitoring 
indicates change from the previous state (pp.90-92). However, these indicators are 
subject to interpretation, including whether a crisis has occurred and, more generally, 
policy actors’ pre-existing notions, and what is “in the back of (their) minds” (pp.92-
95). Ongoing feedback (monitoring, complaints and casework) from existing programs 
is another source of information when considering whether a condition should be 
“upgraded” to a problem. Activists, or lobbyists, may also contribute insights (p.115). 
How, in addition to whether, a problem is defined, impacts the policy response. For 
example, if high costs are defined as the key problem in healthcare, “attention to more 
costly initiatives is dampened, and all present and proposed activities are scrutinized 
according to...cost” (p.115).  
Another consideration in defining a problem is the category into which a condition is 
placed. “People will see a problem quite differently if it is put into one category rather 
than another” (p.111), Kingdon argues. This is a particularly salient point for TB 
control. Kingdon observes “(t)here are great political stakes in problem definition” 
(p.110). These stakes, it is argued here, extend beyond the policy problem to the impact 
on individual policy makers.  
Policies 
Kingdon describes the world of policy formation as akin to natural selection, using the 
metaphor of a “primeval soup”. Ideas are like primordial molecules, with some more 
viable than others; some “bump into” and confront each other, sometimes combining to 
create something new and different (pp.116-117). The source of policy “molecules” is a 
policy community which operates largely outside of political events. The members of 
various policy communities may be tight-knit, or fragmented, meaning the policy 
options generated from within a community range from a coherent to a conflicting 
array of ideas on the same topic (pp.121-123). Whilst acknowledging that power and 
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influence play a role in developing policy alternatives, Kingdon focuses on the ideas 
themselves, stressing the importance of content and the intellectual exercise of debate 
and exchange which leads to policy alternatives being formed (pp.124-127). If a policy 
proposal is to emerge from the primeval soup, it must meet certain criteria, including 
technical feasibility, providing decent value, and being saleable to the public and 
politicians (pp.131-138). A short-list of alternatives eventually rises to the top of the 
primeval soup pot, with one idea gradually gaining prominence and support. The 
importance of identifying a solid, widely agreed alternative is key to ensuring policy 
change (p.142).  
Politics 
Kingdon’s political stream refers to “such things as public mood, pressure group 
campaigns, election results...and changes in administration” (p.145).  The national 
climate determines whether the ground is fertile enough for a particular seed of an idea 
to germinate, or whether a policy community should wait before actively pursuing an 
idea. As the public mood is cyclical, there is an acceptance that most ideas’ time will 
eventually come (pp.147-149). Kingdon assumes weak structural influence from the 
broader system and, writing from a US perspective, emphasises the role of pressure 
groups and lobbyists in mustering support and mobilising the vote in favour of specific 
policies (pp.150-153). UK parallels include the medical profession and patient groups 
(Klein 2010:40,273). The most obvious components of the political stream are elected 
officials and their staffs, and a change of administration is a powerful means of 
changing policy agendas – adding new ideas, dropping others.  
Joining the Streams Together 
Whilst the streams described above develop and function independently of each other, 
at some point they must come together for a policy alternative to advance and become 
enacted. This happens when a “policy window” opens: “(a) problem is recognized, a 
solution is developed and available in the policy community, a political change makes it 
the right time for policy change, and potential constraints are not severe” (Kingdon 
1995, p.165). Such windows usually open after a change in government or crisis 
(pp.166-168). A policy alternative’s time to shine is a short one, so the alternative 
needs to be fully developed and ready once the elusive policy window opens. 
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Population Level Considerations 
Dievler and Pappas (1999) analysed the policy response to the HIV/AIDS and TB 
epidemics in Washington, DC in the early 1990s using Kingdon’s model. Their study 
was undertaken at the population level, examining the impact of race and social class 
on the policy response to TB. The TB situation in DC was remarkably similar to 
London’s today, as the District battled a surprise resurgence of the disease. As in 
London, the authors note that TB was “confined to certain ‘places', that is, among the 
homeless on the streets or among those locked away” (p.1100). Further, the responses 
of the two cities were almost identical. In DC,  
the problem of TB never fully got on the government's agenda and many of the 
solutions that were developed and implemented were either inappropriate or 
unsuccessful...The bureaucracy responded defensively...creating a task force to 
develop a plan, meanwhile ignoring previously developed planning documents 
that were available and adequate to begin action. (pp.1098-1099).  
 
In DC as in London, it seems there was action but little change or improvement. Dievler 
and Pappas conclude (p.1095), “Social class considerations and racial politics shaped 
what policies were developed or not developed and implemented successfully or 
failed.” 
The Importance of Political Commitment   
 
Political commitment is a vital component in good TB control. Broekmans et al (2002), 
writing with regard to TB control in countries with a low incidence observe “essential 
elements of the WHO recommended strategy of tuberculosis control...are political 
commitment to tuberculosis control” (p.765) and 
(e)fficient tuberculosis control and ultimate elimination will not be possible 
without government commitment...demonstrated by: provision of the necessary 
basic infrastructure (in terms of funding, human resources and facilities) (and) 
effective technical leadership at a national level” (p.770). 
  
Discussing the deep political commitment within New York City to its programme of TB 
control, Coker et al (2004) note “(w)ithout the skills, advocacy and commitment” of 
various senior level city officials, including the Commissioner of Health, “it is unlikely 
the programme would have achieved as much as it did.” The authors continue: “whilst 
the publication of quantitative data...is common in peer-reviewed journals, the 
narrative exploration of other important factors, including the political, that might be 
important in ensuring success receive less attention. Yet...political commitment is 
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important in programme success.” Coker et al (p.222) conclude, “Whilst in New York 
City it is clear who is responsible for tuberculosis control, the same still cannot be said, 
15 years after the rates of tuberculosis started to climb, for London.”11  
A well rehearsed claim in public health circles, attributed to former New York City 
Health Department official Hermann M. Biggs in 1905, is that a “city can have as much 
reduction of preventable disease as it wishes to pay for. Public health is purchasable: 
within natural limitations a city can determine its own death rate.” Coker (1998:616) 
observes, “(t)he sentiments are as true today...it just depends on how much we are 
prepared to spend and how. Political will needs to be allied to a political and public 
health mandate.”  
Relatedly, Kingdon offers an important observation regarding whether a policy idea 
takes hold: “If the costs of paying attention are too high, otherwise worthy items are 
prevented from becoming prominent...if an unacceptable political cost would have to be 
paid, the item is shunted aside” (p.88). As shown later, this point is highly relevant to 
understanding TB control in London. 
Parallels Between Kingdon’s (1995)Model and Complexity Theory In his book’s 
post-conclusion, entitled “Some Further Reflections” Kingdon (1995:223-224) briefly 
discusses the “parallels” between complexity theory and his theory, citing three 
similarities: 
1. Both find pattern and structure in complicated, dynamic and unpredictable 
phenomena (e.g., the “simple rules” concept discussed earlier), with these 
structures emerging locally, “rather than being imposed from on high”(e.g., self-
organisation) 
2. A “residual randomness” remains even after the above structures are identified, 
“so that there is surprise and unpredictability”, and non-linearity between 
cause and effect 
3. Both models “are historically contingent” and initial conditions matter in 
determining how a system develops and changes 
 
These observations appear again in the updated, 2011 edition of Kingdon’s book, but, 
interestingly, the author did not further develop them. Various public management and 
public policy scholars writing from a complexity theory perspective cite Kingdon’s 
model, but this research could locate only two papers which attempt to build on 
Kingdon’s observations regarding similarities with complexity theory, and both do so 
                                           
11
 Nor, indeed, 24 years later, in 2012. 
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only briefly. Eppel (2009) likens Kingdon’s multiple streams model to a whole system, 
but her development of Kingdon’s theory from a complexity perspective is brief and 
non-empirical. Rhodes & Murray (2007) examine, empirically, a decision-making 
process within the Irish public housing sector from a “complex adaptive systems” 
perspective and Kingdon’s (1995) theory is introduced. But it is not used vis a vis the 
complexity theory sections of the paper nor in the discussion. Rather, it is narrowly 
applied and contrasted to the research’s own observed process of decision making, i.e., 
outside the complexity theory aspects of the paper. In Chapter Eight this research 
develops and elaborates upon the synergies between complexity theory and Kingdon’s 
theory, resulting in one of the major theoretical contributions of this thesis..  
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has reviewed the literatures relevant to the professional dominance and 
NPM frameworks, both of which are used as competing explanatory models to 
complexity theory in this research. Key components of professional dominance and 
NPM were highlighted, with areas of contest within each literature discussed. The 
chapter concluded by identifying the five “signs and symptoms” from within the 
professional dominance and NPM models which will be operationalised in the research. 
Kingdon’s (1995) theory on public policy development was also introduced and 
discussed, as it is used later to provide theoretical elaboration on the key inductive 
finding of this research; namely, the low policy priority accorded to TB control in 
London.  The next chapter builds on the discussion in this, and the preceding, literature 
review chapter by discussing research paradigms, research strategies and research 






CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the research philosophy, strategy and methods used in this 
study. It opens with a discussion on the various research paradigms available to social 
scientists, and then describes and defends the one ultimately chosen for this research. A 
researcher’s choice of research philosophy, or paradigm, is a vital consideration as it 
impacts subsequent decisions regarding research strategy, design and methodology, 
although the extent of this influence is contested and multi-strategy research is 
increasingly common (Henn et al 2006:18-22). After discussing research philosophies, 
the discussion turns to the research strategy, design, methodology and methods used in 
this study. It then shifts to a focus on the specific data collection methods and analyses 
used, including the limitations, challenges and other issues confronted during the 
course of the research. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion on ethics and how 
ethical concerns were addressed.  
Research Paradigms: Choices and Approach  
Ontology is concerned with “notions about the world” and is an area of philosophy 
“which indicates the necessary features of which exists” (Danermark et al 2002:206). 
Ontology, or assumptions about the nature of the world, and epistemology, or 
assumptions about the nature of knowledge (Henn et al 2006:18) have tended to shape 
the methodologies which researchers use. Those who assume that objective reality 
exists and is “knowable” tend to rely on approaches grounded in the “scientific method” 
and quantitative approaches to “measure” aspects of this reality. In contrast, those who 
assume that reality is socially constructed and that knowledge is always subjective tend 
to rely on qualitative methods. This will be discussed in more detail below.  Another 
dimension to the research paradigm choice surrounds the goals of the researcher. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979), for example, differentiate approaches aimed at measuring 
or exploring the status quo in contrast to those aiming to effect change. In general, 
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“critical” approaches, regardless of their prevailing assumptions about the nature of 
reality and our ability to know it, have a change-oriented or emancipatory agenda.  
Some critical researchers focus on structural change (like Marxists and Radical 
Feminists), and others on the agency of individuals, typical of more “liberal” 
approaches (Klein 1999). 
As scholars have noted, there are increasingly blurred boundaries between the major 
paradigms and perspectives (Denzin & Lincoln 2005:183, Henn et al 2006:10), of which 
the emergence and growing acceptance of critical realism may provide further 
evidence. Critical realism is characterised by some as a middle-ground between 
objectivism/naive realism and subjectivism/relativism (Guba 1990:19-27). The section 
below explains why critical realism is an appropriate approach to the study of 
complexity theory 
Objectivism and Positivism 
Objectivists believe in the existence of an independent, immutable reality “out there”. 
Consequently, their study of this reality is well-supported by, and usually focuses on, 
measuring, counting, modelling and otherwise manipulating their collected 
observations. In general, positivists apply quantitative research methods. At its core, 
the function of positivist scientific inquiry is to establish and isolate laws of cause and 
effect. This, in turn, facilitates prediction within the object of study (Reed 1992:292). 
These causal laws are seen as essentially linear, even if they may involve multiple, and 
even disparate, variables. In an organisational context, identifying these laws, always 
via the scientific method, is seen as the means of securing control and engineering 
change within an organisation (Donaldson 1985).  This focus on predictability is an 
especially difficult position to reconcile with complexity theory, as complexity science 
owes its very existence to dissatisfaction amongst scientists, especially social scientists, 
with their ability to isolate causal effects using traditional, positivist approaches. 
Positivists take a deterministic view of causality and, regarding organisation theory, 
downplay the significance of human choice within organisations (Donaldson 1997). 
This is at odds with the view held by complexity theorists who see behaviour within 
complex organisations as emergent and inherently unpredictable beyond the short-
term 
Even when choice is exercised, the positivist argument goes, actors are not really 
choosing freely, as they are severely constrained by various organisational realities and 
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pressures. Organisations are seen as rational instruments of co-ordination and control, 
encompassing various environmental and functional necessities (Reed 1992:260).  
In contrast, complexity theorists believe that behaviour within organisations is 
emergent and unpredictable beyond the short-term. Human choice, agency, and 
reflexivity shape the functioning of organisations, particularly at the micro, or local 
level, where most self-organisation is thought to occur.  
Positivists maintain that the objective of social science is to study society scientifically 
and see measurement, sampling, statistical correlations and other tools of the scientific 
method as the only valid means of generating true knowledge (Brurell & Morgan 
1979:7, Donaldson 1985, Reed 1992:257, Klein & Myers 1999). However, positivism 
struggles to accommodate the subjectivity inherent in the scientific endeavour arising 
from the role of the scientist as creator and interpreter, and the notion that it will 
always be impossible to separate “facts” and the words and used to describe them 
(Wicks 1998).  
With regard to positivism’s relationship with theory, positivist research is more often 
focused on theory testing, rather than theory generation, although the latter does occur 
(Henn et al 2006:14).  Since prediction is highly valued in the positivist tradition, 
researchers most often deductively test models or hypotheses using quantitatively 
focused research methods in their efforts to falsify existing theory. Henn et al 
(2006:52) refer to this as the “theory-then-research” approach. 
 Clearly there are aspects of the study of organisations which lend themselves to 
measurement and other quantitative approaches - financial performance, productivity 
levels and wages settlements, for example. But organisational positivists argue that 
other phenomena, such as the distribution of organisational power, the effects of 
organisational structure, and authority, should also be captured quantitatively and can 
be studied in terms of independent and dependent variables (Pugh et al 1968, 
Donaldson 1985, and Hinings & Greewood 1988). Donaldson suggests quantitative 
studies could benefit from incorporating some qualitative elements, such as adding 
“select personality variables” to the other independent variables, in, for example, the 
study of organisational power distribution. The author does not suggest how this 
exercise might be approached, perhaps because qualitative research does not generally 
use variables. By breaking organisational functioning down into discrete variables, 
positivist research struggles with understanding and explaining how the organisational 
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system works as a whole. Easton (2010:120) observes that “(v)ariables are measures 
of things and not the things themselves” and they tell us nothing about the causes of the 
change which the variables may be designed to reflect.  
For positivists, if it cannot be measured, it is not important to our understanding. Such 
a reductionist effort highlights a significant shortcoming of applying the “scientific 
method” to organisation theory: “the confusion between a pedagogical device – the 
device of summarizing the upshot of one’s narrative in pithy little formulae – and a 
method for discerning truth” (Rorty 1985:2). Godfrey and Hill (1995:531) refer to this 
as “the scientistic error” in that it “equates measurability of a construct with its 
relevance in explanation.” This sort of thinking is highlighted by Power (1997:51) 
when he discusses the NPM-inspired practice of designing “organizations...to make 
them auditable”, as highlighted in the previous chapter.  
Positivists remain troubled by the notion of unobservables, accepting Flew’s caution 
against “attempts ...to go beyond...observation in order to inquire into first causes and 
ultimate ends”, accepting a distinction between finding reality, and making or 
interpreting it (quoted in Wicks & Freeman 1998:125). The puzzles of complexity 
theory, on the other hand, arise largely as a result of “generative mechanisms” (Bhaskar 
1975:49), which can be either exercised or latent and are often initially hidden to the 
scientist. Amongst other things, these mechanisms may be responsible for some of the 
non-linear and self-organising behaviours observed in systems, both of which are 
important considerations for complexity theorists who study organisations. For their 
part, positivists respond to the challenge of understanding these behaviours by 
engaging in reductionist efforts, as discussed in Chapter Three, in the belief that an 
increasingly fine-grained understanding of a system will eventually explain unexpected 
or puzzling results. This research takes the position that the study of complex 
organisational systems requires ontological and epistemological approaches which 
accept, without hesitation, the existence and importance of unobservable structures 
and mechanisms, of the sort Bhaskar refers to above. Positivism, despite its long and 
successful history within the physical sciences, is not able to offer this to a complexity 
theorist’s study of organisations. Nonetheless, even in the pure sciences, recent 
discoveries, particularly within particle and quantum physics, have forced a move from 
strict logical positivism to a more moderate instrumental positivism which accepts the 
presence of some unobservable elements (Godfrey and Hill 1995). In sum, then, 




Subjectivism and Interpretivism 
By the late 1800’s, an anti-positivist movement had emerged, centred in Germany and 
led by Max Weber, Wilhelm Dilthey and Edmund Husserl. However, this early 
movement “did not carry the day” and the “procedures and logic of the physical 
sciences” prevailed in the study of “the human realm” (Polkinghorne 1983:20). It was 
not until the 1970’s that subjectivism came into its own in the social sciences. This 
early anti-positivist approach developed in response to disquiet with positivism’s 
capacity to generate knowledge of both the “sphere of reality that exists because of 
human beings” and of the meaningful experiences which human beings generate 
(Polkinghorne 1983:21). Rather than striving for what was seen as an unobtainable 
objectivity on the part of the scientist observer, anti-positivists believed human 
experience and subjectivity should be confronted and should inform the object of study 
(Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991). As previously noted, this notion of whether there exists a 
hard, objective reality “out there” or whether reality is a subjective social construction 
is the key distinction between a positivist approach and an anti-positivist, interpretivist 
approach.  
Interpretivists contend that researchers act as participants rather than mere observers 
during the process of knowledge generation and that value-neutral observations are 
not possible. They contend that language is a pre-condition of the facts which we use to 
describe and interpret reality, although not necessarily of the entity or reality itself 
(Fleetwood 2005). Interpretivists argue against the existence of social structures 
outside of the mental models which they believe create them (Burrell and Morgan 
1979:28-32, Fleetwood 2005). “From the standpoint of the interpretivist paradigm, 
organisations simply do not exist” (Burrell and Morgan 1979:260). Nonetheless, 
interpretivists are amongst those scholars most actively studying organisations 
(Mintzberg & Waters 1982, Bennett & Ferlie 1994). 
In contrast to positivism, with its conviction that observed patterns of the past will 
repeat themselves, interpretivist researchers believe in placing the object of study in its 
historical and social context to show the important role these contexts play in creating 
the current situation (Fleetwood 2005, Klein & Myers 1999). This belief in the value of 
context over predictability naturally points to an acceptance of dynamism within 
systems, an important aspect of complexity theory. A key component of this dynamism 
is the interaction between and among the people and events which comprise social 
systems. These relationships are ever-changing, based on shared norms and interests, 
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and have a two-way, dialectical effect on the system and its components (Orlikowski 
1991). People change the system and are in turn changed by it. Since the study of 
complex systems is largely the study of relationships, the utility of an interpretivist 
perspective is clear. 
The “hermeneutics of suspicion”, a key element in the work of critical social theorists 
such as Jϋrgen Habermas and Michel Foucault, is also consistent with some research 
taking a complexity theory perspective. Critical theorists question how certain social 
constructions are used to promote favoured options and outcomes and aim to 
understand phenomena such as power dynamics and vested interests (Klein 1999). 
Engaging in such questioning has emancipatory potential. Even if it is not an objective 
of most complexity theory research, the value of empowerment, of understanding the 
impact of relationships, and of enhancing social equality is evident in the work of some 
complexity researchers (Levin 2002), including those studying the public and social 
enterprise sectors (Houchin & MacLean 2005, Rhodes & Donnelly-Cox 2008), and 
scholars analysing culture as a complex adaptive system (Boisot 1999). In this regard, 
again, an interpretivist approach is consistent with some complexity theory research.  
Interpretivists view causality as arising from so many factors in each and every event 
that it is impossible to determine the roles played by any of them, meaning “they can 
only provide their own interpretation” (Easton 2010:118). They contend that “events 
are determined by potentially infinite causalities...and..any explanatory power derived 
from this approach is inescapably partial” (Mir & Watson 2001:1172). As noted earlier, 
complexity theorists, whilst rejecting linearity in cause and effect, believe in causality, 
often arising from some form of self-organisation. Consequently, adopting a research 
approach which supports the notion of causality is important here. This study’s 
objective of elucidating the structures and mechanisms at play within complex systems 
involves explaining the potential causal factors within these systems. Consequently, 
interpretivism’s position on causality does not offer a strong platform for meeting this 
research objective. This weakness is underscored by what Fleetwood says are 
interpretivism’s “emaciated” explanations, arising from its tendency of “downgrading 
extra-discursive entities”, resulting in an “impoverished” ontology (Fleetwood 
2005:214). 
With respect to its relationship with theory, and in contrast to positivism, 
interpretivism adopts an inductive “research-then-theory” approach and is focused on 
theory generation, rather than theory testing (Henn et al 2006:53). Since prediction is 
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not a priority, and since interpretivists are interested in understanding aspects of 
human behaviour which are not readily measured (Henn et al 2006:16), qualitative 
research methods are the preferred tool of the interpretivist researcher, although 
quantitative methods are sometimes used. 
So despite some clear aspects of utility, interpretivism on its own is not sufficient to 
meet the needs of this complexity theory study.  Since interpretivists argue “there is no 
reality to be discovered” (Easton 2000:215), or that what is called reality is purely a 
social construct (Easton 2000:207), the study of causality, so important to complexity 
theory research, becomes extremely difficult. On the other hand, positivism’s embrace 
of linearity, focus on measurement, and discomfort with unobservable structures and 
mechanisms, rendered it ultimately insufficient for this study, too. Critical realism, as 
argued below, fills these gaps and provides an ontological platform (recognising that 
reality exists) along with an epistemology (our understanding of reality is subject to 
historical and other influences) appropriate for this research.  
Critical Realism 
The foregoing discussion illustrates why positivism and interpretivism both fall short 
in offering a sufficiently robust ontological and epistemological platform for complexity 
theory research, particularly in the study of a large, organisational system. Critical 
realism is an approach which fills the identified gaps, offering complexity theorists 
working in the social sciences a strong philosophical grounding for their research, in 
some respects combining the ontology of positivism with the epistemology of 
interpretivism. Critical realism on the one hand assumes that reality exists 
independently of our representation of it, but also acknowledges that our knowledge of 
it is shaped by historical and other influences (Reed 2001, Blaikie 2007, Bhaskar 1975, 
Sayer 2000). 
Critical realism can trace its origins to the work of Aristotle, although modern critical 
realism is seen to have emerged first through the writings of American Maurice 
Mandelbaum in the mid-1950s. But it is the work of British philosopher Roy Bhaskar 
which has inspired much of the significant and growing interest in the field over the 
past three decades (Hatch 2006:329).  Bhaskar’s initial efforts focused on developing 
what he alternately termed “transcendental realism” and “scientific realism”. His 
objective was to provide an alternative to the significant limitations he sees inherent in 
empiricism/positivism, rationalism and constructivism as approaches for 
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understanding the natural sciences (Bhaskar 1975). In 1979 Bhaskar extended this 
argument to cover the human sciences by writing The Possibility of Naturalism, his 
attempt to address what he saw as “the social scientific malaise” (p.25).  
Bhaskar’s work has been described as a program of “modest objectivism” (Reed 
2001:222, quoting Layder 1997), and Blaikie describes critical realism as “a middle 
way between Positivism and Hermeneutics” (2007:147). Danermark et al (2002:202) 
refer to critical realism as a “third way”, but stress that it is “not a conflation of, or 
compromise between” objectivism/positivism and subjectivism/interpretivism.  For 
example, Bhaskar argues that objects like the mechanism of natural selection and the 
specific gravity of mercury would exist even if we did not know about them. He 
combines this perspective with a view of knowledge and science as being socially 
produced, iterative and antecedent (Bhaskar 1975:60-62). Critical realism is concerned 
with two “objects of knowledge”: the “transitive” (the theories, facts, models and 
paradigms that we develop) and the “intransitive” (the world which we are studying, 
including its mechanisms and structures, which exists independently of our study of it). 
Transitive knowledge is used to understand intransitive objects (Bhaskar 1979:14). 
Bhaskar (1975) develops some important and useful arguments and devices for 
organisation theorists and complexity theorists alike, particularly those with an 
interest in critical perspectives. These include: 
o a view of causality that acknowledges its often non-linear nature in open 
systems;  
o a description of reality in which social systems exist in three levels: empirical 
(observable), actual (expressed but not necessarily observable), and real 
(where events actually happen, where the structures and mechanisms of our 
world lie); and, 
o a contention that social systems are hierarchical and nested, with discursive 
activity occurring among the levels. 
Critical Realism as a Means of Explaining Generative Mechanisms, 
Causality and Non-linearity 
Critical realism is concerned with identifying and examining persistent relationships 
and the relations between these relations (Bhaskar 1979:36). Contrary to positivism, it 
offers a means of explaining the dynamics of change by arguing that objects and 
phenomena can be studied by means other than direct observation (Bhaskar 1975:45-
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46). Danermark et al (2002:203) observe, “Where empirical research finds a ‘flat’ 
reality, reducible to events that can be observed, critical realism sees a deep dimension, 
comprising the mechanisms that produce events in the world”. Realism, including 
critical realism, argues for a fundamental shift in how we evaluate scientific criteria, 
“away from the search for truth and toward the search for adequate explanation” 
(Godfrey & Hill 1995:524).  Unobservable objects of interest include the generative 
mechanisms which cause change, and these mechanisms are characterised by 
“tendencies”, as opposed to “laws” (Bhaskar 1975:50). As they do not involve strict 
laws of cause and effect in the positivist sense, generative mechanisms do not facilitate 
prediction, or at least not beyond the short term. However, by helping scientists 
understand their object of study, these generative mechanisms do provide a means of 
potential emancipation for members of systems. This result arises when researchers 
demonstrate certain societal understandings to be false, thereby revealing as 
questionable the outcomes which these understandings produce (Bhaskar 1979:32).  
Understanding the role of generative mechanisms within natural and social systems is 
important. In fact, the primacy given by critical realists to identifying mechanisms is the 
major distinguishing feature between critical realists and interpretivists, with the latter 
focused on identifying meaning in social action and social artefacts. Surfacing the 
generative mechanisms within a system requires looking beyond the “constant 
conjunction of events” (Tsang & Kwan 1999:762) which produces some sort of pattern 
to discover what actually causes the regularity. As Sayer observes, “What causes 
something to happen has nothing to do with the number of times we have observed it 
happening” (Sayer 2000:14). Researchers working from a critical realism perspective 
have sought to identify generative mechanisms in fields as varied as organisational 
studies (Reed 1992, 2001), management (Fleetwood 2005), marketing (Easton 2010), 
crime (Pawson & Tilley 1997), geography (Byrne 1998), regional economic 
development (Chiles 2004), and higher education (Sayer 2000).  
Within healthcare research, the widespread use of Pawson & Tilley’s (1997) evaluation 
model speaks to the perceived value and applicability of critical realism in that field. 
Pawson & Tilley’s work is firmly grounded in critical realism, and focuses on the 
importance of context and of identifying mechanisms during evaluative studies which 
typically seek to move beyond interpretations of the organisational context to assess 
programme effects. Healthcare studies using this model include an insightful study into 
TB control by Atun et al (2004), a study of the NHS national bookings services (Ham et 
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al 2003), and an evaluation of a £21 million healthcare modernisation initiative in 
London (Greenhalgh et al 2009)12. Wilson & MacCormack argue that critical realism 
should inform future clinical practice development evaluations (2006) and Hanly 
(1995) discusses the merits of a critical realist approach in informing the field of 
psychoanalysis. 
Critical realists and complexity theorists both accept causality as important and spend 
considerable effort trying to identify causal factors. They do not, however, accept that 
causality is either linear or predictable. Rather than joining the positivist search for 
immutable laws to explain cause and effect, they seek to identify general tendencies 
(Danermark et al 2002:74). Critical realists emphasise the importance of both context 
and the enabling and constraining factors which act on events (Sayer 2000:15; Pawson 
& Tilley 1997:58, 69; Byrne 1998:113; Fleetwood 2005). This focus on context is 
another reason why a critical realist perspective is well suited to this research and to 
complexity theory research generally. By incorporating a degree of constructivism in 
their analyses, critical realists accept that there will always be a “difference between 
our descriptions of reality and the reality that is described”, and that these descriptions 
are derived historically and culturally, whilst accepting that “this does not mean that 
the nature of the things known would be different” (Hughes & Sharrock 1997:165).  
Critical realist inquiry aims to explain the absence of linear causality and to validate the 
often non-physical nature of causality. This is not an exercise in simply identifying 
intervening variables or deciding whether the relationship between variables is direct 
or indirect. Rather, the task involves developing a theory regarding why the processes 
at play behave and interact the way they do to produce the regularity in question 
(Pawson & Tilley 1997:67-68). In developing causal explanations, a critical realist 
distinguishes between what must happen and what could happen (Sayer 2000:27). The 
researcher identifies how “X” is possible and “what properties must exist for X to be 
what X is” (Danermark et al 2002:110). Further, these explanations characterize causal 
mechanisms and structures in terms of their systems of relations and the relationships 
which comprise them (Reed 2001), an important component of complexity theory 
research. Coming to know these mechanisms is “the arduous task of science”, and 
depends upon a combination of “intellectual, practico-technical and perceptual skills” 
(Bhaskar 1975:47).   
                                           
12
 Although, as noted by Greenhalgh et al (2009:412), “identifying the mechanisms of change for 
different activities in a large-scale modernization effort was far more difficult than Pawson’s widely 
cited textbook implies”.   
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The manner in which these generative mechanisms exercise their causal tendencies is a 
highly contingent and contextual affair and may result in any number of outcomes. 
Further, these tendencies may or may not be expressed or visible (Sayer 2000:12, 
Bhaskar 1975:45-46). Because of this, critical realism is a particularly applicable 
program for research involving potential non-linear causality. It is the job of the 
researcher working within the critical realism paradigm to parse out which of the 
properties and mechanisms are key to an object’s existence and which are not. For this 
reason, predictability is not seen as possible, but explanation is. Critical realism 
recognizes “that what has happened or been known to have happened does not exhaust 
what could happen or have happened” (Sayer 2000:12).  
Agency and Structure in the Critical Realism Program 
Generative mechanisms provide a means of explaining human agency. Owing to its 
ontological basis in both objectivism and subjectivism/constructivism, or its focus on 
transitive and intransitive objects of knowledge, critical realism takes an even-handed 
approach to the agency-structure debate. Whilst post-modernist constructivists reject 
the duality of agency and structure (Fleetwood 2005), vitally, critical realism 
steadfastly refuses to collapse agency and structure into one element. Rather, critical 
realists maintain that actions presuppose existing structures, which are themselves the 
result of prior actions (Sayer 2000:18). Structures do not exist independently of the 
activities which comprise them (Reed & Harvey 1992). Structures are “causally 
efficacious” when it comes to their impact on actors and their actions – they both 
enable and constrain. It is for this reason that the outputs of some generative 
mechanisms are neutralized or unobservable, despite the generative mechanism 
having performed as usual. For example, a healthy, able person has the capacity to 
work whether she is currently employed or idle. She could become employed or remain 
idle owing to any number of enabling or constraining events acting upon the current 
“structure” of her unemployment (Sayer 2000:11-12).  
The combination of critical realism plus complexity theory acknowledges the 
importance of human agency in potentially disturbing the generative mechanisms 
within systems. It is at the heart of the argument that, in some circumstances, we can 
intervene in systems to achieve desired outcomes (Byrne 1998:118). This reveals the 
emancipatory potential of the critical realism paradigm, as discussed earlier, and 
contributes to critical realists being “critical”, rather than just being “realists” or 
“scientific realists”. Unlike positivism, critical realism does not claim to be a value-
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neutral “scientific” paradigm. “When we lay bare the generative mechanisms at the 
social level, we thereby also explain social phenomena in terms of social causes. These 
are produced by people and can be changed by people” (Danermark 2002:201). In 
terms of TB control in London, an example of the emancipatory potential of critical 
realism is that by revealing the mechanisms responsible for keeping TB as a low 
healthcare priority, it becomes possible to take steps to address this situation. 
Recognising the importance of human agency also means the critical realism program 
is well positioned to support analyses of how novelty and change arise within complex 
systems (Reed and Harvey 1992, Byrne 1998). Change, or the generation of novelty, is 
explainable because it is not necessary to directly observe the generative mechanisms 
responsible for causing the change or novelty (Bhaskar 1975:46). For critical realists 
and complexity theorists alike, agency is central in determining problems, their 
components and the rules which define them.  
Critical Realism and Its Methodological Alignment with Complexity Theory 
Social scientists Michael Reed and David Harvey were amongst the first to propose that 
Bhaskar’s work in “transcendental realism”, as the critical realism program was once 
known, was a natural complement for what they termed a new science of “dissipative 
systems” - soon to become widely known as “complexity theory” (Reed& Harvey 
1992:354). They saw the merger of Bhaskar’s philosophical ontology of 
transcendental/critical realism with the scientific ontology of “dissipative systems” as 
giving rise to a new meta-theoretical perspective and providing a much needed and 
useful tool for social scientists. Byrne (1988), whose work on complexity theory and 
tuberculosis informs this research, endorses Reed and Harvey’s arguments regarding 
the compatibility of complexity theory and critical realism, stating that it “informs” his 
complexity theory research, too (Byrne 1998:64). Fuller and Moran (2001) espouse a 
similar position, and the argument for a meta-theoretical approach as envisaged by 
Reed and Harvey (1992) is put forward again, 15 years later, by Blaikie (2007:210-
212).  
Despite the cautious approach adopted by conventional social science toward critical 
realism, I believe it provides the most suitable research paradigm for this thesis. The 
following five points summarise the main reasons, based on the foregoing discussion, 
for this choice:  
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1. it focuses on identifying and understanding the role of generative mechanisms 
in observed social phenomena (Bhaskar 1975, Danermark et al 2002); 
2. scholars have defended its high applicability to the analysis of complex 
organisational systems (Reed & Harvey 1992, Byrne 1998); 
3. it emphasises the vital role played by the broader context of which the observed 
phenomena are a part (i.e., the wider social and organisational environments) 
(Sayer 2000, Byrne 1998, Fleetwood 2005, Pawson & Tilley 1997);  
4. it is indifferent to the number of units or entities involved in the study (Easton 
2010); and, 
5. it supports research in which there are relatively objective outcomes; in this 
study the number of TB cases, for instance. (i.e., real people get real TB and it is 
not just a social construction.)  
These features make the paradigm particularly suitable for answering the questions 
posed by this research (as detailed in the next section), are useful for understanding 
and explaining the impact of complexity theory features like self-organisation, 
historicity and non-linear causality, and for understanding the role of unobservable 
structures and mechanisms. And finally, critical realism, with its systemic focus, is 
compatible with the case study method and its approach to knowledge generation 
(Tsoukas 1998, Byrne 2005), as discussed later in this chapter. 
Having discussed issues surrounding research paradigms and the choice of critical 
realism for this study, the chapter now moves on to discuss, first, the research 
questions which guide this thesis, and then the specifics of the research strategy and 
research method used. 
Research Questions 
A starting point for research design is the formulation of questions including “what?”, 
“why?” and “how?” The first – “what? – addresses  a “detailed account...and reporting of 
the characteristics of some population, group or phenomenon, including establishing 
regularities” (Blaikie 2000:72). This research tries to understand the nature of the 
organisational response to TB in London and the role of complexity theory in 
facilitating this understanding. The second - “why” – “establishes the elements, factors 
or mechanisms that are responsible for producing the state of, or regularities in, a 
social phenomenon” (Blaikie 2000:72). Here the “why” questions focus on establishing 
the mechanisms underlying the organisational response, determining what these 
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mechanisms are and how they explain empirically observed phenomena. “How?” 
questions are concerned with “identifying practical interventions and outcomes with 
the objective of bringing about change” (Blaikie 2000:61) and are beyond the scope of 
this research, although potentially beneficial interventions likely become clear by the 
end of the thesis. Specifically, this research addresses the following questions: 
1. What is the nature of the organisational response to resurgent TB in London? 
2. What is the contribution of complexity theory features (and/or professional 
dominance and/or New Public Management features) in analysing the 
organisational response to this phenomenon? 
3. Why does the organisational response to resurgent TB in London illustrate 
these features?, i.e., what are the mechanisms and structures which explain this 
organisational response? 
4. Does complexity theory provide a theoretical basis for understanding the role 
of the New Public Management paradigm and practices within this case? 
5. What perspective might Kingdon’s (1995) theory of public policy development 
offer on TB control in London? 
 
Research Strategy, Methodology and Methods 
Nature of the Research  
This research is qualitative in its approach, taking the form of a single, but large, 
longitudinal, multi-organisation case study; namely, the system responsible for 
controlling and treating tuberculosis in metropolitan London. As discussed at length in 
the previous chapter, the boundaries of the study necessarily extend beyond the NHS to 
include other TB stakeholders, all broadly diverse in size, function and form. These 
include small to large-sized organisations such as the Department of Health, the NHS, 
NHS London, particularly its public health and commissioning support functions, the 
Health Protection Agency, including some Health Protection Units, and the Find and 
Treat team. The research also extends to the voluntary sector; namely, TB Alert (an 
awareness raising and advocacy organisation). Physically, the research encompasses 
the five geographic healthcare sectors of London: South East; South West; North East; 
North West; and North Central, and includes all 31 Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), or 
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boroughs.  While broad, these boundaries are consistent with a systems view of 
organisations, the approach adopted for this research.  
As a logic of enquiry, or as its overarching research strategy, this research uses 
retroduction, “the interplay of induction and deduction...central to the process of 
scientific discovery” (Ragin & Amoroso 2011:76). Why retroduction is the best choice 
of research strategy for this work is discussed below, with a focus on the specific model 
of the retroductive process used in this study. A combination of narrative form and 
Miles & Huberman’s (1994) method of data reduction, display and conclusion drawing 
were used to “feed” Ragin & Amoroso’s (2011) model of retroductive inquiry. The 
narrative form is used to present and discuss empirical findings, which in this research 
mostly take the form of a series of smaller case studies. The resulting narrative reveals 
the relationships which characterise London’s TB control system, along with key 
aspects of the system’s history, retaining “the holistic and meaningful characteristics of 
real-life events” (Yin 2003:2) associated with case study research . However, the scope 
and volume of data collected required that it be manipulated to become more usable 
and manageable for conclusion drawing and theory generation, which is where Miles & 
Huberman’s guidance proved useful. Software (HyperResearch) assisted with coding, 
textual analysis, data organisation and surfacing themes. Details regarding the case 
study method and the data analyses used are discussed later in this chapter and in 
Appendices B and C.  
Research Strategy  
The research strategy most closely associated with critical realism is retroduction 
(Blaikie 2000:108-114; Blaikie 2007:82-84; Danermark et al 2002:73; Pawson and 
Tilley 1997, Reed 2009).  Whilst it is not a new logic of enquiry, retroduction has a 
limited history of use within the social sciences, likely because its traditional focus on 
model building makes its application outside the natural sciences challenging (Blaikie 
2007:84,85) and perhaps incompatible with the nature of much social science research. 
However, Bhaskar (1979:20), Blaikie (2000, 2007) and Reed (2009), all specifically 
cite its utility within the social sciences. Critical realists are not purists. Blaikie observes 
that combining research strategies is a means of avoiding “unnecessary restrictions on 
the conduct of social research” (Blaikie 2000:262), a point also taken up by critical 
realist Sayer (2000). Critical realism scholars note that the program “does not...exclude 
any method a priori, but the choice of method should be governed...by what we want to 
know and...by what we can learn with the help of different methods...We have labelled 
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this working procedure ‘critical methodological pluralism’“(Danermark et al 2002: 
204).  
Although retroduction has been characterized as “deduction+”, there are two vital 
distinctions. First, deduction is concerned with prediction and building predictive 
models whereas retroduction has no such pre-occupation. Second, deduction is 
concerned with identifying patterns, whereas retroduction’s job is to surface the 
generative mechanisms and structures which give rise to these patterns in the first 
instance. Blaikie (2007:83), citing Bhaskar, characterises retroduction as peeling back 
the layers of an onion in an effort to expose relationships and different levels of reality. 
A retroductive research strategy’s objective is explanation, not prediction. And 
explanation is only possible when a regularity (i.e., an outcome) is described in terms 
of the relevant causal mechanism(s) in combination with the context in which it occurs 
(Pawson and Tilley 1997:67-72), or when the question “what qualities must exist for 
something to be possible?” is answered (Danermark et al 2002:81). Put another way, 
while employing the traditional hypothetico-deductive method answers the question 
“what follows from these premises?”, retroduction asks “from what premises can this 
anomaly be shown to follow?” (Hanson 1971:66). 
There is limited literature on the practical application and operationalisation of 
retroduction in the social sciences. Blaikie (2000:108-114, 2007:82-84) and 
Danermark et al (2002:108-111), two leading proponents of the use of retroduction in 
the social sciences, are simultaneously prescriptive and abstract in their explanations, 
and short on empirical examples. Blaikie suggests researchers build models with the 
objective of revealing the unobservable generative mechanisms causing the pattern of 
interest, testing this model in the form of hypothetical descriptions and then identifying 
the constraining and enabling factors as well as the context and contingencies at play 
(Blaikie 2000:109-112). However, he concedes that the emphasis on model-building 
arises from retroduction’s more frequent application in the natural, as opposed to the 
social sciences, and does present challenges for social scientists (Blaikie 2007:82-84). 
Danermark et al (2002:108-111) prescribe a six-step method of retroductive analysis 
in which researchers move from the concrete to the abstract and back to the concrete, 
but they also stop short of offering any worked examples. Similarly, Tsoukas (1989) 
argues that while the data themselves can yield empirical regularities, abstract 




Ragin (1994:55-77) and Ragin & Amoroso (2011:57-78) adopt a slightly looser 
approach, as portrayed in Figure 16, and it is this model which largely guided this 
research. It is compatible with the narrative form (used in this study to produce the 
“images” noted below) and supports the use of the multiple theoretical frameworks 
applied in this research (complexity theory, professional dominance and NPM), each of 
which provided different inputs to the model’s “ideas/social theory” component. The 
model also facilitates a highly iterative approach to data analyses and theory 
generation. Gramling et al (1998:1084) remark that “not all theory building strategies 
are clearly classifiable as either inductive or deductive”, and retroduction, and the 
Ragin & Amoroso model, assisted this research in building theory inductively 
deductively, and retroductively as seen in Chapter Eight.  
 
FIGURE 16: A SIMPLE MODEL OF SOCIAL RESEARCH (RAGIN 1994, P 57, RAGIN & AMOROSO 2011, 
P. 60) 
 
In describing their model, Ragin & Amoroso (2011:75) observe 
...(r)esearchers link pieces of evidence together to make images. The analytic 
frame provides the context for creating and understanding the image, 
establishing conceptual boundaries around the evidence-based 
image...representations appear to audiences as finished products, complete 
with images and frames.  
117 
 
The authors also provide short, worked examples of their retroduction-based research 
strategy, and stress its particular value for case study research. Saether (1998) argues 
for its application within environmental science and the “greening” movement, 
sketching out how it might potentially be done, while Gramling et al (1998) use 
retroduction in a manner highly similar to that espoused by Ragin & Amoroso in their 
study of coping skills in young women. Gramling et al (p.1084) also specifically cite the 
utility of retroduction in building, expanding and/or clarifying theory, particularly 
when the phenomena under study “are complex and multi-faceted; truth is subjectively 
constructed and direct linkages of theory and research to context are crucial”; an apt 
description of this research. The Ragin & Amoroso model is consistent with Orton’s 
(1997) observation that the closing of the gap between data and theory can begin at 
either or both ends (data or theory) and may often iterate between them, as is the case 
with this study.   
Ragin & Amoroso (2011:130) observe that “(r)esearchers work back and forth 
between their ideas and their evidence, trying to achieve...a ‘double fitting’ of 
explanations and observations (that is, ideas and evidence). This process of double 
fitting is best understood as retroduction...”. While they do not use the language of 
“mechanisms and structures”, Ragin and Amoroso’s suggested approach, as captured in 
Figure 16, clearly facilitates Bashkar’s “peeling of the onion” – the elucidation of the 
generative mechanisms and structures at play within the phenomenon of research 
interest. Easton (2010:124) remarks that retroduction results in “the identification of 
mechanisms that explain what caused particular events to occur”, presumably the 
“representations of social life” referred to in Figure 16, above.  
Having described the use of the research strategy adopted in this study, the discussion 
now moves on to describe the research method used – the case study. 
The Case Study Method 
This research takes the form of a large, single case study comprising the multi-
component system responsible for TB control in London, which then further generated 
a number of sub-case studies to enable cross-case comparison. Within the case study, 
three different theories have been applied to ground data collection and analyses so 
that the initial preferred theory, complexity theory, is not imposed on the data a priori. 
Yin (2003:4,40) espouses such an approach for testing or expanding existing theory. 
Comparing and contrasting different conceptual models within a major case study is a 
well known analytical technique: for example, Allison’s (1971) study on decision 
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making in the Cuban missile crisis; Addicott et al’s (2007) exploration of three models 
of power within healthcare networks and Talbot’s (2010) use of a complexity theory 
lens (inter alia) to explore performance improvement in public services.  
Henn et al (2006:65-66) refer to the case study as a type of research design, while 
Blaikie (2000:10,213-226) frames it is a means of selecting data with a consequently 
vital impact on how findings and results can be generalised. Yin (2003:1-3), in turn, 
proposes that the case study is a research strategy. Regardless of the terminology, the 
reasons for choosing a case based approach vary, but case studies are well-suited for 
analysing the dynamics of organisational processes and for explaining how and why 
things happen as they do (Stake 1994, Pettigrew 1990).  
The Value of Case Study Research 
As discussed above, case based research is consistent with critical realism (Easton 
2010). The method has been noted as particularly useful for complexity theory 
research (Byrne 2005, Houchin & MacLean 2005, Klijn & Snellen 2009, Rhodes et al 
2011), and particularly so when the complexity theory research is also informed by 
critical realism (Byrne 2009, Reed & Harvey 1992). In other words, this study.  Further, 
the case study method has been identified as specifically useful for studying healthcare 
systems through a complexity theory lens because this approach supports analyses of 
the system from a holistic and dynamic perspective, holding promise for elucidating 
new insights (Anderson  et al 2005). 
The objective of case study research is to establish a causal argument about some social 
phenomena, its nature and how certain outcomes arise (Walton 1992:122). Case 
studies are useful for “observing the effects of otherwise unobservable, idiosyncratic 
effects” (Godfrey and Hill 1995:531), a consideration in this research. They are also 
effective for looking at the multiple levers and layers at play within organisations, for 
surfacing relationships through iterative analyses and for answering “why” questions 
(Eisenhardt 1989), again, all goals of this research. Also of significance for this 
research, case study research supports efforts to understand the relationship between 
the micro and macro levels under study:  
…our ability to offer a full, causal explanation of any phenomenon rests upon 
exploring the micro/macro connection: “What structural factors govern or 
influence patterns of individual choice, how are those choices constructed, and 
what are the structural consequences? (Vaughan 1992:182) 
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Blaikie (2000), Yin (2003) and Meredith (1998) offer spirited defences of the value of 
case study research and argue that it should in no way be seen as inferior to its more 
traditional and positivistic cousin, the “scientific” or experimental method. They argue 
that the combination of sound data collection, observation, triangulation and logic 
which characterizes case studies is every bit as valid as the mathematics and statistics 
used by rationalist researchers, and that case studies have the added benefit of 
capturing contextual and temporal richness, particularly important features in 
complexity theory research. Ragin (1992:4-5) remarks that “variable-oriented 
comparative work...as compared with case-oriented comparative work, disembodies 
and obscures cases.” Byrne (2009:4) argues that the increased interest in case study 
research arises from dissatisfaction with the use of variable-based modelling when 
trying to understand causality, again a relevant point for complexity theory research 
such as this.  
In terms of theory development, the case study method has been shown to be a valid 
tool, particularly in a younger field of research (Eisenhardt 1989, Ngwenyama & 
Nørbjerg 2010). Theory building is generally an incremental process, in the Kuhnian 
sense, building on previous empirical research efforts. However, in the absence of a 
significant body of empirical work, as with organisationally focused complexity theory 
research, “theory building from case research is particularly appropriate” (Eisenhardt 
1989:548). This is so for two reasons: (a) theory building from case studies does not 
require either prior literature or empirical data; and, (b) the process of theory 
generation used with case studies is highly iterative, often surfacing conflict and 
paradox within findings (Eisenhardt 1989). This approach is likely to result in “the kind 
of novel theory which is desirable when extant theory seems inadequate” (p.548). 
Ragin (1992:224-225) observes that case study research makes an important 
contribution to the primary goal of all research, “to link the empirical and the 
theoretical – to use theory to make sense of evidence and to use evidence to sharpen 
and refine theory...produc(ing) theoretically structured descriptions of the empirical 
world that are both meaningful and useful.”  
Reliability, Validity and Generalisability of Case Studies  
Diefenbach (2009b:883), quoting Hammnersley, observes that an “account is valid or 
true if it represents accurately those features of the phenomena that it is intended to 
describe, explain or theorise”. Relative to quantitative research, qualitative research is 
generally viewed as having more validity, particularly internal validity, because of the 
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thick, rich descriptions it often generates, while quantitative research is usually 
thought of as being more reliable (i.e. replicable), because of its reliance on 
experimental and survey methods. Although Yin (2003) argues that not all case study 
research need be qualitative, one of the widely accepted strengths of qualitative case 
study research is its capacity to allow “investigators to retain the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real life events” (2003:2), the means by which internal 
validity is enhanced.  
Whilst case studies are sometimes criticised for lacking external validity, or 
generalisability, Yin (2003:37) counters this argument by pointing to case studies’ 
value in analytical generalisation by way of theory building. He cautions against 
comparing case studies with survey research which relies on statistical generalisation. 
Gillham (2000:12) and Yin (2003:31-33,37) observe that while there may be limits to 
generalising the particular findings of an individual case study, the theory which a case 
generates might indeed be generalised to other settings. This generalisation begins to 
“stake out ...causal processes...(and)...a different kind of universe is posited...The 
explanatory principles revealed in case studies are generalized because they can solve 
new problems, explore new terrain...”(Walton 1992:126). Byrne (2009:2) calls on 
critics of social science research to remember that the discipline does not aspire to 
establishing universal laws, and that a distinction must be maintained between 
generalising and universalising. He further argues that case based research in 
particular should be recognised as a useful means of “moving beyond a useless and 
destructive tradition in the social sciences that have set quantitative and qualitative 
modes...against each other” (Byrne 2009:9).  
Appropriateness of Method to this Research 
London’s TB control system is an appropriate and relevant site to inform a case based 
complexity theory study seeking to produce description and explanation (i.e., identify 
the mechanisms responsible for the empirically observed processes) because: 
 it has clearly defined geographical boundaries; 
 its objective, whilst unarticulated, is clear (to manage and control TB in 
London); 
 it is comprised of numerous (circa 70), largely independent, components, or 
subsystems; and, 
 it addresses a complex (public health) phenomenon. 
This study is qualitative in nature and used archival documents, semi-structured 
interviews and “detached” or non-participant observation to gather data. As discussed, 
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it is grounded within a critical realist research paradigm. As previously established, on 
its own, a positivist, quantitative approach to data collection and analysis would be 
neither sufficient nor appropriate to meet the aims of this research as the systemic 
relationships and interactions amongst subsystem components within the TB control 
system would be lost; “the entire social system and all of its elements” would not be 
seen “as a coherent whole” (Klijn & Snellen 2009:45). Further, positivists have 
difficulty accepting the existence of unobservables (Wicks & Freeman 1998), which are 
an important aspect of this research. Similarly, a purely interpretivist method also falls 
short because of that paradigm’s views that (a)organisations do not really exist 
(Burrell & Morgan 1979), and (b)that causality is essentially indiscernible (Easton 
2010). Consequently, a critical realism paradigm is most appropriate for this research 
as, in addition to being compatible with case study research, it (a) supports the search 
for causality via the identification of unobservables and generative mechanisms, and 
(b) assumes the existence of an independent reality “out there”, although our 
knowledge of this reality is incomplete, imperfect and shaped by theory (Easton 2010). 
These are both important aspects in meeting this study’s objective of answering 
“what” and “why” questions.  
Gathering Evidence in Case Study Research 
Before any research strategy can be applied, or data analysed, evidence and 
observations must be collected. Yin (2003:83) identifies three important 
considerations regarding case study data collection: using multiple sources of evidence, 
building a “database” of evidence and establishing a “chain of evidence” to make clear 
the links between questions, data and conclusions. Gillham (2000:18) remarks that the 
most important aspect of collecting data in case study research is striving at all times to 
keep an open mind.  
As noted earlier, since case study research can be either quantitative or qualitative, it 
accommodates the use of a variety of methods in gathering evidence. Gillham 




o “detached” observation 
o participant observation 
o physical artefacts 
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Readers are referred to Appendix B for detail regarding the specific data collection 
methods employed in this research, along with detail on the data itself. 
Data Analyses  
In order to “feed” Ragin & Amoroso’s (2011) retroductive research model (Figure 16), 
data resulting from the evidence and observations collected must be manipulated, or 
analysed, to produce the required “images” and, eventually, the “representations of 
social life”, or findings, of the research. The narrative method is used to present the 
empirical findings of this research (Chapters Six and Seven) and to assist with theory 
generation, as will be discussed shortly. Ultimately, it is used to capture the 
“representations of social life” to which Ragin & Amoroso (2011) refer, i.e., the findings 
and conclusions of this research. Miles & Huberman’s (1994) framework, as illustrated 
below in Figure 17, was used to generate the “images” required by Ragin & Amoroso’s 
model and to assist with validating the “representations of social life”, or findings, of 
this research. Miles & Huberman’s (1994) framework parallels Ragin & Amoroso’s 
model, particularly with regard to its iterative and recursive approach to reaching 
conclusions and in its ability to support inductive, deductive and retroductive research 
strategies. Combining the two models proved a useful method: the Miles & Huberman 
(1994) model provided valuable guidance in producing usable “images”, and the Ragin 
& Amorso model provided a means of theorising these images.  
 





A discussion of the key steps in Miles & Huberman’s (1994) framework, and details 
regarding its application in this research, are found in Appendix C. 
The Narrative Form 
As mentioned above, I have also employed the narrative form as a means of data 
presentation and theory generation in this research. Theory is, or can be, narrative in 
that it provides an explanation connecting cause and effect (Dimaggio 1995, Pentland 
1999). DiMaggio (1995:391) defines theory as “an account of a social process, with 
emphasis on empirical tests of the plausibility of the narrative”.  
Whether narrative and causal explanations are contradictory or alternative to each 
other, Elliott (2005:97) observes that even statistical associations are increasingly 
questioned with respect to their ability to show causality in the absence of 
underpinning explanatory theory. The apparent contradiction between narrative’s 
focus on capturing “time and place” and causal theory’s efforts to be timeless and 
capture an “essential reality” is increasingly contested. Elliott remarks that narrative 
form need not always equate with interpretivism, citing the concept of “narrative 
positivism” which “emphasizes temporality, context and contingency” (Elliott 2005:98-
99). Another example is the use of case studies in medicine.  
The ability of narrative thinking to capture context is important (Tsoukas & Hatch 
(2001). Critical realist research acknowledges the importance of context and 
contingency in determining the enabling and constraining factors which may impact 
events, including how, or whether, mechanisms are activated (Sayer 2000:15; Pawson 
& Tilley 1997:58,69, Byrne 1998:113; Fleetwood 2005). It largely accepts the 
interpretivist assertion that “causal forces...merely print little replicas on our retinas. 
From there on it is up to us to make something out of these replicas by telling a story” 
(Rorty 1985). Narrative is specifically recommended when working with a single case 
characterised by ambiguous situations and “variety and richness” (Langley (1999:695), 
as embodied by this research. And Ragin & Amoroso cite the use of narrative and, 
specifically “vignettes describing typical or exemplary cases” (2011:75), of which a 
variation is used in this research, in the form of the shorter, (sometimes) comparative 
case studies developed in Chapters Six and Seven.  
However, it is Tsoukas & Hatch’s (2001) convincing arguments regarding the value, 
perhaps even the necessity, of using the narrative form in organisation based 
complexity theory research, which is of most relevance for this study. As discussed at 
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some length in Chapter Three, one of complexity theory’s chief tenets is that prediction 
beyond the short-term is not possible, calling into question the utility of proposition 
testing within complexity based research. Specifically, Tsoukas & Hatch (2001) raise 
three significant limitations on the use of propositional-mode thinking in complexity 
theory research: 
1. Imperfect generalisations 
Propositions are generalisations, or rules. However, in real organisational life, 
people usually face circumstances which are unique and require unique, 
localised responses. Historical knowledge is of some, but limited, value in 
responding to current problems, but practitioners do need to understand how 
the current state of their organisation arose. This historical knowledge “cannot 
be provided by propositionally organized renderings of human experience...it 
requires a contextually sensitive narrative” (p.994). 
2. Tacit justification 
Implicit justifications are the reasons for having rules (i.e., if you do x, then y 
will follow). Paradoxically, sometimes it is necessary to break a rule in order to 
meet the justification. However, propositions cannot accommodate paradox 
because within propositions “the conclusion should deductively flow from the 
premises” (p.994). Also, implicitness means that justifications cannot be 
propositionally stated because “it would inevitably be based upon a further 
implicit justification and this...would be reproduced ad infinitum” (p.994) And 
whilst rules certainly exist for specific purposes, these purposes cannot be 
stated within the proposition; rather, narrative is required to explain why 
specified rules should be followed. 
3. Consistency and non-contradiction 
There is often a conflation of logic requiring both timeless rules and temporal 
causality within if-then statements. Some propositional statements have no 
temporal or causal elements (“If Euclid’s axioms are accepted, then the sum of 
all angles in a triangle is 180 degrees) while others (“If the temperature falls 
below 00 C, then the water begins to freeze”) have both. Owing to narrative’s 
“sensitivity to the temporal dimension of experience” it can reveal, and avoid, 
such conflations (p.995).  
 
To sum up, propositionally focused research is compelled to ignore the particular (1, 
above), the local (2, above), and the timely (3, above), which, combined, represent a 
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significant shortcoming for an organisational research study. Furthermore, 
propositions require that paradoxes be avoided, an incompatible scenario with the 
reality of complex systems. The narrative mode, on the other hand, supports the 
analyses of such organisational features (Tsoukas & Hatch 2001) which is why it is 
used in this study. 
The Use of Mini, Comparative Case Studies in this Research  
Narrative and, specifically “vignettes describing typical or exemplary cases” (Ragin & 
Amoroso 2011:75) are used this research. Such mini case studies are an effective 
means of data presentation because of their potential to reveal the systemic relations 
apparent within actual behaviours between and amongst the various components and 
actors within London’s TB control system. They reveal the system in action. The 
particular mini case studies used in this thesis capture especially revealing or trenchant 
episodes in the history of TB control in London, and often provide useful comparisons 
and/or relevant contrasts. Comparative case-based approaches fit well with complexity 
theory research, and case studies employing comparison are the “foundations of useful 
theoretical descriptions of the social world” (Byrne 2009:3). Comparisons are useful 
(a) to identify links between outcomes and case characteristics, i.e., causality patterns, 
including for the study of healthcare systems (Anderson et al 2005), and (b) to identify 
what is similar and dissimilar, assisting researchers in “the exploration of multiple and 
complex causality” (Byrne 2009:5). Two of the four case studies presented in this study 
are comparative in nature. 
Purposeful Sampling and Mini-Case Selection 
This research uses mini-cases selected using principles of non-probabilistic purposeful 
sampling to support relevant empirical analysis (Eisenhardt 1989, Miles & Huberman 
1994, Coyne 1997). A fundamental principle of purposive sampling is to locate and 
select empirical situations within which the phenomena of interest can be observed, 
instead of randomly selecting empirical situations for interrogation (Curtis, et al. 
2000). Blaikie (2000:197) observes that all social research requires its practitioners to 
exercise judgment regarding how they select cases for their studies. In the broadest 
sense, case selection takes the form of either probabilistic (i.e., random) or non-
probabilistic sampling. But beyond that, Blaikie argues, case sampling “is frequently the 
weakest and least understood part of research designs” (p.197). Coyne (1997) 
contends that if the processes surrounding case selection were made more transparent, 
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many of the concerns regarding the utility and value of qualitative research would be 
addressed.  
One type of non-probabilistic sampling is “purposeful” sampling, often referred to as 
“theoretical sampling” (Eisenhardt 1989), although some argue for the terms to be 
used distinctively (Coyne 1997). The case studies developed here reflect the concept of 
“purposeful sampling”, defined by Patton (1999) as sampling which  
...involves studying information-rich cases in depth and detail. The focus is on 
understanding and illuminating important cases rather than on generalizing 
from a sample to a population... Rigor in case selection involves explicitly and 
thoughtfully picking cases that are congruent with the study purpose and that 
will yield data on major study questions” (Patton 1999:1197). 
According to Blaikie (2000:205), “theoretical considerations” often inform case 
selection. Similarly, Miles & Huberman (1994:34) advise that sampling efforts should 
be relevant to the “conceptual frame and research questions” and also enhance the 
theoretical generalizability of the research.  For example, research studying the 
behaviour of mental health inpatients would be undertaken in mental health 
institutions and not in a diabetes outpatient clinic. Sometimes researchers will 
purposely choose cases which illustrate contrasting outcomes (as seen in mini case 
studies one and four in this research), or those which strongly embody certain 
theoretical elements under study, (as in case studies two and three here) (Blaikie 
2000:205). The cases were selected and developed in order to illustrate behaviours 
and phenomena of interest, consistent with the three initial frameworks chosen for the 
research. The frameworks guided the strategic choice of cases, dictating the cases’ foci 
and boundaries. Extensive discussions in supervision also informed case development.  
The shorter case studies presented in this research emerged from analysing a 
combination of data derived from interviews and field observations along with 
information culled from archival documents, particularly for the analytic history of TB 
control in London, comparing New York City’s response to their TB epidemic with that 
of London, and the (mini)case study which analyses a 13-year drug-resistant TB 
outbreak in London. .  Taken in their totality, the mini-cases also offer important details 
on the context in which London’s TB control system functions. A brief explanation of 
why each of the cases was selected follows. 
Case Study One: An International Comparison Between Tuberculosis Control in New 
York City and London 
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This comparative case was chosen as it illustrates a potential pattern of causality, or a 
link between the outcomes of TB control efforts in New York City and those in London, 
and the characteristics of each case. It provides a particularly stark contrast between 
the organisational structures of the TB control systems in the two cities. London’s 
system is highly fragmented and largely leaderless, whilst New York City’s system is 
verticalised, hierarchical and with clearly defined leadership (and accountability). It 
illustrates the impact of NPM organising principles on London’s TB control system; 
especially the fragmenting nature of the quasi-market and the power of managerialism 
(as seen in the quashing of the control board concept).  
Case Study Two: An Ongoing Outbreak of Drug Resistant TB in London 
Several complexity theory concepts are illustrated in this case, along with highlighting 
the dynamic between HM prison service, the healthcare system, the Department of 
Health and the HPA. It offers a clear illustration of the lack of co-adaptation which has 
come to characterise London’s TB control system, of the role of historicity in impacting 
how prisoner TB care is currently delivered, and of the non-linearity in response by the 
system to the drug resistant outbreak. It also demonstrates NPM-induced 
fragmentation within the prison healthcare sub-system, arising from the introduction 
of the internal market. 
Case Study Three: Creating the Health Protection Agency 
This case exemplifies a number of NPM-related precepts, mainly relating to the role of 
the quasi-market. Specifically, the creation of the HPA embodies disaggregation, 
agencification and hollowing-out within the healthcare system, and has lead to the loss 
of policy making capacity within the Department of Health. As with Case Study Two, 
this case also illustrates key aspects of the relationship between the Department of 
Health and the HPA, especially the lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities 
within London’s TB control system. Complexity theory concepts are surfaced, too, in 
this mini-case. For example, the HPA’s genesis can be seen as another segment in the 
long and ongoing saga of NHS hyper-reorganisations, i.e., demonstrating the role of 
historicity.  
Case Study Four: Two Self-Organising Initiatives, Two Very Different Organisational 
Outcomes 
Whilst mainly chosen to illustrate the complexity theory concept of self-organisation by 
contrasting the outcomes of two different nurse-led initiatives, the diametrically 
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opposed outcomes of the projects are discussed as resulting from the impact of an NPM 
induced need to control and manage risk. This case also offers evidence of the other 
four aspects of complexity theory discussed in this thesis (non-linearity, the role of 
historicity, the role of system diversity and system level co-adaptation).  As with the 
other cases, the dynamics between actors, mainly the NHS London and the Find & Treat 
Team, are also highlighted. 
The concept of “purposive sampling” implies that some empirical findings may not be 
included in each and every presentation of a research study, as is the situation here. 
The research undertaken for this thesis found some additional evidence of self-
organisation, the lack of system co-adaptation and non-linearity which is not presented 
in this thesis. These findings were, however, highlighted in Trenholm & Ferlie (2012) in 
two brief vignettes. First, a TB clinic in a socio-economically deprived borough in 
London provided a clear example of self-organisation which resulted in (minor) 
innovations within the TB control system. However, none of the clinic’s initiatives were 
replicated by other clinics, despite the initiatives being well known within the system. 
This points to a wider lack of learning, or co-adaptation across the system.  Second, 
minor evidence of some non-linearity was found in the ongoing, significant investment 
by government in x-ray machines at airports, the purpose of which is to detect TB in 
visitors or migrants to the UK. Despite solid evidence that performing random chest x-
rays is an ineffective tool for finding TB, investment in the program continued for years 
and is only starting to wind-down now.  
A decision was taken, again after discussion in supervision, not to include these two 
vignettes in this thesis for two reasons: (a) whilst interesting, their inclusion would 
simply have confirmed, rather than changed, the outcomes reported in this research 
(so they broadly confirmed the results of the more extensive vignettes that are 
presented here and did not change the conclusions of the thesis) and thesis word count 
limits were a concern, and (b) the data which gave rise to the vignettes was limited and 
not capable of supporting more sustained analyses than that presented in Trenholm & 
Ferlie (2012). It is also important to note that no significant empirical findings arising 
from this research have been omitted from this thesis. No other potential case studies 
were identified in fieldwork. 
Despite the contention that all sampling is purposive (Coyne 1997), during data 
analyses and case development I was consistently trying to identify phenomena or 
findings which were unexpected or inconsistent with what the three chosen theoretical 
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frameworks could be expected to “predict”. This approach is consistent with the 
concept that “all science is by negation”, making it vital that researchers consistently 
try to refute their conjectures and expectations. With specific regard to sampling, 
Patton (1990:178) refers to this approach as “confirming and disconfirming”, noting “it 
requires significant rigor and integrity” by the researcher. Maintaining such “rigour and 
integrity” was a consistent and constant concern during this research. 
In this research, two key conjectures, or expectations based on the applied theoretical 
frameworks, were refuted. First, and most importantly, medical consultants were not 
found to be a dominant force at the system level, contrary to the theory of professional 
dominance. Whilst they were the undisputed dominant forces within their TB clinics, 
this dominance was not maintained by the consultants at the system level, the potential 
reasons for which are discussed in Chapter Seven.  Second, the research found very 
limited use of formal contracting within the commissioning function for TB services, 
contrary to established NPM norms. Both of these issues will be revisited in later 
chapters. 
Limitations, Challenges and Other Issues  
This research was self-funded and, as such, was not conducted under the auspices of an 
official “sponsor” such as the NHS or NIHR. I anticipated this could make access more 
challenging, and it may have. On balance, however, most components of the TB system 
were co-operative, and indeed, supportive of this study.  
The London TB Commissioning Board sent a widely distributed e-mail to TB 
stakeholders, some of whom were no longer working within the Network, outlining my 
research, indicating their (non-financial) support and asking stakeholders to respond 
positively to my request for an interview. Whilst this proved most helpful, I was 
cautious at the time about becoming too closely associated with the TB Commissioning 
Board, as some people involved with TB control in London were, and remain, sceptical 
about its role. On reflection, this was not a valid concern as the people I interviewed 
assumed, correctly, that research of this nature could only be undertaken with the 
support of the TB Commissioning Board and they did not appear to perceive me as 
being unduly influenced by the Board.  
My main source of archival documentation was a combination of the TB Commissioning 
Board and other current and former TB professionals, some of whom had amassed 
significant personal TB archives which they were willing to share.  
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The HPA was less forthcoming in terms of document sharing, but was very agreeable to 
meeting observation and employee participation in interviews. The DH was less 
cooperative in terms of consenting to my attendance at its meetings, sharing 
documentation, or allowing current employees to be interviewed, aside from one 
individual.  The reasons underpinning the DH’s caution were never clear. 
Accessing documents from between 1988-2001 was challenging. This was largely due 
to a relative lack of activity during this time resulting in limited documentation being 
produced, especially until the mid-late 1990s. More generally, I had more limited 
success in accessing correspondence, e-mail, and other non-public documentation than 
I had hoped for. I attribute this to a combination of factors: many documents were 
destroyed or lost; informants often lack the time and resources required to gather and 
screen such information; and, nervousness about potentially revealing too much was 
another likely factor. 
I also interviewed two TB experts in Canada: the first was responsible for Health 
Canada’s (the DH equivalent) TB strategy; and the other was a public health leader of 
both the province of Quebec and the City of Montreal. My initial intention was to 
undertake a mini case study comparing London with Montreal, and comparing 
Canadian/Montreal TB policies with those in the UK/London, but I concluded that TB 
infection and control within these jurisdictions is too different to be fairly or usefully 
compared, despite both having high levels of foreign migration. (Montreal’s target TB 
rate is 3.5/100,000, which they seem generally to achieve, while London is struggling 
to contain its infection rate in the mid-40’s/100,000, as discussed in Chapter Two.)   
Finally, TB control in London is in the midst of what some participants describe as its 
most significant period of change ever. (Although many also feel, in terms of service 
delivery at least, nothing much ever changes other than job titles, and other superficial 
restructuring.) Regardless, when my data collection period began in late 2009, the TB 
control system was being re-organised with a view to facilitating a centralised, pan-
London approach to commissioning TB services, in recognition of the need to reduce 
duplication and increase standardisation. However, this effort quickly ran up against 
the very substantial organisational changes heaped upon the NHS by the coalition 
government elected in May 2010. These changes had a clear impact on the efforts of the 
TB Commissioning Board to reconfigure TB services. At the time of writing the future 
direction and shape of TB control in London remains unclear. During my upgrade 
presentation (from MPhil to PhD candidate status) in July 2010 I flagged this as a 
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potential issue and believe it is useful to identify it again. NHS restructuring efforts 
have resulted in staff turnover, busier-than-average work days, and a notable increase 
in overall anxiety levels, all of which may, in turn, have impacted my data collection 
efforts.  
Reflexivity 
Blaikie (2000:54-56) highlights the now widely accepted view that social science 
researchers must be reflexive in their approach to research, particularly when 
conducting qualitative research. Citing various scholars, he argues that neutral 
detachment from their research subject(s) is not possible for researchers; 
consequently, it is important that a researcher’s biases, values and assumptions be 
confronted and acknowledged. Writing with specific regard to case study research, 
Diefenbach (2009b:885) also notes the importance of researcher reflexivity, 
particularly in regard to selecting and analysing data, stressing “there is no chance to 
achieve any kind of positivistic (pseudo-)objectivity in the process...It is a creative 
process and its quality...is a result of the skills and courage of the researcher.” 
 
As a researcher, I had no prior knowledge or involvement with TB, the system 
responsible for controlling it in London or the English healthcare system. As I am not a 
UK native I had not formed any views on the effectiveness or efficiency of the NHS, 
although I do concede a bias in favour of publicly funded healthcare. Prior to pursuing a 
PhD I worked for almost two decades within the Liberal Party of Canada as a political 
and strategy advisor. The Liberal Party is best described as centrist, but with deep 
social democrat roots and a long history of pursuing and enacting equality-seeking 
policies. This is potentially material in that I share these Liberal values, a fact which I 
surely did not entirely succeed in suppressing whilst undertaking this research and 
subsequently writing this thesis. However, being acutely aware of these quite deeply 
held values means I have also tried to “manage” them as much as possible. My prior 
professional history also means I tend to see social issues from a public policy 
perspective, puzzling about how problems might be solved using the tools and tricks of 
the political trade. I’ve little doubt that it is why Kingdon’s agenda-setting theory 




Ethical considerations must be of great concern for researchers. After submitting a 
research outline, protocol and interview schedule for review in January 2010, King’s 
College Hospital Research Ethics Committee determined that separate NHS ethics 
approval was not required for my research. Following this determination, I received 
final ethics approval on 25 May 2010 from King’s College London, after which time I 
was able to start conducting interviews. A copy of the letter of approval from King’s 
College London and a copy of the approved research participant consent form, 
including the ethics approval code, are attached in Appendix D.    
Primary among ethics concerns is that informed consent is given and confidentiality 
and participant anonymity are assured. All interview participants provided signed 
consent forms which ensured their information would be treated confidentially and 
explained their right to withdraw from the research at any time. In terms of 
guaranteeing the safety and anonymity of the data, I took such safeguarding 
precautions as using password protection for all text and audio files, and locking 
documents, transcripts and other sensitive files in a secure location. 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has discussed issues related to the choice of research philosophy, 
methodology and methods relevant to this study: a single but large-scale qualitative, 
complexity theory-informed case study set within the healthcare system. The chapter 
outlined the critical realism paradigm and discussed at some length why it is the best 
choice for this research, rather than positivism or interpretivism. Next, the research 
questions which guide this study were introduced. These questions are “what” and 
“why” questions, as indicated by a study with description and explanation as its major 
goals. The use of retroduction as a research strategy was discussed. Then the case study 
method was detailed, highlighting its appropriateness for this research and discussing 
the specific research methods used. The discussion then moved on to issues related to 
data analyses, with an overview of how data was collected, managed and analysed in 
this research. Before closing with a discussion on how ethical concerns were addressed 
and the role of researcher reflexivity, this study’s use of narrative as a tool for data 
presentation and theory generation was highlighted.  
The next chapter marks the start of the presentation and discussion of the empirical 





CHAPTER SIX: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: PART ONE 
 
Introduction and Purpose of Chapter 
This chapter provides the analytic history of London’s TB control system at the macro 
and system levels. It provides: 
1.  an overview of the organisational and structural features of the system, 
comprised of multiple agencies and professions;  
2. an account of the present system’s recent history and how it has evolved to its 
current form: 
3. a review of the many studies and reports into London’s TB resurgence which  
accompanied this evolution, noting that most of the resulting advice and 
recommendations have been left unheeded; and, 
4. a mini-case study comparing the London TB control system to New York City’s.  
Providing such a retrospective view relates to the complexity theory concept of 
recognising the importance of “historicity” or “path dependence”, as outlined in 
Chapter Three. An analysis of a system’s history illustrates important systemic 
relations and their impact, such as those between the NHS, the Department of Health, 
and the Health Protection Agency, or the TB Commissioning Board and NHS London. 
This also manifests as “circularity” (Tsoukas 1998) which presents as ongoing action 
leading to little change, a defining feature of the London TB control system.  
Writing in the Introduction to the Special Issue on complexity theory in the journal 
Organization, (Tsoukas 1998:303) asks,  
How else could one hope to do justice to the historicity of the phenomena to be 
explained, if not by narrating how the actions of interacting agents and the 
occurrence of chance events, unfolding in time, have been intertwined to 
generate the phenomena at hand?  
Drawing inspiration from this observation, this analytic history of London’s TB control 
system helps “to do justice” to developing a complexity theory based understanding of 
the system. McKelvey (2003) observes that complexity science may best be described 
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as an effort to explain “order creation”. Implicit in this argument is the need for an 
historical overview of how the system (not just a single organisation) in question 
arrived at its current state.  
This chapter also argues that the overall public policy context in which the system has 
been operating - one still heavily influenced by New Public Management principles - 
has affected the manner in which the complexity theory based features of the system 
were observed.  Finally, a short case study is developed, contrasting London and New 
York City’s approaches to TB control. It highlights London’s highly fragmented, 
unaccountable, medically-driven and leaderless system with the New York City Bureau 
of Tuberculosis Control which is a hierarchical, verticalised, diverse, organisation with 
a clear public health focus and strong leadership and accountabilities. The mini case 
study also discusses the longstanding ambivalence in London toward embracing 
learnings from other jurisdictions’ successful TB control programs. Taken together, the 
analysis of the history of London’s system and its contrast to that of New York City, lays 
a firm foundation for the remainder of the empirical discussion in Chapter Seven. 
 
Analytic History of the Organisational and Managerial Response 
to TB Control Across London 
Chapter Two discussed the extent and nature of resurgent TB in London today, 
illustrating the serious and ongoing nature of the problem. The next section examines 
the broader environmental organisational and structural context in which London’s TB 
control efforts are undertaken, highlighting efforts to date in controlling the re-
emergence of the disease. 
Analysing tuberculosis control in London: no stone left unturned   
Tuberculosis control in London has clearly proven challenging for major players within 
London’s healthcare system. The NHS, the Department of Health, and the Health 
Protection Agency (and its precursors) have all wrestled, with varying degrees of 
engagement, with how to reverse rising TB rates. Nonetheless, lack of success in 
tackling TB in London cannot be attributed to lack of knowledge about the problem, or 
to lack of calls to action. A striking feature of the system is the volume of papers and 
reports produced since the mid-1990s analysing the TB situation, contributing to what 
one high-level respondent referred to as “...paralysis by report and recommendations”. 
These reports vary in intended audience, authors and foci, but demonstrate that TB has 
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long been acknowledged as a problem in London and there have been consistent and 
ongoing calls for urgent action. Figure 18, below, highlights the 14 commissioned and 
internal studies and reports, discussing various aspects of the problem of resurgent TB 
in London and/or England and the UK. 
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Year TB Group Formed Commissioned/Internal Report or Study 
1992 First ‘working party’ of 
London Consultants in 
Communicable Disease 
Control established – focus on 
surveillance 
 
1996 Interdepartmental Working 
Group on Tuberculosis 
formed, led by Department of 
Health 
Report 1 
The Interdepartmental Working Group on Tuberculosis, (i) 
The Prevention and Control of Tuberculosis in the United 
Kingdom: Recommendations for the Prevention and 
Control of Tuberculosis at the Local Level and (ii) 
Tuberculosis and Homeless People (Dept. of Health and 
Welsh Office)  
1998  Report 2 
Interdepartmental Working Group on Tuberculosis – Focus 
on HIV and Drug-Resistant TB (Dept. of Health) 
Report 3 
Tuberculosis control in London – The Need for Change 
(NHS Executive) 
1999 “TB in London” group formed Report 4 
Improving TB Control in London (NHS Executive) 
2001  Report 5 
TB Control in London: Next Steps (London TB Group for 
London NHS Regional Office) 
2002   Report 6  
Getting ahead of the curve: A strategy for combating 
infectious diseases (Department of Health) 
2003  Report 7 
Tuberculosis in London (London Assembly Health 
Committee) 
2004  Report 8 
Stopping Tuberculosis in England: An Action Plan from the 
Chief Medical Officer (Department of Health) 
2005 “Stopping London in TB” 
group formed  
 
 
2007  Report 9 
Tuberculosis prevention and treatment: a toolkit 
(Department of Health) 
2008 TB Commissioning Board and 
Clinical Working Group 
formed 
Report 10 
An Audit Evaluation of Pan-London TB Services and 
Training Needs (Commissioned from London Southbank 
University) 
2009  Report 11 
Tackling Tuberculosis in England: the PCT response to the 
challenge (Commissioned by The All-Party Parliamentary 
Group on Global TB, The British Thoracic Society, TB Alert 
and The Royal College of Nursing) 
2010  Report 12 
London TB Service Review and Health Needs Assessment 
(known as The PHAST Report). (Commissioned from the 
Public Health Action Support Team) 
2011  Report 13 
TB Model of Care (NHS- London Health Programs) 
Report 14 
TB Case for Change (NHS- London Health Programs) 
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 FIGURE 19: TB CASES GROW ALONG WITH THE NUMBER OF COMMISSIONED AND INTERNALLY 
PRODUCED REPORTS  
To the above list of reports could be added the richly detailed Annual Reports on TB in 
the UK and reports on TB in London produced by the HPA, all of which include 
recommendations for swift action along with well developed epidemiological data 
showing the severity of the TB resurgence. In its 2010 report on TB in the UK, the 
Agency recommended: 
The national effort to control tuberculosis needs to be scaled up in order to halt 
the continuing rise in cases and ongoing transmission...Specific urban control 
measures should be applied, using examples from cities in other western 
countries. Appropriate local mechanisms for governance and coordination of 
city-wide control activities should be instituted...(Health Protection Agency 
2010b:5) 
There have been many academic papers, some cited in this research, discussing a wide 
range of clinical, epidemiological and social issues related to London’s TB epidemic. 
And the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, NICE, provides up to date 
clinical guidance, including special, recently released guidelines on treating TB in the 
“hard to reach” patient populations. 
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The Nature of the TB Control System 
Whilst these reports were being produced, the TB control system in London was 
constantly morphing and reconfiguring, often in response to ongoing NHS and DH 
restructuring initiatives. The extent of change within the NHS has been a significant 
factor in London’s inability to control TB. For instance, the Centre for Disease 
Surveillance and Control, the source of much of the membership of the Working Party 
of Consultants in Communicable Disease Control, the first group to study London’s 
rising TB rates, disappeared in 2003 with the creation of the Health Protection Agency. 
Similarly, the Department of Health continued to downsize and reduce its role in TB 
control over the years. In fact, by 2010, their participation in formal TB control groups 
was very limited, with one respondent observing that the Department was effectively 
“out of the TB business”. The impact of these particular changes, the creation of the 
HPA and the “hollowing out” of the Department of Health, will be discussed in greater 
detail in Chapters Seven and Eight. Nonetheless, there remains a small, core group of 
individuals, mostly consultants, but also a few nurses, who have been working within 
the system almost since the beginning of the TB resurgence and who remain dogged in 
their determination to turn the TB tide.  
Respondents’ accounts of the system’s history all differed somewhat. Most people, 
particularly nurses and doctors, noted that because the treatment regime for TB 
patients has remained largely unchanged over the past few decades, the changes in the 
structure of the broader TB control system are tangential and obscured by larger scale 
change and turbulence within the NHS. However, based on accounts by respondents, 
combined with information gleaned from archival documents, a reasonably detailed 
and accurate historical overview has been developed, identifying the groups formed to 
guide TB control in London since the onset of the current epidemic. Figure 20, below, 
illustrates the ongoing organisational restructuring within London’s TB control system, 
highlighting the various groups charged with leading TB control efforts over the past 
23 years.  
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FIGURE 20: APPROXIMATE TIME LINES OF TB CONTROL GROUPS IN LONDON  
 
Key Groups Involved in London’s TB Control System  
For a detailed overview of the groups involved during the early stages of TB’s 
reappearance in London, along with their key activities, please see Appendix F.  
Later Groups 
By 1998, in the face of accumulating data and growing anecdotal evidence, it had 
become received wisdom within the TB community that TB infection in London was 
climbing at an alarming pace (a 71% increase over the previous decade [Rose et al 
2001]). Tuberculosis control in London – The Need for change (Thames Regional 
Directors of Public Health1998), laid bare the urgent need for improved coordination 
of service delivery and the need for TB to be taken seriously in London. Amongst its 
detailed recommendations are three potential models for organising services; 
iterations of these models are still under discussion today, evidence of both the model’s 
robustness and of the inertia which has come to characterise TB control in London.  
The report also discussed results of a follow-up survey of members of the Working 
Party (see Appendix F), in which members were asked about the current status of TB 
140 
 
control in their geographical areas, two years after publishing their recommendations. 
The conclusion (p.3) was blunt:”...the survey has identified widespread difficulties in 
implementing these recommendations. It is unlikely that implementation of these 
recommendations is achievable within the current organisational structure”.  This 
organisational inadequacy is highlighted throughout the report: “the current service 
structure has been unable to respond effectively to the increasing problem of 
tuberculosis in the city” (p.2) and “the overall picture is one of a fragmented and under-
funded service which has difficulty in meeting recommendations for good practice” 
(p.10). The report’s executive summary concludes, “The rate of increase in tuberculosis 
cases in London demands that a process to improve services is taken forward rapidly.”  
Clearly, this did not happen. The issues identified 14 years ago, in what has become a 
seminal report, have been repeated in only barely modified form in most of the reports 
which have followed. Figure 21, below, illustrates. 
Report Key Excerpts 
Improving TB Control in London 
(1999). [The official  follow-
up/response document to 
Tuberculosis control in London – The 
Need for change (1998).] 
“There was a strong consensus among participants 
about the need for change” 
“TB control services in London should improve 
outcomes by working to consistent guidelines and 
quality standards” 
A call for “clear leadership” and “a London-wide group 
which will ensure consistency across the sectors” 
TB Control in London: Next Steps 
(2001) 
“TB continues to be an important public health issue for 
the capital” 
A major priority: “developing commissioning for 
London wide TB control services” 
“There should be a dedicated TB Manager working 
across London to lead the TB control project team...” 
Tuberculosis in London (2003) “...there is need for a broader, more coordinated 
approach to TB control across the capital which must 
include non-health public services such as Local 
Authorities and voluntary sector agencies” 
“More will need to be done to permanently reduce the 
level of TB in the capital. There is still a need for NHS 
organisations to work closely together...” 
 “...services in London are fragmented...” 
“...the commissioning process for TB services is 
unclear...(and)complicated further by the many 
different organisations...which are involved” 
“Failure to heed the rising rates in London and to ensure 
adequate TB control now could result in major 
problems.” 
Stopping Tuberculosis in England: 
An Action Plan from the Chief 
Medical Officer (2004)  
“Public health effort needs to be better organised...They 
need a... clear structure to work within and clear 





Report Key Excerpts 
Tuberculosis 
prevention and 
treatment: a toolkit 
(2007) 
“...if we are to contain the return of a disease over which we once had 
control...we strongly recommend that all PCTs plan for TB service 
provision.” 
“There is at present a lack of clarity about how TB services are 
commissioned or procured” 
An Audit Evaluation 
of Pan-London TB 
Services and Training 
Needs (2008) 
“TB needs greater prioritization by commissioners” 
“Urgent consideration should be given to establishing a pan-London 
services network…to support more consistent strategic planning, co-
ordination, sharing of best practice and responsive delivery of… 
services” 
“TB services teams should develop and formalize collaborative ways of 
working with non-NHS and voluntary sector organizations.” 
London TB Service 
Review and Health 
Needs Assessment 
(2010) 
“The management of TB in London needs to become more standardised 
and a greater degree of central control applied. There is currently a 
complete lack of standardisation of clinical pathways of care across 
London. A manual of protocols and pathways for London is needed 
(based on the New York equivalent)” 
“performance monitoring needs to be centralised, and accountability 
for performance needs to be improved.” 
“A London Board of TB Control should be established, whose prime 
objective should be to reverse the trend of year on year increase in TB 
incidence and in burden of disease. Membership…would need to be 
drawn not just from the NHS, but also from the Department of (Public) 
Health, from Local Authorities, from the office of the Mayor of London, 
from users of services, and from the third sector.” 
“The need to improve control of TB in London is sufficiently pressing 
that action needs to be planned now and implementation begun, 
despite (NHS) organisational uncertainty.” 
“The impression received is that of 30 services working in relative 
isolation, with little or no sharing of…good practice.” 
The Case for Change 
(2011) 
Model of Care (2011) 
“The existing TB service model in London has not impacted on the rates 
of TB...” 
“There is the risk that the control of TB will become more fragmented 
as the responsibilities for protecting health and procuring services 
move into new and disparate organisations most of which will be 
unable to take a pan-London strategic view of the disease.” 
FIGURE 21: SELECTED EXCERPTS FROM VARIOUS COMMISSIONED REPORTS ON TB CONTROL IN 
LONDON 
The two most recent reports, the Case for Change and the Model of Care, were 
produced by “London Health Programs” (the branch of NHS London which “hosts” the 
TB program), but were effectively written by the TB Clinical Working Group and 
Commissioning Board. The two documents are complementary. They have much in 
common with earlier reports in highlighting the alarming state of TB infection rates in 
London and issuing an urgent call for action. For an overview of the contents of these 
two key documents, please see Appendix G.  Reading them it appears that today’s 
organisational structure is no better positioned to respond effectively to TB than it was 
when the first report was written in 1998.  What does set them apart from earlier 
reports, however, is that together they offer more detailed and specific 
recommendations for change than prior reports, along with a rudimentary attempt at 
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costing and calculating the current investment in TB control in London. Taken together, 
they comprise a detailed “policy alternative” as will be discussed in Chapter Eight.  
The challenge, as so often has been the case, is securing a place on the NHS policy 
agenda when the entire system is again undergoing a massive restructuring. For 
instance, during the course of producing these reports, the established and agreed 
steps for advancing policy documents through the hierarchical NHS approvals process 
was constantly shifting. During the summer and early autumn of 2011 plans revolved 
around preparing to present the documents to the NHS London “Strategy and 
Innovation PLG”, followed by a presentation to the “London Delivery Group”. However, 
on 20 September 2011, just days before the first presentation was due to take place, the 
meeting was cancelled because it was decided by NHS London that the “Strategy and 
Innovation PLG” was now a redundant body in light of the shift to GP commissioning. 
The presentation to the “London Delivery Group” was still to take place, but the 
scheduled October meeting of this group was also cancelled. Eventually, it was 
concluded that the “London Delivery Group” was also obsolete, so the presentation to 
this body never took place either. Minutes from the 20 October 2011 Clinical Working 
Group meeting observed: 
Following recent changes to the sign off process within NHS London it is 
unclear what the final sign off process for the case for change (and Model of 
Care) will be. Until this paper has been approved it is not to be disseminated to 
a wider audience.  
Despite this uncertainty, all efforts became focused on presenting these strategy 
documents at an upcoming meeting of Cluster Chief Executives. Again, after three false 
starts, including cancelled meetings or the TB item being bumped from the meeting 
agenda, the presentation finally occurred in January 2012. TB Commissioning Board 
Minutes from the 3 February 2012 meeting report the following: 
The Cluster Chief Executives supported in principle the CfC (Case for Change) 
and MoC (Model of Care). However they suggested that they were not the right 
group to make the full financial commitment to implementing the model. The 
CCEs recommended that the MoC should be presented to the GP Council. 
This decision resulted in deep annoyance and frustration amongst Commissioning 
Board members, prompting one of those who had made the presentation to the Chief 
Executives to comment that he was “pissed off” at their decision. At the time of writing, 
eight months after this decision by Cluster Chief Executives, London’s TB control 
strategy, as outlined in these two documents, continues to languish.  
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To summarise, the themes which arise consistently throughout the 14 reports are: 
1. clear acknowledgement regarding the extent and seriousness of 
resurgent TB across London 
2. the extensive fragmentation within the system and the problems it 
causes, including 
a. a lack of consistency in care across London; 
b. a resulting need for enhanced co-ordination of services with 
commissioning being undertaken on a pan-London basis; and,  
c. a need for accountability at a system-wide level.  
 
“ACTION REQUIRED: Not Applicable”  
Despite the plethora of research, analyses, reports, recommendations for action and 
various groups dedicated to tackling TB in London, very little seems to actually happen. 
One respondent likened the situation to “wading through treacle” in terms of making 
any changes at a system level. Another interviewee who had left the system out of 
frustration - one of several research participants who had made a similar decision - 
characterised efforts during the late 1990s to the late 2000s as “just a decade of 
discussion”, noting, “sixteen years after the WHO called a global emergency, sixteen 
years, and we’re still talking”. Another noted, with great, albeit rueful, hilarity, the 
inside cover of the 2004 Chief Medical Officer’s report, Stopping Tuberculosis in 
England: An Action Plan. In the box specifying “Action Required”, the response is “Not 
Applicable”.  
This research uncovered a clear pattern of rehashing and repeating recommendations 
in report after report, but with limited implementation. As noted, this research 
observed the process of producing the 2011 Model of Care and Case for Change 
documents. This effort took almost a year and consumed vast hours of discussion and 
clinicians’ and managers’ time. The contents of the final documents, however, could 
have largely been trawled from previous reports. For example, the 2007 DH document, 
Tuberculosis prevention and treatment: a toolkit described in detail “a tiered model of 
commissioning” which is largely similar to the one eventually (re)produced in 2011 in 
the Model of Care. The 2010 PHAST report also discussed the utility of such a model 
and recommended its adoption.  
A similar scenario was observed involving hours of discussion, over many months, on 
the merits of adopting a pan-London model of commissioning TB services, rather than 
commissioning services on a PCT-by-PCT basis, as is largely the case now. As illustrated 
in Figure 21, the value of adopting a pan-London commissioning approach had been 
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identified consistently, starting with the 1998 report, as a means of addressing the 
damaging fragmentation of services which characterises TB control in London. There 
was scant opposition to the idea of pan-London commissioning during Model of 
Care/Case for Change discussions, and its adoption was eventually recommended– 
again. But this did not prevent the topic consuming significant amounts of time and 
resources. Occasionally during meetings participants would observe that various topics 
under discussion were suspiciously similar to something which had already been 
addressed in previous documents. Such observations would simply be acknowledged 
and the discussions would resume, unabated.  
Summary and observations  
Much is known about the epidemiology of tuberculosis in London, along with how its 
resurgence might best be brought under control. One of the leading contributors to the 
PHAST report remarked that in all his years of working in public health consultancy in 
the UK and abroad, he had never worked on a project in which there was so much “off 
the shelf” material available to inform his work. There has been a great deal of action – 
numerous reports and studies, working groups, committees and boards - but very little 
improvement to show for it.  So, whilst it is abundantly clear what needs to be done to 
tackle resurgent TB in London, it never happens. The majority of the 14 reports cited 
above were either produced or commissioned by some wing of the NHS, resulting in the 
curious situation of the NHS repeatedly telling itself what to do but never actually doing 
it.  
It is posited that this failure to implement policy relates to a combination of:  
1. TB occupying a low place on the public health agenda, which itself ranks lowly 
on the overall London healthcare agenda; 
2. the closely related issue of an absence of accountability and leadership, as will 
be discussed in more depth in Chapter Eight;  
3. ongoing, and often significant, organisational restructuring within the broader 
NHS which stymies efforts at advancing proposed changes in how London 
controls TB; 
4. little organisational capacity for co-adaptation or learning, making change 
difficult 
5. lack of systemic capacity to change as a whole; 
6. an excessive number of boundaries, leading to turf squabbles; and, 
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7. a fragmented and misaligned structure with very little integration and no co-
ordination. 
The objective of this section was to outline the historical and organisational context of 
this research, building from the epidemiological overview of TB in London presented in 
Chapter Two. The remainder of the chapter will examine, in comparative case study 
form, the differences between New York City’s and London’s organisational responses 
to TB control. 
 
Case Study One:  An International Comparator Between 
Tuberculosis Control in New York City and London 
As discussed in Chapter Two, New York City’s approach to tackling its TB resurgence 
differed dramatically, and produced dramatically different results, to London’s. This 
difference in approaches is partly attributable to differences between the American and 
British healthcare systems; however, much of this was neutralised early on in the 
epidemic when TB treatment in New York City became free to all patients, even in 
private clinics (well before TB medicines were free to all TB patients in the UK, which 
happened only about a decade later). As previously discussed, London’s TB rate has 
been on an almost constant upward climb since 1988, with infections increasing 71% 
between 1988 and 1999 (Rose et al 2010), and continuing to climb almost yearly since 
then. In contrast, New York City’s TB rate has fallen by 82%, from the height of its 
epidemic in 1992, as seen in Figure 22. Even more remarkably, its rate of MDR-TB has 
decreased by 97%, while London’s rate is increasing at an alarming pace. The 
remainder of this mini case study will describe the contrasts between the two cities, 
discussing the significant structural, organisational and operational differences which 
characterise the two systems, and how longstanding ambivalence in London toward 
emulating New York City’s approach to TB control may finally be softening.
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FIGURE 22: TUBERCULOSIS CASES AND RATES, NEW YORK CITY, 1982-2011. SOURCE: NEW YORK 
CITY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE (2012) 
  
Like London, New York City was also initially slow to react to the re-emergence of TB – 
it took from 1987 until 1992 to put a clear plan in place (Hayward and Coker 2000). 
But once they started, officials tackled the disease with focus and ferocity, backed by 
high level political support that is still absent in London today. This included a dramatic 
and rapid increase in resources given to the Bureau of TB Control: a quintupling of staff, 
to 841, and a ten-fold increase in their operating budget to $781 million (USD) (Kambili 
2010) (contrasted with the approximately £25 million per annum estimated to be 
spent in London [NHS London 2011 b]). Today, the Bureau still employs 300 personnel, 
despite the low rate of TB infection in the city, reflecting a key learning from the early 
days of the epidemic when staffing levels and infrastructure had been allowed to 
deteriorate to dangerously low levels (Kambili 2010). As cited earlier, London’s TB 
infrastructure had also been allowed to deteriorate and the city was ill-equipped to 
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deal with TB’s comeback. However, unlike in New York City, this has not resulted in any 
increase in funding or other resources. The number of staff working on TB control in 
London today is estimated to be between 200-250, employed by approximately a dozen 
different employers spread across 31 boroughs, and treating approximately 3500 new 
cases of TB yearly. In contrast, New York City’s 300 TB control staff treated 689 cases in 
2011. Consequently, resource and staffing shortages may well be a factor impeding 
London’s efforts to control the disease. 
Nine initiatives, delivered from within its centralised Bureau structure, are seen as key 
to New York City’s success (New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 
(2009) : 
1. Free, high-quality care 
2. Enhanced case management of all (emphasis added) confirmed and highly 
suspected cases of TB 
3. Provision of Directly Observed Therapy (DOT) 
4. Extensive outbreak investigations conducted by highly trained teams 
5. Rigorous contact investigations for all infectious TB and all paediatric TB 
6. A TB shelter for homeless TB patients 
7. Improved infection control within institutions (especially homeless 
shelters, prisons and hospitals) 
8. Improved diagnostics services 
9. Cohort Review 
The table below provides a simplified overview of the extent to which New York City’s 
key success factors are also evident in London.  
Key Success Factor in New York City In Place in 
London 
Partly in Place 
Across London 
Not in Place 
in London 
Free, high-quality care 
 
√   
Enhanced case management of all (emphasis 
added) confirmed and highly suspected cases 
of TB 
 
  √ 
Provision of Directly Observed Therapy 
(DOT) 
 
                              
√ 
 
Extensive outbreak investigations conducted 
by highly trained teams 
 
√   
Rigorous contact investigations for all 
infectious TB and all paediatric TB 
                               
√ 
 
A TB shelter for homeless TB patients   √ 
Improved infection control within 
institutions 
 √  
Improved diagnostics services 
 
  √ 
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Cohort Review  √  
FIGURE 23: EXTENT TO WHICH LONDON SHARES NEW YORK CITY’S KEY TB CONTROL SUCCESS 
FACTORS 
From amongst these nine factors, only two, the provision of free care and extensive 
outbreak investigations, are fully in place in London. The remaining seven key success 
factors which are not fully in place, with the possible exception of improved diagnostic 
services, are inter-related. The DOT program is perhaps the single most important 
factor, as it leads to a number of positive consequences, including fewer infectious 
patients entering institutions like hospitals, shelters, and jails (Frieden et al 1995). The 
benefits flowing from this, in turn, include a reduced need for enhanced case 
management, fewer TB shelter beds, and fewer resource-intensive contact 
investigations, making DOT the start of a virtuous cycle in TB treatment.  
Improved infection control within institutions is an important corollary to DOT. In 
London, fewer hostels now use large dormitory-style rooms and there are also now 
sufficient numbers of negative pressure facilities in hospitals, both helpful components 
in controlling the spread of TB. The situation in prisons, however, continues to be cause 
for concern, despite significant changes made over the past decade in how the UK 
prison system responds to TB. This will be discussed in detail in Case Study Two.  
Directly Observed Therapy (DOT) 
DOT involves a healthcare professional or social care worker watching patients 
swallow their TB tablets, anywhere from three to seven days per week. Whilst not 
universally embraced as superior to other treatment methods (Coker 2000:8-10), it is 
widely recognised as the preferred approach for administering TB treatment and is the 
method endorsed by the World Health Organisation. In the UK, DOT is additionally 
recommended by both NICE and the British Thoracic Society for all patients with one or 
more “social risk factors” which make it more likely they will not complete their full 
course of TB treatment. DOT’s value is that it is seen to significantly improve the rate of 
treatment completion, thereby lowering the risk of drug resistant TB developing later, 
as well as the onward transmission of the disease. In New York City, its application is 
seen as pivotal to the city’s successful TB control program (Friedan et al 1995, Gandy 
&Zumla 2002, Paolo and Nosanchuk 2004), especially its success in combating MDRTB. 
Increased use of DOT was also a focus in Barcelona’s previously cited successful TB 
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control campaign (Rodrigo et al 2001), and in China, India and Bangladesh (Gandy & 
Zumla 2002).  
Patients with one or more social risk factors, such as being homeless, drug dependent 
or with a history of imprisonment, are less likely to complete their full course of TB 
treatment. In Barcelona, DOT was aggressively expanded, although they failed to reach 
their target of covering more than of 90% of the at-risk patient population (Rodrigo et 
al 2001). And in New York City fully 76% of the “eligible” TB patient population (in 
effect the entire TB patient population), were receiving DOT in 2008, up from 
approximately 2% in 1984 (New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 
2009). In that city, all patients diagnosed with TB – including professionals, those with 
stable personal backgrounds, young or old, with social risk factors or without - are 
automatically put on DOT, and it is the exception and not the rule that the patient stays 
on the program until treatment completion. This also eliminates the stigma sometimes 
associated with being a “DOT patient”. 
London currently uses DOT for 8.5% of its TB population (NHS London 2011 a). As 
mentioned above, NICE guidelines advocate DOT for all patients with one or more 
social risk factors, but this guidance is clearly not followed in London where less than 
one-third of at-risk cases receive DOT (Health Protection Agency2011a). NHS London 
acknowledges wide variation in the usage of DOT across London, with some TB clinics 
not even offering DOT outside of regular working hours, a likely result of the notable 
absence of a pan-London DOT protocol (NHS London 2011 a). 
But Potential Change on the Horizon? 
The current state of DOT in London reflects a historically deep ambivalence amongst 
members of the London TB community toward the program, observed during the 
course of this research. However, resistance seems to be lessening at the time of 
writing, perhaps a consequence of the positive experience of implementing the Cohort 
Review process in London, another “imported” idea. It is not clear whether the aversion 
to DOT in London is a defensive reaction, trying to justify why its rates of application 
are so low when it is the approach recommended by NICE, the WHO, the British 
Thoracic Society, and numerous published studies, or whether there are genuine 
misgivings in London about the program’s efficacy. It may also be an instance of self-
organisation within the system working to maintain the status quo, even when the 
status quo is detrimental to improvement, a phenomenon discussed more in Chapters 
Eight and Nine.   
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Nonetheless, the recent Model of Care document does, finally, offer a draft pan-London 
DOT protocol, which, if enacted, compels providers to offer DOT up to seven days a 
week, to anyone who is deemed at risk of not completing treatment. Whether the 
protocol will be put in place remains to be seen, and there is clearly some doubt as to 
whether this will be the case. One of the most senior figures in TB in London, one who 
in most other organisations would have the authority to ensure that protocols such as 
DOT are enacted, observed, “DOT will be a really, really interesting thing to see what 
happens because we are very clear now, I think, with what we expect. And I’ll put 
money on the fact that it won’t happen in half of London.” 
This comment reflects a significant structural shortcoming within the London system: 
that a person one would expect to have the power to make things happen is almost 
devoid of such authority. This system-wide lack of accountability and responsibility is a 
serious and significant weakness which impedes TB control efforts. This issue of 
accountability will be discussed at greater length later. However, it draws attention to 
another significant difference between the New York City and London TB control 
systems; namely, their organisational structures.  
Organisational Structures in London versus New York City 
The two cities strongly contrast with respect to the manner in which their TB control 
systems are organised. In London, the system is highly fragmented, comprised of 
multiple organisations, each with its own set of priorities and accountabilities, and with 
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FIGURE 24: A SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE TB CONTROL SYSTEM IN LONDON 
 
In contrast, New York City’s system is vertical, hierarchical, and with a clear point of 
accountability, as can be seen schematically in Figures 25 and 26 below.  
 
FIGURE 25: ORGANISATION CHART, BUREAU OF TB CONTROL, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF 






























FIGURE 26: NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE ORGANIZATION 2010 
(SOURCE: KAMBILI 2010) 
 
The UK and US have vastly different healthcare systems and models of government. The 
federal government in the US has devolved more powers to local governments than is 
the case in the UK, giving US states and cities a greater degree of law-making authority 
than in the UK. The New York City Department of Health, headed by a Commissioner 
appointed by the Mayor, who in turn is directly elected by the people of the city, has a 
staff of 6000 and a budget of $1.6 billion (USD).  The New York City Department of 
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Health formulates strategies for public health, including TB, promulgates local public 
health laws (as long as those laws do not contravene national or New York state laws), 
and creates and implements activities to address public health needs (Kambili 2010). 
As seen in Figure 26 above, it is within this structure that the New York City Bureau of 
Tuberculosis Control is located, illustrating the Bureau’s authority and accountability. 
While this organisational structure differs significantly from that found in London, NHS 
London does have comparable authority, at least from a regulatory, if not a legislative, 
perspective, which it could use in addressing the city’s TB problem. Organisationally, 
however, the two systems are miles apart. 
 London’s TB control system reflects two and a half decades of NPM-influenced 
healthcare reforms in the UK, which, coincidentally, took hold at approximately the 
same time as did the resurgence of TB in London, as will be highlighted in Chapter 
Eight. These reforms have led to a highly dispersed and often misaligned system. This 
situation has arisen in part from NPM’s goal of pushing decision making down to the 
lowest possible level and disaggregating once powerful departments like Health into 
arms-length organisations such as the HPA. Simultaneously, numerous services and 
functions formerly provided by major departments such as Health are now outsourced 
to external for-profit and not-for-profit organisations, such as TB educational outreach 
(now often provided by the charity TB Alert), and laboratory and prisoner escort 
services (now provided by the for-profit private contractor Serco). And despite the 
usual NPM penchant for top-down decision making and control, the TB control system 
in London is devoid of a centralised point of control, clear decision making and 
accountability structures, and any evidence of top-down management control or 
interest. By comparison, in New York City, authority and decision making are 
centralised and the organisation is verticalised and hierarchical, as seen in Figures 25 
and 26.  There is limited outsourcing of functions, with the Bureau providing a 
hierarchical, though holistic and highly accountable, system of TB control. 
In stark contrast to New York City’s single “Bureau” structure, this research determined 
that there are almost 70 distinct entities, most of them multifaceted, stand alone 
organisations in their own right, significantly implicated in TB control in London 
(Figure 24). These bodies are largely drawn from the public sector, but also include 
private sector (prisoner transport services, laboratory services), third sector (TB Alert 
and other charities), and, until recently, a social enterprise (the original Find and Treat 
team). Many, but not all, are involved in delivering care to TB patients and many, but 
not the majority, are members of the London TB Commissioning Board and/or the 
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London TB Clinical Working Group. These two important bodies were established in 
2008 with the goal of developing a TB strategy for London and, ultimately, reducing TB 
levels. Corollary benefits were meant to include bringing together the varied and 
dispersed organisations working on TB control in the city in an effort to address the 
problem with fragmentation of TB services, as well as sharing best practices and better 
co-ordinating efforts across the city.  The Clinical Working Group functions in an 
advisory capacity to the TB Commissioning Board on clinical matters and has a larger 
membership than does the latter group. Unlike formal Managed Care Networks within 
the NHS (for stroke and cancer, for instance), the London TB control system, most 
notably the TB Commissioning Board, has not been granted any authority, 
accountability or budget-holding power by the NHS or the DH. In practice, the 
Commissioning Board relies on persuasion and goodwill in achieving its objective of 
lowering TB rates in London. It possesses neither a carrot nor a stick in terms of 
compelling TB service providers or commissioners to respond to its directives, 
resulting in significant incongruence between its objectives and its means, its form and 
its function.  
By placing its Bureau of Tuberculosis Control within the Department of Public Health, 
New York City has clearly chosen to follow a public health model in its TB control 
efforts. Again, this provides a contrast with London where most respondents in this 
research expressed concern that the system in London is overly bio-medical, with 
insufficient attention focused on the broader determinants of health and other public 
health concerns. This sentiment crossed professional lines:  
They’ve (TB clinic staff) had such similar training and... experiences, they’re 
very kind of fixed...some might say narrow, in terms of perspective on 
everything else apart from that “clinician and case notes” environment... there’s 
not much knowledge of what goes on outside of that hospital clinic setting (TB 
Outreach Worker) 
...some of the public health leads for London...they’re notorious, until recently, 
for not being interested in tuberculosis. (Senior TB consultant) 
I think the public health aspects are not really very well addressed yet. I mean 
we try to do contact screening but TB nurses are not public health trained...it’s 
not within their remit actually. They’re not paid to do community work, they’re 
paid mostly by the Trusts...to look after the patients...So that’s what’s missing. 
(Consultant in Communicable Disease Control) 
The table below offers a summary overview of some of the key organisational and 




FIGURE 27: ORGANISATIONAL AND STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF TB CONTROL IN NEW YORK CITY AND 
LONDON (BASED LOOSELY ON QUINN & MCGRATH [1985] AND FREDRICKSON [1986]) 
Although there may have been incredulity in London in the early 1990s regarding the 
reversal of previously declining TB rates, there was a sharp awareness within London’s 
medical community that New York City was in the throes of a serious and deadly 





New York City London 
Accountability Clearly delineated lines of 
accountability 
No obvious point of accountability, aside 
from the clinical accountability of physicians. 
Organisational 
structure 
Vertical, integrated and 
hierarchical. Bureau is sole 
employer of its Chest Centers staff. 
Highly fragmented and dispersed with 
dozens of employers operating across 
London’s TB system.  
Funding Annual budget based on the goal 
of eliminating TB in the city; 
consequently, it  includes funding 
for  case finding, screening 
activities and subsequent 
prophylactic treatment, and 
general costs associated with TB 
treatment  
Funding for TB services is at either the 
sector, or more commonly, the borough level 
and comprises an unallocated “pot” of funds, 
often as part of a broader respiratory 
medicine budget, and based on treating 
projected number of active TB cases in the 
acute trusts’ 31 TB clinics. No known 
dedicated funds for active case finding and 
prophylaxes. Despite a significant recent 
investment of time and effort, the London TB 
Commissioning Board was unable to 
determine with any precision how much is 
spent annually on TB across the city. 
Budget holding Centralised with individual budget 
holders able to exercise decision 
making powers and influence 
policy decisions commensurate 
with the size of their budgets 
No central budget holder, budget powers are 
widely dispersed. No obvious correlation 
between budget holding and relative policy 
influence or engagement (i.e., DH and NHS 
largely absent). 
Holistic focus Yes. Relevant social services, such 
as services for immigrants, 
refugees and the homeless, 
including running a homeless 
shelter. Bureau also provides 
educational outreach materials, 
along with HIV community 
outreach.  
No. Highly medicalised approach with a 
commissioning focus. No representation of 
migrant or high-risk ethnic communities. 
Outreach services scarce and provided 
randomly at borough level. Limited, ad hoc 
contact with housing officials.  Educational 




Top-down Unclear. Scant evidence of leadership being 
exercised at any level aside from within 
some clinics. 
Compliance Via monitoring and control as the 
Bureau itself provides virtually all 
required TB services  
Largely unmonitored due to weak 







Extensive, including formalised 
relations with private healthcare 
providers and various ethnic 
groups, as dictated by infection 
rates and/or outbreaks 
Often perfunctory, aside from outreach to 
certain ethnic communities with high rates 
of TB infection 
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1994, Evans 1995, McEvoy & Maguire 1995). In 1999 more than 160 healthcare experts 
met in London to analyse their city’s approach to TB as contrasted “against the public 
health response of New York City’s Bureau of Tuberculosis Control” (Hayward & Coker 
2000). Also, amongst the previously cited 14 reports written about TB in London, the 
“New York City phenomenon” is sometimes highlighted, but often, particularly in 
reports written before 2010, with an emphasis on how the approach used there would 
not be suitable for London (with different immigration patterns and higher MDRTB in 
New York City often cited as reasons). Tuberculosis officials in London were, and to 
some extent, remain, sceptical about the extent to which they might learn from New 
York City’s approach and tactics. One respondent observed: 
you got a sense there was a general antagonism or resistance to being critiqued 
by an outsider...I suggested was that we draw on New York’s experience by 
perhaps inviting [name redacted], to come and speak. And also maybe to 
conduct an audit of London TB, and that was rejected outright because this 
view, you know, ‘what do we want, (them) coming to evaluate our program? 
(Senior TB Consultant) 
This reluctance to critically examine expertise from New York City was eventually 
(mostly) overcome, with two interesting outcomes:  
1. the implementation in London of the “Cohort Review” process, which 
will be discussed in greater depth in the next chapter, in Case Study 
Four; and,  
2. serious consideration amongst London’s TB healthcare and policy 
experts regarding implementing a more holistic, centralised model of 
TB control, as embodied by the New York Bureau of Tuberculosis 
Control.  
In 2010, the “London TB Service Review and Health Needs Assessment”, better known 
as the “PHAST Report”, (as it was commissioned from the consultancy Public Health 
Action Support Team), was effusive in its praise for the centralised, holistic approach to 
TB control taken in New York City. The report recommended that London’s existing TB 
Commissioning Board be replaced by a TB Control Board. As implied by the new name, 
a Control Board’s mandate would be all-inclusive and would include representation 
from the Mayor of London’s Office, Local Authorities, social services (especially 
housing), and the third sector; in sum, a broader public health and population-based 




1. Establishing a Board of TB Control for London should be considered. Similar to 
the approach adopted in New York, the Board would be responsible for 
achieving the overall objective of a year on year reduction in the incidence of TB 
in London. The Board would also be the central point of accountability of 
services for their performance against agreed standards of TB prevention, care 
and control.  
2. A Board of TB Control would deliver its objectives through:  
o Standardisation of TB prevention, care and control, with agreed care 
pathways and performance measures;  
o A robust and consistent management approach, including the 
commissioning of TB services across London;  
o Transparency of performance;  
o Accountability for delivery;  
3. Membership of a Board of TB Control for London should not be restricted to the 
NHS. It should comprise representatives of London’s TB services, expertise in 
public health, specialist and GP commissioning, together with users, community 
and third sector (London TB Service Review and Health Needs Assessment, 
2010) 
In late 2010, shortly after this report was issued, the head of the New York City Bureau 
of Tuberculosis Control, Dr. Chrispin Kambili, was invited to speak to the All-Party 
Parliamentary Group on Global Tuberculosis and to meet with NHS London and the 
HPA. This visit further underscored a new openness in London toward learning from 
New York City’s experience, which had started in earnest with a group of nurses 
visiting New York City in 2009 and learning about their “Cohort Review” process. Dr. 
Kambili’s visit added to a growing enthusiasm about the prospect of London moving 
toward a centralised “Bureau-like” model for managing TB, as per the PHAST report. As 
part of this research, many of Dr. Kambili’s interactions with London TB officials were 
observed, including hearing the advice and recommendations which he shared. His 
presentations were compelling and meeting participants were clearly engaged and 
interested. Whilst the content of Dr. Kambili’s message was barely changed from what 
had been known and available to the London TB community for over a decade (Frieden 
et al 1995, Hayward & Coker 2000), and via various public reports from the New York 
City Bureau of Tuberculosis Control, having those messages reiterated by someone 
with Dr. Kambili’s stature, experience and passionate belief in New York City’s 
approach was powerful. For the weeks and months following Dr. Kambili’s visit, there 
were numerous instances where his comments were repeated in meetings, along with 
frequent, positive references to the way things were done in New York City. 
During the last quarter of 2010 and the first quarter of 2011 many of the 
recommendations contained within the PHAST Report were gaining traction. Most 
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notably, the TB strategy developing within the TB Commissioning Board and the 
Clinical Working Group13 during this period was centred on the idea of establishing a 
“London TB Control Board”, modelled closely on the New York City Bureau of 
Tuberculosis Control. Indeed, as late as March 4th 2011, in a document prepared by the 
TB Commissioning Board for discussion at their monthly meeting of that date, the 
concept of a Control Board was being promoted:  
the establishment of the Board would emulate the successful approach 
developed by the New York City Bureau of Tuberculosis Control...Membership 
of the Board will need to consist of the following organisations...: 
o Office of the Mayor of London14 
o Department of Public Health (as was envisioned at the time) 
o Local Authority 
o NHS (commissioners, primary care and provider services)15 
o Social Services 
o Voluntary and community services 
o Service users 
This broad enthusiasm for the establishment of a “London TB Control Board” was 
highlighted by representatives from the London TB Commissioning Board at a meeting 
observed by this research in the House of Lords of the All-Party Parliamentary Group 
on Global TB on March 3, 2011. This was followed by the formal adoption of the 
recommendation by the TB Commissioning Board itself during its regular monthly 
meeting, held on March 4, 2011 (referenced above). However, by the next 
Commissioning Board meeting on April 8th 2011, the idea was unexpectedly rejected. 
Whilst the reasons for this abrupt reversal remain unclear, it appears to be largely the 
result of a mid-level staff change at NHS London, arising from ongoing NHS 
restructuring. At any rate, sometime between March 4th 2011 and April 8th 2011 a new 
manager with responsibility for the TB file appeared and took his place on the TB 
Commissioning Board, replacing a well-regarded, yet short-tenured, predecessor. With 
the arrival of the new manager, the tone and content of the argument emanating from 
                                           
13
 This plan eventually became the “Case for Change” and “Model of Care”, Reports 13 & 14 in Figure  
17 
14
 The Mayor of London’s office was lukewarm, at best, in its support for the Control Board concept 
and for participating on such a body. When presented with the idea by a senior Commissioning 
Board representative, a senior official from the Mayor’s Office asked if the Commissioning Board 
representative really wanted to sit in front of the Boroughs and share such bad news (i.e, TB rates), 
“airing the NHS’ dirty laundry”. This apparent lack of enthusiasm was later cited on several occasions 
by the NHS and Commissioning Board representatives when justifying their decision to scrap the 
Control Board idea. 
15
 Field notes from October 2010 indicate that from the moment they were presented with the 
PHAST report, senior public health leadership at NHS London expressed concern about the media 
attention which might result from establishing a Control Board, fearing its establishment would draw 
attention to London’s TB problem and politicise the issue. 
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the NHS was that if TB control was ever to become a priority for NHS London, it must fit 
within the standard NHS-wide commissioning processes, and that the holist language of 
a Control Board was inappropriate. The new manager making this argument observed 
“if I were cynical I’d say a Model of Care document (the TB strategy document under 
development) is one that sits on a shelf”, whereas a commissioning document is really 
used. And with that observation, the concept of a London TB Control Board was 
effectively abandoned. 
During this meeting it was clear that some members of the Commissioning Board, 
namely those from NHS London, were aware that the new manager would be making 
this move to set aside the Control Board concept. It is unlikely he could have done so 
without at least some senior level support. But the feeling amongst other members of 
the Board in attendance at that meeting was one of disbelief. In informal discussions 
following the meeting some members, especially medical and public health consultants, 
indicated they were so taken aback by this move that they were not even able to 
challenge it during the meeting. This decision to abandon the pursuit of a New York-
style TB Control Board was taken swiftly and unilaterally, resulting in considerable, 
though short-lived, consternation, particularly among non-NHS members. Interestingly 
and contrary to the theory of professional dominance, even senior consultants quickly 
acquiesced, although there was broad support amongst them for the Control Board 
concept. By the next monthly meeting of the TB Commissioning Board on May 6th 2011, 
the term “Control Board” is nowhere to be found in either pre-meeting materials or the 
resulting minutes. The minutes from the May meeting state: 
There was some discussion around the advantages and disadvantages of using 
New York as an example. The TB Project Team (led by the above-noted newly 
arrived manager) agreed to highlight the differences as well as the similarities... 
 
Informal discussions in the following weeks and months were held with key 
Commissioning Board members who appeared to support setting aside the Control 
Board concept. The overall impression gained was that when the new manager, who 
had no prior background in TB, arrived, he vigorously questioned the viability of a New 
York City-style Control Board. This apparently resulted in something akin to a 
collective “wake up call”, with NHS London representatives on the Commissioning 
Board asking themselves, in effect, “what were we thinking?”  
Curiously, however, the final version of the Model of Care, dated November 2011, 
includes the control board concept, with the suggestion that a new TB Commissioning 
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Board should also “act as a board of TB control”, with mention of broadening its 
membership along the lines of the original Control Board recommendation. This is 
peculiar. Once the original Control Board concept was quashed in April 2011, as 
discussed above, there were no observed instances of the Control Board, or the general 
concept underpinning it, re-emerging as an option during either TB Commissioning 
Board or TB Clinical Working Group meetings. Based on these observations as well as 
with discussions with members of these groups, it is assumed that the Control Board 
concept remains effectively shelved.16 Speculatively, the language in the final version of 
the Model of Care likely reflects feedback received during the formal consultation on 
the document, in which external parties were invited to comment. It may also represent 
an attempt to acknowledge the widespread support amongst members of the TB 
Clinical Working, in particular, for the Control Board concept.  
At the time of writing this thesis, the 2010 PHAST Report, with its key 
recommendations for establishing a Control Board, appears to be heading for its place 
on the shelf beside the eleven previous reports on TB control in London. Similarly, the 
Model of Care and Case for Change have been unable to gain the necessary 
endorsements from senior NHS London management to move ahead, meaning they are 
also on course to join this growing collection of disused and forgotten reports. This 
latest setback has been officially attributed to ongoing fall-out from current NHS 
restructuring. Perhaps most remarkably, apparently there is emerging discussion about 
the need to commission yet another “needs assessment” report.  
The state of upheaval in the NHS is such that it remains unclear as to how any changes 
to the current structure and organisation of the TB system will manage to proceed. 
Meeting minutes since mid-2011 invariably contain references to various NHS bodies 
meant to play a role in sanctioning a newly reconfigured TB control system having 
dissolved and replaced with another body, or simply disappearing. During a TB 
Commissioning Board meeting in August 2011 when “next steps” were being discussed, 
a senior NHS manager observed, “I don’t know the commissioning landscape anymore 
and TB is not sitting comfortably anywhere...from where we kicked off two or three 
years ago the world looks very different”. 
                                           
16
 And at any rate, the Model of Care and Case for Change policy plans are not moving ahead  
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Summary and Observations for Case Study One 
This (mini)comparator case study has provided an overview of the structure and 
operation of the TB control systems in London and New York City, including London’s 
deep ambivalence toward embracing important learnings from the New York City 
experience.17 The vignette has also highlighted the significant differences between the 
TB control systems in the two cities, illustrating that New York’s approach has been 
significantly more successful. The reasons identified as responsible for this difference 
are operational – the widespread use in New York City of the DOTS regime and Cohort 
Review (as will be discussed in Chapter Seven)– and organisational and structural – 
New York City has a highly verticalised and centralised TB control system with clearly 
defined accountabilities, leadership and political support. This mode of organising 
stands in sharp contrast to London’s highly diffuse and fragmented structure with its 
absence of leadership and accountability. TB control in New York City is seen as 
important and is firmly ensconced as a vital component on the City’s public health 
policy and political agendas. These issues of fragmentation, an absence of 
accountability and leadership, and the role of public policy priority setting will be 
examined in depth in later chapters.  
With regard to complexity theory, the ambivalence in London toward embracing 
learnings from New York City may arise from a form of self-organisation which seeks to 
maintain the status quo and protect entrenched interests, rather than working toward 
change and innovation. This manner of self-organising is reinforced by the NHS’ 
previously cited aversion to risk and its focus on control. Complexity theory’s concept 
of non-linearity was also observed, but, as with the sort of self-organisation just 
described, it too, appears as a negative force within the system. Despite extensive 
investment in studying and analysing the best way forward (in the form of the 14 
reports cited above), the system has not responded. Two other complexity theory 
precepts are notable by their absence in London’s system: diversity amongst system 
components, relative to that found in New York City, and an inability by the system to 
co-evolve with, and adapt to, its changing environment (i.e., rising TB rates). 
                                           
17 Relatedly, during a meeting of TB nurses held in December 2010, a highly experienced Dutch nurse 
recounted to the group how she had made a presentation to London TB physicians in 2000 regarding 
an innovative and successful DNA fingerprinting project being undertaken in the Netherlands. She 
was thanked for her presentation, but told that it was of limited applicability in London as the city 
did not really have a problem with TB.  
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The preceding section has also highlighted the real impact on the TB control system of 
the constant restructuring which has come to characterise the NHS. This research 
captured firsthand how these ongoing initiatives impede, even foil, efforts at bringing 
change and improvement to the system. This, too, will be illustrated at greater length in 
the following chapter. 
The next chapter will present three more worked case studies, each providing 
empirical evidence of various complexity theory and NPM concepts. A key empirical 
finding regarding the lack of policy priority accorded to TB control, which arose 
inductively from the research, is also discussed.  
Readers will also note the continuing lack of empirical evidence for the theory of 











This chapter presents a series of “mini” case studies, with the objective of illustrating 
key events, scenarios or relationships within London’s TB control system. As discussed 
in the Methods chapter, mini case studies, or vignettes, have been chosen to present 
most of the empirical data because they illustrate the systemic relations amongst and 
within the subsystems which comprise the broader TB control system in London. They 
also facilitate cross-case comparison. Understanding relationships is vital when 
undertaking complexity theory-based research, and comparison has been noted as a 
useful tool (Byrne 2009:3,5). 
The chapter also presents a key inductive finding from the research related to the low 
priority accorded to TB control. This empirical finding will be explicated and discussed 
in the final section of the chapter. 
The first case study in this chapter revisits the issue of drug resistant TB in London, 
focusing on a significant and ongoing outbreak of isoniazid-resistant TB (InR-TB), 
originally centred on a group of prisoners from HMP Pentonville, but which has since 
spread beyond, into other parts of the community. The outbreak is now in its 13th year 
and remains uncontrolled. It is argued that this illustrates the extent of misalignment 
between subsystems within the broader TB control system, and contra complexity 
theory, an inability of different system components (the prison healthcare system and 
the NHS) to co-adapt and learn in response to a crisis within the system. As with the 
mini case study in the previous chapter, attention is drawn to challenges arising from 
the organisational structure and function of London’s TB control system.   
The second case study in this chapter discusses the creation of the Health Protection 
Agency (HPA), and the hollowing-out of the DH. Unintended consequences arising from 
structural and organisational changes to the broader healthcare system required to 
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support the Agency’s creation may well have been detrimental to TB control in London. 
This is ironic since the HPA’s mandate involves controlling the spread of infectious 
diseases like TB.  
The third case study in this chapter discusses two initiatives within London’s TB 
control system which come from bottom-up, self-organising innovations: the Find & 
Treat Service (formerly the Find & Treat Team) and the Cohort Review process. This 
case study focuses largely on the genesis, challenges and metamorphoses of Find & 
Treat (F&T), but also compares and contrasts this initiative with Cohort Review. 
Despite the similarities between them, including their common goal of enhancing TB 
control in London, Cohort Review has been enthusiastically supported and promoted 
by the mainstream NHS, whilst F&T was the subject of deep suspicion and its 
operations were ultimately taken over by the NHS.     
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the mid-range themes generated from the 
data, including those which arose inductively, and revisits the role played by the theory 
of professional dominance in this research.  
 
Case Study Two: An Ongoing Outbreak of Drug Resistant TB in 
London: “a potential public health emergency, a time bomb” 
As mentioned earlier, drug resistant TB is a serious and growing problem in London 
and is of particular interest as, organisationally, it represents a failure of the TB control 
system (Nathanson et al 2010). In the words of one key consultant, “If we did TB 
properly we wouldn’t get these problems”. When TB is properly treated and managed, 
drug resistant TB does not occur. In London, where both mono and MDRTB rates are 
climbing, this is further evidence of a system in trouble. 
The InR-TB outbreak in London was first identified in January 2000, from samples 
collected in late 1999 in HMP Pentonville (Pentonville) and analysed by the Public 
Health Laboratory Service (PHLS) (Ruddy et al 2004).  (The PHLS was a precursor to 
the Health Protection Agency.) In contrast to the sluggish organisational response to 
London’s broader TB resurgence, there was a timely response to this outbreak, with an 
“Incident Control Committee”, led by the PHLS, established within six months of the 
first cases being identified. In June 2001, the chair of the Committee issued her report, 
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including a sub-report focusing on the outbreak within Pentonville and the prison’s 
role in the incident.   
Prison Healthcare and TB in London 
Of the original 58 cases analysed in the 2001 outbreak report, 15, or 26%, were 
connected to Pentonville. Eight or possibly nine of these cases acquired the disease 
whilst in prison. This transmission rate subsequently slowed, although by 2009, 23% of 
all InR-TB cases still had a prison connection. The HPA reports that new cases continue 
to occur in Pentonville and throughout the London prison system (Health Protection 
Agency 2012d), although the Agency no longer releases prison-specific numbers 
because of complications in collecting sufficiently accurate data on offenders, owing to 
the mobility of the prison population.  
The Organisation of Prison Healthcare 
Pentonville has been a central actor in the InR-TB outbreak, and its role, along with that 
of the broader prison healthcare system is discussed here. Understanding inter-
organisational, or inter-agency, working amongst the bodies involved in prisoner 
health is important when analysing the role of Pentonville in this outbreak. This 
subsystem encapsulates, and often emulates, many of the problems plaguing the 
broader TB control system, such as fragmentation, and a lack of leadership and 
accountability. Components of this subsystem include: 
1. the now defunct prison health system run by HM Prison Services and the Home 
Office, until 2006;  
2. the replacement prison healthcare system, the Offender Health regime,  
administered by the NHS but with policy guidance coming from the 
Departments of Health and Justice; 
3. HM Prison Services, the broader system of which prisoner healthcare services 
are a part; and,  
4. prisoner escort services, outsourced since 1993 to various private firms 
(Williams et al 2000), with Serco holding the current contract until at least 
2018.  
The current NHS-led system of offender healthcare is a response to a 1999 report, “The 
Future Organisation of Prison Health Care”, produced jointly by HM Prison Service and 
the NHS Executive. This report was the result of unsparing criticism from the Chief 
Inspector of Prisons “who observed that the prison service patently fails to deliver a 
standard of health care equivalent to the NHS” (Grounds 2000:260). The report’s focus 
was on the importance of “equivalency” between the levels of healthcare inside and 
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outside of prison, but it stopped short of recommending a full-scale assumption of 
prison healthcare by the NHS. Instead, it advocated a stronger collaboration between 
the NHS and HM Prison Service and for several years there were experiments with 
various forms of collaboration. After several years’ experimentation in jointly managing 
and delivering prison healthcare, in 2006 the NHS assumed full responsibility for 
offender healthcare services. However,  
over the past few years, there has been increasing concern about the quality, 
and continuity, of health care that the average offender receives both in and out 
of prison. Health care for offenders is not currently equivalent to the health care 
that everyone else in the country is receiving (Siva 2010:447).  
This observation, particularly with regard to continuity in healthcare, is reinforced by 
anecdotes from respondents. Several spoke of the difficulty in keeping TB-infected 
offenders on treatment once they are released from prison. Often, when a prisoner 
leaves prison in the morning for a court appearance it is not known whether he will be 
coming back to the prison later that day or released by the judge during his hearing. 
This presents a significant challenge for the system and, in the words of one 
respondent, is “a massive problem”. Many prisoners have risk factors such as 
homelessness, drug and/or alcohol problems or mental illness, making it more likely 
they will not continue with their TB treatment post-release. This problem is 
exacerbated with remand prisoners whose chances of release are often highly 
unpredictable, meaning these prisoners lack a “release plan” (unlike offenders whose 
sentences are coming to a planned end and who are, in theory at least, instructed on 
how to continue their TB treatment). For remand prisoners, their release often comes 
without warning, so they may lack all knowledge about how to carry on with their 
treatment, including how to find a TB clinic which can supply their tablets. A nurse with 
prison healthcare experience recounted how she would try to ensure prisoners taking 
TB treatment would know what to do in the event they were released from court (but 
often without success):  
Respondent : So that’s very difficult to manage. And the only way you can do it 
is ensure the prisoner knows that if they walk from the court they must know 
where they’ve got to go. So I would say to them, “if you walk from the court, this 
is what you must do tomorrow”, so that they’ve got a plan in place...So I would 
set something up for them and say “just suppose you get released, you must do 
this tomorrow”. 
 ST: And were most of them, would they follow-up as you discussed? 
 Respondent : No 
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This scenario also raises a general issue related to continuity of healthcare for 
prisoners, specifically handling and managing their medical records. Prisoners neither 
arrive at prison carrying their medical records nor once they leave prison do they take 
any new healthcare records back out into the community. Communication between the 
prison healthcare system and the community healthcare system remains spotty at best 
(Siva 2010). 
The logistics of controlling the movement of the prison population, managed by HM 
Prison Service but delivered by the private contractor Serco, is also problematic. When 
a prisoner leaves the prison to attend a court hearing, documentation follows the 
prisoner, including medical records and any request for a return to the same prison. 
However, this system is far from foolproof and prisoners, including those with active 
TB, are sometimes taken to a different prison at the end of the court’s working day. This 
usually happens because during the time they’ve been in court, their “home” prison has 
received a new influx of prisoners which brings the facility to its maximum capacity 
and the prisoners who left that morning are moved to other facilities. According to a 
well-informed respondent, it would not be unusual for the receiving prison’s reception 
services to be so rushed that they would not properly check the prisoners’ 
documentation upon arrival and a TB-infected prisoner would be checked-in, 
undetected, and treatment would cease. In the words of this respondent “too many 
times it (the system) hasn’t worked”.   
This research uncovered three instances in which decisions taken by the prison 
healthcare system, post-NHS takeover, resulted in added challenges for the treatment 
of prisoners with TB, including InR-TB. These are outlined below.  
First, an HPA evaluation on the utility of London’s mobile x-ray unit (part of the F&T 
Team) acknowledged that Pentonville was playing a key role in the InR-TB outbreak 
and that prisons generally contained a high number of TB-infected inmates 
(208/100,000 versus approximately 44/100,000 in the general London population)  
(Story et al 2007). Consequently, it was decided to supply all London prisons with 
static X-ray machines. The objective was to screen all prisoners upon arrival for active 
TB (x-rays pick up only active pulmonary TB, but this is only this type of TB which is 
contagious). Plans to purchase the machines were made in 2005 (five-six years after 
the start of the InR-TB outbreak), but it was not until 2011 that the machines were in 
place in all five London prisons, i.e., 12 years after the initial outbreak.  At the time of 
writing, the machines were not yet fully operational in most of the prisons, including in 
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Pentonville where, respondents say, the x-ray machine has still not been used to screen 
a single arriving prisoner for active pulmonary TB. Currently, the machines are rarely, 
if ever, used, and then only in acute situations such as for identifying swallowed foreign 
objects. A respondent familiar with the situation says the problem is a matter of 
resource allocation by prison healthcare staff. The prison health service refuses to fund 
the training necessary for staff to use the machines for TB screening, citing other 
priorities given shrinking budgets. One part of the NHS funded the machines, while 
another part of the NHS refuses to operationalise them for their intended purpose, 
demonstrating significant misalignment within the NHS. In the meantime, prisoners in 
London’s over-crowded prison system remain unscreened for TB despite evidence that 
a prison history is a risk factor for TB (Story et al 2007). 
The second problematic decision by prison healthcare officials concerns efforts at 
computerising prison health records. It was intended that computerisation would 
improve inter-prison communication, a significant issue as when prisoners are 
transferred between institutions their medical histories and records are often 
misplaced, as noted above. Connecting for Health is the NHS body responsible for 
building and maintaining the NHS IT infrastructure and for sourcing and installing e-
records in the prison system. However, the first iteration of the system lacked the 
capacity to allow prisons to even share records amongst themselves. One research 
respondent told of how after the system was installed prison health staff would still 
have to print off the prisoners’ health records and physically send them with the 
prisoner when they were transferred or sent to court with a pending possibility of 
transfer.  When, some years later, Connecting for Health upgraded the system to allow 
for record sharing amongst HM prisons it did not purchase the “module” necessary to 
allow x-rays and x-ray reports to be sent electronically, and it is not possible for this 
capacity to be added to the system. Consequently, prison health staff must now convert 
x-rays to PDF format outside of the electronic record system and make a note in the 
prisoner’s health record that such a report exists. Not surprisingly, requiring this 
additional effort from over-extended staff means x-rays and reports sometimes do not 
get added to prisoners’ medical records.  If the x-ray needs to be forwarded to another 
prison it must be done via email, raising privacy concerns.  So in the rare event that the 
x-ray machines are actually used on a prisoner for their intended purpose - to assist in 
the diagnosis of TB – there is a risk that the resulting information may never find its 
way into the patient’s medical record. Again, this is an instance of one part of the NHS 




The third problematic decision concerns the addition of “negative pressure” isolation 
facilities. The original 2001 HPA report into the InR-TB outbreak identified the issue of 
an absence of such facilities within HMP Pentonville as a problem requiring attention. 
However, it was not until after the NHS assumed responsibility for prison healthcare 
that facilities were built, indicating at least a five-year lag from when the problem was 
identified.  Until the isolation rooms were built, prisoners with contagious TB were 
kept in single-bunked cells within the prison hospital, but the hatches in the cells 
through which food and medication were passed were open into the general prison 
hospital ward, and external ventilation was poor. When the NHS agreed to the 
construction of purpose-built isolation facilities the decision was seen as a clear step 
forward for TB control, particularly given the high transmissibility of the isoniazid-
resistant strain within the prison. But as with the installation of the x-ray machines and 
the introduction of electronic medical records, issues arose when it came to executing 
the plan and again, one part of the NHS (prison health services) failed to communicate 
adequately with another (facilities management). The construction of the rooms/cells 
proceeded without consulting NHS infection control experts, of which the NHS had 
many. Consequently, the isolation cells were built without washing facilities, meaning 
that prisoners with contagious TB have to walk through the general prison hospital 
ward to exercise their statutory right to a daily bath or shower, sometimes doing so 
without wearing a face mask, according to a respondent. (This is still the current 
situation at Pentonville.) 
Despite the challenges in the NHS’ management of prison healthcare, Siva (2010) notes 
that the DH is pleased with the overall improvement in the standard of care and the 
partnership between the NHS and HM Prison Service, while noting there is room for 
improvement. The then director and head of offender health at the DH acknowledges 
the challenges and that more is needed “to even begin to address the array of complex, 
multiple needs evident in this population—requiring active partnership working across 
a range of health, criminal, and social care agencies” (Siva 2010:447).  
Responding to the Outbreak in Pentonville  
Starting with the early days of the outbreak, before the NHS was responsible for prison 
healthcare, the lack of a functional working relationship between the prison health 
system and the NHS caused problems. A senior TB nurse with significant experience 
liaising with the prison health system described how difficult it was to communicate 
with her prison counterparts. She described them as having very different methods of 
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working from nurses and other NHS clinicians , saying that the highly structured prison 
environment resulted in them being task focused (as opposed to patient focused), that 
they did not carry bleepers or use email, and that the only way to reach them was via 
telephone. This made it difficult to schedule prisoners’ appointments at external TB 
clinics, or to organise visits to the prisons. These poor communications manifested in 
various outcomes, including difficulties in conducting contact tracing interviews and 
time delays in treating offenders infected with InR-TB after testing by prison healthcare 
staff and subsequent confirmation of the infection at external NHS or HPA laboratories. 
Delays in treatment meant more opportunities for this highly infectious strain of TB to 
spread within the overcrowded prison, or more opportunity for an infected offender to 
be transferred, released, or otherwise lost to follow-up and treatment. This 
troublesome state of affairs was described by a former senior public health leader: 
...unlike anything else I’ve been involved with, you hear these ridiculous stories 
about, you know, a team would go into prisons and test. And I remember one 
horrible day they went to Pentonville and found five positive cases. But the 
prison escort system could only deal with one or two a week, so it would take 
us three weeks, minimum, to get all of those five people properly to a clinic to 
be assessed. And the clinic team were willing to go into Pentonville, but 
Pentonville didn’t want them. And again, there was nobody to say “stop this, 
you know. These people, this is an emergency. They need their treatment sorted 
out within twenty-four hours. If they can’t come to the clinic, the clinic will 
come to them and we will make that happen”. 
As troubling as the obvious fragmentation and lack of leadership and communication 
between the prison healthcare system and the NHS was, the NHS response to it was 
equally disquieting. The respondent quoted above went on:  
But you know, I sort of look back on it and think, you know, we should 
probably, should have been more assertive around stuff like that. But because 
the people in the frontline were just used to it, they would almost not bother to 
tell you the story, you know, because oh, “it’s happened again”. And so we were 
much too tolerant of people potentially spreading TB, I think. 
Besides being a further example of the fragmented nature of the TB control system, this 
anecdote illustrates how weak accountability and leadership can potentially translate 
into more TB cases. Perhaps if the nurses or even the person sharing the anecdote, a 
senior public health official, believed they would have to account for their actions, the 
response to Pentonville officials would have been more forceful and insistent. 
Whilst the event recounted above happened at least six years ago, two research 
respondents indicated that this situation could occur again today. Both respondents 
suggested this is because prisoner health is still accorded a low priority by the prison 
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service, despite now being run by the NHS’ offender health unit, and that in-reach by TB 
clinics to prisons, including Pentonville, remains weak. Communication and joint 
working between the TB clinics “on the outside” and the prisons is still often 
ineffective. 
Why the InR-TB outbreak is cause for such concern 
The outbreak is of particular concern for several reasons. First, isoniazid resistance “is 
one drug away from MDRTB” (senior TB consultant), which, as previously mentioned, 
is more lethal as well as complex and expensive to treat. Second, the strain of InR-TB 
circulating in London is highly transmissible, according to an HPA report, with an 
almost 100% higher transmission rate to contacts than the overall rate of TB 
transmission to contacts (21.5% vs. 11.3%) (Neely et al 2009). As early as 2004, an 
HPA report entitled “Outbreak of Isoniazid Resistant Mycobacterium Tuberculosis in 
North London 1999-2004” identified a case of community-acquired MDRTB, believed 
to have been contracted from an isoniazid-resistant patient who did not complete 
treatment and who went on to develop MDRTB. As seen in New York City’s recent TB 
epidemic, community-acquired MDRTB infections cause great concern, and can lead to 
panic amongst the general public. Such infections embody the concept of TB “jumping 
the fence” from its usual epidemiological base of the poor and marginalised into middle 
class communities. This is also a concern for healthcare professionals in London’s TB 
community, as the reality of rising MDRTB rates in London take hold:  
What’s going to happen if someone (middle class) contracts MDRTB and it 
turns out that all of us sitting here have been talking about it for years and 
knew it was going to happen? (Senior TB nurse speaking at a TB Clinical 
Working Group meeting, February 2010) 
Owing to the nature of the isoniazid-resistant outbreak’s patient population, many of 
whom are described as having “chaotic lives”, treatment completion rates were well 
below average, between 42%-68%, for the first 5 or so years of the outbreak, further 
increasing the risk of MDRTB transmission. Even by 2009, the completion rate stood at 
only 71%, well below the minimum target of 85% set by the Chief Medical Officer. (Of 
some concern, treatment completion data contained in the latest HPA report, for 2010, 
was available for only 106 of the 343 outbreak cases surveyed. But of those reported, 
treatment completion was 86%, a potentially significant improvement if sustained 
across the set of cases.) Finally, contact tracing in this outbreak is made more difficult 
because of reluctance by many InR-TB patients to share details about their personal 
lives. This further increases the risk that the disease will spread, undetected and 
untreated, outside its original patient base. Low treatment completion rates and 
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contact tracing are directly related to organisational functioning, and until addressed 
adequately within the outbreak population, it is unlikely the outbreak will be brought 
under control, especially given the high transmissibility of the strain.  
Please refer to Appendix H for an overview of the InR-TB patient profile. 
 
Treating InR-TB Patients 
As discussed, widespread use of directly observed therapy (DOT) is regarded as an 
important component of successful TB control programs, but its use in London is 
limited and highly variable. In New York City, on the other hand, it is the default mode 
of treatment for all TB patients, regardless of their risk profile, and 76% of all patients, 
regardless of social risk profile, are on the regime (New York City Department of Health 
and Mental Hygiene 2009). DOT is seen as especially important for patients whose 
social risk factors which make it less likely they will successfully complete TB 
treatment; virtually all of London’s InR-TB patient population fall into this category.  
 
However, in keeping with the low overall DOT rates in London, only 52%, of InR-TB 
patients were on DOT in 2010. This is contrary to all official guidance provided by the 
WHO, NICE and the British Thoracic Society which indicates that DOT must be 
considered for all patients with one or more social risk factors. During the course of 
this research no adequate explanation for the low rates of DOT amongst InR-TB 
patients emerged, but it does provide further evidence of the ambivalence or reluctance 
toward establishing a serious DOT program in London. More than one respondent 
indicated that DOT, and enhanced case management in general, are not good uses of 
resources. The argument is that it is better to focus on the 80-85 per cent of patients 
who do not have a social risk factor rather than on the 15-20 per cent who do. This “80-
20” split was raised by several interview subjects, none of whom had much 
professional contact with socially at-risk patients, but some of whom occupied senior 
or influential posts within the TB control system. In fact, a respondent heavily involved 
in developing the latest NICE guidance for treating “hard to reach” TB patients noted,  
we tried to seek members to join the group and we didn’t get one application to 
join from the London chest physicians, not one, which was pretty extraordinary. 
While targeting resources toward the larger group is a seemingly logical position, it 
ignores the distinct challenges presented by “the 20 per cent”. A senior TB consultant 
described this group as: 
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the ones who cause all the problems, you know, they’re the ones who don’t turn 
up to treatment, they’re the ones who have to get sectioned, they’re the ones 
who are going to transmit infection locally.  So they’re kind of the ones that are 
indicative of poor control within this country... they’re certainly going to be at 
least half of all the cases that are lost to follow-up. 
Given limited resources, it is tempting to focus the system’s efforts on the “80 per cent”, 
those patients who require little cost or effort to cure, placing the appropriate 
treatment of the 20 per cent of “high maintenance” patients who are difficult and often 
expensive to cure, as a lower priority. From this perspective it is easy to justify not 
providing the infrastructure to support DOT, not supporting the work of the Find & 
Treat team, and focusing on the purely clinical aspects of tuberculosis, at the cost of a 
broader public health perspective. More than once the argument was offered by 
interview subjects that that money spent on Find & Treat could hire at least 10 more 
nurses to work within established TB clinics. The merits and drawbacks of this strategy 
is an ongoing topic of discussion and debate within London TB control circles, with 
little agreement between the two camps. 
The latest reports advocating changes to TB control in London, the Model of Care and 
the Case for Change, finally endorse the WHO, NICE and British Thoracic Society 
recommendations regarding DOT and at-risk patients. Although it appears that the 
documents are not moving forward within the NHS hierarchy, this may signal a new 
openness toward accepting the tenets of DOT and to perhaps promoting greater use of 
this approach. But the language, in keeping with that of previous reports, is weak and 
non-directive:  
all patients should have a risk assessment for adherence to treatment, and DOT 
should be considered for patients who have social risk factors...The use of DOT 
improves treatment compliance and completion rates. (NHS London 2011a:35) 
Again, this stands in clear contrast with New York City’s approach. As mentioned 
earlier, in that city DOT is mandated as the default approach for all newly diagnosed TB 
patients. 
Treating the “20 percent”, including the InR-TB patient population, and especially with 
regard to providing DOT and conducting effective contact tracing, tests London’s TB 
control system and lays bare organisational shortcomings and challenges. In London, 
where the InR-TB outbreak has entered its second decade and MDRTB rates have more 
than doubled in the past four years, these challenges are clearly not being met. As with 
fully-drug sensitive TB in London, many reports document the epidemiology of the InR-
TB outbreak, with some containing recommendations as to how the system should 
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respond. Typically recommendations focus on the need for more resources, but they 
also suggest ways to address operational issues, as discussed below. (These reports, it 
should be noted, are in addition to the 14 reports outlined in Chapter Six.) There is 
strong awareness of the seriousness of the situation, with the outbreak described in an 
undated presentation by NHS London, but circa 2003-2004, as a “potential public 
health emergency: ‘a time bomb’”.  Almost a decade later the isoniazid resistant “time 
bomb” is still ticking, although usurped in urgency by the even more serious threat of 
rising rates of MDRTB.  
A snapshot of the system’s response to another rise in rates 
Fully 13 years after the outbreak was first identified, it is continuing, uncontrolled, with 
cases now showing up across London. At a TB Clinical Working Group meeting in mid-
2010 a troubling and surprising increase in isoniazid-resistant cases was revealed by 
the HPA. From an average of approximately five cases per quarter, 15 cases in the last 
quarter of 2009 were confirmed. A senior TB consultant, observed: 
I said before the meeting, I said I want to know what’s happened to the 
isoniazid resistant outbreak, and it was clear it had jumped 100 cases (since the 
last formal reporting). And where on earth, I mean, that was ridiculous. And 
what was most ridiculous about it was someone must have been looking at that 
data. They must have just been collecting the numbers and going oh, ‘look at 
this curve, and it’s gone up again. That’s great. Let’s see how it goes.’  
In the formally minuted words of a senior Director of Public Health, “the control 
mechanisms had been a complete failure”. 
After this finding, a sub-group was assembled to discuss the outbreak. The previous 
iterations of the Outbreak/Incident Control Committee had been subsumed by the TB 
Clinical Working Group and consequently, had stopped meeting (as revisited in the 
next section). It would be the first time in approximately 18 months that such a 
gathering had been organised, despite the HPA recommendation that a dedicated 
outbreak group convene at least every six months. During this period, the outbreak was 
continuing. Although it did appear for a time that the rate of new infections had 
stabilised, at no point was there evidence of a consistent decline.  
The meeting was organised for a month hence, to be led again by the HPA and held at 
their offices, and was observed. Two key action items arose:  (1) for the HPA to produce 
an updated spider diagram of the outbreak to enable the identification of “super 
spreaders” both within the prison system and in the wider community (it is unknown 
whether this ever happened as there were concerns expressed by the HPA about the 
resource intensiveness of the task), and (2) that a letter be sent to all case managers 
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(i.e., nurses) of  recent outbreak cases asking them to ensure contact tracing for their 
outbreak cases was robust, “advising” them that all cases should be on DOT, and 
reminding them of the two acceptable pharmacological treatment regimes for these 
cases. An additional action item, related to undertaking a cohort review of these cases, 
was also agreed. (However, the need for this was superseded by the eventual adoption 
of the broader, formalised Cohort Review program across the city, as described in Case 
Study Four.)  
At the start of the meeting the HPA stressed that the recommendations from their 2004 
outbreak report, which built on those contained in their original 2001 report, were not 
reviewed and assessed as to the degree of follow-up or implementation which had 
occurred. This point was also highlighted in the formal meeting minutes, as discussed 
below. The overall impression left after observing this meeting was one of surprise at 
how timid and incremental the group’s response was given the sharp rise in outbreak 
cases and the sense of urgency which had led to the meeting. The group’s lack of 
authority was notable, as exemplified by the plan to send such a tentatively worded 
letter to case managers. But the organisational structure of the TB control system is 
such that the letter could take no other form. The nurses were employed by several 
different employers and this group had no authority to give them instruction – nor 
responsibility if their “advice” was not followed.  
Organisational Restructuring and Inter-organisational Politics 
Finally, any serious discussion of the InR-TB outbreak in London must acknowledge the 
potential impact of the creation of the HPA and ensuing inter-organisational politics 
between it and NHS London. Some of these inter-organisational challenges were 
carried over from the HPA’s precursor, the Centre for Disease Surveillance and Control, 
Public Health Laboratory Service, and some of them were personality-based, but a 
disconnection, or misalignment, between the HPA’s official mandate and its operational 
capacity appears to have exacerbated the situation. The next mini case study will 
discuss the genesis of the HPA and its impact on London’s TB control system, 
highlighting the role of NPM principles in its formation. Consequently, the remainder of 
this section focuses on the inter-organisational dynamics between NHS London and the 
HPA. 
During the course of conducting interviews, and in formal and informal “side” 
discussions, various NHS London personnel actively encouraged the pursuit of the 
story of London’s InR-TB outbreak. It appeared that their motivation was to reveal the 
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outbreak story as what they saw as evidence of shortcomings by the HPA. The HPA, on 
the other hand, neither encouraged nor discouraged this line of inquiry. 
Regarding their role in the outbreak, the HPA feel they were placed in an impossible 
situation. Whilst they were initially handed leadership of the isoniazid-resistant 
outbreak file, as they are for all TB outbreaks, treating and managing the individual 
outbreak cases is the responsibility of the NHS. In practice, this results in an 
organisational “disconnect” between the two key bodies responsible for addressing the 
outbreak. As part of its usual procedure during an outbreak, the HPA compiled 
important facts and data which, in this instance, they used to formulate 
recommendations on how the outbreak and its patients should be managed. But it is 
the job of NHS-run TB clinics to actually deliver the type of case management and 
patient care recommended by the HPA, as the HPA has no role in these areas. Neither 
does the HPA have the authority to compel the NHS to follow its recommendations as 
the HPA is, by statute, an arms-length advisory agency (for more detail, see below). In 
the words of a former commissioner in a London borough with a high rate of InR-TB 
cases: 
...the rigidity is having surveillance and clinical practice, and the HPA and the 
NHS, and getting better coordination between the two. So there's this 
underlying problem of (isoniazid) resistance bubbling along...but it would seem 
to me that there's transmission occurring, which could probably be dealt with if 
there was better collaboration or coordination between the HPA, who kind of 
do the surveillance side of things, that say, “oh isn't that interesting” but in their 
defence don't really have the resources or the power or the expertise or the 
mandate, ultimately, to deal with that…and the TB Service 
A former senior DH advisor observed: 
there was absolutely no strategy for doing anything about it, there was just a 
kind of, you know, “if we measure it enough it will go away and if we know 
enough about the people, if we know enough about their social networks and 
the bands they play in and the garages they work in...It will all be alright” and 
there wasn’t, it’s very interesting, it was almost like you were watching a forest 
fire and making lists of the trees that had been destroyed, instead of trying to 
find some water...it was a very bizarre situation.   
As will be argued in the next case study, this organisational disconnection is potentially 
significant and provides further evidence of the extensive, NPM-inspired fragmentation 
within the system. 
As mentioned above, the first report with recommendations into the InR-TB outbreak 
was released in June 2001, by the HPA’s predecessor, the Centre for Disease 
Surveillance and Control. Unbeknownst at the time, this would be the first of at least six 
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similar reports eventually produced, with the latest released in November, 2011. A 
précis of the recommendations contained in the HPA’s initial report in 2001, along with 
their current status, follows: 
Recommendation Status 
1. Local resources be put in place to ensure the outbreak is 
properly investigated and managed 
not implemented 
2. The temporary TB liaison nurse and other support posts 
be “funded as a priority” by local health agencies 
not implemented 
3. The instruction from the London Regional Office in 2000 
“to ensure adequate resourcing for TB control is acted 
upon across the city”  
not implemented 
4. Following BTS guidelines (including the use of DOT for 
almost all I-RTB patients) 
not implemented 
5. Providing free anti-tuberculosis drugs implemented several years 
later  
6. Providing anti-tuberculosis drugs at the patient’s clinic 
visit 
implemented several years 
later 
7. Providing food when patients attend for follow-up and 
covering the cost of travel to attend clinic, preferably up-
front 
generally not implemented, 
aside from in a few clinics  
8. An understanding by clinics of “the importance of 
ensuring compliance and its monitoring as well as 
outcome monitoring” as outlined in letters sent to “chest 
physicians, Chief Executives of Trusts, Directors of Public 
Health and Consultants in Communicable Disease Control 
across London” 
status not possible to assess but 
treatment completion rates 
amongst outbreak cases 
indicate it is unlikely that 
clinics responded  
9. Urging “Local Authorities (to) prepare contingency plans 
for the likelihood that more of these cases will develop 
multi-drug resistant disease and be very difficult to 
manage for hospitals and the prison service” 
not implemented 
FIGURE 28: STATUS OF HPA RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONDING TO THE INR-TB OUTBREAK 
Although most of these recommendations were not implemented, in a follow-up report 
issued in 2004, a new set of recommendations is set forth by the Outbreak Control 
Committee under the leadership of the (now) HPA. These recommendations are more 
operationally focused and detailed and include: 
1. Use a case management approach 
2. Use DOT at the outset for patients at risk of non-adherence to treatment and 
for all outbreak patients unless the clinician deems it unnecessary 




4. (Interestingly) no change to current recommendations for contact tracing 
(although this changed shortly thereafter to suggest aggressive contact 
tracing) 
5. Semi-annual meetings of the Outbreak Control Committee 
The 2004 report outlines these recommendations in tabular form over 13 pages, 
including columns for “Action” and most notably, “Responsibility”. A sample page from 
this report is reproduced in Appendix J. Those identified as responsible for 
implementing various key actions are largely external to the HPA and beyond the 
organisation’s realm of control. Again, the fragmentation within the system is evident.   
With the tabling of this report leadership of the Outbreak Control Committee changed 
from the (now) HPA to NHS London. The number and seniority of representation from 
the NHS on the control committee increased at the same time. The change in leadership 
(though not the membership) was ultimately short-lived, lasting only two or three 
years, but at the time of its occurrence it was seen as a coup by NHS London and a firm 
rebuke of the HPA’s handling of the outbreak. Archived electronic files accessed for this 
research contain a 2004 document entitled “Isoniazid Resistant TB Incident Control 
Committee: Review of Terms of Reference (TOR) and membership” which contains the 
arguments from the NHS in support of the changes. They focus on the need for 
“additional expert and cross-London input” (i.e., expertise which goes beyond 
epidemiology and with a more localised, borough-level focus) and the need to respond 
to  
extensive organisational changes in the NHS, with the formation of Primary 
Care Trusts (PCTs) and Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) in 2002 and the 
Health Protection Agency in 2003...the ICC’s (Incident Control Committee) 
roles, executive responsibilities and accountability are unclear within these 
new organisations.  
The document further states:  
 The new membership of the ICC should take into account the balance between: 
o The expert advisory role of the ICC (i.e, the HPA’s role) and direct 
management/executive responsibility for the incident (i.e, the NHS’ 
role) 
o Central co-ordination and communication vs. responsibility within 
individual sectors 
Despite these NHS-led changes, there was no ensuing reversal in InR-TB rates, and the 
new committee’s recommendations, issued in 2006, were almost identical to those 
proposed in the 2004 report. But the change did manage to generate tensions between 




Respondent: Because there were some dynamics around the isoniazid resistant 
outbreak actually as well, in terms of whether the HPA was the right body, 
exemplified by (name redacted) and whether that was the right ownership, 
because at that stage it had grown to a certain size and I think the sense was... 
ST: The outbreak had or the...? 
R: The outbreak had and I think there was a sense that, there is a stage when 
this needs to be owned politically by the NHS, by Directors of Public Health.  I 
have a feeling that that’s what happened...but they (the NHS) created a group 
that couldn’t do what its terms of reference were. (They) created a group that 
subsumed the activity of the pre-existing isoniazid resistant TB outbreak team... 
But the agenda would be, we were there for like a whole day, you could never 
get through all the business that needed to be done because some groups were 
not working effectively, in fact they were disbanded. So that was too ambitious, 
so for me, I found that fascinating.  
Nonetheless, a senior NHS official who played a key role in orchestrating the change 
remains convinced that it was a necessary move, that the HPA was simply not up to the 
task of leading the outbreak committee: 
The isoniazid resistant response should have been grasped and managed much 
earlier on. The response was far too little, far too late...that’s where the Health 
Protection Agency bit did or did not come in...it retained a surveillance focus 
rather than a control focus and they were the one organisation that could 
possibly have brought everybody together and dealt with the control, rather 
than the, ”oh, look it’s rising again”...it isn’t as if things didn’t happen, they did, 
but nevertheless, they were insufficient, insufficiently coordinated 
As will be highlighted in Case Study Four, the NHS London staged another similar 
“coup”, or takeover, when it brought the Find & Treat team under its purview and 
control. On one level, these takeovers might be seen as efforts at reducing 
fragmentation, but it will be argued later that a deeply rooted instinct within the NHS 
toward strong control and risk management is a more likely primary motivation. In the 
case of the outbreak committee, once the NHS controlled the group, it effectively shut it 
down by rolling it into the broader TB Clinical Working Group. A similar scenario is 
unfolding with the Find & Treat Service, which may also be headed for extinction.   
Whatever validity the NHS criticisms of the HPA may have, the HPA-led reports 
contained detailed recommendations for action by both themselves and the NHS, and 
the majority of the NHS-focused recommendations were never implemented. The 
reasons for this are complex: fragmentation in the system; ongoing NHS restructuring; 
lack of authority and leadership to drive the necessary changes; and, an absence of 
responsibility and accountability for why these changes never occurred. However, the 
fact that these recommendations were never formally reviewed for follow-up remains a 
point of contention with senior HPA officials: 
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Now the review that was agreed the last time round is... more description...and 
again we’ve been tasked with it. So it’s less about the system and how the 
system has responded to those cases and what it means... but still the automatic 
reaction, “oh get a review, get a group together to agree what the review will 
be”.  Whereas, in fact, arguably what the review should have been, is of those 
(early) wide-reaching recommendations, many of which talked about the 
systems, not just about the cases, clearly.  And have they been enacted or done?  
So it’s an interesting one, yes. (Senior HPA respondent and leader on the InR-TB 
outbreak)  
The source of this rivalry, or tension, between the HPA and the NHS was never 
articulated during this research. Some of it is certainly personality driven, but it also 
likely relates to attempts by both parties to assign blame or responsibility to the other 
for inability to manage the outbreak. The HPA assumed leadership of the issue when 
the outbreak was first identified as this is standard operating procedure in the case of 
TB outbreaks, most of which occur at schools, colleges/universities or workplaces. 
These “incidents” generally have defined boundaries and last for relatively short 
periods of time - as long as it takes to identify and test all of the initial case’s contacts, 
and then turn diagnosed cases over to TB clinics for treatment. And since the vast 
majority of TB patients do not fit into the “chaotic lifestyle” category of the typical InR-
TB patient, they complete a basic course of TB treatment and are cured, usually within 
6 months. As the InR-TB outbreak has been going on for 13 years, there have been 
abundant opportunities for disagreement, tensions and accusations to arise, as indeed 
appears to be the case. 
Summary of Case Study Two 
This vignette has discussed the ongoing InR-TB outbreak in London, using it as a 
microcosm to illustrate organisational challenges and shortcomings within London’s 
broader TB control system. It discussed the nature of the outbreak, highlighting the 
challenging life circumstances of many of the InR-TB patients, the difficulties in 
ensuring their successful treatment and cure, and the importance of so doing in order 
to minimise their risk of developing MDRTB and subsequently spreading it. It was 
noted that many of the outbreak patients have prison histories, with HMP Pentonville 
playing a key role. This role, along with that of the prison healthcare system more 
generally, was also discussed. As with the previous case study, comparing New York 
City and London, the issue of NPM-inspired fragmentation within the system arose. 
Within HMP Pentonville, there were recurring instances of misalignment amongst 
components of this subsystem and an apparent inability of components to learn from, 
or communicate with, each other. These operational shortcomings had a significant 
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impact, for example, in the construction of inadequate isolation facilities in the prison 
hospital.  
In complexity theory terms, this scenario stands in stark contrast to what would be 
expected from a complex system, where actors and components within systems are 
expected to co-evolve and adapt to changing realities. Similarly, there was no apparent 
self-organisation amongst system actors, or emergent innovation. Non-linearity is 
arguably evident in terms of the lack of positive results despite significant prison 
healthcare infrastructure investments (x-ray machines, isolation facilities, e-healthcare 
records), although all of them were poorly executed or operationalised.   Consistent 
with complexity theory, the system’s history does seem significant in explaining its 
current status, particularly regarding the prison service. After years of poor levels of 
care and infection control for TB-infected prisoners, the system’s long overdue 
attempts at improvement have met with limited success and middling levels of 
commitment from officials. 
The case study also discussed the role of the HPA in managing the outbreak, with 
particular emphasis on the sometimes difficult relationship between it and NHS 
London. The HPA is an arms-length government advisory body. NHS London is, among 
many other things, an operational and service delivery organisation over which the 
HPA has no authority. Similarly, the NHS does not have any authority over the HPA. 
This typically NPM-based structural and organisational configuration makes 
accountabilities unclear, invites opportunities for misalignment, and embodies the 
fragmentation which characterises the broader TB control system as well as that of the 
outbreak subsystem. It is argued here that these factors have been detrimental in 
controlling, let alone ending, the InR-TB outbreak.  
Finally, a lack of accountability within the system emerged as an important 
organisational issue. Also highlighted was the NHS’ apparent instinct to take over 
independent subsystems or organisations which, in their view, require greater control 
and more rigorous risk management, reflecting an NPM-induced desire toward 
excessive risk management and control.    
The HPA will now be discussed at more length. The next vignette highlights the 
agency’s genesis and what its formation has meant for the DH. It also revisits the 
concept, introduced earlier in this chapter, of how the Agency’s organisational 
structure, roles and objectives within the broader healthcare system has likely affected 
TB control in London.  
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Case Study Three: Creating the Health Protection Agency, the 
Subsequent Hollowing Out Of the Department of Health and the 
Potential Impact on TB Control in London 
The Role of the Health Protection Agency 
The Health Protection Agency was created in 2003, initially by an Order of Parliament, 
followed in 2004 by an Act of Parliament. The HPA is an executive, non-departmental 
public body whose enacting legislation describes its role as follows: 
(1) The Agency has the following functions in relation to health—  
(a) the protection of the community (or any part of the community) against 
infectious disease and other dangers to health;  
(b) the prevention of the spread of infectious disease;  
(c) the provision of assistance to any other person who exercises functions in 
relation to the matters mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b). (Health Protection 
Agency Act 2004) 
 
The establishment of the HPA is in keeping with what had become a well established 
public policy orientation toward NPM principles. In this instance, a once powerful line 
department, Health, was disaggregated and structurally flattened as a consequence of, 
and possibly as part of the motivation for, creating the HPA. As will be discussed in 
more length later, this move resulted in a loss of policy and functional expertise within 
the DH, or in a “hollowing out”, in NPM parlance. Most in-house public health experts at 
the Department were relocated to the new HPA as a spun-out agency and became 
employees of that organisation, joining other public health experts from the former 
Public Health Laboratory Service (also once closely aligned to Health), along with a 
variety of other professionals.  
The HPA regards itself as an independent, arms-length agency whose objective is  
to protect the public from threats to their health from infectious diseases and 
environment hazards. It does this by providing advice and information to the 
general public, to health professionals such as doctors and nurses, and to 
national and local government. (Health Protection Agency 2010:3)  
The term “providing advice and information” is key to understanding the HPA’s role 
and its inherent limitations in TB control. The Agency has limited operational 
functionality in the healthcare system aside from providing expert and specialised 
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laboratory services and sophisticated disease surveillance data. But with regard to TB 
at least, this limitation has not prevented the HPA from adopting goals and assuming 
responsibilities which extend well beyond acting in an advisory capacity. It is argued 
here that this has resulted in a misunderstanding within the HPA itself, and the broader 
TB control system, regarding the Agency’s role and responsibilities within the TB 
control system. 
 When it was established, the Agency adopted 12 strategic goals to guide its work, as 
detailed in Appendix K. Of these, three are directly relevant to TB control: 
 To reduce the incidence and consequences of infection 
 To strengthen information and communication systems for identifying and 
tracking diseases and exposures to infectious, chemical and radiological 
hazards 
 To build and improve the evidence base through a comprehensive programme 
of research 
With specific regard to tuberculosis, the Agency states that its mandate is “to reduce the 
incidence and consequences of tuberculosis” and to “work towards preventing 
tuberculosis transmission by identifying and managing tuberculosis clusters.” (Health 
Protection Agency 2011c:18-19).   
Of interest is the action-oriented language of these goals, which indicate a role for the 
HPA beyond that of acting in an advisory capacity. Of those goals listed above, the 
Agency has the clear capacity to implement improvements to IT systems and to conduct 
research. And indeed it has done so with regard to TB. However, it is not at all obvious 
how the HPA could “reduce the incidence and consequences of tuberculosis” (or most 
infections, for that matter), and “work(ing) towards preventing tuberculosis 
transmission by…managing tuberculosis clusters” also presents organisational and 
functional challenges (although the HPA does routinely identify TB clusters, owing to 
its microbiological expertise). Structural and legal constraints within the HPA mean 
executing these goals is challenging, perhaps unrealistic. The Agency has limited 
operational capacity when it comes to communicable disease control, as healthcare 
delivery in the UK is the purview of the NHS (and private providers). An example was 
discussed in Case Study Two, with the HPA offering concrete recommendations for 
managing the InR-TB outbreak whilst the NHS largely failed to implement them. Even 
with regard to managing and coordinating TB outbreaks, for which the HPA is 
responsible, they still rely on, variously: 
 the NHS to supply the nurses to conduct onsite screening,  
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 the local PCT to agree to pay for rapid testing if this is deemed preferable or 
necessary by the HPA, and, 
 TB clinics, usually within acute trusts, to supply and administer the lengthy 
course of TB treatment.  
In sum, it is not clear how the HPA can be expected to fulfil the mandate “to reduce the 
incidence and consequences of tuberculosis” in the absence of the necessary 
operational capacity. It is similarly unclear as to why the Agency assumed such 
responsibility at the time of its creation when its founders may have known it lacked 
the capacity needed. When queried on this point, a senior HPA official involved in the 
formation of the Agency, and who also has high level oversight responsibilities for TB 
control, dismissed the importance of the organisational objectives: 
I think that those organisational documents, you see them in so many other 
areas too, are aspirational and naïve. And naïve in the kind of way that 
organisational documents often are…particularly in health there’s, you know, 
“we should not be about process. We should be about outcome”…but actually 
the one cog in the clock, no matter how perfect it is, no matter how well-oiled it 
is, it is but one cog in the clock and it cannot alone, deliver these things, unless 
the other parts of the clock do the same thing, pull in the same direction. So the 
notion that the HPA’s activity in this area should be judged on the basis of that 
kind of outcome for TB seems to me to be absurd.  
Whilst not entirely clear from these comments, there was sense this may have been the 
first time the respondent had considered the issue of the mismatch between the 
Agency’s goals with relation to TB and its capacity to deliver on them:  
…but the kind of targets set should fit the remit of the organization. And so if 
the HPA…was given overall responsibility for TB services in this country, 
including every aspect of it, right from new entrants’ screening to delivery of 
treatment…then, and I think only then would it be appropriate to have the kind 
of targets that are being set… 
There may be an argument for saying the HPA’s role in TB control…should not 
be defined as it currently is, but should be extended to take on a greater 
proportion of the whole job. If that were the case, then those targets, objectives, 
whatever, could then sensibly be broadened to take that into account. But short 
of that, it doesn’t make a great deal of sense to be measuring the HPA in those 
terms. 
These observations indicate that misalignment within the TB control system had 
become normalised so that it was no longer apparent to some of those involved in it, 
even those who had contributed to its creation.  
But for others, including some HPA staff and those delivering TB care and control, there 
was an awareness of the misalignment between the HPA’s mandate and its operational 
capacity. Specifically, respondents wondered whether the HPA is responsible for the 
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control of TB as well as its surveillance, and the extent to which the organisation could 
function beyond a purely advisory capacity: 
But then...we were kind of created as a separate body... so the delivery of the 
whole thing is with the NHS. We are in an advisory capacity. It (TB 
control)...should be led by the NHS. Because we don't have the resources...They 
hold the resources...and they know it's not within the HPA to be able to achieve 
that (reduction in TB rates). The achievement is going to have to come from the 
NHS because they have all the money. So there's no point in having a goal for 
our organisation when the delivery is within the NHS because we'll fail. Who is 
responsible? We don't know...We have not got any muscle at all. (HPA 
consultant) 
...they (HPA)just sit in their Ivory Tower. And it’s not out of unwillingness, I 
think, that they don’t participate or want to do a really good job but, I think in 
one sense, they themselves might just feel powerless to do things. Because, you 
know, I’m being quite damning here, but I think there’s a lot of…really good 
people...that... seem to have taken a step back in engagement… (PCT manager) 
So the HPA can monitor what the problem is, and think they ought to do 
something about it, but they can’t. It’s got no levers to pull. (Chief Executive)  
...the Health Protection Agency, which I guess was both for me, and…I am going 
to talk honestly, it was both a problem as well as a solution. (I)t meant ...(y)ou 
could get data from it in a way that had been much harder …previously, but 
then they had no interest really, in health service data. They just wanted to map. 
So actually, they were very much about describing and analysing, but not very 
much about “so what does this mean in terms of action?”.(Former Director of 
Public Health) 
I would go to meetings that would last four hours, I’m not exaggerating, at 
which we would have presentation after presentation... about cluster analyses, 
how it was spreading, the rates, how it was mutating, all these sort of wonderful 
overheads...And I’m sitting thinking, nobody ever mentions doing anything to 
stop it and it was almost as if, well, “it’s not our job”, you know, it wasn’t 
something they did. (Former senior DH employee) 
Similarly, a Chief Executive interviewed for this research indicated that the lack of 
clarity regarding the HPA’s role, or the recurring sense that the Agency’s potential 
effectiveness has not been maximised, can be traced to the HPA’s origins:  
when the HPA was created, there was no discussion with Chief Executives about 
what would we like, what were we losing, how would it work. It was designed 
by the public health people and that's it. So I have no idea what to expect from 
the HPA. (NHS Chief Executive) 
  
The Creation of the Health Protection Agency 
At the time of the HPA’s creation its first Chairman, Sir William Stewart, described the 
Agency as “a global first, with an unflinching commitment to ever-improving health 
186 
 
protection for the public whom we serve” (Health Protection Agency, 2004b).  A rather 
less glorious description comes from a former Director of Public Health interviewed for 
this research: “(the) Health Protection Agency was assembled out of bits of things that 
were in the Department” (of Health). These “bits” included the Public Health 
Laboratory Service, with its Centre for Disease Surveillance and Control and specialised 
microbiology services, in addition to in-house departmental experts working in 
communicable diseases, infection control and other public health related areas.  
Several respondents indicated their belief that the motivation for creating the HPA 
arose from the 9/11 tragedy in New York City and that the initiative was largely driven 
by the then Chief Medical Officer. There was a sense that the UK was increasingly 
vulnerable to radiological, chemical and biological terrorism and that government 
required an expert, arms-length body to advise them on how to prepare and respond. 
From this, the idea grew to include more traditional health protection functions, 
including communicable and infectious disease control. Some respondents also likened 
the HPA to the American Centre for Disease Control in its broad, national mandate. 
Regardless of the external or political motivations, its creation was predictable within 
the context of a public policy agenda guided by New Public Management principles.  
As mentioned above, at the time of its formation, the HPA subsumed the former PHLS, 
including the Centre for Disease Surveillance and Control and the Microbiology 
Reference Lab. Whilst they were officially arms-length, operating under their own 
legislation, the Public Health Laboratory Service Act, these bodies were widely viewed 
by interview respondents as being part of the DH. The role of the PHLS was “to provide 
a national framework for surveillance and control of infection and update and inform 
effective public health policies” (Cranshaw et al 2000:132). The authors go on to note 
that the “service receives core funding from the Department of Health” (p.132), or in 
the more colourful language of another former Director of Public Health, the DH were 
“the paymasters” of the PHLS. 
This history is important in understanding the current relationship between the HPA 
and the DH as it illustrates the traditional link, and the history of control, which has 
existed between the Department and the broader public health function in the UK. 
Notably, expertise in the area of communicable diseases, however, resided mainly 
within Local Authorities, and for a short while during the creation of the HPA, within 
PCTs. But with the creation of the HPA, these communicable disease experts from the 
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Local Authorities moved into this new organisation, resulting in a melange of expertise 
coming from a variety of organisations and employers. 
(Unintended) Consequences of the Creation of the Health Protection Agency 
Consultants in Communicable Disease Control (CCDCs) were tasked with managing, 
advising and coordinating issues related to public health, including TB. (This is the 
same group discussed previously, in relation to the important role they played in 
focusing attention on rising TB rates in the early 1990s.)The CCDCs were formally 
employed by the NHS, but were physically located within Local Authority offices, 
working as part of larger public health teams and reporting to the local Director of 
Public Health. Whilst this is further evidence of the fragmentation which has long 
characterised London’s TB control system, the arrangement is reported to have worked 
well by those respondents who were part of it and they clearly felt themselves to be 
members of local authority teams. Additionally, the CCDCs had some budget holding 
power within the local authority and possessed a sense of power and influence in terms 
of setting public health and spending priorities. In the words of a long-serving CCDC: 
I used to have a budget in my health authority…for hands-on work…the health 
authority budget was available if we wanted to embark on any program, we had 
direct access to that through the Director of Public Health.  
With the creation of the HPA, CCDCs were removed from local authorities and became 
employees of the newly created HPA, working within geographically aligned “Health 
Protection Units”. With this move they lost much of their influence and were no longer 
budget-holders, able to direct investment in local TB control initiatives. Their new 
relationship with local authorities, now PCTs, had become advisory:  
Respondent: ...we (the HPA) haven't got any money to tell you (the PCT), to give 
you, to do this. And the PCT says “we've got our own priorities. You may advise 
us endlessly, but (laughs) we've got our own priorities” 
ST: And does that happen? 
Respondent: Yes, oh yes. Even up to now... in (name redacted) Trust, we don't 
have the right number of TB nurses. We are in an endless struggle with the 
PCTs… (Long-serving CCDC) 
And in the words of a PCT manager: 
When they (the CCDCs) were in the PCT, yes, they had their own budgets. They 
had, you know, generally a very good and direct link to the Boards, to the 
Directors…”I’m the CCDC. This is my responsibility locally. This is what you 
need to do”, in the old system. Now, it’s “I’m a CCDC. This is my responsibility, 
this is my advice.” Um, and then the responsibility goes back to the Director of 
Public Health (in the PCT) to implement that or not...And I think, in a sense, 
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that’s a great shame because I think CCDCs have got a lot to offer and I don’t 
think they’re utilized.    
A senior HPA employee conceded longstanding concerns regarding the former CCDCs 
acting solely in “advising” roles rather than both advising and “doing”, as had been the 
case:  
…and indeed it’s one of the key concerns I had many years ago when they were 
creating the HPUs, because many of the Consultants in Clinical Disease Control 
are very clear, that they didn’t want to take on some of the “doing” 
responsibilities…that their role stopped at advising. And I felt that that wasn’t 
really the right approach, that they felt the “doing” wasn’t their job...Yes, when 
the HPUs were created that very quickly became the norm and accepted as the 
approach. But in many instances it was the same individuals working within 
health authorities that did both the advising and the “doing”, and then they 
suddenly got jobs that allowed them to do just the advising and not the “doing”, 
which from a personal point of view you can see the attraction actually, you do 
less.   
 
The issue of the physical location of the CCDCs, post-HPA creation, emerged as a 
recurring theme during interviews. A number of respondents indicated that TB was 
better represented and had a higher profile when the CCDCs were physically co-located 
with Directors of Public Health and were in the organisations where TB program and 
service delivery decisions were made, namely, the local authorities: 
One of the changes that I noted over that time period…is I felt much closer to TB 
when the Communicable Disease Consultant was…was reporting to me...when 
the CCDC moved to the Health Protection Agency, it was firstly one stage 
removed and then we stopped getting any feedback from the Health Protection 
Agency. The lead (TB) person ceased to be my CCDC. It was somebody else in 
the sector... and then it just, it just all felt too distant. I never got, you know, the 
London-wide feedback as to what was going on. (Former Director of Public 
Health) 
What I saw was a disengagement with the local area. When the CCDCs went into 
the HPU, they went from a local hub to a sector hub, physically, and as a result, I 
felt in the (name redacted) sector, the engagement from the CCDCs with the 
PCTs was simply a lot less because they were physically somewhere else and 
there wasn’t this kind of day to day interaction...And you normally have to have 
a fairly good reason not to take (the) advice of the HPA but, you know, it’s just 
their advice. It’s nothing more than that. We can discard as we like...(PCT 
Manager) 
Since the HPA’s role is largely limited to advising (aside from provision of microbiology 
services), it is logical that the Agency’s burden of accountability would be impacted. 
This issue of accountability was raised during the consultation process held prior to the 
Agency’s formation. The broad public health community, including the Faculty of Public 
Health and the Royal Institute of Public Health, voiced concern regarding the nature of 
accountability within the new organisation (Pickles 2004). Responsibility for 
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communicable disease control formally rests with local authorities, and even with the 
establishment of the HPA, there “was no intention to undermine the responsibilities of 
local authorities” (Pickles 2004:241). Various DH guidance documents “have served to 
emphasise the key responsibilities of NHS bodies such as acute trusts (and) Primary 
Care Trusts, confirming the HPA in an advisory role” (Pickles 2004:242). The HPA lacks 
formal accountability for its involvement in TB control, which is arguably consistent 
with its purely advisory capacity. But in reality, this absence of accountability spreads 
well beyond the HPA, to include the NHS and the DH, even though these bodies do have 
statutory accountabilities.  
Relationship Between the HPA and the DH  
As noted earlier, there has been a lengthy historical relationship between the public 
health function and the DH. Although the Department lost considerable public health 
policy expertise with the creation of the HPA, they stopped well short of removing 
themselves completely from the public health arena. As can be seen in the below 
excerpt from the HPA’s Management Statement, the administrative relationship 
between the DH and the HPA is close, with Health retaining significant influence on the 
operations of the HPA – a typically NPM “steering not rowing” relationship.  
The Department of Health determines the Health Protection Agency's 
performance framework in the light of the Department's wider strategic aims 
the Health Protection Agency shall submit annually to the Department a draft of 
the Agency's updated corporate plan covering five years ahead.  
The Health Protection Agency shall have agreed with the Department the issues 
to be addressed in the plan and the timetable for its preparation. 
The main elements of the plan – including the key performance targets – shall 
be agreed between the Department and the Health Protection Agency in the 
light of the Department's decisions on policy and resources taken in the context 
of the Government's wider public expenditure plans and decisions. 
(Health Protection Agency 2005) 
The relationship between the DH and the HPA was summarised succinctly by a senior 
TB consultant, “...while officially arm’s length, it's a very short arm, isn't it?”  
During the course of this research the sometimes complicated dynamic between the 
HPA and the DH was discussed by research participants.  
Now the relationship with the HPA is very, very strange... And I don’t think it’s 
worked terribly well...But as they’ve lost power (the DH), they’ve become more 
and more paranoid about losing even more power and I’ll give you a really good 
example of this. When I was doing consultancy for (them)...one day...there was a 
meeting set up between (a senior DH official) and TB Alert...And I can’t 
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remember who it was…who said, “why are they developing all these leaflets 
when we’ve got some really good ones done by the HPA?” And one of us...was 
foolish enough to download them from the internet and print them off…Well, 
(the senior DH official) happened to walk past and absolutely hit the roof.  
“How dare they, how dare they produce these leaflets without my permission?” 
I thought, my goodness, there’s one very scared person and somebody who can 
see their department flying out of the window. Because after all, if you have no 
responsibility for, if you like, governance of the NHS, infectious disease services, 
and you don’t have a public health role because that’s been taken over by NHS 
London, and for monitoring you knew it was being done by the HPA, but now 
they’re taking the health promotion role away from you, which was the last 
little crumb of power you had left.  (The senior DH official) was incandescent 
with rage and wanted to ring the Chief Exec of the HPA.  And we were all 
looking at one another with our eyes rolling, I mean crazy ...But that shows you 
the level of fear and there’s no trust, no trust at all. (Former DH and NHS 
manager) 
 
Another respondent cast doubt on the extent to which the HPA operates at arm’s length 
from the DH: 
I've been at press (conferences) when the latest figures have come out about 
tuberculosis from the Health Protection Agency, where the HPA spin doctors 
have been there, looking at how it's being presented. And the HPA is meant to 
be an arms-length body, it's not meant to be influenced by DH. Just ask the HPA 
whether that's true. That's why the HPA gets people in from the outside, like 
me, to talk at their conferences, because I can say things which HPA employees 
are told not to say...(P)eople who work in…the HPA, unless they are really 
convinced that it's off the record, are going to find it difficult to say just how 
much the dead hand of the Department of Health is...I mean, I was asked to 
speak by the HPA when the figures came out about 4 years ago….do a 
commentary on the figures. And that was because no one at the HPA, 
understandably, wanted to say, "look, they've gone up. This is bad news." The 
figures showed it had gone up by 11%. I then got a message from a junior 
person at the DH who said "I have just been shouted at, saying 'who was that 
guy (name redacted) talking at the HPA, stirring up the mud?'. And I said, ‘tell 
me who it was?’ And I then rang up the CMO's office and said ‘you have an 
amateur Alistair Campbell working in your office.’ (Senior TB Consultant) 
 
Impact of the Creation of the Health Protection Agency on the Department of Health 
 
The Department lost personnel, and expertise, when the HPA was formed, but this was 
part of an ongoing trend. A former Department employee recalled how, at one time, the 
Department was home to well regarded Advisory Groups on various issues, including 
communicable diseases, but that these groups were eventually disbanded during 
rounds of restructuring. And at least one key TB expert was not replaced after leaving 
in 2007 and another in early 2010. At the time of writing, there was only one junior 
official remaining in the Department whose job was solely dedicated to TB. She is 
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supported by two others – her manager and her manager’s manager – both of whom 
have much broader infectious diseases mandates. None of these individuals focus on 
London, but rather have national remits.  
 
Whilst they were invited to the TB Commissioning Board meetings, it was rare for a DH 
representative to attend, and a review of meeting minutes shows the Department was 
represented at less than one-third of these meetings. Observations, field notes and 
formal meeting minutes reveal that for those meetings at which there was 
Departmental attendance, the representative would play a minor role, generally 
contributing only when asked for input. These observations validate the view of a 
former Department employee who said that by 2009, the DH was effectively “out of the 
TB business”, save for responding to Ministerial queries and drafting correspondence. 
The DH was the least supportive key stakeholder of this research presenting challenges 
with arranging interviews, reversing decisions on access to meetings, and generally not 
providing thorough answers to questions when access was granted. 
A surprising example of the sense of powerlessness regarding TB control apparently 
felt by DH officials – whether justified or not –was observed at a March 2010 national 
meeting of TB stakeholders. This was the only Department-led meeting for which 
approval to observe was granted for this research. There were approximately 30 
participants from across England, including two representatives from the London TB 
Commissioning Board, and various other NHS representatives. The Find & Treat team 
and the HPA were also present. In summary comments at the end of the meeting, the 
most senior DH official with direct responsibility for TB offered the following 
observation: “We have to figure out how to most effectively influence the NHS to make 
them understand how important TB is.” This comment belies a startling sense of 
disempowerment coming from the organisation whose mandate involves 
“responsibility for standards of health care, including the NHS… and…set(ting) the 
direction on promoting and protecting the public’s health, taking the lead on issues 
such as…infectious diseases.” (Department of Health 2012).  
It would also likely surprise many of those interviewed for this research, especially 
those within the NHS. Several research participants shared their belief that the DH was 
more powerful than it knew, or acknowledged:  
The Department of Health are a case in point of people who have so much 
power they don’t even know it. They…could tell the NHS what to do and the 
NHS would do it. The Department of Health will say to you “we’re just here to 
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advise”. I say, “Then advise. Advise that they do this.” They don’t get it. From an 
NHS point of view, if I get something which has Department of Health written 
all over it, we jump. (Senior NHS TB Consultant) 
In the words of a former employee of the Department: “the Department of Health has 
got a big hat, even if it doesn’t have a big stick”. 
And an anecdote taken from research field notes underscores how the NHS perceives 
the Department as wielding considerable power over TB control, even if the 
Department itself is ambivalent about its role. Upon learning that NHS London’s Acting 
Director of Public Health (DPH) was to meet with representatives of the TB 
Commissioning Board (an infrequent event), the Department, “summonsed”, in the 
words of one of the Commissioning Board representatives, the Acting DPH to their 
offices just hours before the meeting with the Commissioning Board representatives 
was to take place. According to the Acting DPH the purpose was to make sure the 
Department’s latest activities in TB control in London were known. Although the Acting 
DPH was more senior than the person at Health “requesting” the meeting, there was 
apparently never any consideration given to not complying with the request to meet, 
although it did generate considerable consternation on the part of the Acting DPH.   
Nonetheless, the over-riding sense among research respondents was that the DH’s 
involvement in TB control, as opposed to any power it might have, was not significant: 
… the Department of Health were no part of my thinking managing TB...in terms 
of delivery, they were no part of my thinking. We weren’t doing TB because of 
the Department of Health. (Former Sector Chief Executive with involvement in 
TB) 
And I mean that meeting we went to...the All-Party Parliamentary Group, I 
mean, that was really obvious...the fact that, you know, there is no interest in 
the Department of Health to do anything. (Senior TB Consultant) 
I've sort of noticed them by their absence really actually, I suppose... because I 
can't remember, I'm trying to remember seeing someone. I mean they do 
occasionally turn up at the meetings. (Senior TB Consultant) 
Amongst those involved with TB control in London there appears to be (well justified) 
confusion regarding the respective roles and responsibilities of the NHS, the DH and the 
HPA. The DH believes, or acts, as if it has little power or ability to affect change in TB 
control, although it has formal management responsibilities and apparently, significant 
influence, over the HPA. The Department is also officially tasked with providing 
strategic leadership for the NHS. The HPA, as discussed, has limited operational 
capacity, whilst labouring under an official mandate which includes the “control” of TB. 
The NHS, whilst not disavowing its responsibility for TB control, does not prioritise the 
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issue and, on occasion, has attempted to offload some of this responsibility, most 
notably to the HPA (despite the Agency’s lack of operational ability). Meanwhile, the 
DH neither encourages nor advises the NHS to make TB control a higher priority, 
although it could do so.  
A chief cause, it is argued here, is a marked absence of leadership on the TB control 
issue. Whether or not it is correct to lay the responsibility for this at the door of the DH 
is unclear, but this was the perception of a key respondent, and the most senior person 
interviewed for this research from the HPA: “I think a failure on the Department to 
take...that strong, strategic leadership contributes to the limited effectiveness of TB 
control in this country”. 
If the DH does indeed have the power to force action on TB control in London and to 
make it a higher priority, there is almost no political motivation to do so, as will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Eight. The lack of leadership and the absence of 
accountability within the system are two sides of the same coin, as a functional 
accountability structure would necessarily result in an identifiable leadership 
structure. And at the root of both problems is the extensive NPM-induced 
fragmentation of London’s TB control system. As discussed in Chapter Four, a 
relentless drive toward localism has pushed decision making down to the extent that 
no one is any longer responsible for anything beyond small patient populations, a 
damaging situation for TB and public health more generally. In addition, a weak 
contracting regime and an absence of performance measurement within London’s TB 
control system further exacerbate the situation. 
Summary of Case Study Three 
This case study has analysed the creation of the Health Protection Agency, including the 
impact this has had on the DH and the potentially negative implications for TB control 
in London. In keeping with NPM principles, the HPA was formed largely via a 
disaggregation of the DH, leading to a downsizing of the Department’s policy core and a 
gradual, but significantly reduced, level of engagement by the Department with TB 
control. In addition to deriving expertise from the DH, the HPA drew other key 
personnel, Consultants in Communicable Disease Control, from local authorities. This, 
too, had important, and negative, implications for TB control because these CCDCs lost 
the budgetary and decision making power they had had in the local authorities, 
assuming purely advisory roles in the new Agency. The current role of the DH was also 
examined, questioning whether it might possess latent power which it could exercise to 
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improve the organisation of TB control in London, particularly with regard to 
addressing the inter-related issues of a paucity of leadership and accountability within 
the system. Enhanced leadership and accountability structures could go some distance 
toward offsetting many of the negative consequences arising from the NPM-driven 
fragmentation which has come to define TB control in London. 
Unlike the other mini case studies in this thesis, this one provides less evidence of 
complexity theory concepts and focuses on illustrating the presence and impact of NPM 
organising principles on London’s TB control system. Complexity is notable largely by 
its absence. The introduction of the HPA to the TB control system could be seen as 
adding diversity to the system, which, according to complexity theory can be a positive 
change, making a system more robust. In this case, however, there were no benefits 
realised.  
The next case study highlights two innovations brought to London’s TB control system, 
framing them as contrasting instances of self-organisation. Whilst London’s system of 
TB control stands to benefit from both initiatives, one of them, the cohort review 
process, has been embraced by the mainstream NHS and the other, the Find & Treat 
team, faced considerable challenges and was eventually taken over by the NHS.  
 
Case Study Four:  Two Self-Organising Initiatives, Two Very 
Different Organisational Outcomes 
Homelessness, substance abuse and a history of imprisonment are significant risk 
factors for TB (Story et al 2007). Typically, a TB patient with one or more of these risk 
factors presents at hospital A&Es, often several times, before being correctly diagnosed 
with TB. It is often then a challenge to find the person again to deliver the TB diagnosis, 
whilst subsequently keeping him or her on a difficult and often side effect-laden 
medication regime for six or more months can be almost impossible. Therefore, the 
challenge in addressing this particular population of TB patients lies both in finding and 
then successfully treating them.  
In contrast to the reticence shown in some circles toward adopting learnings from New 
York City’s successful approach to TB control, there was a greater openness towards 
exploring successful models from abroad for working with so-called “hard to reach” TB 
patients. In particular, Rotterdam, Netherlands had demonstrated notable success with 
its TB control program aimed at at-risk populations. A chance encounter in 2002 at a 
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conference between a senior and highly enterprising London TB nurse and a TB 
consultant from Rotterdam set the wheels in motion for the establishment in London of 
a mobile x-ray unit (MXU, also known as “the Van”) and, approximately two years later, 
an associated team of health and social care experts working in and with the Van.  
This team, the “Find & Treat” team (F&T), has a clear objective: finding and treating 
active TB cases amongst socially marginalised groups and re-engaging TB patients 
which traditional TB clinics had “lost” part-way through the treatment cycle, ensuring 
these individuals complete their TB treatment. The creation of F&T exemplifies two 
complexity theory concepts: non-linearity and self–organisation. Non-linearity is 
evident in that one serendipitous encounter between two strangers resulted in a 
complete transformation in the manner in which socially excluded TB patients in 
London are now diagnosed and then treated for their disease. And unlike a previously 
cited example of non-linearity, where vast sums of money were spent on installing x-
ray units in prisons with minimal benefit to TB control, F&T represents a positive 
instance of non-linearity. Self-organisation is demonstrated throughout the emergence 
and subsequent execution of the F&T concept, details of which will be discussed below. 
Once back in London, the above-noted nurse actively pursued the idea of having an 
MXU in London. He was well-connected within the DH, and although the Department 
rarely funds operational projects, it was his first stop. Rather fortuitously, he 
encountered a pair of equally enterprising, and newly arrived, civil servants who 
enthusiastically supported his idea and were willing to work across boundaries and 
interpret accepted Departmental practice to support the MXU concept. Through a 
series of unorthodox actions, one of Rotterdam’s MXUs was soon on the streets of 
London for a short trial run. One of the key people involved in bringing this MXU to 
London recalls the episode: 
So we did this crazy thing, which looking back on it I still can’t believe we did it. 
We brought the van over for three days. And it was madness really. Again, I 
can’t believe we did it and we got into all kinds of trouble. We got caught from a 
guy called (name redacted) at the medical devices agency, and he said, “I think 
you’re just about to make a huge career mistake because you’re breaking all 
kinds of laws” and we just didn’t know. We were so naïve… And we had, you 
know, people would suddenly say, “oh we need to get the doctor who’s coming 
(from Rotterdam) a special dispensation and a permit, we need to get him 
employed…by the University College Hospital”. And then we realized that the 
van was radioactive and we had to get special permissions from Customs and 
Excise. But we did it.  
And we got it to Pentonville and we (also) x-rayed loads of homeless people and 
we discovered that homeless people were willing to be x-rayed. And they 
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recruited…their very first outreach worker, who was a homeless guy with a 
bicycle, an ex-soldier. It seemed it would work, you know, it was worth a try.18   
This short pilot project generated a great deal of enthusiasm and commitment amongst 
those involved. However, both of the above-noted civil servants, without whose 
support the pilot project would likely never have been realised, had short-lived tenures 
at the Department. One was transferred to a newly formed agency and the other’s 
contract was not renewed.  
With this change in personnel it became more difficult to find the necessary financial 
support to convert the pilot project into something more permanent.  Nonetheless, the 
MXU concept had generated enough interest by that time, and produced enough 
believers in its value, that, exceptionally, the DH funded the purchase and operation of a 
bespoke mobile x-ray unit to be used amongst London’s most at-risk populations. By 
April 2005 the Van was fully operational, although it would be almost two years later 
that the Find & Treat team was formally assembled and funded (again, exceptionally, 
by the DH) with the objective of ensuring that those TB patients who were found by the 
Van were also successfully treated to completion.  
The Van itself is sophisticated and efficient. It delivers a significantly lower dose of 
radiation than is the case with traditional, static x-ray units. It takes less than 0.1 
second to make an exposure, as opposed to the five second exposure required with 
traditional machines. This is important because it is often difficult to keep F&T clients 
still for the standard five seconds required to take an x-ray. In the words of one F& T 
member, their client base is often “referred to as ‘highly mobile’, (and) they are ‘highly 
mobile’!” The resulting imagery is of diagnostic quality and is usually produced in less 
than one minute. This is vital as it allows the client to be quickly given either an “all-
clear” or “held on to if they are not” (F&T team member), and then taken, literally, to a 
nearby TB clinic for follow-up. This rapid turnaround requires another area of special 
expertise - the ability to read x-rays accurately yet very quickly. The MXU team learned 
from their Dutch mentors that such skill is usually only found amongst radiographers 
accustomed to screening at a population level. Armed with this knowledge, they were 
fortunate to recruit a former Port Health Screening Unit radiographer with 30 years’ 
experience reading chest x-rays.    
                                           
18
 In fact, during the Dutch MXU’s short time in London three contagious TB patients were found 
amongst 600 people screened. In the words of one of the people working on the MXU at that time, 
none of these men would have otherwise been diagnosed “in a month of Sundays”. As is often the 
case with marginalised populations, all three had been avoiding traditional health services, despite 
their failing health. 
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The F&T team is multi-disciplinary, comprising nurses, caseworkers, radiographers, 
operations and clerical staff, numbering approximately ten to 12 in total. Some of the 
earlier staff, in particular, were former or seconded DH, NHS and HPA employees. From 
their early days as a team they adopted unorthodox methods of working and service 
delivery, as suggested by their patient base and the sometimes tricky maintenance 
required by the Van. They worked odd hours. The Van would arrive at hostels early in 
the morning so they could intercept occupants as they were being made to check out 
for the day. Outreach workers from the Team would turn up at known congregating 
spots for rough sleepers, sex workers and drug users late at night in order to 
administer DOT. They employed creative techniques, like using Skype to watch a TB 
patient with a complex twice-daily treatment regime take his tablets. This initiative 
saved the patient from almost six hours of daily commuting to TB clinics to avail 
himself of DOT, since there were no outreach workers available to administer DOT, 
recognising that the patient was unlikely to complete such a complex treatment regime 
if left on his own.  
The Team invests extensive effort in collecting social network information from and 
about their clients. “We work on the assumption that we need to plan for when they get 
lost, not if they get lost...so we can find them again”, remarked an F&T worker. Relevant 
information is entered into a database so it can be accessed across the Team. In the 
case of lost MDRTB clients, the Team also tap into police, probation service and 
homeless services’ databases, too, if necessary, having established working 
relationships with all of these groups. In essence, the Team go to exceptional lengths to 
locate patients and then ensure they complete their treatment. They also have highly 
developed expertise in working with, and at the fringes of, the social care and housing 
systems and often assist clients in accessing services such as accommodation and 
substance abuse treatment. 
The MXU and the Find & Treat team have been extensively and repeatedly evaluated. 
The first evaluation commissioned by the DH covered years one and two of the Van’s 
operation. The preliminary report concluded that the Van was a cost-effective 
intervention in terms of finding people on the streets who needed TB treatment but 
that it was not enough just to find them, that they had to be treated, too. In fact, 53% of 
all potential TB patients identified in the MXU and referred for further investigation 
would never present themselves to a TB clinic for a definitive diagnosis. Consequently, 
before the evaluation was completed, the team which would become known as “Find & 
Treat” was formally put into action, in large part to address this situation. From this 
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point onward, evaluations would assess the work of both the Van and F&T, and in 
common parlance “Find & Treat” would soon come to refer to the complete service 
offered by both the Van and the Team.  
The latest evaluation report of F&T’s work was completed in April 2011, by the HPA. As 
with previous evaluations, it reached a positive conclusion regarding F&T’s value. In a 
section entitled “Evidence of value for money”, the report states: 
The incremental cost-effectiveness of F&T is estimated to be £8800, well below 
the threshold of £20,000 - £30,000 per QALY gained used by the NICE to 
determine if an intervention is cost effective...both the MXU and the case 
management arms (the Find and Treat team on its own) appear to be 
separately cost-effective. These conclusions appear to be robust when 
assumptions that are more unfavourable to F&T are used...The cost 
effectiveness of the F&T service compares favourably to other interventions 
currently funded to control TB in the UK. The incremental cost effectiveness 
ratio for the dual strategy of tuberculin skin testing and Interferon Gamma 
Release Assay testing is £29,955 per QALY gained and for universal BCG 
vaccination of school aged children is £56,000 per QALY gained.  
But F&T’s existence was a perilous one. They never secured stable, long-term funding 
and they gradually became marginalised, particularly from NHS London. Once the DH 
ended its financial support of F&T in early 2011, and in the absence of a central TB 
budget for London, the Team became reliant on each London PCT contributing to fund 
its work. As discussed earlier, the epidemiological pattern of TB across London, largely 
a reflection of the socio-economic demographic across the city, is such that it is difficult 
to convince a borough with single-digit TB rates and low levels of homelessness to 
contribute some of its shrinking healthcare funding to finance something for which it 
has little need. Although the Team made a point of visiting every borough in London at 
least once each year, the reality is that demand is highest for their expertise in a 
handful of boroughs, mostly where there are many people with no fixed abode, rough 
sleepers and illegal drugs users. In terms of the “80 per cent” versus the “20 per cent” 
debate discussed earlier, F&Ts client base lies firmly within the latter group, and 
perhaps comprises the most marginalised subgroup of the already marginal “20 per 
cent”.   
The culture that had developed within F&T was one of treating “people not pathogens” 
(F&T worker), meaning that clients’ overall health and wellbeing is attended to, and 
requires working across boundaries. In addition to working with housing and social 
care, the Team also proactively developed working relationships with other external 
organisations in order to address the health needs of the whole person, not just the 
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part of the person which needed TB treatment. For example, working relationships 
were established to address dental hygiene and foot care issues, both common 
problems for homeless people. The Team would give toothpaste to clients whom they 
had just x-rayed, or direct them to dentists whose offices would be amenable to 
treating them.  
The Team also developed strong working relationships with hostel staff across London 
so that when the Van was coming, hostels would organise to offer general health 
“MOTs” to their clients.  
So rather than just gear up for the Van, they bring in all those other allied 
services and they're finding that it results in an increase in uptake of BBV 
(blood borne virus) screening, STI screening, flu vaccine, uptakes in general 
health assessment. And perhaps most importantly, results in an uptake of a 
kind of collective will for onward referrals to address their Hep C, etc. (Find & 
Treat Nurse) 
Perhaps more importantly, though, these same hostel workers, along with other social 
care workers, were recruited by F&T in the Team’s mission to expand DOT across 
London – “our mantra is DOT”, in the words of an F&T leader. Much of the London 
hostels’ client base need this therapy, but are unable to access the program, or to access 
it with sufficient ease that they would stay on the program:  
And I think that one of the big achievements is that we've been able to recruit in 
a lot more capacity to offer DOT in the community by engaging with the hostel 
key workers, the drug and alcohol teams, the street teams. It's in their interest 
to promote treatment continuity and it's in our interest to promote treatment 
continuity. And I think therein lies a big part of the learning from this 
project…it's partnership working, it's all about linking things together. (Find & 
Treat Nurse) 
However, in a perverse instance of reward and punishment, the Team may have been 
ultimately penalised for such boundary-spanning innovations and for moving beyond a 
strict TB focus. In late 2010, when the TB Commissioning Board was deciding whether 
they would champion F&Ts work and attempt to secure funding for them from 
London’s PCTs, one of the informal (i.e., unwritten) arguments presented against 
supporting the Team was that they were not exclusively focused on TB and spent time 
on non-TB related work. Some within the TB Commissioning Board argued that F&T 
should look to other areas of the NHS and to social care funders for financial support. 
This argument reflects the reality in which TB control is administered in London: a 
system where “joined-up” working is rare and where there is no systemic capacity or 
infrastructure to support it. It also begs further comparison with New York City’s 
200 
 
model, where a “homeless services” directorate is incorporated into the Bureau of TB 
Control, along with services dedicated to social outreach, HIV coordination and 
immigration and refugee services. From a complexity theory perspective, it is 
interesting to note the positive impact on F&T when they added new and different 
elements to their team (social care, housing, dental care and foot care). By increasing 
its “requisite variety”, the Team offered a better service to its client base, as would be 
predicted by complexity theory. It is therefore ironic that this effort to become more 
holistic may have also have contributed to the team’s ultimate undoing. Interestingly, 
this situation echoes the previously discussed inability of NHS London to deal with the 
concept of the London TB Commissioning Board becoming a more holistic TB Control 
Board.    
The NHS had further issues with Find & Treat, beyond its proclivity for boundary 
spanning and unorthodox service delivery. The Team was, in fact, part of a social 
enterprise, structured as a Community Interest Company, with governance structures 
and practices that were unclear and foreign to the NHS. As they sat apart from 
mainstream healthcare services, they “looked” and worked differently. One research 
respondent reported “resentment” amongst some visitors to F&T’s unconventional 
London Soho offices. Despite having “woodworm and...smell(ing) damp”, this 
respondent observed: 
But there’s no doubt that people going for meetings there see that they have a 
dishwasher and coffee on tap and flowers. And I mean I don’t know who pays 
for the flowers, maybe (name redacted) pays for the flowers, maybe they have a 
kitty, but people don’t see it. People just think, they have coffee and biscuits, 
they have flowers and a dishwasher, why am I working in, I don’t know, Kings 
College Hospital in Dulwich or Peckham or somewhere. 
Neither positive, independent evaluations and reports on F&T’s work, nor an advisory 
panel comprised of senior TB clinicians, researchers and epidemiologists, provided 
solace to NHS London. It was displeased with the seemingly risky and uncontrolled 
manner in which F&T functioned. They were seen as a child of the DH; NHS London did 
not trust them and undertook to bring the Team under mainstream NHS control.   
Anatomy of a “Takeover” 
This resolve, combined with cutbacks at the DH and the announced dissolution of the 
HPA (both organisations had significant pockets of support for F&T), meant that once 
the Team’s DH funding expired on 31 March, 2011 they would effectively cease to exist 
in their original form. The first formal mention by the TB Commissioning Board 
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regarding the need to address the impending end of F&T came during a regular 
monthly Board meeting on 22 October 2010. It was revealed that NHS London 
representatives on the Board had met with the DH in September to discuss future 
funding options for F&T. The meeting also addressed the HPA’s (positive) draft, interim 
evaluation of the Team. The DH had made it clear that they were unable to continue 
funding F&T and that, as per the original terms of the pilot project, if London boroughs 
decided the Team was of value, they would have to find a way to pay for it.  
An apparent additional outcome of the TB Commissioning Board-DH meeting was that 
the TB Commissioning Board representatives (NHS managers) concluded that the HPA 
draft evaluation, clearly heading towards recommending on-going funding for F&T, was 
vulnerable to critique. Shortly thereafter, NHS London hired an external consultant, a 
TB expert who had previously undertaken a cost-effectiveness evaluation of Moscow’s 
MXU service and concluded it did not offer good value for money. His mandate was to 
critique the HPA interim report, including finding methodological and other 
weaknesses which might call into question the Agency’s conclusions. This work was 
undertaken quietly and without the knowledge of the full TB Commissioning Board, of 
which the HPA is a member, although they eventually became aware of the 
undertaking. The external consultant’s report indeed found methodological fault with 
the HPA’s work (although all of these issues were addressed in the final version of the 
report), but concluded that it was not possible with the information provided to 
determine whether or not F&T and the MXU were cost effective.  
This decision to commission an external critique of the HPA’s work was seen by the 
HPA as an aggressive act and caused considerable upset within the Agency. But 
according to one respondent, perhaps the over-riding reaction at the HPA was one of 
bewilderment, wondering why the NHS would go to such lengths. Parallels might be 
drawn here with NHS London’s response to the HPA’s leadership of the InR-TB 
outbreak committee. In both instances the HPA was either taking a position different 
from that favoured by the NHS (concluding that F&T was cost-effective and should be 
continued) or exerting control greater than that with which the NHS was comfortable 
(the HPA leadership of the InR-TB outbreak committee). In both cases the NHS 
intervened decisively; either regaining control of the situation or shifting the general 
“direction of travel” to one which they favoured. 
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On December 17th 2010 there was a special TB Commissioning Board meeting called to 
discuss the future of Find & Treat. During this meeting there were five papers 
discussed:  
1. A joint DH/Find & Treat document, “DH Find and Treat: Options Paper for the 
London TB Commissioning Board”. Conclusion: “the preferred DH option was the 
continued funding of F&T and the MXU service”  
2. The HPA interim report, “The cost-effectiveness of the Find and Treat Service”, the 
one which had been reviewed by the external consultant. Conclusion: The HPA 
reiterated the interim nature of their findings (because they were initially given a 
30 April 2011 deadline by the DH), but observed - based on highly conservative 
assumptions – that “while the MXU was considered to be cost-effective, the F&T 
was more so”.  
3. The external consultant’s “Assessment of the HPA preliminary report on the 
evaluation of the Find and Treat service”. Conclusion: as noted above: “insufficient 
evidence...to make a final decision about the service” 
4. The HPA response to the external reviewer’s comments. Conclusion: noted the 
external consultant’s previous views on MXU cost-effectiveness from the Moscow 
study and argued that “he may be biased against this type of service”. Defended 
itself against the methodological issues raised, arguing that “conclusions could not 
be drawn…based on the data available at the time.”  
5. NHS “Find and Treat Business Plan”. Conclusion: The first point was a caveat that 
“costs in the Business Plan were based on data provided by the F&T Team. This 
data should be audited…including consideration of source documentation.” 
Recommendation was to discontinue funding the MXU and “establish a small pan-
London link team and integrating F&T principles within the sectors” 
In addition to being notable because its conclusions differed significantly from those 
drawn by the DH, the HPA and the external consultant, the NHS document is 
remarkable in two other aspects. First, it laid bare the mistrust which had come to 
characterise the NHS’ perception of the DH, the HPA and Find & Treat, regarding their 
assessments on the value of F&T. Second, and perhaps more surprisingly, its 
recommended course of action was to add to  already significant fragmentation and 
duplication within London’s TB services by suggesting that each of the five geographic 
sectors have, in effect, their own mini F&T teams, supplemented by the above-noted 
“small pan-London link team“. This recommendation was produced by the NHS at the 
same time as the Commissioning Board, led by the NHS, was embracing the PHAST 
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report conclusions regarding the need to reduce the widespread fragmentation within 
London’s TB services. Such was the apparent antagonism toward F&T by the NHS’ 
Commissioning Support for London (later to become part of London Health Programs) 
that they were willing to further fragment TB control services in their aim of 
disbanding the Team. 
Nonetheless, at the December 17th 2010 meeting it was decided, on the weight of 
evidence, and after vigorous lobbying by a few members of the House of Lords, that the 
Board would approach PCTs to secure funding for Find & Treat for one more year, until 
31 March 2012. This decision was a minor rebuke of the NHS’ Commissioning Support 
for London business plan, but meant the landscape would change fundamentally for 
F&T if the PCTs agreed to the funding request. Under the terms of the proposed new 
funding there were no resources earmarked for the MXU, Find & Treat would provide 
their services under strictly defined contractual terms working within an acute trust, 
the size of the Team would be reduced by approximately 30% and their operating 
budget would be cut by approximately 25%.   
The TB Commissioning Board succeeded in securing F&T funding from the PCTs for 
one year. The practical outcome, however, is that the once maverick group working out 
of edgy offices in Soho now find themselves, in reduced numbers, working in severely 
cramped quarters in an obscure corner of an NHS Trust, providing clearly defined and 
delineated services within a conventional NHS commissioning contract. Their future 
beyond April 2013 is unknown, and during the intervening period of 1 April 2011 to 31 
March 2013 a decision will be reached regarding the longer term future of F&T, 
including finding resources to purchase a much-needed replacement van. 
 That the TB Commissioning Board succeeded in securing funding for F&T quickly and 
with relative ease, reflects two facts:  
1. Find & Treat, led by a highly committed and persuasive leader, had been 
tirelessly working with the hundreds of organisations with which it had 
developed relationships over the years, along with numerous politicians in the 
Commons and the House of Lords, to apply strategic and ongoing pressure 
within the broader NHS in favour of continuing F&T’s funding. 
2. A growing body of scientific evidence, some of it peer reviewed and published, 
supported the Team’s work. Further, the PHAST report found extremely high 




This combination led to significant political pressure on the NHS to ensure that F&T’s 
work continued and they were politically savvy enough to realise that they should 
acquiesce to this pressure. A senior TB Commissioning Board member observed at the 
April 2011 Board meeting, “It’s unavoidable now. We will be funding Find and Treat. 
That’s the political reality.” 
In August 2011, the same Board member reiterated this fact: “Politically I can’t argue 
for killing Find & Treat. And the reality is that the £800,000 cost (F&T’s annual budget) 
will not be re-invested in TB, it will go to someone else’s bottom line.”  
However, field notes and meeting minutes reveal a strong sense within NHS London, 
and elements of the TB Commissioning Board, that F&T must change those behaviours 
deemed unacceptable by the mainstream NHS:  “They are now part of the mainstream 
NHS and they need to behave as such”, remarked a senior TB Commissioning Board 
member. And, rather peculiarly in light of the robust cost effectiveness and other data 
which had been amassed, a March 4th 2011 memo from the TB Commissioning Board 
entitled “Find and Treat Update” stated: “The SLA (service level agreement) for service 
delivery is currently being drafted and will include key changes to current provision 
(sic) to ensure the team are cost effective, productive and maximise outcomes.” 
During early 2011, whenever “Find & Treat” would appear as an agenda item on 
Commissioning Board or TB Clinical Working Group meetings, meetings were often 
tense. This was especially true of Clinical Working Group meetings, with their broad 
representation of NHS, HPA and occasionally, DH, officials. During one particularly 
memorable and strained meeting on 31 March 2011, on the eve of F&T’s absorption 
into the NHS, the HPA, along with Find & Treat’s newly appointed clinical director, 
made their unhappiness with the NHS’ handling of the Find & Treat file clear. The HPA 
led the pre-organised charge, by demanding that more than the five minutes which had 
been allocated to discuss F&T be made available. They argued that they were being 
asked to, de facto, validate changes to the F&T model which they were given inadequate 
time to consider and which required lengthier deliberation. They expressed concerns 
that F&T was being significantly reconfigured for the upcoming year despite every 
evaluation to date being positive; that, in effect, the NHS was attempting to fix 
something which was not broken, and for reasons which were never clearly outlined. 




The new Clinical Director for F&T (whose appointment was agreed by the NHS and 
F&T) made several strongly worded interventions clearly meant to show he would 
protect the Team’s interests. He said it was his “prerogative” to decide, operationally, 
how the F&T service was delivered, announcing, “I will not be taking advice from 
people who plan, but from people who do”.19 His apparent passion for F&T resulted in 
some (ultimately short-lived) concern amongst NHS representatives on the TB 
Commissioning Board. A leader of the Commissioning Board noted shortly afterwards, 
at the April Board meeting, that “the current enthusiasm for F&T (emanating from this 
individual) must be managed”. This, in turn, prompted one of the TB consultants on the 
Commissioning Board to ask why the latest positive evaluation of F&T was being seen 
as a “bad thing”. “Shouldn’t we be celebrating this?”, he asked.  
 Months later, in August, 2011, field notes from a Commissioning Board meeting 
indicate that the NHS was still struggling to accept F&T’s value to the broader TB 
control system. A senior and influential NHS manager said that while the HPA may have 
demonstrated F&T’s cost-effectiveness, the Team did not provide “value for money”. 
Presumably this was a reference to the manager’s belief that the money spent on F&T, 
i.e., on treating “the 20%”, would be better invested on “the 80%”. And later still, at the 
December 2011 TB Commissioning Board meeting, the need for a “contractual 
requirement” specifying that F&T work within the “TB care pathway”, (as defined by 
the NHS), and the need for the Team to contribute to “improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the overall TB system”, was raised. This need to have F&T’s operations 
fit into an NHS-defined mould, thereby ignoring the nature of F&Ts work and its client 
base, is an example of the NHS’ determination to control and closely risk-manage the 
Team.  
Find & Treat, post-takeover 
The Find & Treat Team was officially rebadged the Find & Treat Service, apparently in 
an effort to underscore the end of their existence as a stand-alone entity and to signal 
their integration into the NHS. The HPA’s evaluation of the cost effectiveness of F&T, 
the quality of which had been called into question by the NHS, went on to be published 
in the British Medical Journal (Jitt et al 2011).  
                                           
19
 While this intervention may have sent an early warning shot across the NHS bow, the Clinical 
Director’s influence (and enthusiasm) was ultimately quelled by the commissioning contract and 
structure under which F&T now provide their services. 
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Despite their interest in managing F&T via contract, according to respondents within 
F&T, the NHS’ commissioning contract did not arrive until 6 months into fiscal year 
2011-12 (this assertion is consistent with field notes and observations). The document 
was  said to be 162 pages long and, apparently, deemed so complex by F&T that it was 
never read, owing both to a lack of resources and inclination. Further, the performance 
reports which were required by the contract, according to F&T sources, asked for 
extensive, often irrelevant data, or data which F&T were unable to provide. In response, 
F&T offered alternative templates for the reports, versions which they believed 
collected more useful and germane data. The NHS declined the offer and continues to 
send F&T its version of the report template, whilst F&T continues to only partly 
complete the template. Consequently, reports indicate that F&T’s activity level is down, 
although F&T vigorously dispute this, claiming that if the same pre-takeover activities 
were being counted, activity levels would be the same or slightly higher.  
During the monthly Commissioning Board meeting in August 2011, the “Find and Treat 
Update” focused on how the NHS was returning the incomplete performance reports to 
F&T with requests that F&T complete the form in the format which they received it, 
rather than persisting in adding information which the NHS had not requested.  The 
argument was that the NHS required the template’s proper completion in order to 
properly “performance manage”, i.e., control, F&T. Clearly this tussle for control is not 
one which either the NHS/TB Commissioning Board or F&T are willing to concede. In 
one of the last meetings observed as part of this research, in February 2012, a senior 
leader on the Commissioning Board complained that F&T “just go around things” and 
don’t tell commissioners what they are doing. “We just need a bit more compliance”, it 
was observed, as “they don’t behave like they are part of the NHS”. During a follow-up 
interview with F&T in August 2012 it became clear that the struggle between the Team 
and the NHS regarding the activity reports persists. The Team see themselves as 
victims of a “hostile takeover” and this lessens their sense of obligation to 
accommodate NHS requests with which they do not agree. 
On a more positive note, some previously reticent members of the TB Commissioning 
Board, and the NHS, have ultimately been convinced of F&T’s value, albeit 
begrudgingly. A senior member of the Commissioning Board conceded he had “been 
persuaded of the value of Find & Treat, but now we’ll have to focus on improving their 
performance management”. As noted, the Board consequently and successfully sought 
another year’s worth of funding from PCTs for the team, this time until March 31st, 
2013. At the time of writing, Find & Treat’s future remains unknown beyond this date. 
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One respondent expressed concern about the long-term future of F&T even before the 
Team was taken over by the NHS:  
You see…if you made it part of the big NHS system, the “management” in the 
bad sense of the word would start chipping away at it. They would kill it and 
eventually it would be shut down because they would need the money for 
something else. I’ve seen that happen in loads of areas. (Former DH and PCT 
employee) 
 As has been the case since the dissolution of the original F&T team, they do not receive 
communications from the TB Commissioning Board or from London Health Programs 
regarding future funding: “The turkeys have taken over, and the turkeys may decide 
that this year there will be no Christmas”, said a clearly exasperated F&T team member. 
The result is a highly insecure and uncertain work environment, but informants within 
F&T said this has led them to seek alternative sources of funding from other 
government departments and large third-sector organisations. The Team has an 
aspirational goal of becoming independent of NHS funding – and control.  
The Cohort Review Process 
In sharp contrast to the experience of F&T, the establishment and subsequent 
acceptance of the cohort review process (“cohort review”) by the NHS has been both 
smooth and enthusiastic. In 2009, five TB nurses from London visited New York City to 
see that city’s TB control system at work. (Notably, perhaps, the nurses’ visit was not 
funded by the NHS, but rather by the Royal College of Nursing, with some assistance 
from the HPA.) Feedback from this study visit was highly positive, and there was great 
enthusiasm regarding the potential benefits of implementing some of the practices in 
London which had been so successful in New York City. Key among these practices was 
“cohort review”, a highly systematised case review procedure that had been used with 
great success from the early days of TB’s resurgence in New York City in the early 
1990s. The process is particularly successful in increasing treatment completion rates 
and contact tracing (Munsiff et al 2006), and is invariably cited by TB officials from that 
city as vital to their success. In effect, it is a tool which enhances clinic-level 
accountability. By having clinics report their data in a meeting of peers from other 
clinics, transparency is increased and, if necessary, questions asked about lagging 
treatment completion rates or inadequate contact tracing. Such meetings usually 
happen on a quarterly basis. 
The cohort review concept originated in Tanzania in the 1970s, but it was not until the 
re-emergence of TB in the West in the late 20th century that it was embraced outside of 
the developing world. In the 40-odd years of its existence, the benefits of cohort review 
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became well known in TB circles and documented in the medical press (Veen et al 
1998, Munsiff et al 2006, Arnadottir 2009). It is seen as a fundamental complement to a 
successful DOT program (Cegielski et al 2006:20) and, in the words of a respondent, 
cohort review “shines a bright light” on the manner in which both individual clinics and 
the broader TB control system functions, revealing any shortcomings and problems.  
Despite its success and acceptance in many countries around the world, cohort review 
was, curiously, not so much as piloted in London until 2010. By this time, TB rates in 
London had been climbing steadily for more than 20 years. While this time lag may 
seem surprising, London TB officials did not shy away from acknowledging it. At the 
2012 World TB Day conference held in London, the following slide was presented, with 
London TB officials seemingly unbothered that it spoke volumes about how slowly the 
city’s TB control system has been to adopt learnings from other jurisdictions. 
Origins of Cohort Review?
• Tanzania – 1970’s 
• New York – 1990’s 
• Piloted in NC London - 2010
 
Source: NHS London (2012) 
The pilot project referenced above involved the North Central London TB sector, the 
home sector for one of the five nurses who had travelled to New York City and the 
person who would become, perhaps, London’s most enthusiastic and tireless 
proponent for the program. (Two of the other nurses who travelled to New York City 
were from Find & Treat, and interestingly, Find & Treat were responsible for securing 
the travel grant for this study trip. The fourth nurse was from the HPA and the fifth 
nurse worked within the NHS but left shortly after the trip.)   
Within the London TB control system, the North Central London sector is arguably the 
furthest advanced in terms of addressing issues of duplication and fragmentation in TB 
service delivery. For instance, several years ago the sector decided to merge its various 
TB nursing and (limited) outreach services, spread across five boroughs, into a single 
TB service with a single nurse manager. Because of this relatively innovative working 
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arrangement, the sector was well suited to pilot the cohort review process.20 Within a 
year of the trip to New York City, cohort review was set to be piloted in London.  
As part of this research two of the early cohort review meetings were observed. The 
process is highly labour and resource-intensive, and each meeting lasted almost a full 
day, as each case from each clinic in attendance was presented. Epidemiologists from 
the HPA compiled, in real time, the data as it was presented, allowing them to feed back 
preliminary findings at the mid-point of the day and then final findings at the end of the 
day. Participants presenting the case data were mostly nurses from TB clinics across 
the sector, sometimes supported by TB consultants from their clinics. The nurses were 
highly engaged, although clearly nervous at the beginning of the meetings. The nurse 
leading the meetings was the same person who had originally travelled to New York 
City and was championing the process, and she took great care to reassure participants 
that they were in a “safe” environment. She repeatedly stressed that the objective was 
not to penalise or judge clinics, but rather to start the process of collecting detailed 
clinic-level data, identifying trends, and determining what was working well and where 
there was room for improvement. It would be fair to judge the meetings as rousing 
successes. Participants reported feelings of excitement about the cohort review process 
and were committed to addressing the areas for improvement identified by the HPA. 
Post-meeting conversation indicated they were already looking forward to the next 
quarterly meeting to see whether their clinic had improved and to observe how their 
peers had responded to the process, too.  
Despite its late arrival, cohort review has been enthusiastically embraced in London. 
From the above-noted pilot, the program has now spread to all sectors in London and 
from 2012 it was added to London’s “Commissioning Intentions” for TB, imparting a 
contractual obligation for providers to undertake at least some version of cohort 
review (if indeed they follow the Commissioning Intentions). Field notes and formal 
meeting minutes indicate that there was virtually no debate or opposition to this move 
during meetings. In contrast to when “Find and Treat” appeared as an agenda item at 
meetings and would be often met with sighs of resignation or frustration (at TB 
Commissioning Board meetings), or by rising tension (at Clinical Working Group 
meetings), a “Cohort Review” discussion engendered a sense of support, and almost 
pride, amongst London’s TB community. In fact, as an agenda item it rarely appeared at 
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 This organisational innovation has not been replicated in any other sector, despite its well-known 
successes, demonstrating another instance in which the broader system was unable to co-evolve and 
adopt a successful subsystem innovation. 
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all, indicating its broad and quick acceptance within London’s TB control system and 
the absence of controversy it generated. This is likely because cohort review is 
essentially a more systematised and sophisticated version of the well established 
practice of “case review”, something with which healthcare professionals are familiar 
and comfortable: “the cohort thing is, I think, a version of a now very recognizable 
version of clinical practice. So it's saying to people, “do what you do, just do it better. 
This will help you do it better.” (Former Director of Public Health)  
Both cohort review and F&T identify gaps and shortcomings in the system and then 
address them– patients who are lost to follow-up, those who need DOT but who are not 
able to access it, and those who have not completed their treatment. The two initiatives 
are highly complementary, with cohort review’s findings validating the necessity of 
F&T’s work. F&T are unwavering in their support of cohort review, making the vastly 
differing fates of each of these initiatives particularly ironic. However, the behaviour 
and motivation on the part of the NHS has been consistent – in their responses to both 
cohort review and to F&T their objective has been to enhance control and 
measurement within the system, as would be predicted when the initiatives are 
analysed through a New Public Management lens. From the perspective of the 
mainstream NHS, cohort review embeds a further means of control and measurement 
and does so with the full support of its workforce. 
As with F&T, the HPA was engaged to conduct a formal evaluation of the pilot of the 
cohort review program. The conclusions were highly positive. The following outcomes 
were reported from the pilot project, all of which are consistent with those reported 
over the decades from elsewhere in the world: 
 Improved treatment completion rates, from 82% to 90%, including among 
those with a social risk factor. 
 The proportion of smear positive pulmonary TB patients receiving DOT (i.e., the 
most contagious subsection of an already contagious population), and with one 
or more risk factors, increased from 42% to 67%. (NB – this is still well below 
100%, as per all official treatment guidance, with the rate falling considerably 
lower than 67% when all pulmonary TB patients are included.)  
 A reduction in proportion of “lost” patients, from 2.5% to 0%. 
 The proportion of smear positive pulmonary TB cases who had one or more 
contacts identified increased from 79% to 100% 
 The proportion of smear positive pulmonary TB cases who had five or more 
contacts identified increased from 50% to 69% (NB, in New York City, five 
contacts is seen as the minimum acceptable number for all TB cases) 
(Health Protection Agency  2012a) 
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Perhaps not surprisingly, the report identified two related structural issues within 
London as limiting the ultimate success of Cohort Review: “the current service 
configuration” and the “fragmented nature of the structure of TB services across 
London”. “Limited resources” was cited as a further limitation. 
Unlike the HPA’s last evaluation of F&T, which was the subject of both derision and 
suspicion by the NHS, the Agency’s report on cohort review was accepted without 
question and has formed the basis for the expansion of the program across London. 
Summary of Case Study Four 
This case study has compared and contrasted two nurse-led, self-organising and highly 
complementary initiatives within the London TB control system. The emergence and 
subsequent success of F&T presented the NHS with challenges, mostly related to its 
desire to control and risk manage a team which, arguably, was successful for the very 
reason that it was not micromanaged and was able to develop an entrepreneurial and 
risk taking culture. When its multi-year pilot funding from the DH ran out, the NHS 
seized the opportunity to exert its control over the Team, consistent with NPM 
principles of risk management and desire for control. The NHS long-term goal may be 
to absorb the services offered by the F&T team (but not the Team itself) into 
mainstream TB service offerings. At the time of writing, the Team has been operating 
within the confines of an NPM-inspired NHS contract for approximately one and half 
years. The TB clinics and individual patients using the Team anecdotally report little 
difference in the service they receive from the Team, and the Team’s own activity 
reports indicate they have been as busy as ever. The team, however, reports being 
stretched to its breaking point, as it scrambles to meet growing demand for its services 
with fewer staff and a smaller budget. A significant part of F&T’s success is attributable 
to their unorthodox, boundary-spanning and often risky work practices. It remains an 
open question as to how long this can be maintained under the current NHS-led 
arrangement.  
The long overdue emergence in London of the cohort review process, on the other 
hand, has been without incident and is enthusiastically supported by the NHS. The 
program is now in place across most of London and, unsurprisingly in light of 40 years 
of largely positive international experience, it has been favourably evaluated by the 
HPA. Cohort review reinforces the NHS interest in measurement and control, consistent 
with NPM principles, and unlike F&T, it does not introduce “strange” or risky elements 
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into the broader TB control system, thereby keeping system diversity in check and 
reducing risk.  
With regard to complexity theory, both of these initiatives represent examples of self-
organising behaviours. In the case of F&T, it also exemplifies non-linearity in that a 
chance meeting between an enterprising London TB nurse and a Dutch physician led to 
the eventual creation in London of the Find & Treat team. Scholars argue that diversity 
within a system increases its robustness, following Ashby’s rule of requisite variety 
(Leifer 1989, Axelrod & Cohen 2000). This theory seems to hold true in the New York 
City Bureau of TB Control where this highly successful operation includes an array of 
medical, social, administrative and operational functions. Similarly, but on a smaller 
scale, London’s Find & Treat team is also comprised of a variety of medical and non-
medical functions. However, having succeeded in its efforts to take over F&T, NHS 
London is now struggling to accommodate the diversity which defined the Team. So far 
at least, the NHS response has been to try and reduce, or control, this diversity, rather 
than embrace and exploit it, another effort at risk management. This approach can also 
be seen as exemplifying self-organisation, this time to protect the NHS status quo and 
its own interests, a mode of self-organisation which was highlighted in Chapter Three. 
In effect, both negative and positive instances of self-organisation are seen within this 
case. 
This concludes the presentation of the mini case studies, although their content will be 
further analysed as well as theorised in the following chapter. Next, empirical 
observations and the key inductive finding of the research are presented. 
The Low Ranking of TB Control on the Public Policy Agenda: A 
Key Inductive Finding  
As discussed earlier, the low policy priority accorded to TB control in London emerged 
inductively as a major finding during the research. The extent and the consistency with 
which this finding arose meant it could not be overlooked.  
As discussed in Chapter Five, the software analysis program HyperResearch assisted 
with coding data and validating inductively emerging themes. Appendix L contains a 
bar graph illustrating the frequency of the various codes used. A key inductive finding, 
as seen in this bar graph, is the strong sense amongst respondents that no one outside 
the TB community cares about, or prioritises TB control as a policy issue, with 
respondents frequently referring to TB as “a Cinderella service”. Based on this 
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observation, combined with other empirical data presented earlier, TB’s low priority on 
the policy agenda is seen as the root from which other observed organisational 





FIGURE 29: RELATIONSHIP AMONGST TB’S STATUS AS A LOW-PRIORITY ISSUE AND OTHER OBSERVED 
ORGANISATIONAL PHENOMENA 
 
Respondents, unsurprisingly, displayed much frustration, or worse still, resignation 
and acceptance, at the system’s failure to control TB. Some had quit the system in 
despair.  More than one respondent became angry or upset during interviews and 
clearly valued talking to an outsider. Absent organisational accountability was 
identified previously as contributing to London’s inability to reduce TB. This lack of 
accountability, it was argued, arises from the extensive fragmentation and 
decentralisation within the system, given embedded NPM practices. Whilst it is useful 
to understand the likely structural source of this lack of accountability (NPM), the 
related general issue of the low policy priority accorded to TB control must also be 
analysed in more depth. Specifically, understanding why and how this situation arose 
and persists is necessary. Appendix L shows the extent to which these phenomena 
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 Taken together, the phenomena outlined in this graphic account for almost one-quarter (7/31) of 
this research’s total applied codes (of which all seven emerged inductively), and for 33% (1400/4305) 
of all coded phenomena. 
 
TB Low Priority 
Frustration/Disappointment 
Pace of Change 
Acknowledgement of Failure 
TB Politically Sensitive 
Lack of Accountability Lack of  Leadership 
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prevailed. As can be seen, the second and fourth most commonly occurring codes were 
“TB low priority” and “frustration/disappointment”, (and much of what is captured by 
the third most common code, “internal politics” also pertains indirectly to these issues).  
“ ‘For God's sake, this is a major priority, what are you doing?’...TB is nowhere 
...there is no interest”  
Chapter Two described the epidemiology and history of TB in London, showing it to be 
predominantly a disease of the foreign-born and the marginalised. White, middle-class 
Londoners are largely unaffected by the disease and unaware of living in its presence. 
As one former director of public health observed, “We had 69 deaths last year from TB. 
Presumably, none of them actually sort of (pitched) up at Hampstead dinner 
parties...”.22 A respiratory consultant noted similarly: 
one of the problems is not every disease entity is treated with the same degree 
of importance...because of who has it. TB is a disease of the poor... often the 
disease is in people whose first language is not English and they're not able to 
express themselves. 
At a population level, this research validates Dievler and Pappas’ (1999) conclusions 
regarding the role of race and class in impacting the official policy response to TB. With 
over 80% of all TB cases in London occurring amongst the foreign-born, and the 
remainder within various marginalised communities, the “face” of TB in London today 
differs significantly from that of the first half of the 20th century when most of those 
infected were white and British-born. Place of treatment now differs significantly, too. 
Whereas sanatoria were common until the 1970s, they no longer exist, deemed too 
costly given falling TB rates and inappropriate from a civil liberties perspective. 
Nonetheless, sanatoria comprised a physical manifestation of society’s recognition of 
TB as a healthcare priority and its commitment to healing those afflicted.23 Members of 
London’s TB community accept it as a “given” that the composition of the TB patient 
population impacts the nature of the policy response. There is a widespread sense that 
TB does not receive the attention it would if it were striking more affluent 
communities. On more than one occasion, the sentiment was voiced that “we need a 
middle class person to contract MDRTB" if the issue is to be taken seriously (which is 
what precipitated New York City’s aggressive response to its TB epidemic). 
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 There is some interest within the London TB community in reintroducing a modernised version of 




A potentially fatal communicable disease against which it is difficult to protect oneself, 
and described by an NHS official as a potential public health “time bomb”, has been 
allowed to grow in London, unabated, for over two decades. This fact alone speaks to 
the low priority accorded the issue. Each of the case studies presented earlier provides 
(sometimes tacitly) more detailed evidence: 
o The virtually unchallenged (either from within the TB community or from 
higher levels within the NHS or Department of Health) decision to jettison 
the holistic Control Board concept in favour of a vaguely enhanced, yet 
essentially status quo, Commissioning Board, despite evidence from New 
York City that the former approach is arguably more effective; 
o A reticence to adopt proven best-practices from other jurisdictions (New 
York City, Holland and Tanzania, from within London itself) without having 
to account for this approach; 
o A dangerous drug resistant TB outbreak, uncontrolled for 13 years, without 
apparent pressure by senior health officials to end it; 
o A TB control regime within the prison system which, for years functioned at 
a sub-standard level as part of the overall (inadequate) prison healthcare 
system, eventually becoming the original source of the 13-year InR-TB 
outbreak, and an ongoing contributor;  and,  
o A poor HPA-NHS interface was allowed to persist in the area of TB control 
in London without apparent senior leadership intervention. 
Members of the TB community have accepted, and indeed promulgate, the 
categorisation of TB as a “small” disease, characterised by low numbers of patients 
(approximately 3500 per year) relative to conditions such as diabetes, cancer and heart 
disease24. Whilst this is true, curiously, only a few respondents qualified this 
observation by highlighting the communicability aspect of TB and that there is very 
little one can do to prevent catching it, or transmitting it (before diagnosis). One 
exception was a TB nurse who observed, “My public health message is ‘don't 
breath’...because it's an airborne disease and there's a lot less choice going around in 
terms of transmitting TB than there is with blood-borne viruses”, such as HIV and 
hepatitis. Patients, too, are disinclined to draw public attention to the need for better 
TB control, owing to the stigmatisation of the disease in minority communities and the 
socioeconomic characteristics, i.e., the powerlessness, of the patient base.  
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Respondents repeatedly characterised TB control as a “Cinderella service”. One TB 
consultant observed, “If I were a cardiac-thoracic surgeon I wouldn’t be worried about 
where I am going to relocate my clinic after it’s been demolished.” And in the words of 
another, “TB is notoriously good at being a bit of a backwater”. Not surprisingly, PCTs 
used this categorisation of TB as a “small disease” to justify according it a low place on 
their priority lists. In the words of a Chief Executive: 
So you could say it’s the PCTs’ problem but it’s never going to be large enough in any 
one PCT. Of all the things the PCT has got to worry about, the number of TB cases is 
never going to be so large that they think they need to do something. 
 
A former senior PCT manager offered a similar sentiment:  
 
the thing about TB, is that the attitudes of the PCTs, i.e. the Director of Public Health 
and the Chief Executive of PCTs, is often one of mild irritation. And the characteristic 
comment that you’ll get is, “oh TB isn’t even on my radar.” And that’s because, again, 
the numbers are very small. 
 
Neither is there Evidence of Political Commitment 
Not only is there little recognition of TB in London as a problem, equally there is no 
political support for addressing it. On one level, the reason is obvious, as powerfully 
summarised by a TB consultant: 
It's a disease which affects foreigners. It affects the poor. It doesn't really affect 
voters. And it's also been an embarrassment politically to accept that it's still 
there and it's a problem. You know, it's like saying "we need a report in to child 
labour in London". 
However, at a less obvious and more systemic level, political concerns extend beyond 
potential embarrassment. A very senior manager within the system observed bluntly at 
a TB Commissioning Board meeting, “my total frustration is the total lack of interest in 
TB by political people...There is nobody who has ever championed it...”. A surprising 
discovery of this research was learning of a blunt, clear, and unwritten code coming 
from senior levels of NHS London that the TB issue was to be kept quiet and not 
become a media or political issue in London. It is an open secret within the TB 
community that the brief from senior NHS management is to keep TB out of the news, 
“off the radar” and far from mainstream society’s consciousness. A very senior level 
respondent said of senior NHS London management:  
217 
 
they are being defensive rather than proactive. They are not ready for TB to be 
a big issue: ‘we don't want to have a huge whereabouts bloody mobile X-ray 
van. Just make (TB) go away’...I do think there is a genuine public health sense 
that this isn't very good, but...I suspect there's 2000 other targets and 
deliverables they have and until a Minister or somebody says “what about TB?”, 
they won't focus on that... I'm sure they all, somewhere in their heads, it's on the 
radar, but because either politically or whatever, or because we haven't had a 
serious problem, it just doesn't ever quite get into the “now we must take 
action” category.”  
 
Field notes record similar sentiments being openly shared with members of the TB 
Commissioning Board on at least two separate occasions. Curiously, despite hearing 
what might be considered a startling observation, there was no reaction observable 
from Board members. It was not clear whether this was a result of their widespread 
resignation, whether this was “old news”, or whether it is further evidence of the self-
censorship discussed earlier. Similarly, a respondent shared that another informal, 
unwritten instruction from senior NHS and/or Department of Health management was 
that the term “epidemic” in relation to TB in London be dropped from usage in the run-
up to the London 2012 Olympics. The TB community seemingly acquiesced and the 
word is nowhere in the TB control lexicon. In a masterful display of understatement, 
written documents use language such as “TB in London is at rates generally considered 
high”. 
Various respondents suggested that the nature of TB means it is destined to second-
class public health status. One former director of public health, referring to senior NHS 
London management, commented that individuals there have their own professional 
agendas, “and I don't think a difficult and unpopular thing like this (TB) was necessarily 
going to get up (their) list.” The widespread, tacit acceptance of TB’s low status within 
the NHS London is disheartening for those working within the TB control system, as 
mentioned earlier. A senior nurse, seen as a leader within the TB community, observed: 
“for many years, we didn't really get managed...We got a phone call about once every 
three months from someone... we didn't have a clear management structure and there's 
nothing more demoralising..” 
At the same time, senior management within London’s TB control system were doing 
their part to comply with senior NHS London wishes that the city’s TB problem be kept 
as quiet as possible. On at least four occasions, the TB Commissioning Board was 
informed that various media outlets (The Times, BBC, The London Evening Standard) 
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were interested in writing or producing stories on TB in London. The instruction to the 
communications officials was to either try and kill the story (the preferred outcome) 
or, if that did not work, to co-operate with a view to minimising potential damage and 
ensuring reporters were clearly told that NHS London was apprised of the issue and 
doing all it could to tackle TB. These efforts were largely successful, as during the 
course of this research only one major (front page) story emerged on the issue, in The 
Times (3 June 2011), and was limited to the issue of TB vaccines for children. 
Subsequently there has been a BBC Radio 4 documentary on TB in Britain, which first 
aired on 31 July 2012. It is not known whether there has been any fall-out within the 
London TB community, but it seems unlikely. The BBC production was focused on the 
increase in TB in migrant communities in Birmingham and suggested more resources 
for improved screening and treatment of latent TB. It was critical of NHS efforts, but 
non-alarmist and balanced in tone. As this thesis was being finalised, The Times carried 
another prominent story on the rise of TB, on 7 December 2012. 
It is interesting to note the absence of any “whistle blowing” activity from within the TB 
community. With media interest, it would not be difficult for someone from within the 
London TB community to speak out. A key respondent disclosed that s/he had 
seriously considered this option, but decided against it.  
 
Respondent (R)...all the steer from the bureaucracy was don't do that. It won't 
help your cause in the long run. And that's a judgment as a (post redacted) you 
have to make, do I really want to go public and get, you know, because what will 
happen is I would go public, say loads of things probably that would be pretty 
difficult and the DH and the SHA would rebut. 
 
ST: Oh they would? 
 
R: Oh yeah. 
 
ST: You think they'd just let you ...? 
 
R: Oh yeah. They'd say “(name redacted) doesn't know what (s/he’s) talking 
about. This is what's actually happening, here's what we're really doing. 
(S/he's) misunderstood it.” Yeah, yeah. They would have no, if it got really dirty, 
that's what they'd do. 
 
ST: They'd just hang you out? 
R: Yeah. So in a way, there was no point in trying to push it, and I think it's a 
shame. I think it's a shame. 
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Other well-placed respondents mused about the potential long-term value of loud and 
negative media attention. A former director of public health mused:  
...do we need two serious XDR25 cases including a death in Newham in July 2012 
to wake everybody else up for the Olympics, when the Daily Mail will then run a 
scare story, “TB Epidemic Strikes East London” before the Olympics...”Olympic 
Health Scare”? Do you need that? Well, actually, maybe we do because then 
maybe there will be some leadership. And if I sound pissed off, it's because I am. 
There is little political gain in championing improved TB control in London. At the 
elected level, in the words of a former director of public health, “‘he cracked TB in 
London’, that's about two and a half votes, you know, it's invisible (TB). The people 
who'd be grateful are very unlikely to vote, most of them...”. At the same time, a risk 
assessment could conclude that after 25 years of slowly climbing TB rates, the chance 
of a crisis erupting is small within an electoral mandate. And should such an event 
arise, senior levels of the system could point to many actions taken over past years in 
response to the rising rates of TB in London (whilst ignoring their summary lack of 
effectiveness). 
This concludes the presentation of the key, inductively derived, empirical finding in this 
research, in which the low organisational and political priority accorded to TB control 
in London, and the serious consequences flowing from this status has been revealed. As 
with the other empirical findings presented in this chapter and in Chapter Six, this 
finding will be theorised at some length in the next chapter, in this instance using 
Kingdon’s (1995) theory of public policy development. 
Before moving on to identifying the mid-range themes which have emerged from the 
case studies and concluding remarks for this chapter, it is useful to return to the theory 
of professional dominance and its role in this research. 
The Theory of Professional Dominance Revisited 
This chapter and its predecessor tacitly illustrate, mainly by way of its absence, the role 
of medical dominance within London’s TB control system. This was most clearly shown 
when TB consultants quickly dropped their opposition to NHS management’s move to 
drop the TB Control Board concept and revert back to a Commissioning Board model. 
Although almost all respondents identified TB physicians as being the most dominant 
group within the TB community, their power remained oddly unexercised outside of 
                                           
25 “extensively drug resistant” 
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their individual clinics. Field notes indicate they did tend to dominate meetings 
verbally, but as they often arrived late and left early owing to their busy schedules, 
even this form of influence was limited. The reasons for this lack of observed 
“operationalised” medical dominance are not entirely clear. Speculatively, it could arise 
from a lack of slack or redundancy in the system, meaning doctors simply do not have 
time to significantly influence TB control in London. For even the busiest TB 
consultants in London, TB occupies no more than 30% of their time (COPD and asthma 
comprise the major clinical issues), despite apparent high commitment to their TB 
patients and to improving the TB control system. Perhaps related to this, neither was 
there evidence of robust ties (nor many of them) amongst TB consultants, thereby 
reducing the potential of beneficial self-organisation emerging amongst the group. 
Consequently, it’s been concluded that the theory of professional dominance does not 
provide a strong or viable conceptual framework for understanding TB control in 
London and it will not be analysed or theorised more extensively.  
The remainder of this thesis will focus on the theoretical development and application 
of complexity theory and NPM concepts. Below are summary tables of the empirical 
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FIGURE 31: SUMMARY OF NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS EMPIRICALLY OBSERVED  
 
Before moving on to some concluding remarks, it is helpful to identify relevant mid-
range themes arising from this case study data, and which will be more explicitly 
theorised in the next two chapters.   
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Mid-Range Themes Identified From the Empirical Data 
1. There is a high degree of NPM-style fragmentation throughout London’s TB Control 
system.  
As discussed in Chapter Four, conditions of high fragmentation can arise from 
operational decentralisation (e.g., 31 TB clinics across London, of which only those five 
in North Central London share some resources) and/or fallout from well embedded 
macro-level NPM reforms in the NHS. In this study they have resulted in, specifically:  
(i) the creation of a commissioner-provider split which prevented the 
emergence of  a holistic pan-London TB Control Board;  
(ii)  the creation of the arms-length and seemingly uninfluential Health 
Protection Agency; 
(iii) outsourcing and proliferation of the number of stakeholders in the field, 
including privatised laboratory and prisoner transport services,  
contracted-out services providing a TB awareness-raising campaign for GPs 
and for the diagnosis and care of TB patients from high-risk communities 
(F&T, which was initially governed as a social enterprise): 
(iv) poorly implemented contractual performance management reporting 
regimes; and, 
(v) a  hollowed-out policy making capacity at the DH. 
Whilst all these NPM-inspired reforms are present and appear generally to exert 
negative effects at the TB system-wide level, other NPM reforms which may have been 
helpful appear weak or absent. The use of targets is a strong NPM policy instrument, 
designed to galvanise action around particularly visible policy areas (such as NHS 
waiting times), but this research found no officially sanctioned targets relating to either 
TB rates or the delivery of specific TB services. With over 70% of PCTs not having 
Service Level Agreements in place for TB (Laycock et al 2009), performance 
measurement and audit tools generally are not used in this field. Similarly, there is no 
“steer” or pressure to perform emanating from the centre, perhaps reflecting TB’s low 
profile as a health policy issue (as explored in Chapter Eight). 
Also, as a deeply fragmented TB service has been the norm in London for so long, it was 
easier for NHS managers to set aside the holistic TB Control Board concept in favour of 
a vaguely modified status quo, aided by the lack of opposition from TB physicians. 
Finally, a further implication of NPM-style fragmentation is a severe lack of 
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accountability within the system, related in part to the above-noted lack of rigorous 
contracting practices and officially set targets. 
2. The public health function is impeded and weak 
 
As also discussed in Chapter Four, the public health function, with its systemic focus on 
holism and the need for co-ordinated, multi-organisation working, is impeded and lacks 
influence within strong NPM environments. The case study of the HPA suggested its 
weak influence on core agencies. This problem is expected to be exacerbated as a result 
of the recently passed health and social care legislation which will see the public health 
function split amongst local authorities, GP commissioning groups and (the yet to be 
created) Public Health England.  
 
3. There is little evidence of co-adaptation amongst TB system components 
Neither was there evidence found of co-adaptation between the TB control system and 
its environment, nor evidence of organisational learning (as complexity theory would 
predict, too optimistically). Rather, the ongoing production of similar reports on TB in 
London, along with repeated discussions on similar topics (i.e., the value of pan-London 
TB commissioning) speaks of “organisational forgetting”. Similarly, the refusal or 
inability of clinics to adopt successful best practices from other jurisdictions or even 
local clinics (Trenholm & Ferlie 2012), the apparent difficulty the NHS had in working 
with the HPA, and the failings of TB services in prisons are reflective of a maladaptive, 
non-robust system, including games around narrow turf defence. 
Mid-Range Themes Arising Inductively 
As mentioned earlier, some mid-range themes arose inductively during data analysis. 
The software HyperResearch proved helpful in validating these themes26, as outlined 
below. 
1. The extensive and deep fragmentation which characterises the system (as discussed 
above) 
 
2. The low priority accorded TB as an issue and, flowing from this, an absence of 
political support, and a lack of accountability and leadership within the system.  
                                           
26 Please see Appendix L for a graphical presentation of the frequency with which the codes used for 
data analysis appeared. 
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These concepts are closely related and manifest in TB being frequently characterised 
by respondents as a “Cinderella service” which is easily ignored. This lack of priority 
given to TB control is an important finding and will be discussed in Chapter Eight. As 
noted earlier, NPM-led decentralisation and fragmentation makes it easier for 
responsibility (and blame) to be shifted, or avoided, by pushing it down to ever lower 
operating levels. This was observed within this research as virtually no one within the 
system held, or claimed, responsibility beyond their local “patch” or patient population. 
The absence of accountable leadership within the TB control system, and crucially, at a 
higher level within NHS London, means the TB “situation” has been allowed to 
deteriorate, with no one being held accountable. 
Finally, an additional theme surfaced which is not directly related to the organisation 
and structure of the system, but was a strong and recurring sentiment which should be 
noted; namely, a widespread and deep sense of frustration, often bordering on anger, 
amongst current and past actors within the TB control system at the lack of 
improvement and slow pace of change. As this is clearly related to the preceding theme, 
it too, will be discussed in more depth later.  
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has presented much of the empirical data collected. Each case study 
illustrated different systemic relationships within London’s TB control system, whilst 
also relating them to relevant aspects of the theory used in this research.  A key 
inductive finding related to the low policy priority accorded to TB control in London 
was also presented and discussed. 
The first case study in this chapter discussed drug resistant TB in London, with a focus 
on the role played by Pentonville prison and the organisational relationship between 
the prison health system and the TB control system. The sometimes strained 
relationship between the NHS and the HPA, with regard to the management of the 
outbreak, was also discussed. The outbreak is now in its 13th year and remains 
uncontrolled. Key components of the recommended approach to treating drug resistant 
TB – rigorous use of directly observed therapy and extensive contact tracing - are made 
more difficult by London’s deeply fragmented and resource-scarce structure.  
The next extended “vignette” discussed the impact on London’s TB control system of 
the emergence of the HPA, a devolved, NPM-inspired, arms-length, agency. The creation 
of the HPA embodies the NPM process of hollowing-out formerly strong, central 
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government departments, in this instance, Health. One of the consequences of the 
formation of the HPA was further fragmentation within an already fragmented TB 
control system and the disempowering of a key group of TB control experts. As the 
relationship between the HPA and the DH is seen as unclear, both the nature of the 
HPA’s autonomy and the resulting role of the DH in TB control were discussed.  
The last, comparative, case study contrasted two self-organising initiatives: the 
establishment of the Find & Treat team and the cohort review process. Whilst the 
workings of the former were the frequent subject of suspicion and misunderstanding 
by the NHS, the latter was warmly embraced and its expansion across London 
encouraged. Eventually the NHS launched a “hostile takeover” of Find & Treat, a move 
which, it is argued here, was motivated by the NHS’ NPM-driven need to control and 
risk manage the service provided by F&T.  Cohort review, on the other hand, played 
into and supported this need, leading to enthusiastic support from the NHS for the 
initiative. Cohort review also offered no threat in terms of how it was executed – 
essentially as an extension of the well established patient case review process. At the 
time of writing, Find & Treat’s mid-to-longer term future is still unknown, whilst cohort 
review is on its way to becoming a mainstay in London’s TB control system. 
A key inductive finding arising from this research was also presented. Surprisingly, 
despite being a potentially fatal, communicable disease which has taken hold in a 
densely populated urban centre, TB control in London is given scant priority by policy 
setters. TB is characterised as a “small” disease within NHS London and its treatment is 
seen as comprising a “Cinderella service”. The implications of this characterisation 
were discussed and will be theorised fully in the next chapter. 
In the final section of the chapter, an overview of the mid-range theories which arose 
both deductively and inductively from the empirical data was presented. These themes 
include deep fragmentation within the system which often results in misalignment, an 
absence of co-adaptation, a lack of accountability and leadership within the system, a 
virtual absence of political or high-level policy support for TB control initiatives, and 
widespread frustration amongst actors within the system. 
This chapter, along with the one before it, has provided an extensive review of the data 
collected for this research and has introduced theoretical elements which are relevant 
to understanding the data. The next chapter will theorise these findings further to 





CHAPTER EIGHT: Theorising the Explanatory Potential of 
Complexity Theory and New Public Management in TB Control 
Across London and the Lack of Public Policy Attention Accorded 
to TB Control in London  
 
Introduction 
The previous two chapters presented empirical findings from this study. This chapter 
will theorise specific aspects of these findings by revisiting the research questions 
posed at the start of this thesis. In particular, this chapter considers: 
1. What is the contribution of complexity theory features (and/or professional 
dominance and/or New Public Management features) in analysing the 
organisational response to this phenomenon? 
2. Why does the organisational response to resurgent TB in London illustrate 
these features?, i.e., what are the mechanisms and structures which explain 
this organisational response? 
3. Does complexity theory provide a theoretical basis for understanding the 
role of the New Public Management paradigm and practices within this 
case? 
4. What perspective might Kingdon’s (1995) theory of public policy 
development offer on TB control in London? 
These questions will be discussed in the context of both the findings captured by 
Figures 30 and 31 in Chapter Seven and the mid-range themes which were identified 
from the data and summarised at the end of that chapter. To recap, these themes are: 
o the high degree of NPM-style fragmentation throughout London’s TB control 
system; 
o the scant evidence of co-adaptation amongst TB system components;  




o the low priority accorded the TB control issue in London, leading to frustration 
and a lack of accountability. 
In theorising these findings, special attention will be focused on the interplay between 
complexity theory precepts and NPM-based principles of organising. Specifically, how 
NPM is embedded, especially within the broader NHS, and to a lesser extent within the 
TB control system itself, is explored. This recognizes the need for complexity theory 
research to be mindful of the broader context in which it is undertaken (Marion & 
Bacon 1999, Rhodes et al 2011, Byrne 1998), in this instance a heavily NPM-influenced 
environment. And as mentioned earlier, Kingdon’s (1995) theory on public policy 
agenda setting will also be used, so the key inductive finding of this research can be 
fully theorised. This exercise will be augmented by re-introducing some elements of 
complexity theory, as suggested by Kingdon himself. 
Complexity Theory Precepts Widely Observed, But Often With 
“Negative” Manifestations 
Complexity theory precepts identified for use in this research - self-organisation, non-
linearity, and historicity/sensitivity to initial conditions were widely observed (Figure 
30). The concept of “co-adaptation/co-evolution within the system” was found to exist 
in only a limited manner and within a single case study, the Find & Treat team.  The 
clear lack of adaptive behaviours within the system is a significant issue and will be 
discussed later. In addition, there was a marked lack of diversity observed within the 
system. Also significant is the manner in which the complexity theory concepts often 
materialised within the system; namely, in ways which impeded TB control efforts.  
Self-Organisation 
Self-organisation is often seen as a “force for good”, and this research found evidence of 
self-organising behaviours leading to beneficial outcomes within London’s TB control 
system; specifically, the creation of the Find & Treat team and the Cohort Review 
process. Both of these initiatives exhibit most of the aspects of self-organising systems 
highlighted in Chapter Three: the absence of a single leader, the lack of an overarching 
plan or blueprint to guide actions, and the emergence of order and innovation. Both 
F&T and Cohort Review were initiated by nurses but neither started out with a grand 
scheme and the nurses involved in the early days of the programs expressed some 
surprise at the eventual outcomes.  
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However, self-organising behaviours may also exert detrimental influences on their 
host system (Boons et al 2009, McKelvey 2003), and in this research they often did. 
Chapters Six and Seven identified instances in which NHS management self-organised 
to maintain the status quo, impeding much needed system change. The first of these 
was the reaction by system actors, or more accurately the non-reaction, to the many 
commissioned reports and studies looking at how to better manage TB in London. 
While there was no evidence that these reports were formally rejected, there was a 
pronounced “non-response”, or a response cycle comprised largely of ignoring the 
latest report and then commissioning another one shortly thereafter.27  Similarly, 
system members were observed to self-organise in the context of the F&T “takeover”. 
Although there were concerns amongst NHS managers regarding the lack of 
governance and the unorthodox and far-reaching work practices within the Team, 
there did not appear to be a specific “plan” or single leader in place who was driving the 
“takeover initiative”, until the Team’s last days as a social enterprise. What was 
observed was a tacit agreement amongst some NHS managers that the time had come 
for the Team’s activities to be brought under the health service’s purview. It is not 
possible to identify a single, clear motivation for this action as the Team was successful, 
cost effective and well regarded outside the aforementioned group of NHS managers. 
The impetus was not financial, as it was recognised that the money spent on F&T would 
not be redirected to other parts of the TB control system in the event of F&T’s demise, 
but would simply “disappear” into the broader NHS. It is conjectured here that the anti-
F&T drive is a general reflection of a well-established culture of control and risk 
aversion within the NHS. The third, and perhaps most “pure” or conservative 
manifestation of self-organisation involves a series of clearly uncoordinated, 
individually motivated behaviours by senior NHS managers, the net result of which is 
TB’s on-going status as a low-priority, unsuccessfully managed, healthcare issue. This 
particular instance of self-organisation is described and theorised at some length in the 
next chapter.  
Non-linearity of Response 
Complex systems often exhibit non-linear responses to disturbances in their 
environments, sometimes leading to the emergence of novelty or innovation (Holland 
1992, Manson 2001, Plsek 2001). A positive instance of non-linearity noted above 
involved the chance meeting between an enterprising TB nurse and a Dutch TB doctor 
                                           
27
 The DH Commissioning Toolkit represents a minor exception to this, as some of its contents 
appear to have been used by some PCTs and commissioners.  
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which led to the eventual creation of F&T. However, most instances of observed non-
linearity did not contribute positively.  After 14 reports outlining the need for action to 
be taken against TB, the system remains steadfastly moribund. Similarly, despite a 
strong environmental perturbation in the form of the InR-TB outbreak, the prison 
healthcare system remained unresponsive for years. When it finally did act, the 
response was inadequate and poorly executed. On a more macro level, non-linearity is 
evidenced by the system-wide non-response to rising drug resistant TB rates in 
general. So as with the observed instances of self-organisation noted above, most of the 
examples of non-linearity also contribute negatively to TB control. 
Historicity and Sensitivity to Initial Conditions 
It is admittedly challenging for a deadly communicable disease like TB to develop a 
positive history within an organisation. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, history and the 
initial system conditions it creates are important considerations in complexity theory 
research (Begun et al 2003, Rhodes & McKechnie 2003). As with the self-organisation 
discussion, above, there were also negative manifestations of these concepts within 
London’s TB control system.  
The TB service’s longstanding history as a low priority, “Cinderella service” is 
perpetuated, with negative outcomes for the system. As will be discussed in the next 
chapter, this metaphor has become a self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts, making it easier 
for policy makers to disregard the very real needs of the system. History also affects 
how the poor quality healthcare traditionally provided to London prisoners impacted 
the system’s response to the InR-TB outbreak. Whilst the current prison healthcare 
situation may be a slight improvement on the past, and in some prisons TB facilities 
have improved, historically prisoners have been subjected to well documented 
substandard levels of care (Siva 2010), including those infected with TB. Arguably, this 
contributed to prison health officials’ inadequate response when faced with the InR-TB 
outbreak. Similarly, a lengthy history of ignoring best practices from other jurisdictions 
likely contributed to the late arrival in London of the cohort review process and to the 
city’s on-going ambivalence toward implanting a full-scale DOTS program. The next 
chapter further discusses the importance of historicity and initial conditions, reflected 
in the impact of the state of the UK’s political economy when resurgent TB returned to 
London (NPM) compared with the arrival of HIV/AIDS in the early 1980’s (pre-NPM).  
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 Co-Adaptation and Co-Evolution  
Co-adaptation increases system fitness by ensuring that systems are aligned with their 
ever-changing environments (Leifer 1989). Systems successfully adapt if “the entire 
ecology…evolves; (when) individual subsystems contribute to, and are affected by, the 
whole system’s evolution” (Goldstein et al 2010:32).  
Empirically, there was almost no evidence of co-adaptation or co-evolution within the 
system, save for the F&T subsystem’s observed responsiveness to its clients’ wide-
ranging needs, as the team became aware of them.  On a more macro level, most of the 
observed evidence pointing to a lack of co-adaptation overlaps with observed non-
linear responses, underscoring the importance of these observations. The TB control 
system did not successfully co-adapt to the very significant environmental changes 
resulting from over two decades of rising TB rates, or to the serious appearance over a 
decade ago of drug resistant TB. As well, the system engaged in “organisational 
forgetting” rather than organisational learning, failing to co-adapt to changes in its 
environment with, for example the introduction of new reports and recommendations.  
On a subsystem level, HMP Pentonville was very slow in adapting its TB control 
practices to the outbreak of InR-TB (a significant environmental change), and when it 
did, it engaged in a variety of often unsuccessful infrastructure and process changes. 
The prison healthcare system (run by the NHS) was unwilling or unable to 
communicate and work with other parts of the NHS to ensure its TB facilities were 
adequate, demonstrating further evidence of poor organisational learning. For 
Mitleton-Kelly (2003:42), “(w)hen learning leads to new behaviours, then the 
organisation can be said to have adapted and evolved”. By this measure, London’s TB 
control system has neither adapted nor evolved, as is consistent with the evidence 
collected by this research.  
Diversity Amongst System Components 
Diversity within systems is important for enhancing robustness and fitness because it  
provides a wide range of possible responses to any given situation. The wider is 
the range of variations, the more likely it is that (at least) one will become 
viable in furthering the adaptability of the whole (Goldstein et al 2010:179). 
As noted, the London TB control system is medically dominated and there is no 
representation from outside the NHS or DH, aside from some sporadic involvement by 
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former TB patients. Even before they were subsumed by the NHS, there was no F&T 
representation on either the TB Commissioning Board or the TB Clinical Working 
Group. Respondents noted the dominance of the medical model in London’s TB control 
system and the absence of a public health approach, as seen in Appendix L, reflecting a 
lack of diversity of viewpoints within the system. Had the Control Board idea been 
implemented, this might have enhanced both public health input and diversity of 
opinion and experience, through the intended involvement from social care interests, 
including housing, as well as the Mayor’s Office.28 Instead, the system features a marked 
lack of diversity29 and, arguably, as a result, is less able to respond to environmental 
challenges.  
As can be seen, complexity theory precepts were only observed as manifesting 
positively within the original F&T team and not within the London-wide system. 
Elements of the TB community self-organised in ways which prevented much needed 
change and adaptation within the system, displaying the sort of negative self-
organisation discussed by Boons et al (2009) and McKelvy (2003). In turn, these 
behaviours contributed to the observed lack of system co-adaptation and its non-linear 
responses (i.e., non-responses) to significant disturbances to the TB control system 
(rising TB infection rates and drug resistant outbreaks). In the absence of co-adaptive 
behaviours, systems become increasingly misaligned with their environments (Leifer 
1989), failing to adopt vital “self-repairing” changes (Mitleton-Kelly 2003), as observed 
in the organisational response by London’s TB control system. 
NPM Precepts Also Widely Present, But With Some Variability 
Along with complexity theory, the NPM precepts identified for application in this 
research were widely observed, as highlighted in Figures 30 and 31 in the previous 
chapter. The extent to which NPM serves as a useful conceptual framework for 
understanding London’s TB control system came as a surprise. Particularly notable is 
the profound manner in which NPM impacted the expression of the complexity theory 
concepts found within the system and the extent of its ongoing presence. And just as 
the complexity theory precepts manifested in unexpected or unusual ways (often 
negatively and with negative outcomes), the NPM precepts also contributed in negative 
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 This was ultimately a “double-edged sword”, as increasing diversity was likely perceived by the 
NHS as potentially relinquishing control, or at least making the Board more difficult to control. 
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ways to the system’s efforts at controlling TB. This is less surprising given the 
previously discussed relationship between NPM and public health.  
Below is a recap of the negative expressions within London’s TB control system arising 
from various NPM precepts. 
 Managerialism (Ferlie et al 1996:11,108,182 -183, Diefenbach 2009) 
o derailing the last TB strategic policy plan (the Case for Change and Model of 
Care documents) by senior NHS London management 
o quashing the TB Control Board concept by London Health Programs (NHS) staff 
(with the support of more senior NHS officials) 
o the demise of F&T.  
 Quasi-markets, hollowing-out, and disaggregation (McNulty & Ferlie 
2002:56, Dunleavy 1995, Allen 2009) 
o Control Board concept set aside, owing, in part, to the primacy of the 
commissioning function over a more holistic approach to TB control 
o Unclear accountabilities arising from disaggregation, decentralisation and 
fragmentation 
o A loss of policy making capacity at the DH 
 Control, risk aversion, and measurement (McNulty & Ferlie 2002:66 -57, 
Moran 2003:153) 
o NHS fear of  losing control contributed to the demise of the Control Board 
concept  
o F&T takeover largely motivated by NHS need to control TB service delivery 
 
As with the complexity theory concepts, the NPM precepts sometimes also emerged – 
or not - in unusual or unexpected ways.  For example, there is virtually no evidence of 
top-down pressure for reform coming from either the DH or the NHS (presumably 
owing to the low priority accorded to TB control), although such pressure is arguably 
needed. Neither is there any real evidence of performance measurement or enforced 
target-setting aside from a series of “metrics” which were developed by the TB 
Commissioning Board and Clinical Working Group and provided to PCTs and TB clinics. 
A presentation by the London Health Programs arm of the NHS on World TB Day 2012 
described these as “a tool to measure progress rather than performance”. In fact, the 
most recent data show that of the eight performance metrics currently in place, only 
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two have met the minimum acceptable standard, two have been deemed “not currently 
measurable” and four have not been met (Health Protection Agency 2011a:22). At the 
time of writing, these metrics were an on-going topic of discussion, with efforts to 
revise and update them underway. The Model of Care document also noted the need for 
more robust performance measurement. Yet this situation is atypical within an NPM 
context.  It should not be construed as management lacking interest in exercising 
significant control over the system since the weight of evidence presented points in the 
opposite direction.  Another key NPM concept which was surprisingly absent from the 
macro-level view of TB control in London was the desire to control outcomes via 
various risk management methods. Whist the mainstream NHS demonstrates a need to 
exercise control and manage risk at a micro level within London’s TB control system 
(the F&T takeover), this is curiously absent in the health service’s overall approach to 
managing TB in London. At this level, NHS London leadership can be characterised as 
gamblers, seemingly willing to take the chance that this communicable disease will be 
contained in both size and scope.  
The next sections of this chapter address, through a theoretical lens, how NPM has 
impacted London’s TB control system, with a view to identifying key contributing 
organisational mechanisms.  
How NPM Impacts TB Control in London 
A Deeply Fragmented System 
Early concerns were raised about the potential impact of the NHS internal market 
reforms on TB control (Evans 1995, Ormerod et al 1994, Pearson et al 1996): 
“The purchaser/provider split necessitates improved communication between 
the CCDC, the specialists in thoracic medicine...and the contract managers for 
the tuberculosis contact tracing service. This role may require the service of a 
part-time dedicated tuberculosis co-ordinator...Clear objectives and agreed 
targets for the prevention and control of tuberculosis in London should be set 
between commissioners and providers” (Pearson et al 1996:176).  
The authors foresaw the potential danger of fragmentation in TB control services along 
with the need to offset this risk by instituting a system of targets and measurement. 
Their apprehension was well placed. Just two years later, in the 1998 report 
Tuberculosis Control in London – The need for change, it was observed, “overall the 
service is patchy, fragmented and under-resourced” (Thames Regional Directors of 
Public Health 1998:2). As detailed in the previous chapter, this research has shown that 
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fragmentation continues to stunt London’s TB control system, with no end in sight, as 
acknowledged by the TB Commissioning Board itself:  
“There is the risk that the control of TB will become more fragmented as the 
responsibilities for protecting health and procuring services move into new and 
disparate organisations most of which will be unable to take a pan-London 
strategic view of the disease.” (NHS 2011a:2) 
The introduction of the NPM-inspired quasi-market to the NHS and the ensuing 
contract-driven disaggregation within the TB control system (often achieved via 
outsourcing, e.g., GP awareness-raising initiatives, prisoner transport and laboratory 
services) facilitated system fragmentation. Where once there were relationships, now 
there are contracts. A leading microbiologist observed during a TB Clinical Working 
Group meeting how NHS employees cannot enter the Serco-run labs in his Trust 
without special permission (apparently to safeguard corporate competitive interests). 
Colleagues working in the same Trust who would have been able to informally mix with 
each other and develop workplace relationships now find this more difficult owing to 
the quasi-market.  
Not all NPM-inspired disaggregation arose from outsourcing, however. With the 
creation of the HPA, the DH simultaneously hollowed-out its TB policy making capacity, 
further fragmented the TB control system and muddied already unclear lines of 
accountability.   By downgrading its role in TB policy, the Department also sent a 
message regarding the low relative priority which it placed on TB control, thereby 
underscoring the damaging “Cinderella service” identity attached to TB. The 
implications of this will be explored in the next chapter. 
NPM systems do not feature the traditional methods of accountability associated with 
bureaucratic and hierarchical modes of organising (Allen 2006, Pollitt 2005:381). 
Rather, these systems move decision making power to ever more localised levels, 
thereby increasing system fragmentation. At the same time, these systems implement a 
regime of contracts, targets, audit and performance management to maintain some 
element of control by the centre, resulting in a contradictory model of simultaneously 
loose and tight controls. Finally, intra-system communications become more 
complicated within fragmented systems, with organisational learning often negatively 
impacted, i.e., vital system co-adaptation and co-evolution is more challenging in the 




Lack of Accountability Within the System  
 Early warning bells were sounded regarding the risk of NPM-led fragmentation on TB 
control, as well as concerns about accountability within the system: “How should 
tuberculosis services be provided and purchased and who should manage both the 
patients and the programme and so be held accountable?” (Ormerod et al 1994:1088). 
And as with the concerns regarding the impact of fragmentation, this fear has also been 
realised.  
Accountability within NPM systems differs from that found in traditional bureaucratic 
and hierarchical systems. By pushing decision making power down to the lowest 
possible system levels, accountability becomes highly diffused, indirect and often 
contract based, with few political or visible lines of accountability. NPM advocates 
argue the risks of this diffusion are offset by the simultaneous implementation of a 
rigorous regime of performance measures, targets and audits. While this approach can 
be effective where it is employed, in the case of TB control in London, it simply does not 
exist. As noted above, there is no system of performance measurement in place; 
consequently, “(w)hile metrics have been developed for TB and are regularly reviewed, 
active performance management is not comprehensive across the city” (NHS 2011a:7). 
NHS-enforced targets are also absent for the TB control system as a whole (e.g. a target 
rate for TB incidence or DOT usage across London) and for individual components of 
the system (e.g. well-defined treatment completion rates per clinic). 30   Nor was any 
evidence of audit activity observed (readers may recall that despite significant efforts, 
NHS London was unable to determine exactly how much money is spent annually on TB 
control in London). Ironically, the sole exception is the F&T team since its takeover by 
the NHS. Under the terms of the detailed contract discussed in Chapter Seven, the Team 
find themselves subject to a level of performance management and measurement 
exceeding that found anywhere else in the TB control system. 
Similarly, the contracting regime in place between purchasers and providers of TB 
services in London is poorly developed. Strong contracts are another means by which 
the potentially negative impacts of decentralisation, i.e., fragmentation, are offset. 
However, as most PCTs do not have Service Level Agreements in place with their TB 
service providers, but rather combine TB services within broader contracts for 
respiratory services, again a potential counterbalance to system fragmentation is not in 
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 For a brief time circa 2000-2002, NHS London adopted one TB-related measure in its list of 
“official” targets - the overall treatment completion rate. 
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place. For TB control in London, the situation can be seen as representing the worst of 
both NPM worlds: a fragmented system (arising from decentralisation and localisation 
drives) without the offsets of a performance management and targets regime or strong 
contracts. NHS London has not delegated any authority or power to the Chair of the TB 
Commissioning Board, compelling the Chair to rely on goodwill and collaboration to 
implement system change. The net result is an almost total absence of accountability at 
the system level.31 
NPM Suffocates Complexity Theory Concepts and Potential Benefits to System 
The preceding discussion has (a)reviewed the nature of the complexity theory concepts 
observed, including their often negative or non-manifestations within London’s TB 
control system and (b)established that NPM is deeply embedded within London’s TB 
control system and the broader NHS. This latter point provides an important 
theoretical underpinning for understanding how and why the system functions as it 
does. Figure 32, below, brings these two points together, providing a summary 
overview of this chapter’s discussion thus far. 
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 London’s situation contrasts with New York City’s centralised, clear and hierarchical organisational 
structure. There is no doubt as to who is directly answerable for TB control there -the Director of the 
Bureau of TB Control. 
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Complexity Theory Concept and Observed 
Negative Manifestation or Absence 
NPM Concepts Implicated 
Self-Organisation (negative) - actors self-
organised to maintain the status quo.  
 Reports and studies ignored despite clear 
need and calls for change 
 Control board concept repealed in favour of 
status quo Commissioning Board  
 F&T takeover  
 TB's status as a low healthcare priority 
reinforced by TB community itself 
o NPM-driven need to control supported 
negative self-organising behaviours which: 
 ignored reports and studies 
(implementation could lead to 
unpredictable changes) 
 led to quashing of holist Control 
Board concept (potentially too 
many non-NHS actors, leading to 
reduced control) 
 supported F&T takeover 
 perpetuate TB’s status as low 
priority 
o Managerialism  underpinned demise of 
Control Board idea and, at senior NHS levels, 
derailed the latest strategic policy 
alternative 
o Quasi-markets resulted in primacy of 
commissioning, leading to demise of Control 
Board concept 
o NPM-led efficiency drives reduced system 
slack and redundancy, making the formation 
of potentially productive ties amongst 
system actors more difficult  
Non-Linear Responses (negative) 
 System unresponsive at both micro 
level (prisons) and macro level (overall 
system) to drug-resistant TB despite 
significant environmental perturbations 
Fragmentation within system, arising from 
quasi-markets, makes it difficult to co-ordinate 
an effective response to outbreak and easier to 
avoid accountability for such a (non)response 
Co-adaptation (absent) 
 At macro level, inability of TB control 
system to respond to resurgence of TB 
in London, including drug resistant TB 
 Ineffective changes in TB control 
infrastructure and processes in HMP 
Pentonville; existing, extensive NHS 
expertise ignored 
 No evidence of organisational learning. 
Reports saying largely the same things 
repeatedly produced and their contents 
forgotten. 
 
Fragmentation across system, arising from 
quasi-markets, combined with lack of leadership, 
makes it difficult to facilitate cross-system 
communication and learning. 
 
Diversity Amongst System Components (Absent) 
 System inputs from outside healthcare 
sector are virtually absent, unlike in 
New York City where social care 
elements such as housing and refugee 
services are incorporated. 
NPM efficiency drives reduced system slack and 
redundancy, with no space to add diverse inputs 
(as would have occurred if Control Board had 
been implemented), thereby reducing diversity 
and its potential creation of more viable options 
for responding to environmental change. Further 
supported by NPM-driven need to control. 




So it is argued here that NPM’s extensive influence prevents potentially beneficial 
complexity theory precepts from being expressed within London’s TB control system, 
thereby impeding the organisational response to the disease (Trenholm & Ferlie 2012). 
The remainder of this chapter will theorise this claim, with a view to identifying 
relevant mechanisms. 
Understanding NPM Embeddedness in London’s TB Control 
System 
Applying Instituitionalist Theory to the Analysis 
Having established the presence and importance of NPM embeddedness in the 
observed organisational response to TB control in London, this section now further 
theorises this phenomenon, searching for potential explanatory causes, or the 
mechanisms underlying this embeddedness. The instituitionalist perspective, or 
archetype theory, is introduced to support this analysis.  
A useful definition of institutions is found in Dacin et al (2002:52), quoting Bellah et al 
(1991): 
Institutions are patterns of social activity that give shape to collective and 
individual experience...Institutions form individuals by making possible or 
impossible certain ways of behaving and relating to others. 
Following on from this, the authors suggest (p.52) that institutionalism is “a process 
within organizations (which) establishes a kind of character defined by the 
organization’s commitments to values and principles”. These commitments are key to 
understanding organisational behaviours, and form “the basis for a kind of normative 
rationality that legitimates organizational choices...(and)...may constrain organizational 
adaptation” (Dacin et al 2002:52-53, quoting Oliver 1997,emphasis added). 
Institutionalism has developed as a major theoretical perspective within the broad 
discipline of organisational studies over the last twenty or so years. Institutionalism 
has a distinctive perspective on patterns of organisational stability and of 
organisational change, with a keen interest in field level dynamics as well as the 
behaviour of particular organisations. The literature is vast, but for the purposes of this 
discussion Hinings & Greenwood’s (1988) and Greenwood & Hinings’ (1993, 1996) 
versions of the framework will be used as they develop an interesting theory of 
organisational stability/change and have also worked empirically within UK public 
service settings (local government). 
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Institutionalism is often associated with explaining similarity and stability within 
populations of organisations, and not with studying organisational change. But 
intuitionalism also explains why organisations become static and perhaps non-
adaptive, as well as why some organisations undergo radical change, or not, as the case 
may be (Greenwood & Hinings 1996).  
Organisational archetypes, defined as “compositions of structures and systems given 
coherence or orientation by an underlying set of ideas, values and beliefs” have the 
potential to explain organizational change (Hinings & Greenwood 1988:4). Structures 
are seen as “the patterning of relationships, differentiation of tasks and positions, 
formulation of rules and procedures and prescriptions of authority” (p.8). Systems 
connect an organisation’s structures and include processes for resource allocation, 
various human resources functions (appraisal, compensation) and “information and 
control processes” (p.10). But it is the combination of “ideas, values and beliefs”, or 
norms, which underlies Hinings & Greenwood’s version of institutionalism. Once these 
organisational norms become embedded, organisations often become resistant to 
change (Greenwood & Hinings 1996), a claim with significant relevance for this 
research. Applying this approach to the study of organisational changes in UK public 
services, Ferlie & FitzGerald (2002) note that of the three components – structures, 
systems and “ideas, values and beliefs”, it this third which is most difficult to change 
within an organisation, and perhaps of most importance when initiating change.  
Archetypal Change in Organisations  
Since organisations tend toward inertia, archetype switches are not frequent, and 
attempts at inducing them are not always successful (Greenwood & Hinings 1996). The 
authors refer to unsuccessful attempts at switching to a new archetype as 
“discontinued excursions” and successful switches as “reorientations” (Hinings & 
Greenwood 1988:159,138). A third alternative is that organisations remain in an 
inertial state (p.119). The implication is that organisational fields may display long 
periods of stability, punctuated by the occasional radical archetype shift.32 
Interestingly, as with complexity theory, “organizational starting point and history are 
important in understanding the subsequent organizational processes”, and in 
understanding why shifts between organisational archetypes succeed or fail (Hinings & 
Greenwood 1988:159).  
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“Discontinued excursions” can arise from a number of organisational features (Hinings 
& Greenwood 1988:160-161): 
o weak commitment to organisational change; 
o limited organisational capability or capacity to change, perhaps including high 
workforce turnover; and, 
o an absence of “transformational leadership”. 
If excursions into archetype change are not to become discontinued, there must be 
“some kind of articulated alternative organizational form” to the status quo, and the 
above-cited transformational leadership must not use its power and influence to 
confirm the validity of the existing (status quo) archetype (Hinings & Greenwood 
1988:177). This point is notable with regard to the ability of London’s TB control 
system to undergo archetype change. 
Organisations in which “reorientations” or organisational archetype change is 
precipitated and enabled also feature some commonalities (Hinings and Greenwood 
1988:139-143). These include a “strong value commitment to change” (p.141), the 
presence of transformational, as opposed to transactional, leadership (pp.59-60) and 
“transformational organisational capacity”, such as a well developed corporate 
planning function (p.141) which are essential if organisational structures and systems 
are to be changed (p.156). Perhaps surprisingly, there may or may not be institutional 
pressure for change arising from an organisation’s “task situation” (p.140), i.e., the 
work which must be done. Of these factors, the authors stress that “strategic 
commitment to particular interpretive schemes” (p.156), or the organisational “values, 
commitments and beliefs”, are paramount. 
Inertial organisations are described by Hinings & Greenwood (1988:119-121) with 
some caution, as their research revealed that even those organisations appearing to be 
in equilibrium often spent “considerable periods of time” in states of relative instability, 
or incompatibility between internal organisational characteristics and external 
pressures. Generally, however, organisations characterised by a state of inertia have 
“congruence” between their structure, systems and values. However, once 
“incompatibilities” between any of these three components arise, “tensions and 




The NPM Archetype in the UK Healthcare Sector 
NPM has been theorised as an organisational archetype within the UK healthcare 
sector, and its displacement of the long-standing public administration model in the 
1980s is seen as epitomising a (rare) archetype change (Ferlie & FitzGerald 2002), 
underpinned by a coherent ideological challenge. In the language of Hinings and 
Greenwood (1988), an archetype “reorientation” occurred. Ferlie & FitzGerald (2002) 
further contend that NPM principles continue to define the sector’s structure, systems 
and norms, speculating, correctly, that New Labour’s attempts to move to a network 
governance reform narrative would be too partial and non-ideological to shift away 
from the embedded NPM archetype. 
This research supports Ferlie & FitzGerald’s(2002) contention, observing that this 
embedded NPM archetype continues in the NHS extending to the particular case of 
London’s TB control system, albeit in a modified form. This observed variation between 
the broader NHS and the more micro level TB control system will now be analysed 
using Hinings & Greenwood’s (1988) structures, systems and values/norms typology.  
Structures 
In institutional theory terms, “structures” determine the nature of relationships, tasks, 
rules and procedures, and establish authority (Hinings & Greenwood 1988:8). As 
discussed in Chapter Four, quasi-markets are arguably the defining feature of NPM and 
its major “structure” in archetype theory terms. Despite the introduction to the system 
of some minor relational elements in the late 1990s by the Blair government (Allen 
2009), the internal market persists within the NHS. This was observed less consistently 
within London’s TB control system; although the single most important group within 
the London TB control system - the TB Commissioning Board - would not have been 
created in the absence of a strong quasi-market culture. Managerialism is another 
important NPM “structure” within the NHS and more consistently noted in both the 
broader NHS and the TB control sub-system. But as with the quasi-market, there were 
differences in the “systems” which accompany managerialism within the TB control 
subsystem and the broader NHS. Another important NPM structure - the creation of 
stand-alone, arms-length agencies, a.k.a. agencification - was strongly evident within 
London’s TB control system in the form of the HPA, a key organisation in TB control.  
However, its power was stilted by its independent advisory role and lack of authority, 




Systems are the processes which make structures work, and include such things as 
procedures for resource allocation and human resource management, along with 
“information and control processes” (Hinings & Greenwood 1988:10). At this level the 
variation between the more macro-level healthcare system and the micro-level TB 
control system can be seen most clearly. 
Commissioning and Contracting 
As noted, the contracting function between purchasers and providers is weak within 
the TB control system (aside from the contractual arrangements with F&T); but not at a 
macro-NHS level. Nonetheless, this research observed a great deal of time at TB 
Commissioning Board and Clinical Working Group meetings given over to discussing 
TB “Commissioning Intentions”, suggested features for PCTs to include when 
negotiating with acute trusts. It is unclear whether the resulting “Commissioning 
Intentions” document was used outside of the North Central London sector, which 
commissions TB services jointly for five boroughs, as discussed in Case Study Four. As 
previously noted (Laycock et al 2009:38), only 29% of PCTs reported having Service 
Level Agreements in place for TB services, so the application of the Commissioning 
Intentions is likely to be limited. Nonetheless, members of these two groups, both 
managers and healthcare professionals, were engaged with the process of developing 
the “intentions document”, even though many of them clearly knew it would find 
limited use by commissioners in their geographic sector.   
Target Setting, Performance Measurement and other Modes of Control 
Similarly, there are no performance management or officially sanctioned NHS targets 
within London’s TB control system (just a collection of looser “metrics”)33, although 
measurement and control systems are widely used within the broader NHS.  
Nonetheless, this research observed significant time spent discussing the specifics of 
these “metrics”, with attempts at revising and updating them, and the Model of Care 
document does call for enhanced performance measurement, as mentioned. This was 
partly in response to noted significant limitations in their effectiveness and adoption 
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 For a short period, circa 2000-2002, the London Regional Office (LRO) of Public Health did set five 
fairly “soft” targets for TB control: (1)100% monitoring of TB treatment outcomes and treatment 
completion rates of at least 90%; (2)One TB nurse per 40 TB notifications in each sector; (3)Each 
sector to have a TB network; (4)All TB patients to be offered an HIV test; and (5)All clinics to link to 
London TB Register (Ohkado et al 2005). Respondents reported that these targets were abandoned 
with the departure from the LRO of a senior manager who held a particular interest in TB. 
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(London TB Service Review and Health Needs Assessment 2010, Health Protection 
Agency 2011a).  
The London TB Service Review and Health Needs Assessment (2010) (the “PHAST 
report”) noted:  
There is no systematic reporting of metrics performance across the whole of 
London” (p.141)...“(c)urrent arrangements for the nine London TB metrics are 
ad hoc. Some of the metrics have no utility; others have not been systematically 
monitored. Two of them cannot currently be measured.” (p.160)  
This latter point echoes that made by the HPA (Health Protection Agency 2011a).The 
PHAST report (2010:138) also observed, “(a)ll PCTs in London are now required to 
report to NHS London on just one of these metrics: their local rate of TB Treatment 
Completion.” However, the NHS does not seem to do anything with the data, and TB 
treatment completion rates likely remain below the 85% target suggested in 2004 by 
England’s Chief Medical Officer. This is consistent with the informal status of the 
metrics which do not form part of the “official” London targets. As with the discussions 
surrounding the “commissioning intentions”, healthcare professionals and managers 
appeared so inured to the importance of goals and performance measures that they 
were willing to give up their very scarce time to facilitate the use of such goals, even 
when they knew the “targets” were neither well-designed nor centrally monitored. 
Norms, “Interpretive Schemes”, or, “Values, Ideas, and Beliefs” (Hinings & 
Greenwood 1988:4,12-19) 
Hinings and Greenwood (1988:19) note that interpretive schemes inform actors’ views 
in three areas: “the appropriate domain of operations” (purpose, mission); “the 
appropriate principles of organizing”; and, “the criteria of evaluation to be used within 
the organization for assessment of organizational performance”. In other words, almost 
all aspects of organisational life are impacted by the values, ideas and beliefs of the 
members of the organisational system. Dacin et al (2002:52-53) remark that values  
become the basis for a kind of normative rationality...that legitimates 
organizational choices in reference to an organization’s mission and values and 
sustains organizational integrity, defined as fidelity to self-defined values and 
principles.  
Crucially to this discussion, the authors further note that these norms “may constrain 
organizational adaption” (p.53). These norms are “the crucial ingredient” which allow 
“systems and structures to ‘hang together’ to form a coherent design” (Hinings and 
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Greenwood 1988:13). Further, “(o)ne of the crucial attributes of values is that they 
become taken for granted and can serve to mute or temper expressions of 
dissatisfaction”, a key point to this discussion (Greenwood & Hinings 1996:1036).   
During a number of informal discussions and during some interviews managers 
working within London’s TB control system could not conceive of a system without an 
internal market, contracts and targets. When prompted, they were consistently unable 
to imagine another mode of TB service delivery. The following exchange with a veteran 
commissioning expert (no longer working in TB) illustrates: 
Respondent(R): I'll be honest, I'm so used to it. It's sort of the way I've come up 
through the NHS – “them and us” - whichever side of the coin you're on - that 
you get used to it. And I quite like accountability. When I started, I started doing 
some work on research funding. And no one had any records of where the 
research funding was coming and going and I remember walking around 
hospitals taking files out of people's offices. "You can't have it." "Oh yes I can." 
And that lack of discipline is quite scary in the public sector. So I quite welcome 
that, but I suppose that...every service? You are probably right it doesn't. But I 
can't think of a service that doesn't fit? Can you? 
 
ST: well, I mean TB is obviously the one that is coming to mind. For me, for 
something like a hernia operation, cataracts, something like that that are quite 
clean cut, you're in, you're out...The patient - you're not quite so concerned 
about all these psycho-socio factors that go along with TB patients. 
 




R: "How would you commission it?", is the counter question and I'm not sure 
what system would work...It's the only way we've got. 
 
Another example of the extent to which NPM-inspired systems have become the taken-
for-granted norm was found in the almost unchallenged move by NHS management to 
set aside the Control Board concept. Despite TB Commissioning Board and Clinical 
Working Group members being briefly exposed to and excited by an alternative, more 
holist, approach to organising TB services, in the end they quickly and easily reverted 
to what they knew and were most comfortable with.  Further evidence of the extent to 
which an NPM-mindset exists, and continues to be influential, is reflected in the recent 
Model of Care. As discussed in Appendix G, this document features, distinctively 
amongst the 14 reports/documents which have been prepared on TB in London, 
246 
 
explicit and “positive” use of “NPM language”, including the following stated objectives 
for improving TB control in London:  
o To ensure robust commissioning of TB services, including sound planning and 
strong performance management. 
o To improve the quality and productivity of services. 
o To ensure capacity of services is related to need. 
o To exploit opportunities for cost reduction. (NHS London 2011 b: 22) 
 
During observed meetings, healthcare professionals, including consultants, rarely, if 
ever, challenged NHS management when they would say a particular option could not 
be pursued because it would require extra funding. This was particularly evident 
during the development of the Model of Care and Case for Change policy documents 
(although in the end, the agreed policy did require an additional investment of £2 
million to be shared across the 31 PCTs, an amount described by an NHS manager as 
equivalent to “a rounding error” for a PCT). It is widely agreed that TB control in 
London has been, and continues to be, chronically underfunded despite increasing 
demands on services. Yet the NPM commitment to driving efficiency appears to be 
deeply ingrained, even amongst staunch public health advocates, and NHS managers 
face little challenge in their ongoing focus on cost containment in the face of rising TB 
rates. The New York City approach, in which a significant financial investment was 
made in the early days of the epidemic and is seen as pivotal in stemming the spread of 
the disease, is dismissed in London as simply impossible. 
These examples speak to the extent to which the norms, or values, of members of 
London’s TB community would have to be changed if NPM is to be usurped by another 
archetype. Those working within London’s TB control system clearly, and 
understandably, feel obligated (knowingly or not) to uphold NPM’s underlying 
principles and play by its rules. The organisational archetype of the broader system 
within which most system actors work (the NHS) is New Public Management and there 
is little reason to expect a small subsystem like London’s TB control system to operate 
with a different archetype. For the vast majority, it is the only system they have ever 
known; or, in the words of the respondent quoted above, “It's the only way we've got.”  
Nonetheless, it could be argued that there is a “disconnect” between the TB control 
system’s NPM archetype and some elements of its structures, systems and 
values/interpretive scheme. For instance, contrary to what would be expected from 
NPM, London’s TB control system is not subject to any top-down pressure for reform, 
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although this is sorely needed. Neither is it subject to centrally mandated targets or 
performance measures. And further, most research respondents clearly espoused 
public health values, which are contrary to much of what NPM represents. According to 
Hinings & Greenwood (1988:34), this sort of misalignment should indicate 
vulnerability to archetype change. Further, Greenwood & Hinings (1993, 1996) note 
that competing commitments to archetypes, i.e., the observed commitment to both the 
NPM and public health archetypes, means further potential to “destabilize 
organizational arrangements” (1993:1075). 
So is there any evidence of a shift away from embedded NPM values in this study? 
There are two ways of assessing this question. In an active sense, it could imply the 
articulation of a post-NPM ideology: there was little evidence of this. In a passive sense, 
it could be the case that respondents had come to perceive of NPM as impossible to 
dislodge and that any other alternative was literally unthinkable. It was for this latter 
option, the passive embedding of the NPM archetype, for which evidence was found, as 
cited above.   
Further, and as discussed above, archetype change, or “reorientation” requires 
transformational leadership (Hinings and Greenwood 1988:59-60) and/or 
ideologically motivated change agents (Ferlie & FitzGerald 2002).  There was no 
evidence of the presence of such change agents or leadership within the TB control 
system. Indeed, as discussed earlier there is little evidence of leadership at all within 
the system. Consequently, it is highly unlikely that NPM will be replaced as the 
dominant organisational archetype, leaving the system struggling with the previously 
noted challenges this brings. 
The purpose of the foregoing discussion was to use archetype theory/institutionalism 
to theorise NPM embeddedness within London’s TB control system. As noted at the 
start of this chapter, and earlier on in the thesis, this embeddedness exacts a significant 
cost in terms of the organisational response to TB control. Specifically, NPM impedes or 
negatively impacts the expression of some of the potentially useful aspects of 
complexity theory observed within the system (especially self-organisation, co-
adaptation and the presence of diversity), and is generally unhelpful to a public health 
approach. Archetype theory, as applied above, has allowed for a deeper understanding 
and explanation for the reasons of this embeddedness. 
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The remainder of the chapter provides an explanation, using a theoretical elaboration 
based on Kingdon’s public policy agenda setting theory, for the lack of public policy 
attention given to TB control in London. 
Theorising TB’s Low Public Policy Ranking Using Kingdon’s 
(1995) Theory of Agenda Setting 
This section theorises the key inductive finding of the research (the low policy priority 
accorded to TB control in London) by drawing on the literature reviewed in Chapters 
Three and Four, as well as on the empirical data presented in Chapters Six and Seven. 
As the issue emerged inductively, a full theoretical examination requires the use of an 
additional conceptual framework; namely, Kingdon’s (1995) theory on public policy 
agenda setting. The theoretical analysis of this existing model will be supplemented by 
(re)introducing elements of complexity theory into the discussion. 
A Brief Review of Kingdon’s (1995) Theory of Public Policy Development 
As discussed in Chapter Four, this theory argues that three separate streams – 
problems, policies and politics – must develop independently of each other and then 
join together if public policy is to be changed. Problems are conceptualised as 
conditions which are in need of addressing. “Conditions” may become “problems” when 
routine monitoring detects a change. Policies, according to Kingdon, are formulated in a 
Darwinian-like process in which numerous ideas and alternatives are developed and 
discussed by a policy community, with only the strongest and most viable surviving. 
The policy alternative which ultimately emerges from this process is usually technical 
feasible, provides decent value and is acceptable to both politicians and the public. 
Kingdon’s politics stream is comprised of politicians and their staffs who, in turn, set 
the general political climate of the day. These prevailing political winds largely  
determine whether the time is right for a particular policy idea to be pursued. However, 
since change is a constant feature of the political landscape, Kingdon observes that for 
most ideas, their time will eventually come. 
Theorising the Situation via Kingdon’s Three Streams 
With respect to TB control in London, only one of the three streams has been 
successfully developed – the formation of an agreed policy alternative - and that has 
occurred only within the past year.34 The London TB community was acutely aware of 
the need for such a policy. Numerous respondents recounted an anecdote about a very 
                                           
34
 “The Case for Change” and “Model of Care” documents, cited earlier, comprise this plan.  
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senior NHS leader in London declaring that until there was a solid, widely agreed plan 
of action for TB, it would be difficult to secure support and resources for TB control. 
The response by the TB community was slow in coming (it took at least 4 years from 
the call for such a plan until it was produced), but the advice was taken and acted upon. 
Producing the policy plan was not a seamless exercise, and the end product reflects 
various compromises largely arising from cost containment pressures within the NHS 
and related, ongoing restructuring initiatives. (The major concession by most members 
of the TB Commissioning Board and the TB Clinical Working Group was accepting the 
demise of the TB Control Board concept in favour of an enhanced Commissioning 
Board, as discussed in Case Study One.)   
TB in London is not a Problem? 
 However, Kingdon’s other two streams – problem recognition and political will to 
affect change – are absent in London’s TB control system. Although Kingdon contends 
that the three streams develop independently of each other, “problem recognition” and 
“political will” appear more closely related to each other in this study than either is to 
the policy formation stream. The successful development of the policy document, in the 
absence of problem recognition and political will, reflects this observation. However, 
Kingdon’s model would predict that until the need for improved TB control in London 
is recognised as a problem by the appropriate senior-level NHS and DH officials, and 
political support to tackle the issue is forthcoming, the policy plan will languish.  
Empirically, Kingdon’s argument is fully supported by this research. Readers may recall 
the situation discussed in  Case Study One, whereby the policy plan, once written, 
repeatedly encountered dead ends and brick walls when TB Commissioning Board 
representatives tried to move it through the byzantine NHS approvals process.  At the 
time of writing, the completed plan was largely in disuse. Ongoing NHS restructuring 
and cost cutting make its eventual implementation even less likely, at least in the short 
to medium term, while providing “cover” to senior levels of the healthcare system  
which continue to de-prioritise the issue35.  
Kingdon argues that conditions become problems when key indicators reveal a change 
in a situation, or in a crisis. By the first measure, TB in London should now qualify as a 
problem. Crucially, however, the category into which a condition has been placed is also 
important, since category placement “structures people’s perceptions of the problem” 
                                           
35
 Of course, this could all change quickly in the event of a significant TB outbreak or drug-resistant 
TB infecting someone in “mainstream” London society, as happened in New York City  
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(Kingdon 1995:111). This perhaps unlocks a key reason why, rather wondrously, 
resurgent TB in a densely populated metropolis is not recognised as “a problem”. 
The preceding analysis describes TB as having fallen victim to a problematic 
categorisation, consistent with Kingdon’s argument that “conditions” need to be 
properly categorised to become recognised as “problems”. Within the NHS, including 
within its public health function, TB control is categorised as a relatively minor 
problem and lack of organisational support is justified on this basis. The issue of 
communicability and the danger of drug resistant disease “jumping the fence” into 
mainstream society is largely ignored, owing in part to concern about causing undue, 
potentially xenophobic, alarm amongst the general public. The result is that TB in 
London remains, in Kingdon’s terms, a “condition” and not a “problem”. 
Further, there is little political mileage for elected officials in supporting TB control in 
London. From an organisational politics perspective, senior NHS management receives 
this signal and reacts as expected, concluding there is no professional benefit in 
pushing for improved TB control. The unwritten, yet clearly communicated, steer from 
NHS London to keep the TB issue “off the radar” has a powerful, silencing effect. 
Speculatively, it reflects senior NHS management’s interpretation that their elected 
political masters, and hence their own careers, would be best served, if the resurgence 
of TB in London were to remain invisible (even if the price is a continuing high TB 
infection rate). It is proposed here that the Department of Health shares a similar 
perspective, given the continued downgrading of its operational and policy capacity 
with respect to TB control and its refusal to set TB targets on the grounds that the 
disease is not significantly widespread (information relayed by a key respondent).  
Organisational Level Considerations 
Whilst it is important to acknowledge the role played by race and class in TB control in 
London (here confirming Dievler and Pappas (1999)), this current research has been 
undertaken at the system and organisational levels, analysing the relationships 
between different components of the TB control system. Consequently, the remainder 
of this discussion will focus on that level.  
The first section of this chapter discussed the impact on TB control of NPM 
embeddedness within the healthcare system, highlighting the surprising lack of targets 
and organisational performance measurement tools within London’s TB control 
system. A leading public health consultant observed that “none of the Chief Executives 
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will be being managed on their ability to control TB”. Similarly, a long-serving public 
health consultant commented, “I used to do quarterly reports on TB and I haven’t done 
one in a year and nobody has rung me up and said ‘where is my report on TB metrics?’. 
They are not bothered because they’re not doing anything with that information.” 
These comments not only reflect NPM embeddedness at a macro-level, but also the low 
organisational priority given to the TB issue and associated metrics.  
The extensive NPM-inspired fragmentation within London’s TB control system is made 
more problematic by weak leadership and accountability at the organisational level. 
This is also symptomatic of the low priority given TB on the healthcare policy agenda. 
In the presence of strong leadership and an ensuing chain of accountability, some 
respondents felt it more likely that London’s need for improved TB control would be 
acknowledged and addressed. For example, a well-placed respondent noted the need 
for someone courageous within the healthcare bureaucracy to champion better TB 
control. If this occurred, the issue might well move up the healthcare priority list. “If we 
could have found a couple of people somewhere in the hierarchy bold enough to work 
with us on it, it would have made a difference”, said the source. 
There appear to be two main reasons why this has not happened. First, TB control’s low 
status as a healthcare need in London can be conceptualised as arising from a “perfect 
storm” of factors which collude to keep it off the agenda: public health is seen as a 
lower status specialty within medicine (Abbott 1981) and TB is  “a poor relation in the 
family of public health” (Department of Health 2004:9); within the respiratory 
medicine speciality TB has a lower status than other diseases such as COPD; and finally, 
within broad society, TB patients themselves generally occupy the lowest social strata. 
With this confluence of phenomena, all occurring within a fragmented and leaderless 
system, TB control struggles to find a place on the healthcare agenda. 
Secondly, TB carries with it complex political considerations. Those working within the 
system are cautious about arousing the “wrong kind” of interest, leading to uninformed 
public hysteria. Various respondents raised concerns about igniting the tinderbox of 
what was sometimes termed “the Daily Mail effect”. They had concerns that London’s 
TB epidemic would be portrayed simplistically by the tabloid and right-wing media as 
resulting from immigration, acquiring xenophobic and racist overtones. This 
apprehension resulted in significant self-censorship by many working within the 
system; the fear expressed by respondents was sincere and undoubtedly impacted the 
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manner in which they believed the TB “issue” should be approached externally. One 
public health director observed:  
in a way the people involved have always been quite cautious about how we 
present it politically because it also had the risk of feeding into a particular 
reactionary side of, “it's all these immigrants or asylum seekers or whichever 
bad group”, you know?... that's been part of the balance...about not advocating 
too loudly because otherwise you end up stigmatising further people who are 
probably struggling with lots of complex conditions... 
On the other hand, these respondents, along with most others in the system, also 
expressed profound frustration at their inability to have TB taken seriously as an issue. 
This research found profound frustration amongst respondents that TB control in 
London is not prioritised, suffering from a lack of internal (NHS-Department of Health), 
“small p” political commitment.  
NHS London was the most frequent target for criticism from a group of well informed, 
including senior-level, respondents. A former director of public health observed, “that's 
where I would put my finger of blame, actually, because they were probably the only 
single organization that could have gotten this taken seriously across London, because 
they do hold all the Chief Execs to account...”. Another former director of public health 
shared a similar sentiment, observing “within NHS London, in recent years, nothing has 
happened. And that's a leadership failure...”. Parallel observations came from a former 
senior PCT manager who commented, “I suppose NHS London could have filled the 
policy vacuum in London, but there wasn’t anybody who perhaps could be bothered to 
take the risk”. A TB consultant similarly remarked, “NHS London has been pretty 
supine actually, in terms of getting tuberculosis care sorted out”. 
 
Complexity Theory: Self-Organisation and the Importance of Initial Conditions and 
System Historicity 
TB’s low-priority status as a health policy issue is theorised in this chapter by 
combining Kingdon’s framework with elements of complexity theory, as he himself 
suggests; specifically, concepts of self-organisation and initial conditions and 
historicity. This section recaps relevant aspects of these complexity theory concepts. 
 Self-organisation forms the backbone of complexity theory. Many authors, particularly 
those writing for general management and lay audiences, portray self-organisation as a 
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generally positive phenomenon and something which organisations should foster 
(Axelrod & Cohen 2000, Pascale et al 2000). Whilst this is often the case – self-
organisation is the source, after all, for novelty and innovation – not all self-organising 
behaviours are beneficial. It is useful to recall the definition offered by Boons et al 
(2009:234-235): “self-organisation is the ability of actors and organizations as well as 
larger systems to maintain or change their structure and strategy by themselves, 
without external control, and to resist externally induced change”. Some self-organising 
behaviours can be maladaptive (McKelvey 2003), perpetuating the status quo when 
change is needed and promoting self-interest above organisational effectiveness 
(Boons et al 2009). So self-organisation can be a source of stability – or inertia – in 
organisations (Stacey 1996:204). According to the most conservative conception of 
self-organisation, an absence of any intent by actors (i.e., to achieve a particular 
objective) is a key feature of self-organising systems (Paley 2011). 
 History informs the initial conditions found within a system which, in turn, affect that 
system’s current and future behaviours and outputs. Of particular importance here is a 
point noted in Chapter Three: a system’s history “shapes individual and organizational 
schema (mental models, or ‘worldview’) and schema in turn constrain what is seen and 
not seen, what is important and what is not” (Zimmerman & Dooley 2002:70). In other 
words, actors within a system partly determine the system’s future based on how they 
see its past. 
Having reviewed the main tenets of Kingdon’s theory earlier in this section and re-
capped pertinent elements of complexity theory here, the chapter now applies the two 
theories to examine why TB control in London occupies such a lowly place on the 
health policy agenda. As discussed earlier, this present research now builds on 
Kingdon’s own observations regarding the congruence between his theory and 
complexity theory, leading to a theoretical contribution to the political science 
literature on policy making.  It is proposed here that the two theories are more than 
analogues; in fact, complexity theory can enhance the explanatory power of Kingdon’s 
model as he himself hinted. Two illustrations follow.  
The Role of Self-Organisation in Developing Kingdon’s Problem Recognition and Political 
Response Streams 
The inability of the London TB community to have TB recognised as a “problem” and to 
gain political commitment for change - two of the three necessary streams identified by 
Kingdon - can be usefully understood as arising from maladaptive self-organising 
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behaviours. This additive theoretical analysis helps explain the seemingly illogical 
situation in London today whereby political support for combating surging levels of a 
serious, airborne, communicable disease is lacking.  
As discussed earlier, the most conservative definitions of self-organisation stress the 
lack of intention amongst actors in self-organising systems in working toward a specific 
outcome (Paley 2011). As in all self-organising systems, participants act according to 
local knowledge, have no identified leader and are unaware of how their actions 
contribute to a particular outcome. It is argued here that this conservative type of self-
organisation explains how two of Kingdon’s three streams (problem recognition and 
political commitment) have not been developed with regard to TB control in London.  
Members of the TB Commissioning Board have each decided, for individual reasons, to 
comply with NHS London’s wish that TB be kept “off the radar”, and have kept quiet 
about the issue. It is not suggested here that this represents in any way a deliberate or 
organised conspiracy of silence. Rather, it appears that members individually surveyed 
the professional and organisational landscape in which they work (i.e. attained local 
knowledge, in the language of self-organisation), and have concluded that acquiescence 
and quiet are the best approaches (e.g., above quotation: “So in a way, there was no 
point in trying to push it”, and the previously cited behind-closed-doors musings from a 
nurse regarding what would happen if someone in mainstream society contracted 
MDRTB, whilst everyone in the meeting room had been aware, for years, of this risk 
without doing enough to prevent it happening.). For some Commissioning Board 
members, particularly consultants (professionally powerful and independent), or those 
not employed by the NHS, the motivation may stem largely from concern about igniting 
a racism-fuelled public backlash regarding immigration, or a genuine belief that no one 
“out there” cares enough about TB to listen to their concerns. The sole TB advocate 
organisation with a primary domestic focus, TB Alert, is also concerned about creating 
a public backlash. Also, they work with significant resource constraints and focus their 
efforts on TB-affected communities and on awareness-raising amongst health and 
social care professionals. For others, particularly senior NHS managers, there are 
significant professional considerations associated with drawing attention to TB control. 
Self-organisation as described by Boons et al (2009:235) “stems from the free choices 
of people in charge often oriented at maintaining their position and 
stability…and…often will be driven by the ambition or need to survive (often this is 
called self-interest)”.  
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It is posited here that these negative, or maladaptive forms of self-organisation 
(McKelvey 2003), are behind both TB’s low priority standing as a public health issue, 
and its inability to be recognised as a problem and to gain political commitment. These 
self-organising behaviours fuel the creation, and maintenance, of a TB policy vacuum in 
which policy champions, whistle blowers and activist groups are notably absent. Just as 
Stacey (2003b:,333) observes, “(o)utcomes are co-created by all agents within a system. 
Everything everyone does, including doing nothing, might have an impact.”  
The Importance of Initial Conditions and Historicity in Developing Kingdon’s Problem 
Recognition and Political Response Streams 
This section examines Kingdon’s observation that initial conditions and historicity are 
important to both his own theory and complexity theory.  It reinforces and develops 
the observation by briefly contrasting system history and initial conditions impacting 
the public policy response to TB control in London with the response to HIV/AIDS. As 
external context is important when discussing history and initial conditions (Rhodes et 
al 2011), the changing nature of the macro environment (the NHS system as a whole) is 
also analysed. 
As noted in Chapter Three, a system’s history determines its initial conditions, although 
Rhodes and McKechnie (2003) contend that it is difficult in a public management 
context to identify clearly a system’s initial conditions. However, for the purposes of 
this discussion, the initial conditions in London’s TB control system will be taken as 
those occurring during the earliest years of the return to rising TB rates, 1988 to 
1992.36 For the HIV/AIDS discussion, the years 1981-1986 will be used (the first HIV 
case in the UK was formally diagnosed in 1981) (Health Protection Agency 2011e:4). 
These periods represent founding conditions for the two epidemics as health policy 
issues.  
Just as maladaptive self-organising behaviours prevent TB becoming recognised as a 
problem meriting a political response, so the history and initial conditions present 
within the system when rates started to increase also have an impact. For instance, TB 
physicians (many trained as chest physicians) were, and are, a lower status, lower 
power, speciality: 
…the status of people in tuberculosis, and in respiratory medicine, tended to be 
lower than in some specialities. Most of the people running the chest clinics 
                                           
36
 The rise in TB rates started in 1988. 1992 was the year the first “working group” of experts came 
together to examine this phenomenon. 
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were...doctors who had themselves had tuberculosis. So most old-style chest 
doctors had had TB and they had then not been able to pursue "a proper" 
career, and were running the chest clinics. (Senior TB physician) 
This history has been internalised and passed down within the TB community over the 
decades, leading to self-identification among those working in London’s TB services as 
working in a “Cinderella” or low-power speciality. This makes it easier for the NHS to 
ignore the disease, leaving it as a “condition” and not as a “problem”, in Kingdon’s 
terms. The lack of patient activism and voluntary groups promoting TB patients’ 
interests (unlike the HIV/AIDS policy arena) were further contributors. 
Further, the epidemiology of TB’s return to London meant the disease’s rate of growth 
was slow (but relentless, as it turns out), with several implications. As discussed, it took 
years before the medical community in London reacted to the rise in TB rates, and then 
the response was tentative and focused on improving surveillance (McEvoy & Maguire 
1995, Pearson 1996, Department of Health 1996). Presumably this would have been 
different if the (eventual) resurgence had signs of rapid spread (as with HIV/AIDS and 
SARS). Similarly, the perceived risk to mainstream society was (and still is) low. 
Consequently, TB’s epidemiological nature stymied its early recognition as a “problem”, 
impeded the development of an agreed “policy” alternative for tackling the disease, and 
dampened “political” inclination to respond. These founding conditions would prove 
fateful in determining the manner in which the epidemic was addressed, both 
organisationally and politically.  
From the situation described above a useful contrast can be found in the organisational 
response to the arrival in London of HIV/AIDS. During the early years of TB’s return to 
London (1987-1993), the number of TB cases rose by 34%, from 1445 to 1941 
(McEvoy & Maguire 1995). During 1981-1985 (inclusive), the analogous period 
defining “initial conditions” for HIV, the number of cases in London increased from 0-
1468 (Health Protection Agency 2012 g). So the rate of HIV infections grew at a more 
alarming pace than with TB. (However, only in 2003 and 2004 were there more new 
HIV cases in London than new TB cases, and then, just barely37.) The physicians 
treating both diseases work within lower status specialties: genitourinary medicine 
(GUM) and infectious diseases for HIV (Bennett & Ferlie 1994:37-39), and respiratory 
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 Number of new HIV cases in 2003 and 2004, respectively: 3259, 3270 (Health Protection Agency 
2012
e
). Number of new TB cases during these same years: 3075, 3127 respectively. From 2005 
onward the annual number of new HIV cases started to decline (to 2,673 in 2011) whilst the number 








medicine, infectious diseases or public health for TB. However, this obstacle was 
overcome by HIV/AIDS physicians by leveraging their positions at key, influential 
teaching hospitals combined with effective “boundary spanning” activities into local 
health authorities and the voluntary sector (Bennett & Ferlie 1994:81-83,127). Further, 
HIV/AIDS quickly established a formidable and effective presence in the voluntary 
sector, and patients were able to shed the stigma associated with the disease and 
become powerful advocates in their own right. (Bennett & Ferlie 1994:22,48-50). 
Meanwhile, the issue of stigmatisation remains for TB patients. Healthcare 
professionals widely regard this as a hindrance to both patient activism, of the type 
associated with HIV, and with actually diagnosing and treating the disease. Figure 33 
below summarises these relevant organisational and environmental factors. 
 TB (1988-1992) HIV/AIDS (1981-1986) 
Status of Medical 
Professionals 
Low Low 
Role of Voluntary 
Organisations 
Absent Active 
Patient Voice / Activism None Significant 
Nature of Epidemic Slow growing Rapidly growing 




FIGURE 33: SUMMARY OF “INITIAL CONDITIONS” CHARACTERISING LONDON’S TB AND HIV/AIDS 
EPIDEMICS (BENNETT & FERLIE 1994, FOR HIV/AIDS DATA) 
 
The Changing NHS Macro System 
As the conditions within a system’s macro climate form an important consideration 
when analysing initial conditions and historicity (Marion & Bacon 1999), below is a 
short discussion regarding the differences between the NHS macro systems during the 
early days of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in London and during the return of the TB 
epidemic.  
The period between 1981-1986, when the HIV/AIDS epidemic took hold in London, 
found the NHS in the very earliest stages of NPM reforms, and most NPM features had 
not yet become embedded. The introduction of general managers following the 1983 
Griffiths Report (Griffiths 1983), seen as the first step in the NPM reform project, was 
in its very earliest stages of implementation during this time (Ham 2004:32-34). It was 
not until 1985 that these first managers were in post, reflecting Klein’s (2010:119) 
258 
 
observation that “(t)he conversion of NHS administrators...into active managers was 
slow”. And unlike the NPM reforms which were to come later, this shift to general 
management arguably helped strengthen vertical hierarchies, facilitating the rapid 
policy response to HIV/AIDS. During the early days of the epidemic in London, the NHS 
had not yet been subjected to the fragmenting internal market reforms which were 
soon to come and prove so problematic for effective TB control. 
Following the 1989 government White Paper, Working for Patients, quasi-market 
reforms were introduced to the NHS, circa 1991 (Ham 2004:37-38). Klein (2010:105) 
characterises the period between the White Paper and the Griffiths’ Report as one in 
which government focus moved from the organisational structure of the NHS to a 
preoccupation with organisational dynamics. As discussed in Chapter Four, this 
introduction of market principles into the NHS resulted in significant fragmentation 
arising from the purchaser-provider split, contracting and commissioning; outsourcing 
to non-state providers and also a shift to agencification. However, by this time, the 
aggressive policy response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic was well entrenched. But not so 
with TB, the modern-day treatment of which would be subject to the “invisible hand” of 
the new NHS internal market. Although TB rates started climbing again in 1988, by the 
time the (re)emergence of the disease was recognised in the mid to late 1990s, the 
most radical and far-reaching of the NPM reforms - the internal market - had taken 
hold, and fragmentation within the NHS was well underway. These changes were 
compounded by the introduction of the agencification program, set in motion by the 
Ibbs Report, The Next Steps Initiative (National Audit Office 1989), and enacted from 
the early 1990s onward. The stated objective of the report was to enhance public 
service efficiency and taxpayer value “by operating departmental services and 
functions as Executive Agencies established within a framework of policy and 
resources set by the responsible Minister” (p.1), e.g., the HPA. And as discussed, system 
fragmentation has become, perhaps, the most serious obstacle to establishing a 
successful TB control program in London. It was under these “initial conditions” that 
the TB community tried to gain recognition, political support and a place on the policy 
agenda. System fragmentation proved to be an instrumental condition. 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has theorised two empirical phenomena: the relationship between the 
complexity theory concepts and the NPM concepts as observed, and the surprisingly 
low policy priority accorded to TB control in London.  
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NPM has been shown to be deeply embedded within London’s TB control system, 
suppressing, or otherwise negatively impacting, potentially beneficial complexity 
theory concepts such as self-organisation, diversity and co-adaptation. This finding 
constitutes the major theoretical contribution from this chapter.  
Further theorising and developing this contribution, and returning to the research 
questions identified at the start of this chapter, the discussion then focused on 
discovering the mechanisms underlying the relationship between the observed 
complexity theory concepts and the strong presence of NPM. This task was facilitated 
by applying the instituitionalist, or organisational archetype perspective, as advocated 
by Hinings & Greenwood (1988) and Greenwood & Hinings (1993, 1996). This 
research also developed and validated Ferlie & FitzGerald’s (2002) contention that 
NPM remains an organisational archetype within the UK healthcare sector, despite 
some indications following the election of the Labour government in 1997 that it may 
be dislodged. The key mechanism identified as most probably responsible for the 
continued strong presence of NPM and the leading constraint to archetype change are 
the “ideas, values and beliefs”, or the “interpretive schemes” of those working within 
London’s TB control system. The structures and systems associated with the 
organisation of TB control in London are underpinned by a set of values which support 
and promote NPM principles, perhaps uncritically and almost certainly tacitly and not 
actively. Despite decrying the lack of a holistic, public health approach to TB control, at 
least some of which has been shown to be associated with the presence of NPM, actors 
working within the London TB control system were observed promoting and 
conforming to key NPM concepts. Of note, these behaviours occurred in the absence of 
any interest or monitoring from senior management in “the centre”. Actors in the 
system, in effect, self-regulated in an almost Foucauldian manner to support the 
embedded NPM archetype.38 An additional identified mechanism is the lack of 
transformational leadership within the system, a necessary ingredient in any archetype 
“reorientation”. 
The chapter also discussed a major finding which emerged inductively from this 
research – the low organisational and political priority accorded to TB control in 
London and the serious consequences flowing from this status. This finding has been 
theorised according to Kingdon’s (1995) model of public policy development, which 
was found to offer a strong explanatory framework. Tuberculosis in London is not 
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recognised as a “problem”, in Kingdon’s sense of the word, by senior NHS London 
officials, Department of Health officials, or elected representatives. Neither has the 
issue been afforded any political support. Despite an agreed policy alternative finally 
being developed, it is not sufficient to have just one stream in place if an issue is to 
move up the public policy agenda. As TB is not seen as a “problem” and there is no 
political will to address it, TB infection rates in London, including drug resistant 
infection rates, continue to climb - as forecast by Kingdon’s model. 
Although Kingdon’s framework proved useful, its application begged the question as to 
how this peculiar situation could arise, i.e., what are the mechanisms which resulted in 
this situation? Complexity theory was re-introduced, following Kingdon’s own brief 
musings concerning potential synergies between his model and complexity theory. This 
additional theoretical analysis revealed that a maladaptive form of self-organisation, in 
which actors within the TB control system self-censor and stay quiet about the severity 
of the TB problem in London, prevents the development of active championing 
leadership which allows the issue to be recognised as a problem and develop vital 
political support. This self-censorship arises from either self-interest and/or concerns 
amongst members of the TB community about causing a xenophobic backlash against 
migrants. Further, system historicity, initial conditions and the mental models at play 
(both at  individual and organisational levels) were identified via complexity theory as 
additional mechanisms leading to TB’s on-going status as “low priority” and 
contributing to preventing the development of Kingdon’s three streams. These aspects 
came together to produce an entrenched characterisation of TB as a “small” disease, 
making it easier for policy makers, both elected and at senior levels of the NHS and the 
DH, to ignore. Finally, comparisons were drawn between the impact of initial 
conditions and historicity on the organisational response to HIV/AIDS versus TB, as 
well as the impact of the differing macro political environments with which each of the 
diseases initially contended.  On balance, HIV/AIDS faced fewer obstacles in its early 
days in terms of developing Kingdon’s three streams, facilitating a vigorous and 
effective policy response.  
This chapter provided two theoretical interpretations of the empirical chapters. The 
next, concluding, chapter reviews key research findings, the research gaps which have 







CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has analysed the organisational response to resurgent tuberculosis across 
London, attempting to explain and understand why one of the world’s most modern 
metropolises has been battling, with limited success, this ancient and confounding 
disease. Dubos and Dubos (1953:vii-viii) remarked that tuberculosis “modifies in a 
peculiar manner the emotional and intellectual climate of the societies that it attacks...It 
is the consequence of gross defects in social organization, and of errors in individual 
behavior.” This research has identified some of these “defects in social organization” 
and the mechanisms responsible, and has analysed the role played by the wider 
political economy of which the “social organization” is a part.  
This concluding chapter opens with a reflection on the methodological approach 
adopted in this study. This will be followed by a review of the empirical and theoretical 
contributions of this research, along with suggestions for further research. The chapter 
then concludes with some personal reflections and observations on the thesis.  
Methodological Considerations and Reflections 
This thesis has a distinctive subject of study (the organisational response of the system 
responsible for TB control in London), uses a novel theoretical framework (complexity 
theory) and is underpinned by a relatively new and emerging research paradigm 
(critical realism). It was not my objective to conduct unorthodox research, and I 
recognise this approach added both risk and extra challenges. There was little previous, 
similar research which I could call upon for guidance, which meant I needed to be 
flexible, yet thoughtful and careful, when designing and executing the study.  
I entered the PhD program with the intention of undertaking a complexity theory-
informed study within a public sector setting. From there, it was not difficult to whittle 
the options down to public health, and from there discussions pointed to a study of TB 
in London. NHS leadership within the TB control system was willing and open to 
accommodate my study, reflecting what I’ve come to see as a deep commitment on the 
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part of the Health Service to promoting research. With regard to the use of critical 
realism in this study, despite its “newness”, I remain convinced of the value of the 
paradigm for this research. Positivist studies aim at producing predictive models and 
interpretivism is concerned with understanding and surfacing meaning. Critical 
realism, however, aims to explain causality by identifying and examining the generative 
mechanisms responsible, thereby making it particularly suited to this research.  
The observation period for this study extended over approximately 25 months, during 
which time I was able to amass a considerable quantity of data. This included observing 
the creation of the 12th, 13th and 14th reports into TB control in London (the externally 
commissioned “PHAST Report” and the Case for Change and Model of Care). It was 
particularly helpful to watch the creation of the Case for Change and Model of Care 
documents, observing relationships and interactions amongst different professional 
groups, amongst the NHS, the DH and the HPA, between geographical sectors and 
between management and professionals. Like much qualitative complexity theory 
research, understanding relationships was vital to this study, so extensive meeting 
observation was a key element of this study, giving me the chance to observe these 
relationships in action. Attending meetings also gave me the opportunity for informal 
conversations with members of London’s TB community, some of which yielded 
valuable background information and contextual detail.  
Not surprisingly, interviews were an equally rich and valuable source of data and often 
respondents were good sources of interesting archival documentation. Documents 
were shared with me from a wide cross-section of the TB community and were 
especially helpful in augmenting my historical knowledge and appreciation of 
organisational aspects of the TB control system. A potential limitation in the data I 
collected is that I was unable to keep my name on internal email lists. This was partly a 
result of administrative staffing turnover at the NHS (specifically within London Health 
Programs which “hosts” the TB program), but likely also reflected a certain degree of 
caution on the part of NHS management.  
My status as an independent, self-funded researcher came with both pros and cons. I 
came into the system with no “baggage”, and members of the TB community seemed to 
appreciate the objectivity and freshness of perspective which I brought. At the same 
time, working without the official sanction of, for example, the NIHR or ESRC, meant I 
was completely reliant upon goodwill in terms of accessing meetings, people and 
documents. But, as mentioned in Chapter Five, I feel I was given tremendous access to 
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the system as a whole and to many of its constituent parts, with the exception of the 
Department of Health (for reasons unknown).  
I had offered at the outset of my research to present my research findings to the TB 
Clinical Working Group and the TB Commissioning Board. This presentation has not 
happened and it is unclear as to whether it will. In early 2012, NHS management 
decided to significantly restrict attendance at these groups’ meetings (which effectively 
ended my ability to observe the meetings) and they currently seem ambivalent about 
inviting me back to discuss my research findings.  
Empirical Contributions 
To the best of my knowledge, this research represents the only large-scale study, 
undertaken from an organisational perspective, of TB control in London. A 2005 paper 
comparing TB management in London with that in Osaka, Japan provided a high-level 
snapshot and overview of TB service delivery in London at that time, but the 
description was limited in scope and does not offer a critical analysis of the system 
(Ohkado et al 2005). As noted previously, TB in London has been well researched from 
a medical/epidemiological perspective (McEvoy 1995, Ormerod 1994, Neely et al 
2009) and through a number of sociological lenses (Coker 1998, Story & Citron 2003, 
Story et al 2007, Gandy & Zumla 2002), but this thesis is uniquely focused on how TB 
control in London is organised at the system level.  
Secondly, as noted in Chapter Three, there have been repeated calls for more empirical 
research within the field of complexity theory (Carapiet & Harris 2007, Chiles 2004, 
Houchin  & MacLean 2005, Johnson and Burton 1994, Lissack 1999). This study 
responds to that call and offers a major empirical example of complexity theory 
research. By also analysing and acknowledging the role of the broader political 
economy within which the TB control system operates (a heavily NPM-influenced 
environment), this thesis also responds to the call for complexity theory research 
which highlights the important role played systems’ macro context (Marion & Bacon 
1999). 
The third empirical contribution arising from this research (and as previously reported 
in Trenholm & Ferlie 2012) concerns how an NPM-inspired need to control by the NHS 
has contributed negatively to TB control in London.  In the cases of both the Find & 
Treat team “takeover” and the mini-coup orchestrated by the NHS against the HPA’s 
early leadership on the InR-TB file, the results, arguably, have not been positive. At a 
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minimum, they generated significant amounts of ill will and contributed to an “us and 
them” mentality. The quashing of the Control Board concept was also likely motivated 
in part by an NHS fear of relinquishing some of its control if Board membership were 
broadened. This research validated what other studies have noted, that, where 
maintaining control is prioritised over looser forms of organising and, indeed, 
creativity, it is difficult for novelty and innovation to emerge (Boons et al 2009, Kernick 
2002). NHS managers were observed to be unable or unwilling to foster the type of 
setting conducive to innovation and learning. Boons et al (2009) suggest that public 
sector managers in complex systems (such as London’s TB control system) should try 
to co-ordinate system processes and develop a fertile environment for creativity, 
novelty and innovation. Vitally, “(c)reating conditions, however, is different from 
exerting control”, they note. Managers in London’s TB control system were not 
observed as making this important distinction.  
The final, but by no means least important empirical finding of this study, is that TB 
control in London is afforded virtually no priority or attention by senior managers 
within the healthcare system, despite being a communicable disease with a growing 
incidence of drug resistance.  It is suggested that this phenomenon is the result of a 
form of maladaptive self-organisation by members of the London TB community, as 
discussed in detail in Chapter Eight.  
Policy Implications 
There are three policy implications flowing from the above empirical findings.  
The first, and perhaps most important implication, is clear: tuberculosis needs to be 
recognised by the NHS and the Department of Health as a serious public health issue 
and responded to as such. Dunleavy (1995) discusses “policy disasters” in Britain 
which have resulted from various NPM-driven decisions and choices. Whilst TB policy 
in London cannot be classified as “successful”, it has not precipitated the sort of crises 
which Dunleavy analyses (the poll tax, the London Ambulance Service IT policy 
changes). But the TB control program does have some characteristics of a slow burning 
policy disaster: an inability for the system to control overall infection rates, worrying 
year-on-year increases in the rate of drug resistant disease and unwillingness by senior 
policy makers to tackle the problem before it becomes a full-blown crisis.  Securing 
senior level support might lead to a better resourced, more effectively organised, and 
more accountable TB control system and ultimately, to a reduction in TB infections. 
There can be little mystery surrounding what needs to be done to improve the 
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management and control of TB in London, in light of the 14 previously cited reports 
addressing this issue. The mystery is why not a single person with the power to affect 
change has seen fit to take action. Recalling the comment from a senior level 
respondent, all that is needed is for someone with some influence within the healthcare 
bureaucracy to show some courage by championing the issue.  
The second policy implication flows from the above-noted proclivity by the NHS to try 
to control its environment, perhaps instinctively and uncritically. It is suggested that  
NHS leaders within London’s TB control system should experiment with, or at least 
consider, loosening their reins of control, and try to create organisational conditions 
more conducive to the emergence of novelty and to co-adaptation and organisational 
learning.  
Finally, on a more macro level, this study backhandedly reiterates and validates other 
research which identifies the value of networks in tackling so-called wicked problems 
(Ferlie et al 2011), of which TB could be considered one. These are conditions such as 
obesity, eldercare and mental health care, which are often accompanied by a complex 
variety of social and medical co-morbidities. The TB control system in London does not 
currently function as a network, but rather as an uncoordinated, fragmented, disparate 
system of largely autonomous sub-systems. Whilst it is unlikely TB would be given the 
status of an “official” DH/NHS network in the sense of cancer or sexual health39, at least 
in the short term, there are aspects of the network approach which clearly could be 
beneficial to London’s TB control system. Consideration could be given to learning 
about these networks and informally incorporating elements from them into London’s 
TB control system. 
Theoretical Contributions 
This study was broad in scope and has generated a number of empirical findings, as 
outlined above. To assist with understanding and theorising these findings, five 
theoretical frameworks were employed: 
 complexity theory 
 New Public Management 
 professional dominance 
                                           
39
 This idea was briefly considered in 2010 but not pursued. The likely reasons seem related to bad 
timing because of ongoing and massive NHS restructuring at the time, in addition to the financial 
costs associated with such a move.  
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 institutional/archetype theory 
 Kingdon’s (1995) theory of public policy development 
 
The first three of these theories were used deductively, applied from the outset of the 
study and used, for example, to inform interview protocols and initial (and later) data 
analyses. The fourth theory used, institutional/archetype theory was applied as a 
supplementary means of identifying the mechanisms responsible for NPM 
embeddedness within the system. And the last theory, Kingdon’s model of public policy 
development, was introduced to explain and theorise the low priority accorded to TB 
control in London. This expansive theoretical approach was challenging, and perhaps 
somewhat unorthodox, in that research often aims toward some sort of convergence, or 
theoretical resolution. This study, however, is theoretically divergent and sought the 
input of additional theories in its goal of identifying mechanisms and understanding 
causality in the organisational response to TB in London.  
 
This research contributes to three bodies of literature:  
1. the growing body of complexity theory literature within the social sciences, and 
within the fields of public management and healthcare in particular; 
2. New Public Management research, including that which debates the status of 
NPM and whether we’ve entered a post-NPM era; and, 
3. political science literature, specifically that which is focused on public policy 
development. 
 
With respect to complexity theory literature, in addition to the major empirical 
contribution noted above, this study also responds to a call for research into the role 
played by environmental context when using complexity theory to study complex 
systems (Marion & Bacon 1999), as previously noted. This research has determined 
that context can indeed play a crucial role in influencing how a complex system 
functions: the complex system charged with controlling TB in London was found to be 
significantly influenced by the broader NPM-based political economy of which it is a 
part. It also confirmed earlier, but less well-acknowledged complexity theory research 
(Boons et al 2009, McKelvey 2003), which argues that self-organisation amongst 
system actors can be used to maintain the status quo within organisations, or indeed, 




Second, this research contributes to the NPM literature by highlighting the extent and 
pervasiveness of the paradigm’s ongoing influence, particularly its focus on control and 
the impact arising from decades of efficiency drives focused on eliminating slack and 
redundancy within the system.  Within London’s TB control system, potentially 
beneficial complexity theory precepts were suppressed by these NPM precepts, thereby 
impeding the organisational response to the disease (Trenholm & Ferlie 2012). 
 
Finally, this study adds to the public policy literature (political science), by validating 
and further developing Kingdon’s (1995) theory of public policy formation. By using 
complexity theory to analyse how and why his “three streams” (problems, policies, 
politics) are cultivated, or not, within a public policy environment, this research 
developed Kingdon’s own remarks (pp.223-224) that there are symmetries between 
his model and complexity theory. The complexity theory concepts of self-organisation 
and historicity/initial conditions were used to usefully theorise why TB control has not 
been able to secure a place on London’s public policy agenda. 
   
The following, then, are the major theoretical contributions arising from this research. 
1. The “meta-meta aggregate” (Marion & Bacon 1999), or the environmental 
context within which a complex system operates, was confirmed as a 
potentially vital consideration in complexity theory research. 
2. NPM embeddedness was observed as  sufficiently strong and pervasive within 
the London TB control system that it negates or otherwise impedes the 
potentially positive complexity theory aspects also found within the system. 
a. NPM continues to be a major organisational archetype within the NHS; 
the much anticipated post-NPM era has not yet arrived in the UK 
healthcare sector. This finding validates earlier research by Ferlie & 
FitzGerald (2002). 
3. Kingdon’s (1995) model of public policy development was validated as a useful 
tool for understanding why some “conditions” become “problems” which merit 
a public policy response, while others do not.  Also, Kingdon’s theory was 
further developed by using complexity theory concepts to explain why the 
model’s three streams might develop or not, building on the author’s own 





The empirical findings and the theoretical and empirical contributions arising from this 
research point to various issues for further study and deliberation. With regard to TB 
control, it would be useful to study the organisational systems and responses used to 
tackle modern-day TB epidemics in other large cities. New York City’s success in 
combating resurgent TB is well documented (Frieden 1995, Coker 1998, 2000), and 
some comparisons with London are drawn by Coker in his works. However, it would 
useful to look at the organisational responses of other large cities with high levels of 
migration and TB, comparing those in high-NPM environments, similar to London, to 
those in low or non-NPM systems. Related to this, a follow-up study conducted ten or so 
years from now on the status of London’s TB control system would also be most useful, 
with a particular view to analysing whether there had been any re-integration within 
the system, or whether the current deep fragmentation is maintained.  Similarly, and as 
alluded to in Chapter Eight, it would be useful to undertake a full comparator study of 
the response by London’s healthcare system to HIV/AIDS versus TB. 
At a more general level, this research identified some inherent challenges and 
difficulties associated with the capacity of high-NPM systems to respond to complex 
health problems. It would be useful to build on this by adding an international 
comparator from a low-NPM setting, such as France, Germany or Finland, to see how 
those systems respond to complex healthcare problems such as mental health, obesity 
and eldercare, as opposed to how the UK responds. 
This study also revealed that encouraging co-adaptation and innovation within a 
heavily NPM-influenced milieu is difficult. It was suggested earlier that an absence of 
slack or redundancy within NPM environments, owing to relentless efficiency drives, 
combined with an unflinching fixation on control, makes it difficult for novelty and 
innovation to emerge within heavily NPM-influenced systems. System fragmentation 
also exacerbates the challenges associated with promoting vital co-adaptation and 
innovation. Further, the nature of relationships within these systems may also be 
impacted (for example, no spare time or opportunities to develop either strong or weak 
ties amongst system actors). It is rare for a high-NPM system to respond radically or 
creatively to problems. An exception in the UK has been the extensive de-
institutionalisation within mental health services whereby psychiatric patients were 
moved into community-based settings. But even in this instance, the response was 
significantly influenced by strong social pressures and stakeholder input. Therefore, it 
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would be most useful and interesting to undertake empirical research in other NPM 
systems to see how or whether they innovate and/or co-adapt. Whilst advocates of 
markets might counter that the private sector, or perhaps the social enterprise sector, 
could be relied upon to introduce innovations into public sector settings, it is not 
obvious how a high-NPM system could accommodate or embed such innovations (to 
wit, the response by the NHS to the Find & Treat team). This could be part of a larger 
research agenda aimed at gaining a better theoretical understanding of innovation and 
co-adaptation within NPM settings. 
The previous sections have outlined the empirical findings and the various empirical 
and theoretical contributions arising from this research, along with some ideas for 
future research efforts. This chapter, and thesis, will now conclude with some personal 
reflections and observations on the journey which has led to this point. 
Reflections 
Some readers may find the language used in parts of this thesis to be 
uncharacteristically blunt, and the findings more political than is the norm for academic 
management writing. I am not unaware of the potential consequences of some of what 
I’ve written here. The discussion on the low priority accorded to TB control in London 
by senior echelons of the healthcare system, and the intriguing absence of whistle-
blowing from within the system, could be seen as particularly provocative.  
The decision to include this information was taken after considerable deliberation and 
discussion in supervision and only after great caution was exercised to protect the 
identities of those implicated in the discussion. The overriding motivation for including 
this information flows from a sense of obligation to the many respondents who spoke 
so freely, candidly and passionately about their frustration at the lack of response from 
senior levels of the London healthcare system to TB in London. These sentiments came 
from across the spectrum of the London TB community interviewed for this research, 
including very senior and politically astute individuals; people who have built highly 
successful careers within an often politicised healthcare sector.  
I have concluded these individuals knew exactly what they were doing when they 
spoke in such forthright terms to me about their frustrations and disappointments 
regarding the response from their superiors to TB control. These respondents were 
rightly confident that their identities would be protected, but they also knew full well 
that anything they said could find its way into these pages.  This led me to conclude that 
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they saw me as a potential messenger who could “get the word out”, in a credible, 
unbiased way, that London’s TB control system is in desperate need of attention. I 
believe they saw the writings of an academic researcher, perhaps particularly a foreign 
one with no prior knowledge of, or involvement in, TB control or the London health 
economy, as a potential means of moving senior healthcare policy makers to action. 
Claiming a “public interest defence”, I have perhaps pushed the traditional thesis 
boundaries by, in effect, answering this call for help.  
On a more mundane note, this study has taught me to appreciate the power and 
importance of tacit knowledge in our daily lives and in the production of academic 
research. For instance, so much of the detail about a nation’s healthcare system is taken 
for granted by those who grew up within the system, and its history and values are 
largely internalised and difficult to share with outsiders. And then there was the 
necessity of learning the ABC’s of the new systems in which I found myself. So 
undertaking a doctorate-level study set within a healthcare system to which I had no 
prior exposure and featuring a disease which I assumed, naively, had been virtually 
eradicated, presented a host of often humbling challenges: “Commissioning??...what is 
commissioning?”, “Why aren’t hospitals called hospitals?” and “Is it really possible to 
have TB anywhere in the human body?” In the end, though, the steepness of my 
learning curve served to make the journey all the more rewarding. It has certainly 
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Abstract   
We employ complexity theory to analyse the English National Health Service (NHS)’s 
organisational response to resurgent tuberculosis across London. Tennison (2002) 
suggests that complexity theory could fruitfully explore a healthcare system’s response 
to this complex and emergent phenomenon: we explore this claim here. We also bring in 
established New Public Management principles to enhance our empirical analysis, which 
is based on data collected between late 2009 to mid-2011. We find that the operation 
of complexity theory based features, especially self-organisation, are significantly 
impacted by the macro context of a New Public Management-based regime which values 
control, measurement and risk management more than innovation, flexibility and lateral 
system building. We finally explore limitations and suggest perspectives for further 
research. 
 
Reference: Tennison B (2002). “Complexity in epidemiology and public health” in 
Sweeney K, Griffiths F (Eds.), Complexity and Healthcare: an introduction. Radcliffe 
Medical Press: Abingdon 
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Introduction:  Complexity Theory and the Organisational Response to Resurgent TB 
Across London 
 
This descriptive study uses complexity theory to examine the organisational response to 
a resurgent TB epidemic across London.  Authors assert that complexity theory could 
fruitfully analyse both a complex and emergent health phenomenon, like a TB epidemic 
(Agar 1999), and the organisational response to it (Byrne 1998, Tennison 2002).  We 
explore this second claim (our particular interest) by examining the multi-component 
system responsible for managing resurgent TB across London. 
Despite much theoretical work, scholars note the need to apply complexity theory in real-
life settings outside laboratories or computer-generated simulations (Houchin et al 
2005). We add to the modest body of empirically informed research, specifically to an 
emergent literature combining complexity theory and public management (Rhodes & 
MacKechnie 2003, Teisman et al 2009, Rhodes et al 2011). Brown et al (1997) and 
Chiles (2004) are useful guides for us as both use longitudinal case studies, while 
highlighting the importance of context, time and relationships. In our research, the 
macro organisational and policy context proved highly significant and need to be 
accorded full attention.  
Complexity theory offers a novel perspective on healthcare organisations and systems 
(Anderson 2005, Plsek 2001). We seek to operationalise in empirical analysis key 
features of complexity theory.  All these complexity-based characteristics surfaced in the 
case, but their impact was intriguingly variable. Further analysis revealed that embedded 
New Public Management reforms significantly impacted how complexity-based features 
manifest themselves, hampering efforts at addressing the city’s TB problem.  Our initial 
research question is specified as follows: 
What is the contribution of complexity theory in analysing the organisational 
response to resurgent TB in London? 
The paper is organised as follows. First we outline the context of our research. Then we 
review complexity theory literature, highlighting its application within healthcare, and 
also outline New Public Management principles found in the field.  Then we describe our 
methods and data sources. Next, we present a narrative of the organisational response 
to TB across London, including vignettes which illustrate aspects of complexity theory 
and New Public Management processes. After discussing key findings, along with 
theoretical implications, we outline limitations and possible future research.  
While our findings should prove useful to healthcare managers and TB specialists, our 
prime audience is scholars of healthcare systems and organisations. The case 
reinforces the importance of organisational contexts in complexity theory research, in 
this case, the legacy of healthcare macro reforms. 
Context and Setting: The Resurgent TB Epidemic in London 
London TB rates reached their lowest recorded levels in 1987 (Pearson et al 1996), 
after which they consistently increased (see Figure 1). Between 1999 and 2009, London 
TB cases increased by 50% (UK Health Protection Agency 2010), despite global 





Figure 1: TB Cases in London (Source: various published HPA reports) 
 
The rate of new TB infections in London (incidence) was 44.8/ 100,000 in 2009, with 
some boroughs exceeding 100 cases/100,000 (Health Protection Agency, 2011 [a]). 
Amongst other European cities, only Brussels (30.5/100,000) comes close to London 
(Health Protection Agency, 2011 [b]). Tuberculosis poses significant public health 
challenges in stopping latent infections becoming active and controlling onward 
transmission. The challenge lies with improving diagnosis and screening and with 
treating active TB disease, and the illness is compounded by economic and social 
factors – patients are often poor, with substance abuse issues, homeless, migrant and 
living in crowded quarters (Collinson and Ward 2010, Gandy et al 2002). Promoting 
disease awareness, encouraging marginalised individuals to seek diagnosis and 
treatment, and linking to primary care are challenging and involve many players. 
Collinson & Ward (2010), Craig et al (2007) and Story et al (2007) provide more detail 
regarding TB in modern London. 
An Overview of Complexity Theory 
Extending complexity theory to studying complex social phenomena is promising 
because of its focus on understanding relationships between and among individuals, 
organisations, and/or systems, and resulting collective behaviours and outcomes 
(Stacey 2003, p 333). Within complex systems, these outcomes are unpredictable, often 
non-linear, and emergent, with their sum greater than their parts (Blaikie 2007, p. 208). 
But complex systems, like all systems, may also perpetuate the status quo or suppress 
novelty and innovation (Boons et al 2009, pp 234-238). At the heart of complexity theory 
lies self-organisation (Rhodes et al 2011, p 14), “the process by which agents in a 
system interact with each other according to their own local rules of behaviour without 
any overall blueprint telling them what they are to accomplish or how they are to do it” 
(Stacey 1996, p.290). Complexity theorists argue that systems tend toward order 
(Kaufman 1993), “a stable pattern of relationships among elements” (Rhodes & 
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They recommend researchers “should look for the ways in which public service systems 
are creating ‘order’, what form/mode this order takes, and how this affects the overall 
performance of the system”(Rhodes & MacKechnie 2003). The importance of order 
creation on system outcomes emerged as a key factor in this research.  
In reviewing the literature, we identify five relevant aspects of complexity theory:  
1. Self-Organisation  
Self-organisation is a dialectical process of co-evolution among agents, comprised of 
relationships and behaviours. It has the capacity to create coherence and form 
patterns. The form which emerges is “radically unpredictable”, explaining the 
relationship between self-organisation and causality (Stacey 2000, p 128-130). 
While the emergent outcome may transform an organisation, the consequence of 
self-organisation may also be to “resist externally induced change” because of 
“ambition or need to survive” (Boons et al 2009, p 234-235). Agents in self-
organising systems respond “according to their own capacity to respond” (Stacey 
2003, p 333), within various organisational “control parameters” including: 
I. Rate of information flow 
II. Degree of diversity 
III. Richness of connectivity 
IV. Level of contained anxiety 
V. Degree of power differentials (Stacey 1996, p 179-182) 
The manner in which self-organisation occurs is debated. Some scholars argue that 
successful self-organising requires the “right” number of ties and informal 
connections among system members: too few ties and the system becomes 
moribund; too many ties and it becomes chaotic (Stacey 2000 pp 111-112). Others 
believe the intensity of the ties matters (Axelrod et al 2000). It is suggested that self-
organisation occurs locally, at the micro level, later giving rise to meso and macro-
level orders (Chiles 2004). Finally, self-organisation may contribute to systems’ 
abilities to balance ’’exploitation” (doing more of what they do well) and 
“exploration” (trying, discovering, or creating – e.g. innovating), and can trigger 
transformational change (Byrne 1998, pp 32-33, Axelrod et al 2000 pp 43-45).  
2. Emergence of Novelty, or Perpetuation of the Status Quo? 
Novelty and the creation of “new properties” in response to environmental 
challenges might arise from self-organisation (Rhodes et al 2011, p. 14), or not, as 
discussed above. Components of a self-organising system may be “often oriented at 
maintaining their position and stability” (Boons et al 2009, p 235), aided by 
constraints arising from control parameters. Where novelty does occur, it is, by 
definition, unpredictable, and history and context matter (Byrne 1998, p 47). The 
composition and/or past actions of the components of the self-organising system 
can determine the nature of the novelty (Rhodes et al 2011, p 14)  "due to multiple 
nonlinear interactions and feedback loops among the parts" of a system and not as 
the result of a ”big plan”' (Begun et al 2003).  Finally, novelty emerging from self-
organisation is not always positive (Plsek 2001), as when healthcare and other 




An aspect of the unpredictability which arises from self-organisation are non-linear 
responses to change. Modest turbulence can produce an unexpectedly large impact, 
while large disturbances may be barely felt (Chiles 1994, Plsek 2001, Sarra 2005). 
An epidemiological example is how introducing crack cocaine into the street heroin 
market changed the drug using population and the entire dynamic of the heroin 
market (Agar 1999). Non-linearity can also be seen in the considerable resources 
invested in healthcare reforms with seemingly little system improvement (Plsek 
2001). 
 
4. Absence of a Single, Formal Leader 
Crucially, self-organisation occurs without a single, formal leader (Drazin et al 1992), 
although this does not necessarily mean that no one is held accountable for the 
performance of the organisation/system (Houchin et al, 2005). Owing to the 
dialectical nature of self-organisation, “neither the individual nor the group is primary 
since they form and are formed by each other at the same time” (Stacey 2003, p 
335); or, “There is control, but no one is ‘in control’” (Stacey 1996, p 204). In 
healthcare, this often takes the form of “distributed leadership” (Gronn 2002).  
 
5. Requisite System Variety  
Complex systems exhibit diversity in the personal backgrounds, world views and 
experiences of system members. Such diversity enhances the system’s capacity to 
manage complex challenges and adapt (Axelrod et al 2000, Stacey 2003 pp 375-5, 
387-88).  
 
Complexity Theory and Healthcare 
Healthcare systems have been analysed as complex systems by various scholars 
(Anderson et al, 2005, Axelrod et al, 2000; pp. 75-77, 83-84, Byrne, 1998; pp.105-120, 
Curtis et al2010 [b], Plsek, 2001, Sweeney et al, 2002). There is interest in how a 
complexity perspective might enhance healthcare innovation, effectiveness and policy 
reform (Leykum, et al, 2007, Plsek et al 2001, Rhodes & MacKechnie 2003). Begun et 
al (2003) argue that healthcare innovation is challenging because of the "number...and 
fragmentation of producers involved", rendering ineffective standard efforts of 
"coordination and control". They argue complexity theory addresses this gap by 
acknowledging the importance of relationships within and between levels of the (nested) 
system, emergent strategy, past history and how the system co-evolves with its 
environment. Simmons’ (2003) case study explores how the Welsh Public Health 
Laboratory Service might use complexity theory to develop its communicable diseases 
managed network.  
Of particular relevance is complexity theory’s emphasis on micro-level relationships 
(Drazin et al 1992), since “health care depends largely on productive interaction” (Plsek 
et al, 2001).  Complexity theory recognizes “the recursive and dynamic connections 
between population health, health policy and health care” (Curtis et al 2010 [b]).  
Empirical complexity theory research in healthcare is, however, limited, tending to be of 
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a quantitative (Leykum et al 2007, Begun & Luke 2001), modelling-based (Agar 2002) 
or “speculative” nature, with writers exploring how complexity theory might be used to 
study a system, but stopping short of operationalising it (Simmons 2003). Exceptions 
are Marion and Bacon’s (2000) research on organisational extinction using three care 
organisations and Begun et al's (2003) short case study of the Allina Health System.  We 
need more complexity theory-informed research within real life healthcare settings. 
The Macro Context and New Public Management. 
Healthcare systems have been researched from various theoretical perspectives, with 
significant study in the UK from the New Public Management paradigm. We used this 
perspective to offer additional contextual insights when analysing our data. It proved 
helpful in understanding the various incarnations of self-organisation and why 
undertaking the action indicated proved challenging.  
 
The paradigm conceptualises significant and enduring changes in public sector 
management from the 1980s (Hood, 1995). The UK was a high-impact site for New 
Public Management internationally, and the NHS a high-impact sector within the UK 
(Ferlie et al 1996). New Public Management ideas became powerful, top-down, and also 
practical ‘reform’ doctrines in the NHS, including:  
(i) “managerialism” whereby managers assume greater control over clinical 
professionals, (Ferlie et al 1996, p 11), as in  powerful NHS general 
managers and non-executive directors; 
(ii) quasi-markets, rather than planning,  allocate resources, with contracts 
replacing hierarchies as the basis of coordination within the NHS internal 
market; 
(iii)  the ‘hollowing out’ of previously vertically integrated ministries such as the 
Department of Health, with their policy making function eroded (Dunleavy, 
1995), and now disaggregated into separate purchasing and providing 
functions and silo-like executive agencies ;  
(iv) wide-spread use of measurement, risk management, strong contracts, 
targets and audits in a ‘targets and terror’ regime (Bevan and Hood, 2006), 
with poorly performing management teams being replaced; and,  
(v) persistent  top-down pressure for reform and constant top-down 
reorganisation (Ferlie et al, 1996, p 37; Moran, 2003)  
The New Public Management is a late modernist project of organisational control. While 
“this omnipotent idea of control remains a fantasy much beloved” in the NHS (Sarra 
2005), this faith in linearity and control places it in contradiction to complexity theory. 
We also explored the preceding core features in the case. 
 
Research Design 
We undertook a longitudinal case study of the inter-organisational ‘system’ responsible 
for managing TB across London from. Consequently, its boundaries extended beyond 
the NHS to include many other stakeholders.  
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We used a qualitative case study design, well-suited for explaining how and why 
organisational processes unfold (Stake 1994), and for still-developing fields (Drake et al 
1998). This holistic approach fits well with the methodological precepts of complexity 
theory; particularly the need to understand, over time, relationships among entities 
(Blaikie 2007, pp 208-209) which could not be captured by other methods (e.g. 
surveys). This approach supports the study of nested complex systems through multi-
level analyses (Eisenhardt 1989). Blaikie (2000) argues case studies’ combination of 
rich data, observation, triangulation and conceptual analysis captures contextual 
richness and temporality. Byrne (2009) observes that comparative case-based 
approaches fit well with complexity theory because (a) they identify links between 
outcomes and case characteristics, i.e., causality patterns and (b) because they “are the 
foundations of useful theoretical descriptions of the social world”, including in studying 
healthcare systems (Anderson et al 2005). Finally, the case study method can build 
theory, particularly in emerging fields (Eisenhardt 1989), and we here aim for a theory-
building contribution as well as empirical analysis.  
Methods and Data Collection 
Our data were gathered over 21 months (2009-2011), using the methods and sources 
outlined in Table 1.  
Semi-structured interviews 53 interviews with TB managers and healthcare 
professionals, both past and present, lasting 60-90 
minutes.  
Non-participant observation Attendance at 55  Department of Health, NHS London, 
Health Protection Agency, and one-to-one informant 
meetings, totalling approximately 103 hours 
Archival documents  Documents commissioned and produced by 
government, the Health Protection Agency, 
Department of Health, NHS, professional bodies and 
third sector, covering 15 years, with approximately 
1200 pages analysed.  
Table 1: Data Collection Methods 
 
One researcher was granted significant access to London TB meetings, along with 
archival documents and email files.  Most components of the TB system were co-
operative in consenting to meeting observation.  Semi-structured interviews followed a 
pro-forma designed to capture the history of TB control efforts with questions derived 
from our initial literature review covering complexity theory and New Public 
Management. Interview participants were identified using TB Commissioning Board lists. 
Snowballing was used, identifying people no longer working within the system. Meetings 
between the authors discussed the progress of fieldwork and elucidated initial analysis. 
One author examined the interview transcripts, field notes, and documents on this basis, 
coding them using HyperRESEARCH software against a set of agreed codes. But as we 
lacked electronic versions of older documents, most analyses were conducted manually, 
by (re)reading documents to surface themes, identify critical incidents and draw 
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comparisons.  Further meetings elucidated an overall approach to telling the narrative of 
the case, for example, using theoretically related vignettes. The entire data set was 
searched systematically against the key themes for examples, e.g. positive and negative 
instances of non-linearity. 
More concretely, we were guided by Ragin and Amoroso’s (2011) model, below. Here 
researchers produce images by linking pieces of evidence together.  These images are 
combined with analytic frames, derived from ideas and social theory, providing “the 
context for creating and understanding the image, establishing conceptual boundaries 
around the evidence-based image...representations appear to audiences as finished 
























Figure 2: Model for Social Research (Ragin and Amoroso 2011) 
 
 
We agree with Langley’s (1999) observation that process research builds theory when it 
“selectively takes concepts from different theoretical traditions and adapts them to the 
data at hand, or takes ideas from the data and attaches them to theoretical 
perspectives, enriching those theories as it goes along.” Tsoukas and Hatch’s (2001) 
arguments regarding the value of narrative in organisation-based complexity theory 
research, along with Stacey’s (1995) warning about using reductionist, hypotheses-
testing approaches to study complex, non-linear phenomena were heeded. 
Ethics approval was received from a local Research Ethics Committee.  
 









We here provide a narrative of the pan-London organisational response to a resurgent 
TB epidemic. We initially mapped the ‘system,’ finding almost 70 entities involved, 
largely drawn from different public services, but including the private sector (prisoner 
transport and laboratory services), third sector, parliamentarians and a not-for-profit 
service provider.  The London TB Commissioning Board and the London TB Clinical 
Working Group derive their memberships from these entities. These two important 
bodies (established in 2008, but with various, similar precursors) seek to develop a 
London TB strategy bringing together organisations to share best practice and co-
ordinate efforts, and ultimately reduce TB levels.  The Clinical Working Group advises the 
Commissioning Board clinically and has a larger, mostly clinical, membership. The 
Commissioning Board is advisory with no formal authority or budget-holding power, and 
relies on persuasion in achieving objectives.  
Between 1996 and 2011, thirteen reports analysed London’s TB problem, most 
concluding with calls for action. Nonetheless, TB rates continued to climb. Table 2 
presents the overall history of the response. 
 
Year Key Event(s) Commissioned Report/Study 
1987 London TB rates  at their lowest recorded 
levels 
  
1993 Regular 5-yearly report showed TB rates in 
London increased by 47% between 1987-93 
(Pearson et al 1996). First ‘working party’ of 
London Consultants in Communicable 
Disease Control established – focus on 
surveillance 
 
1996 Interdepartmental Working Group on 
Tuberculosis formed, led by Department of 
Health 
The Interdepartmental Working 
Group on Tuberculosis, (i) The 
Prevention and Control of 
Tuberculosis in the United 
Kingdom: Recommendations for the 
Prevention and Control of 
Tuberculosis at the Local Level and 
(ii) Tuberculosis and Homeless 
People (Dept. of Health and Welsh 
Office)  
1998  o Interdepartmental Working Group 
on Tuberculosis – Focus on HIV and 
Drug-Resistant TB (Dept. of Health) 
o Tuberculosis control in London – 
The Need for Change (NHS 
Executive) 
1999 “TB in London” group formed Improving TB Control in London (NHS 
Executive) 
2001 Geographically sector-specific TB groups form 
across London 
Concerns raised re: port health screening 
TB Control in London: Next Steps 
(London TB Group for London NHS 
Regional Office) 
2002 Short trial of mobile x-ray unit  Getting ahead of the curve: A strategy 
for combating infectious diseases 
(Department of Health) 
2003 Health Protection Agency created Tuberculosis in London (London 
Assembly Health Committee) 
2004 Global TB rates peak.  
Borough Clinic rates start to fall. 
Stopping Tuberculosis in England: An 
Action Plan from the Chief Medical 
Officer (Department of Health) 
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2005 “Stopping London in TB” group formed  
Mobile X-ray Unit funded by Department of 
Health 
 
2006 Health Protection Agency criticizes port health 
screening  
 
2007 Find and Treat team formed Tuberculosis prevention and treatment: 
a toolkit (Department of Health) 
2008 TB Commissioning Board and Clinical Working 
Group formed 
An Audit Evaluation of Pan-London TB 
Services and Training Needs 
(Commissioned from London Southbank 
University) 
2009 “Department of Health effectively out of the 
TB business”?  
Tackling Tuberculosis in England: the 
PCT response to the challenge 
(Commissioned by The All-Party 
Parliamentary Group on Global TB, The 
British Thoracic Society, TB Alert and 
The Royal College of Nursing) 
2010 Original Find and Treat team winds down 
Cohort Review starts 
New airport x-ray machines installed 
London TB Service Review and Health 
Needs Assessment (Commissioned 
from the Public Health Action Support 
Team) 
2011 Control Board concept quashed  
Table 2: Timeline of Key Events and Reports 
 
Our narrative now develops five vignettes to present empirical findings. Complexity 
theory is used in order to illuminate these vignettes, in which New Public Management is 
often an important part of the story.  
Vignette 1: A tale of two self-organised initiatives  
Homelessness, substance abuse and previous imprisonment are significant TB risk 
factors (Story et al 2007). The Department of Health responded positively to a funding 
request from an  enterprising TB nurse and associates to fund directly (and  
exceptionally) a trial (2005) of a mobile x-ray unit offering TB screening at homeless 
shelters and other locations with at-risk populations . By 2007, “the Van” spawned an 
associated team, “Find and Treat” (F&T), to find active TB cases and ensure more 
patients completed treatment. The F&T team (10 staff) was multi-disciplinary, 
comprising nurses, caseworkers, radiographers, and operations staff, including former 
or seconded Department of Health and NHS employees. They adopted unorthodox 
working methods, as suggested by their patient base. They worked odd hours and 
employed creative techniques to locate patients and administer treatment (using Skype 
to watch a TB patient take his tablets). But theirs was a perilous existence. They never 
secured long-term funding and became isolated. One key informant said, “It sits in the 
middle, in the middle of nothing, nobody asked for it, nobody wanted it. It’s now become 
an entire faction... something separate...”, while adding it did “good work”.” Despite 
positive, independent assessments, F&T became alienated from the NHS mainstream; 
they were seen as a child of the Department of Health, unmanageable and ‘risky’ given 
unusual work practices and unclear governance, as a Community Interest Corporation.  
The NHS took little solace from F&T’s advisory panel of senior TB clinicians, researchers 
and epidemiologists. A drive to bring the team under control meant that it effectively 
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ceased to exist (2011). The once maverick group working out of edgy offices in Soho 
now find themselves, in reduced numbers, working in cubicles in an NHS facility, and 
providing services within a defined, conventional NHS contract. Their long-term future is 
unknown.   
In contrast, “Cohort Review” presented less challenging self-organisation. Another nurse-
led initiative (but with full consultant support), this systematised patient case review 
system means that nurses meet quarterly to present  summaries of  TB cases, including 
treatment outcomes. During presentations the Health Protection Agency compiles real-
time data and provides feedback. Unlike the maverick F&T, Cohort Review reinforces the 
typical NHS focus on measurement and control and has mainstream medical 
endorsement.  Cohort Review quickly gained NHS management support and spread 
across London,   
We comment that F&T and the Cohort Review offer contrasting examples of self-
organisation. F&T challenged the NHS status quo and focus on control and risk 
management, while Cohort Review reinforced it. The NHS macro system rejected F&T 
but embraced Cohort Review. 
Vignette 2: Inner-City Clinic: Local Self-Organisation 
This Clinic is in an economically deprived, over-crowded and migrant-dense borough, all 
factors  associated with increased TB rates (Collinson et al 2010, Craig et al 2007,). 
However, TB incidence here has fallen since 2004. The Clinic team includes doctors, 
nurses and outreach workers, working across and outside traditional NHS boundaries 
with a distributed leadership model. Their ethos is patient-centric looking at patients’ 
overall health and wellbeing, beyond TB treatment. The team works with various 
colleagues, securing housing, sexual healthcare and substance abuse support. Case 
workers cold-call carwashes (major employers of poor migrants), pool halls and betting 
shops, looking for TB cases. They commit to treating identified TB patients, visiting them 
in squats and other unusual locations. They develop rapport with patients to assist 
compliance, providing used toys for patients’ children and reimbursing some household 
expenses.  The team-oriented approach gives members some discretion, whilst they 
remain accountable to the team. 
We comment that the Clinic illustrates self-organisation resulting in local innovation. 
While well-known, the clinic does not extend beyond its borough and consequently, 
presents less visible risk for the macro NHS than Find & Treat. Its approach has not 
been replicated, despite clinic staff sharing their successes. 
 
Vignette 3: System Fragmentation:  A ‘stand alone’ Health Protection Agency and a 
Hollowed-Out Department of Health  
During the early–mid 1990s, various Consultants in Communicable Disease Control 
based in local authorities across London met collectively, with Department of Health 
support, to address rising TB rates. Published data (Pearson et al 1996) highlight their 
importance and key respondents credited them with forcing attention on the TB 
problem.   
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 Later NHS macro-restructuring produced two significant changes. First, a national arms-
length advisory body was created (2003) to advise on public health, including TB. Such 
’spin out’ bodies are a typical New Public Management creation, with the new Health 
Protection Agency subsuming many of the Consultants. As their role is advisory, they felt 
they lost old authority to compel local officials to act against infectious diseases like TB. 
The Consultants were no longer a core part of mainstream NHS organisations but were 
relocated to a specialist, stand alone agency.  
Secondly, the Department of Health lost some senior level policy expertise in this field, 
consistent with the argument (Dunleavy, 1996) that New Public Management produced 
an excessive swing from policy making to management. The TB field experienced a 
gradual reduction within the Department of policy level resources. A key respondent 
observed: 
“I suppose what has changed is the size of the groups dealing with 
infection... the Department of Health reduced fairly dramatically...about 
ten years ago... So whilst they previously had somebody...a scientific 
advisor ...senior sort of civil servant who, basically all they really did was 
TB and flu...a lot of those...got replaced with a much smaller core staff 
who were dealing with all infections.  And so there is a certain amount of 
less, lower level of expertise there than there was in the past.” 
While some respondents did not perceive significant change, one well-placed 
respondent said that by 2009, the Department was effectively “out of the TB business”, 
reduced to drafting replies to Ministers’ and MPs’ questions. Another respondent 
observed TB was not mentioned in a key financial document (2010/2011) from the 
division responsible. By 2011, only one full time person in the Department worked on 
the TB file, covering all England.    
We comment that the London TB system exhibits New Public Management style features 
of disaggregation and system fragmentation. The Department of Health lost policy 
making capacity and creating the Health Protection Agency had the (possibly 
unintended) consequence of disempowering advisers within the wider TB control 
system. 
Vignette 4: Thwarted Reform: NHS Management wants Commissioning NOT Control 
Board 
After long discussion, the TB Commissioning Board hired (2010) external consultants to 
produce a comprehensive “needs assessment” which recommended the existing TB 
Commissioning Board be replaced by a TB Control Board representing the Mayor of 
London, local authorities, social services and housing, and the third sector; taking a 
broad public health and population-based perspective. It would have clear accountability 
lines, overseeing a single, centralised commissioning function and budget. The idea was 
based on the 1990s New York model used when tackling (successfully) its TB epidemic. 
There was broad support, even excitement, and the idea gained momentum but was 
unexpectedly abandoned, given managerial staffing changes and further NHS 
restructuring. NHS leadership argued that the TB community must work within standard 
commissioning and abandon the holistic Control Board. Regarding a document 
produced by the Clinical Working Group, consistent with a Control Board approach, a key 
284 
 
NHS manager commented, “If I were cynical, I’d say (that) document is one that sits on a 
shelf, whereas this (a commissioning document) is really used.” This decision to 
abandon the TB Control Board was taken unilaterally by NHS management. Even senior 
clinicians, who had enthusiastically supported the Control Board concept, acquiesced.  
The 2010- Report may take its place on the shelf beside twelve previous reports since 
1996, all urging action and change. 
We comment that this vignette suggests self-organisation which supports the status 
quo. Self-organisation fed in to a consistent aversion by the TB Commissioning Board 
(and its precursors) to implement recommendations resulting in significant change to 
NHS macro systems. It suggests the New Public Management-inspired purchaser-
provider split is embedded, with a system-wide ‘Control Board’ incompatible with such 
policy. 
Vignette 5: Port Health Screening: An Investment with Non-Linear (Negligible) Outcomes 
New UK entrants with a long-term visa may be screened for TB by chest x-ray at arrival. 
Such referrals appear somewhat arbitrary. A 2006 Health Protection Agency report 
states: “of around 270,000 people entering the UK for more than six months from 
countries at high risk of TB, only about 73,000 were screened by X-rays; and as a result 
of these there were only 90 TB diagnoses. It was not possible to establish how many of 
these were infectious”. With approximately 8000 new UK TB cases annually, this 
represents 1.1% of new cases. Chest x-rays do not pick up latent TB infections or non-
pulmonary TB.  
If an arriving passenger is identified as potentially infected, the Health Protection Agency 
later contact and instruct the person to attend the local TB/chest clinic for testing. This 
assumes new arrivals provide addresses still valid later - often not the case according to 
respondents. As one stated, “port-of-entry x-ray screening is ridiculous. It is so flawed 
and it costs millions...People have faith in a system that’s deeply flawed.” The problems 
with port-of-entry screening have been repeatedly rehearsed, including in the 2001 
document “TB Control in London- Next Steps”; and the Health Protection Agency (2006) 
recommendation for an urgent review. Years later, the system carries on, with new x-ray 
machines recently installed at a major London airport. Because of its political profile, it 
is risky for management to redirect this flawed investment.  
We comment that the vignette illustrates (negative) non-linearity, whereby significant 
and repeated public expenditure has minimal positive impact. We searched for 
“positive” non-linearity in our data but could find no examples: for instance, promising 













Vignette Aspect(s) of Complexity 
Theory Exhibited 
New Public Management 
Mitigator/Influence 
1. A Tale of Two Self-
Organised Initiatives  
o Self-organisation with 
some emergent 
innovation, but ultimately, 
perpetuates  the status 
quo. 
o No single leader 
o Diversity of inputs (within 
Find & Treat) 
 
o Empowered NHS 
management and high risk 
aversion influence 
“takeover” of Find & Treat 
o Purchaser-provider split 
meant Find & Treat 
services were formally 
commissioned, including 
detailed targets. 
o Focus on NHS 
measurement, control, 
and risk aversion 
supported  spreading 
Cohort Review  
2. Inner-City Borough Clinic: 
Local Self-Organisation 
o Self-organisation resulting 
in innovation 
o No single leader 
o Diversity of inputs 
o Emergence of novelty  
 
3. System Fragmentation: 
“Stand alone” Health 
Protection Agency and the 
Hollowing-Out of the 
Department of Health 
 o System fragmentation e.g.  
creation of the Health 
Protection Agency 
o Disaggregation of the 
Department of Health 





(reinforces status quo) 
o Diversity of inputs 
o The purchaser-provider 
split, and service 
commissioning , is 
embedded 
o Strong measurement, 
audit and risk aversion  
means initiatives outside a 
commissioning focus are 
too radical and risky 
5. Port Health Screening: An 
Investment with Non-
Linear Outcomes 
o Non-linearity o Top-down pressure results 
in  the continued  
investment in airport chest 
x-ray screening  
o Risk aversion 
Table 3: Summary Analyses of Data Provided by Vignettes 
 
Discussion of Findings 
 Self-Organising, Yes; But Why Differences Between Pan- London and Local Levels?  
As comparison is usefully employed in a complexity-focused case study (Byrne 2009), we 
analysed both the pan-London and the Clinic “sub-system” levels. All five complexity 
theory features were present in both levels, but the manner in which these features 















nature of its 
impact  
















No single leader, and 
accountabilities, are 
unclear.  Director of 




this to be real . 
Strong 
(negative) 













Instances of diverse 
inputs, but limited and 
localised. The system is 
dominated by traditional 
healthcare 
professionals, many 
ambivalent about the 




need for input from local 
authorities, especially 
housing, but limited 
impact 




Non-linearity Yes.  But input leads to 
little output. See 
Vignette 5. 
No evidence of 
instances where small 





Yes. Clinic’s TB 
team changed 
their borough’s 
housing policy to 
provide 
accommodation 
for TB patients 





Yes, see Vignettes 1, 3.  Low 
(negative) 






Very limited, see 
Vignettes 1,3 .  
Low 
(negative) 




Table 4 – Complexity Theory Features Within the Pan-London TB Control System and an 




Complexity features at the pan-London level often negatively impacted the system’s 
ability to manage TB, while locally they enhanced the (sub)system’s  efforts. We suggest 
that this is because strong New Public Management features at the pan-London level 
significantly influence self-organising behaviours.  So whilst self-organisation is evident 
at both levels, it sometimes led to innovation but sometimes to retaining the status quo. 
Locally, self-organising behaviours were sufficiently ‘under the radar’ to avoid New Public 
Management colonisation. However, the more visible pan-London system was driven by 
New Public Management-inspired objectives of control and risk aversion.  
Strong New Public Management at Pan-London Level 
Our data show the embedded (negative) influence of New Public Management-style 
organising at the pan-London level. Vignette 4 notably demonstrates New Public 
Management’s enduring power, especially the purchaser-provider split, systemic 
fragmentation and strong NHS management. This reduces a system’s diversity, contra 
complexity theory, and its capacity to innovate laterally.   
New Public Management theory prescribes formerly powerful and vertically integrated 
Departments like Health lose authority as traditional areas of  responsibility are spun-off 
into arms-length agencies (e.g., the Health Protection Agency), privatised (laboratory 
services) or out-sourced (TB awareness-raising) (Ferlie et al 1996, p 13).  The stress on 
operational management downsizes the policy core, perhaps excessively (Dunleavy 
1995). All these trends are visible in Vignette 3.   
Our assessment is that, traditionally, the Department of Health undertook a more 
significant policy role. Spinning out the arms-length Health Protection Agency meant it no 
longer had financial or line management authority. A key informant stated, “I struggled, 
actually, to understand how the HPA was going to control (TB) when it didn’t really have 
a mandate to actually, you know, do anything”. 
Adding a subsystem (the Health Protection Agency) to a thriving complex system in 
response to environmental demands should enhance the system. However, this 
potential was blighted by the organisational context into which it was introduced. 
Specifically, New Public Management-style reorganisation weakened advice from ‘stand 
alone’ Health Protection Agency advisors, usually justified in terms of resource 
shortages. 
Our Overall Added Contribution  
We suggest there are two additive contributions from our analysis, Firstly, we conclude a 
complexity theory perspective offers an interesting but by itself, partial, framework for 
analysing the organisational response to London’s TB epidemic. The wider 
organisational and policy context is vital and needs to be incorporated fully in analysis 
(Byrne 1998, p 47, Marion and Bacon 2000); specifically, the ongoing, strong influence 
of macro New Public Management forces impacting the pan-London TB control system’s 
(in)ability to respond.  This observation regarding the macro context is compatible with 
complexity theory: Marion and Bacon (2000) suggest the “meta-meta aggregate”, or the 
macro context in which complex systems operate, is vital. While they do not fully 
operationalise this argument, as neither do Begun et al (2003) in their brief discussion 
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of how the Brazilian healthcare system tackled AIDS, we here provide a major worked 
example.   
Secondly, we suggest complexity theory is more robust when informed by analysis of the 
macro policy and organisational contexts of healthcare systems. Complexity theory’s 
nuances (e.g., different manifestations of self-organisation, how differing 
ties/relationships impact the system) also become clearer when analysed in this 
broader context, including at different levels within a nested system.  As Curtis et al 
(2010 [a]) observe “complexity theory describes, but does not always explain the 
complex and dynamic features of health systems”, and may need to be combined with 
other paradigms.  Recognising the importance of New Pubic Management features 
within the macro context is an important component of the material being explained. 
The perceived utility of additional theoretical perspectives may be related to conflicting 
views amongst complexity researchers regarding teleology; specifically whether systems 
move towards a pre-determined destiny or an indeterminate, transformative, destiny 
(Stacey et al 2000, p 14). Researchers in the former school, largely drawn from the 
natural and physical sciences, see systems as ultimately reducible to their constituent 
parts, and search for means of control and prediction. Complexity theorists in the latter, 
“transformative school” (to which we are closer) are less concerned with predictability or 
control and focus on relationships and why systems change/innovate or not. Such 
researchers are likely to explore alternative theories which help analyse emergent and 
unpredicted forces apparent in the healthcare systems analysed.   
The nature of ‘ties’ at the pan-London level may also be significant. With 70 
components, the system is highly fragmented (reinforced by New Public Management 
restructuring) and interview data revealed minimal informal or robust ties. There may be 
insufficient slack (given resource constraints and efficiency drives) and too much 
prescription (New Public Management-inspired contracts and performance measures) to 
foster self-organisation where system members feel secure in challenging the status 
quo.  
 Beyond New Public Management: Gardeners, Engineers and Synchronicity 
We now add a second research question, given our findings: Does complexity theory 
provide a theoretical basis for understanding the shortcomings of the New Public 
Management paradigm and practices within our case? 
In the pan-London TB case, the New Public Management paradigm’s excesses (e.g., 
focus on measurement, control and risk aversion) are illuminated by a complexity based 
analysis. The complexity literature suggests the (in)ability of managers within complex 
systems to influence long-term outcomes (Stacey 1995, 2000, Kernick 2002, Boons et 
al 2009). Boons et al (2009) propose the role of managers is to co-ordinate the 
processes, with agents in self-organizing systems encouraging “synchronicity”. “Creating 
conditions, however, is different from exerting control”, they observe. Kernick (2002), 
argues that managers in complex healthcare systems should be gardeners not  
engineers; preparing and nurturing fertile ground so innovation might emerge, rather 
than attempting to direct and control.  
 
Within our case, “gardening” tactics were evident in the borough Clinic and in the 
original Find & Treat team. Engineers dominated the “repatriation” of the Find & Treat 
team to the mainstream NHS and shifting the holistic Control Board back to a narrower 
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commissioning focus. There was more pan-London engineering than gardening and 
producing synchronicity is decidedly challenging. New Public Management governance 
produced a fragmented, risk-averse “system of subsystems”, each with its own 
management, goals, targets, and resource needs, and focused on measurement, control 
and formal contracting.  
Generalisability, Limitations and Possible Further Research 
We have produced a single (if large scale) case study, and further TB-related research in 
another major European city or on similar issues, such as HIV or infection control, would 
be useful to explore  external generalisability.  
The UK is famous – perhaps notorious – for continual top down healthcare 
reorganisation (Moran 2003). This may be a UK-specific pattern so comparative studies 
(Hood 1995) of other complex healthcare issues are needed from ‘low New Public 
Management’ systems (e.g. France, Germany). More broadly, complexity theory offers 
concepts lying at the opposite extreme to the New Public Management ideas and 
practices that have so dominated UK healthcare policy. Such ideas may prove useful in 
exploring other UK healthcare ‘systems’ with chronic policy failure: elder persons’ 
services is a prime candidate for future work. 
Finally, there are practical implications for London’s TB policy, and perhaps beyond. The 
inability of a leading city to regain control over a disease once nearly eradicated should 
be analysed within its broader, and negative, organisational context. We hope our 
analysis will provoke reflection, greater recognition of TB as a public health issue, and 
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APPENDIX B: Data Collection 
 
Non-Participant Observation 
Observations and evidence were gathered over 25 months (2009-2011), including via 
non-participant observation at 56 meetings involving the DH, NHS London, HPA, 
individual informants, Parliamentarians and third sector stakeholders, for a total of 111 
hours of observation.  My attendance at meetings was non-participatory, but, as would 
be expected with field research conducted over a long period and involving a 
reasonably stable cast of actors, I did have informal interaction with meeting 
participants, usually during meeting breaks and immediately before or after the actual 
gatherings. In fact, these ad hoc, informal conversations produced some of the more 
interesting data collected. In addition to the formal meeting minutes which were 
usually produced, copies of which I received during their routine distribution, I also 
took my own notes, including observations and “notes to self”. These field notes often 
highlighted the meeting mood and dynamics, interesting and odd happenings, or 
anything which I thought might merit further consideration or be of some consequence, 
even if it wasn’t immediately clear at the time as to why. All of these field notes were 
typed-up and entered into HyperResearch for coding and analyses. As electronic 
versions of the formal meeting minutes and supporting meeting documentation were 
also available, these, too, were coded and entered into HyperResearch.  The table 
below, summarises the nature and number of meetings attended. 
Meeting Number of Meetings 
Attended 
TB Commissioning Board (TBCB) 10 
TB Clinical Working Group (TBCWG) 12 
Sector-level TB Working Groups 5 
TB Workforce (nurses’ group) 3 
Isoniazid Resistant TB (HPA led)  1 
All-Party Parliamentary Group on TB 2 
One-on-one informant meetings 14 
Various (TB stakeholders, NHS London) 9 
 
Semi-structured interviews  
Yin (2003:89-90) identifies interviews as “one of the most important sources of case 
study information” and key in assisting researchers to serve the needs of their line of 
inquiry.  During this study, I conducted 58 interviews with 55 different people using a 
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semi-structured interviewing format. Interview participants were mainly identified 
using lists supplied by my main contact at the TB Commissioning Board; however, 
snowballing also proved effective, particularly in identifying people no longer working 
within the TB control system. Two of the interview subjects worked in TB control in 
Canada (Montreal and Ottawa) but all others were current or former participants in 
London’s TB control system. Informants represented a broad spectrum of healthcare 
professionals, managers and representatives from the third sector. Interviews ranged 
in length from 30-150 minutes, with an average length of approximately 80 minutes. All 
interviews were fully transcribed, most by two professional transcribers. A breakdown 
of interview subjects is shown in  the table  below.  






















The interview pro-forma was constructed based on the fifteen key “signs and 
symptoms” of complexity theory, NPM and PD, which were discussed in Chapters Three 
and Four, as these attributes also capture the conceptual frameworks used in this 
research. A copy of the interview pro-forma, as approved by the King’s College 
Research Ethics Panel, follows in Appendix E.  As per Yin’s observation, above, ensuring 
that interviews followed the approved pro forma was a means of systematically 
pursuing my line of inquiry and also assisted with my goal of data triangulation.  
Archival Document Review 
Reviewing archival documents traditionally dominated social science research. While 
technological developments mean that it has recently been eclipsed by survey and field 
research, documentary research has also been bolstered by advances in technology 
(Henn et al 2006:109-110), with better access to documents, often in electronic form, 
than ever before. However, researchers should view these, and all documents, as 
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socially constructed and reflective of the views and beliefs of the author(s), rather than 
as neutral and value-free materials (Henn et al 2006:112). “Selective survival of 
documents,...governed by the values, perspectives and assumptions of those who are in 
a position to decide what should and should not be made available to researchers”, may 
also, in effect, “edit” what is available, and should be acknowledged as a factor which 
may have somehow impacted the research (Henn et al 2006:121). 
Along with the transcripts of interviews and attending meetings, over 1200 pages of 
archival documentation relating to TB control in London was collected and analysed for 
this study. Much of this documentation was publicly available, such as annual reports 
and TB epidemiological reports, but much was also acquired from various informants, 
both past and present, from within the TB control system. 
This combination of interviews, observations and archival documents offered multiple 
sources of evidence to promote data triangulation, in which “facts” are corroborated by 
more than one source. Triangulation, a defining feature of case study research, 
enhances a study’s validity and value (Yin 2003:97-99).  This research gathered a 
significant amount of data from a wide variety of sources which proved more than 
adequate to conduct the analyses required for this research. In fact, it was found 
difficult to use the high volume of data fully in a thesis limited to 100000 words 
quantity of the data collected was greater than could be accommodated in this thesis. 





58 interviews with 55different people, representing a broad array of 
TB and healthcare professionals, both past and present. Interviews 




Attendance at 56 internal DH, NHS London, HPA, and one-to-one 




Documents commissioned and produced by government, the HPA, 
DH, NHS, professional bodies and third sector, covering 15 years, 
with approximately 1200 pages analysed. Formal minutes 





APPENDIX C: Data Analyses 
 
Data Reduction 
Qualitative research is well-known to produce mountains of archival, observational and 
interview data, since, for a qualitative researcher, almost anything observed or 
discovered during the course of data collection, can, at least theoretically, be 
considered as data. While some of this volume-related challenge is addressed by 
placing boundaries around the case, as discussed previously, researchers may still be 
left with vast quantities of data. To Miles and Huberman (1994:10-11), data reduction 
is “the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting and transforming” field 
notes and transcriptions and occurs throughout the entirety of the research process, up 
until the research is written up. Its objective is to assist with the generation of accurate 
and verifiable, final conclusions.  
During this research, I often wrote “notes to self” in addition to the usual recorded 
observations collected during or immediately after an interview or meeting. These took 
the form of reflective remarks or remarks written in the margins of my notes, with the 
goals of capturing “ideas and reactions to the meaning” of what I was seeing and 
hearing (Miles and Huberman 1994, pp 66-67). I also made use of document summary 
forms, as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994, pp 54-55) as a means of managing 
the volume of archival documents and providing a quick overview of the significance of 
specific documents, particularly longer ones.  
However, coding comprised my major approach to data reduction, consistent with 
Miles and Huberman’s (1994) advice. I used the HyperResearch software package to 
store, organise and code interview transcripts, typed field notes, meeting minutes, 
agendas and, where I had access to electronic versions, archival documents.  An 
electronic “snapshot” of a page of evidence coded using HyperResearch is found in 
Appendix M. The software was useful in a number of ways. It helped with organising 
the vast amount of data collected throughout the research, including sorting and 
retrieving data fragments and quotes. It was also a helpful means of validating the 
themes which had been identified from reading and re-reading the data. As with any 
data analysis program, the software was limited to working with the raw data which it 
was fed, including transcribed interview transcripts, field notes, and the set of codes 
used to analyse the data. Undoubtedly a different researcher would derive a different 
data set, including a different set of codes, and the software would return different data 
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of the state of TB control in London. Nonetheless, the process of learning and using the 
software was useful, particularly for its capacity to validate the findings from the much 
lower tech process of data immersion through reading and re-reading. 
The codes used were chiefly derived from the list of 15 “signs and symptoms” 
representative of the three theories being applied deductively in this study (five codes 
from each of the three theories, as discussed in Chapter Three and Four). But a number 
of codes also emerged inductively, as I read through the interview transcripts and other 
documents. As the process of reading, re-reading and coding progressed, the 
combination of those inductively derived codes, along with those reflecting the three 
original theories used in this study, lead me, inductively, to the use of Kingdon’s 
(1995)theory of agenda setting in public policy making.  
Finally, I enlisted the assistance of another King’s College London PhD researcher to 
“check-code” samples of my data in an effort to enhance reliability (Miles & Huberman 
1994:64-65). This proved a useful exercise in that she brought new insights and asked 
useful questions, although we agreed in terms of overall conclusions. 
Data Display 
Reduced data must be organised and displayed to support the research’s ultimate 
objective of reaching conclusions (in effect, often a means of further reduction). 
“Looking at displayed data helps us understand what is happening and to do 
something”, including either further analyses or moving on to the next step (Miles & 
Huberman 1994:10). For this study, data displays took various forms, including the 
production of frequency counts and bar graphs of coded material, and various tabular 
displays, some of which are found throughout this thesis.  
Drawing and Verifying Conclusions  
Drawing conclusions, or “representations” in the language of Ragin & Amoroso (2011), 
is the culmination of the research process. But it comes about iteratively and while it is 
the rare researcher who does not reach some preliminary conclusions in the early days 
of a study, Miles &  Huberman (1994:11) are clear in their admonition that these early 
conclusions must be tentative and held with “openness and scepticism”. They also 
argue that verifying conclusions is a vital step for researchers, requiring that 
conclusions be somehow tested for their validity. “Otherwise we are left with 




Within a critical realist paradigm, where the focus of the research is on uncovering 
often invisible mechanisms, validation in its traditional, logico-scientific form presents 
a particular challenge and “entails the epistemic fallacy” in that “an empirical 
connection in itself cannot identify the active mechanism...In other words, empirical 
regularities are pieces in the jigsaw puzzle of searching for mechanisms, not arbiters” 
(Danermark et al 2002:153-154). In this study, regularities were identified via a 
combination of HyperResearch (which identified the frequency with which codes 
appeared in the data) and by reading and re-reading the data, and discussing 
preliminary “hunches” and ideas during supervision. For instance, the low priority 
accorded to TB control was a regularity observed empirically, but identifying the 
mechanisms which caused it, was a separate exercise and is discussed at length in 
Chapter Eight.   
Despite the challenges, verifying conclusions is important and in this study another 
PhD student at King’s College London reviewed select data, including some of the 
empirical data found in Chapters Six and Seven, alongside my coding scheme, and 
offered her views and tentative conclusions. As with the simpler code-checking 
exercise, this proved useful. Further verification came by way of the numerous 
discussions during supervisory meetings regarding the data and findings presented 
here, including significant discussions regarding themes and conclusions. Finally, four 
senior members of the London TB Commissioning Board reviewed final drafts of 
Trenholm and Ferlie (2012) prior to its publication, the contents of which is drawn 
from this research and whose key findings are also contained in this thesis. These 
individuals offered useful feedback and suggestions, but the findings and conclusions of 
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 I agree to be contacted in the future by King’s College London 
researchers who would like to invite me to participate in follow up 






agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to 
my satisfaction and I agree to take part in the study. I have read both the 
notes written above and the Information Sheet about the project, and 
understand what the research study involves. 
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Appendix E: Interview Pro Forma 
 
The table below presents a compilation of the five elements derived from each of the 
three theoretical models used in this research (complexity theory, professional 
dominance and New Public Management). Following the table is the interview schedule 
which was used to guide the semi-structured interviews. The numbers in parentheses 
which follow the questions indicate which of the 15 elements is being addressed by the 
specific question. In some cases, the questions address more than one of the elements, 
while in others the questions are of a more contextual, non-specific nature, and not 







1. Autonomy granted only  to 
certain professional groups, i.e. 
physicians  
√   
2. Physicians take orders only 
from other physicians 
√   
3. Physicians control work of 
others in the network 
√   
4. Evidence of institutional power 
for physicians via knowledge 
and expertise 
√   
5. Physician control over resource 
allocation 
√   
6. “Managerialisation”, or 
managers and management 
highly implicated in operations 
 √  
7. Quasi-markets, not planning, 
determine resource allocation 
 √  
8. Widespread use of targets, 
performance measures, audits 
 √  
9. Focus on the “rights” and role 
of the “consumer” 
 √  
10. Top-down pressure for reform  √  
11. Self-organisation   √ 
12. Non-linearity   √ 
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13. Co-adaptation   √ 
14. Diversity of membership, 
“requisite variety”, multi-
disciplinary teams 
  √ 
15. Sensitivity to initial conditions, 
organisational history 




1. What is your position within the network?  
a. How long have you been involved in TB control in London?  
b. How has this position and your role changed over time? 
 
2. If you were to identify the leader of TB control in London, the person effectively 
in charge of and accountable for controlling the disease, who would that person 
be? Or would you say such a person does not really exist, that different people 
are responsible for different parts of the system and there is not really one, 
ultimate leader? 
a. Prompt and probe as needed      (11) 
 
3. Would you characterize the composition of the TB control network as diverse? 
Has the level of diversity changed over the time you have been involved in the 
network?  (14) 
 
4. Do you think any one group, profession, or individual carries particular power 
or influence over the way the network functions?   
a. Is there any group or profession which is notably short of power and 
influence despite being fully present and engaged members of the 
system?  
b. Assuming clinicians are mentioned without prompting: How does 
clinicians’ power and influence manifest itself? Can you give me any 
examples?  
i. Prompt and probe (control over resources, over other 
professionals or members of the network, control resulting from 
their expertise and/or professional autonomy) 
c. Have you witnessed any changes over time in the dominance of 
clinicians? (1-5) 
 
5. If  clinicians are not cited: Do clinicians have more influence than others within 
the network?  How does their power and influence manifest itself? Can you give 
me any examples of this?  
a. Prompt and probe (control over resources, over other professionals or 




b. Have you witnessed any changes over time in the dominance of 
clinicians? (1-5) 
 
6. How about other consultants, such as epidemiologists and microbiologists?  
a. How does their power and influence manifest itself? Can you give me 
any examples?  
i. Prompt and probe (control over resources, over other 
professionals or members of the network, control resulting from 
their expertise and/or professional autonomy) 
b. Have you seen any changes over time in their relative power and 
influence?(1-5) 
 
7. I am interested in determining the nature and extent of relationships among 
those involved in TB control in London.  
a. How much interaction do you have with other members of the various 
TB control groups, outside of formal meetings?  
b. With how many people?  
c. Who? (i.e., others in the same professional group? different group?)  
d. How often?  
e. What is the nature of this interaction?  
f. Do you have any interactions which are not related to your work in TB?  
g. Do you think these relationships facilitate the functioning of the TB 
network, making it more effective?  
h. Is the structure of the system enough to ensure sufficient interaction 
among participants so that effective working relationships develop?  
 (11) 
 
8. There is some stated interest in increasing the involvement of “end users” or TB 
patients and their families, supporters, etc., within London’s TB network.  
a. In the past, what has been the extent of such involvement?  
b. Has this changed over time? 
c. Do you think having greater patient involvement, or involvement by 
groups representing patients, is a good idea?  
i. Why? Why not?       
 (9) 
9. Thinking about your role as a member of the TB network, how much flexibility 
do you feel you have in carrying out your general, day-to-day responsibilities? 
Are your roles and responsibilities closely prescribed or would you say you 
have considerable latitude as long as you get the job done?    
    (11, 13)  
10. I am interested in understanding how the system responds when faced with an 
unforeseen occurrence, like a TB outbreak in a school for instance, or an 
unexpected spike in the MDR (multi-drug resistant) TB rate.  
a. Is there a set of simple “bottom line” rules which everyone knows they 




b. If set of simple rules: Do people have discretion or flexibility to respond 
as they see most fit as long as these “bottom line” rules are met?  
c. Or are there rigidities there which hinder your ability, and that of the 
system itself, to respond quickly and effectively? (Things like requiring 
approvals, sign-offs, hierarchical concerns or a need to reach 
consensus.)    (11,13) 
 
11. Somewhat related to how the system responds to unforeseen circumstances is 
the issue of how, or whether, the system is able to evolve in response to the 
changing and dynamic nature of the overall TB infection landscape in London. 
There is some management research, along with research in evolutionary 
biology, which argues that a system’s complexity has to be roughly equal to the 
complexity of the challenge it is facing. This has been shown to be particularly 
true in terms of surviving, never mind thriving, in a dynamic and changing 
environment.  
a. How would you describe or categorize the system’s ability to respond to 
the myriad populations and constantly changing face of TB in London?  
b. Has this changed over time?      (11-15) 
 
12. Questions for those with a long history of working in TB control: My sense is 
that over the years the organisation responsible for managing TB in London has 
been through numerous changes and has taken on various forms and 
structures. I’d like to explore this historical aspect of the network.  
a. Could you describe for me some of the previous forms or structures of 
the TB network?        
 (6,7,15) 
b. What do you see as the source of, or motivation for, these various 
changes? Politics? Practicalities/realities such as an outbreak or rising 
rates?  (6,7,10,15)  
c. Would you characterize these changes as driven from the top? Or was 
there something more like a consensus among those involved that 
change was necessary?       
  (6,7,10) 
d. When was the period of greatest change and upheaval within the 
network? 
i. How do you manage to carry on fulfilling your responsibilities 
during these changes?      
 (6,7,15) 
ii. Do you have a sense that the productivity of those working 
within the network is affected by these reorganizations?  
 (6,7,15) 
 
13. Would you characterize the London TB control network as one with a critical 
mass of solid institutional memory? 




14. With regard to the use of metrics, audits and performance measures, would you 
characterize their use within TB control as adequate, excessive or insufficient? 
a. Do they create a lot of extra work for you? How long have such 
measures been in place?  
b. Have they taken on greater or lesser importance over the years, or does 
this fluctuate?  
c. On balance, does the overall benefit of such measures justify their cost?   
(8) 
 
15. Elements of “competition” have been introduced within the healthcare system 
over the past 20 years or so as part of the drive to make the NHS more 
business-like and efficient. The very existence of PCTs and a TB Commissioning 
Board and Unit bear witness to this.  
a. Within the system responsible for TB control, how have you seen this 
manifest itself?  
b. If you can think back to pre-Commissioning and pre-PCT days, can you 
identify some benefits of this more market-based approach?  
c. How about some of the challenges or drawbacks?    
 (7) 
 
16. Another change of the past two decades is that the role and influence of 
managers and management within the NHS and the healthcare system itself has 
grown. This has been accompanied by structural changes such as breaking 
apart line departments and separating the purchasing and providing functions 
of patient care, including for TB patients.  
a. What has been your experience with this approach?  
b. Do you think this has made the job of managing and controlling TB 
within London easier or more difficult?  
c. What do you see as the benefits of this sort of arrangement? 
Drawbacks?  (6) 
 
17. Would you characterize TB control in London as successful, on balance?  
a. What have been its great successes?  
b. Most significant shortcomings?  
c. What is your own view on why infection rates continue to climb in 
London, while other Western European and American cities have rates 
which are in decline? 
 
18. Is there anything else you would like to add or think I should know? 
 
 
Conclude interviews by thanking interviewees for their time and contribution, 





Appendix F: An Overview of Key Groups and their Activities 
 
The groups involved during the early stages of TB’s reappearance in London were 
characterised by uneven leadership, bouncing between NHS London, the Health 
Protection Agency and its various precursors. However, since 2004/5, with the creation 
of the Stopping TB in London group, leadership has been situated within various parts 
of NHS London. Internal politics between NHS London and the Health Protection 
Agency has often been unhelpful, according to numerous informants. For example, the 
demise of the London TB Group arose because factions within this group pressed for 
the removal of the HPA as leader, for reasons highlighted in Case Study Two. The 
Stopping TB in London group was formed in its place, with membership virtually 
unchanged, but the organisational climate damaged. This point was illustrated during 
the course of this research, with various NHS employees encouraging an examination of 
London’s response to the InR TB outbreak, arguing that it illustrates why the Health 
Protection Agency was not capable of leading the TB control file in London.  
The membership of these various groups has been, and is, drawn almost exclusively 
from the NHS and various public health bodies/authorities, depending on where the 
responsibility for public health issues is situated. There is some (minor) effort given to 
involving TB service users in these groups, but observational data indicates that patient 
representatives have been present at less than a dozen of the meetings observed for 
this research. Members are drawn mostly from the medical profession - consultants 
from various specialisms and nurses – but there have always been NHS managers 
involved, along with variable representation from the Department of Health. The one 
organisation consistently involved, even before the creation of the Working Party in 
1993, has been the British Thoracic Society [BTS]. However, their role has been largely 
focused on developing clinical guidelines and offering clinical input to the groups 
shown in Figure 19. Three research respondents noted that during the early days of the 
London epidemic, the BTS was pivotal is forcing attention on the issue and in urging 
policy makers to act, managing to keep at least some attention focused on the issue. But 
as history has shown, the group ultimately had limited impact. So various TB control 
bodies have been in existence since the upturn in TB rates was first noted; London’s TB 
epidemic has not flourished for want of awareness of the problem within NHS London, 
public health bodies and the Department of Health. 
Figure 19 shows that the first “purpose built” group formed to address the current TB 
epidemic was a group of London chest and public health physicians who, in 1993, 
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established the Working Party of Consultants in Communicable Disease Control. As 
illustrated, this group was the first of seven groups to emerge over next 19 years, all of 
them with similar mandates; namely, to halt and then reverse the rising tide of TB in 
London. In addition, there have also been several ad hoc, less formal groups, often 
focused on a single TB control issue such as London’s InR TB outbreak and various 
workforce issues.  
In a published account of the (1992) Working Party’s efforts, McEvoy and Maguire 
(1995:303) conclude “the reasons for the rise (in TB) are not entirely clear”. As a first 
step, the Working Party concluded there was a need for more data and outlined 
specifications for a minimum dataset and a pan-London surveillance system. Detailed 
recommendations regarding the proposed surveillance system were published a year 
later (Pearson et al 1996). According to a member of the Working Party interviewed for 
this research, the focus was on the need to collect better data to begin to understand, 
what was seen at the time, as a very surprising turn of events. The first order of 
business was to “insist on a much better surveillance system be put in place so that all 
cases were recorded and followed up.” While a rudimentary system was indeed 
implemented immediately following the Working Party’s efforts, 19 years later there is 
still debate within the TB community as to the nature and quality of the data collected. 
Furthermore, two separate surveillance systems have developed and operate distinctly 
and in some opposition to each other, providing an illustration of fragmentation within 
the TB control system. One system is for England, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
excluding London (known as Enhanced Tuberculosis Surveillance [ETS], established in 
1999) and a separate system operates for London, known as the London TB Register. 
(The London system was established in 2001 as a “break away” model from the ETS, 
although both systems, oddly, are hosted by the HPA).  
Operating two systems results in duplication of effort, extra cost and territorial spats, 
with ongoing disagreements as to which system is superior. The systems have limited 
capacity to “talk” to each other and integrating the two datasets takes time and effort. 
Despite years of ongoing discussions,, neither side appears willing to give sufficient 
ground to allow for the creation of a single, national system. McEvoy and Maguire 
(1995) made a prescient observation about the need for unity in the public health 
function and for a strong decision making function with respect to TB control. And 
whilst there is now a single TB surveillance system covering all of London – an 
improvement from the time their paper was written - the city’s overall system of TB 
control is highly fragmented, as recently acknowledged by the NHS itself (NHS London, 
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2011a). As  discussed later, this lack of “joined up” working has emerged as a serious 
problem highlighted repeatedly in reports and studies, and is seen as significantly 
impeding London’s efforts at TB control.  
Following on from the Working Party, with its focus on surveillance and data collection, 
a more formal group with a broader but time-limited mandate, and comprised of UK-
wide membership, emerged in 1994. This group, The Interdepartmental Working 
Group on Tuberculosis, was sponsored by the Department of Health and its remit was 
“to set up the latest British Thoracic Society Code of Practice for the prevention and 
control of tuberculosis in the United Kingdom in the wider public health policy context 
and to consider and where necessary set up mechanisms for the above.” (Department 
of Health 1996:3). This group issued two formal documents, the first two of the 14 
reports detailed in Figure 17. The first report was issued fully 3 years after the rise in 
TB rates was discovered, likely reflecting the sense of disbelief by many within 
London’s medical community regarding rising TB rates. One research respondent who 
participated on the Interdepartmental Working Group said, “this was a bit of an 
unknown quantity then, so we did guidelines”. In fact, the group produced three high-
level recommendations, rather than “guidelines” per se, supplemented by some further 
explanation within the final, written report (Department of Health 1996):  
1. “All health authorities should have a written integrated policy for 
tuberculosis prevention and control”. [Thirteen years later, a 2009 audit 
of England’s Primary Care Trusts found, “the majority of PCTs still lacked 
a current strategy to tackle TB” and “Worryingly, about a fifth of PCTs 
with a high TB burden (≥ 40 new cases per 100, 000 population) had no 
TB strategy whatsoever”, the vast majority of which were in London. 
(Laycock et al 2009:7)];  
2. Purchasers of healthcare should ensure contracts are consistent with 
this policy40 [By 2009 only 29% of English PCTs had a service level 
agreement (SLA) spelling out which TB services were to be 
commissioned and 18% of PCTs in “high TB burden areas had no TB 
SLA” (Laycock et al 2009:7)] 
3. The public health function and CCDCs “should be provided with adequate 
resources to carry out this work”. (The majority of the above-cited 
reports, including those written most recently, cite lack of resources as 
an ongoing challenge in tackling London’s high TB rates.) 
                                           
40
 Of note here is the timing of this observation by the Interdepartmental Working Group. At that 
time, “purchasers” were a relatively new phenomenon in the UK healthcare system and the 
purchaser-provider split is a key source of the fragmentation which has come to characterise 
London’s TB control system. Neither, as will be discussed later, has the TB control system been able 
to effectively use the contracting mechanism, as TB services are often grouped together by 
purchasers as part of a more general respiratory services grouping. 
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A number of respondents involved during the early days of TB’s reappearance in 
London discussed the sense of incredulity within the medical community that TB could 
actually be spreading across London at the end of the 20th century. One said,  
...it took quite a while for the reversal in notification trends to start to raise any 
alarm...my perception, whether it’s right or not, is that some of the failure to act 
is because of the assumption that TB is largely an imported problem and that 
therefore the only thing that you really needed to do was to ensure migrant 
screening...41  
Indeed, in 1994 a leading journal for respiratory medicine, Thorax, published a paper, 
in which the lead author, one of the UK’s foremost TB experts, discussed his country’s 
“established and successful national tuberculosis control programme”, claiming “good 
systems are in place for tuberculosis control in the UK...” (Ormerod et al 1994:1087). 
By this time, TB rates in the UK had been climbing for almost seven years. Where the 
rise in rates was recognized, the reasons were officially acknowledged as being unclear 
(Hayward & Watson 1995, McEvoy & Maguire 1995), an understandable position in 
light of the paucity and low quality data available. It was also widely acknowledged that 
“(w)orldwide, deterioration of control programs is recognised to have contributed to 
this resurgence”(Department of Health 1996:3), compounded by an increasingly 
mobile global population. Net migration to London between 1992-1997 increased by 
52%, from 89,000 to 135,000 (The Migration Observatory). Rising HIV/AIDS rates 
were another contributor, as immuno-compromised HIV patients often develop a TB 
co-infection.  
  
                                           
41




Appendix G: The Case for Change and TB Model of Care  
 
The combination of these two documents comprises the “London TB Plan”, or the 
“policy alternative” as it is sometimes referred to in this thesis. The documents are 
listed in Figure 17 as the 13th and 14th reports analysing TB in London. 
For the purposes of this research, these documents are notable because (a) the process 
of creating them was observed firsthand, including (unsuccessful) efforts to move them 
through the NHS London senior management approvals process, (b) relative to the 
previous 12 documents reviewed for this study, they offer a highly detailed TB care 
pathway and service delivery plan, (c) they were subject to a formal, internal and 
external consultation process (unlike previous reports, to the best of this research’s 
knowledge). Exceptionally, the Model of Care also attempts to cost its 
recommendations, as well as “guesstimating” the current cost of TB control efforts 
across London (estimated to be in the range of £25million per annum). 42 
The Case for Change sets out the argument, in considerable detail over 53 pages, as to 
why TB in London should be urgently addressed. There is little new in its general 
thrust, although it benefits from incorporating findings from the PHAST report (Report 
Number 12 in Figure 17), and updated NICE guidance on reaching “hard to treat” TB 
patients. Nonetheless, the Case for Change reiterates much of what was argued 
previously, starting with the pivotal 1998 report, “Tuberculosis control in London – 
The Need for Change” (Report Number 3 in Figure 17). 
The 89-page “London TB Model of Care” is more distinctive, although its major 
recommendation is the same as that of previous reports, (including the 1998 report 
cited above): namely, the need for centralised, pan-London commissioning for TB 
services. As discussed in Chapter Eight, it is also distinguished itself amongst the 14 
reports by its use of clearly NPM-influenced language, for example by referring to the 
need to improve productivity and cost reduction (despite widespread agreement that 
TB control in London is currently underfunded).  
                                           
42
 This research observed significant resources devoted to trying to reach an accurate estimate of the 
current cost of TB services across London. In the end it was deemed impossible, and the £25 million 
figure represents a derivation from the well documented costs of TB services in North Central and 
North East London. Commissioners from across the other three geographic sectors simply were not 
able to report how much they spend on TB services, underscoring the relative unimportance of TB 
services to most commissioners.  
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The majority of the document is clinically focused, suggesting updated approaches to 
TB service delivery, enhanced screening techniques, an acknowledgement of the need 
for better, standardised treatment of TB, especially drug resistant TB, across London, 
and greater use of DOT. Also for the first time, it is recommended that the 
Commissioning Board oversee a fund which would provide short-term accommodation 
for homeless, migrant TB patients who are classified as having “no recourse to public 
funds” and have been deemed as posing a public health danger because of difficulties in 
getting these patients to either take or complete treatment. Currently, these patients, 
about 10 per year, are often hospitalised for the duration of their treatment and it 
would be significantly more cost effective it they were provided with temporary 
accommodation in the community.   
On balance, the Model of Care reflects updated thinking about how London should 
tackle TB and provides significant detail as to how this should be done. Also, despite 
ultimately not recommending a TB “Control Board”, the Model of Care does suggest that 
a newly reconfigured TB Commissioning Board take on some of the functions of a 
“control board” and adopt a more holistic approach to TB control across London, 
including seeking input from non-healthcare sector representatives. But notably, it is 
the narrower language and focus of “commissioning”, and not the broader concept of 
“control” which continues to be used when describing how TB should be managed 





APPENDIX H: Isoniazid-Resistant TB Patient Profile 
 
 
The patient profile of this group varies significantly from that of the general TB patient 
population in London, according to the last available internal data from the Health 
Protection Agency (2011). They are a particularly complex and challenging patient 
population to treat and require a well functioning TB control system if they are to be 
managed successfully: 
 42% have a history of imprisonment 
 68% have a history of drug or alcohol problems 
 31% have a history of mental health problems 
 34% have a history of homelessness 
 70% male (versus 55% in the general TB population) 
 85% with pulmonary, therefore contagious, TB (versus approximately 57% in 
the general TB population) 
 53% born in the UK (versus 16% of the general TB population) 
 35% white ethnic group (versus 14% of the general London TB population) 
 28% black Caribbean ethnic group (versus 4% of the general London TB 
population) 
Clearly, this is a patient population which largely lives at the margins of “polite society”, 
and differs significantly from the general London TB population. Epidemiological 
modelling has revealed fascinating links amongst many of the InR-TB patients. A copy 
of the “spider diagram”, produced by the former Public Health Laboratory Service, 
illustrates these connections and can be found in Appendix I. The composition of this 
patient group has changed somewhat over the past decade, but many of the 
connections still flow from associations with HMP Pentonville, a specific north London 
music scene and used car dealerships in the area. 
On an individual level, the following illustrative patient case histories were discovered 
within archival reports accessed for this research. They paint a vivid picture of some 
“typical” I-RTB patients and the challenges, especially resource challenges, they present 
to the TB control system. 
Case EF 
 Drug user, no fixed address, chaotic lifestyle 
 Fails to attend appointments but says he wants treatment 
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 TB nurse visits addresses he has given but he is not there 
 At one point it was decided not to treat him, given risk of developing MDRTB: 
this was followed by phone calls from the patient insisting he wanted treatment 
to continue 
 In and out of prison frequently  
 Has refused all offers of drug rehabilitation  
Case SC 
 Listed as contact of another case but failed to attend screening and non-
responsive to other attempts at contact 
 Eventually admitted very unwell via A&E, with long history of bloody cough; 
diagnosed with contagious TB 
 Drug user (cocaine and heroin), recently evicted by Local Authority for rent 
arrears of £17,000 
 Refused to stay in side-room on ward; wanted to smoke and socialise with 
others 
 Consultant in Communicable Disease Control wanted to section her under the 
Public Health Act but was informed this was impossible as SC was an inpatient 
at hospital 
 Would frequently abscond from the ward for prolonged periods to obtain drugs 
which she then smoked on the ward 
 Cannot be discharged as she is homeless; Local Authority will not re-house for 
three years after eviction. Remains in hospital although physically well enough 
for discharge 
Post-script to this case: SC went on to develop MDRTB and had to be forcibly detained 
in a hospital under armed guard where she was forced to take TB medication. Before 
developing MDRTB, but after leaving hospital after her I-RTB treatment, she continued 
to abuse hard drugs, remained homeless and returned to sex work. It is not known how 
many clients she infected. In total, her health and social care treatments are estimated 
to have exceeded £2 million. Her current whereabouts and TB status are unknown 







 History of depression and overdose, also long prison record Refused to stay in 
side-room on ward, frequently went to smoke in ward foyer and socialised with 
other smokers 
 Very negative view of healthcare professionals – threatened violence towards 
his previous GP – nursing staff intimidated by his aggressive behaviour 
 Transmission of TB to another patient in the hospital has occurred 
 Homeless after separation from his girlfriend, but now re-housed. Having DOT 
in the community, but refuses to come to hospital for it, no longer registered 
with GP 
 Home visits by TB nurse extremely time consuming as she frequently has to 
make three or more visits in a day to find him in. Verbally abusive, manipulative 
and demanding, e.g. threatening not to take his tablets until she has assisted 
him with tasks such as filling in benefit forms 





Appendix I: Spider Diagram of InR-TB Outbreak in London 
 
 






APPENDIX J: Sample recommendation page from the 2004 HPA 
report on the isoniazid resistant TB outbreak 
 
Table R2: Treatment and control measures 
 
Recommendation Action Rationale Responsibility Comments 
CONTROL 
MEASURES 
    
TREATMENT     
Appropriate 
treatment for  
INH-R TB 
Prolonged 
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INH-R TB incident 












     











This is a ‘Step 
down’ rather than 
‘Step up’ 
approach. 
Use DOT in those 
patients who: 
 Are at-risk of 
poor 
adherence 
(BTS criteria)  












DOT does not have 
to be given by a 






essential to control 
the incident.  
Treatment 
completion in this 
incident is below 











Many of the cases 
have risk factors 
and documented 
poor adherence.  
Adherence can be 
improved by 
implementing 
social and housing 
support and 
incentives, as well 
as health service 
measures such as 
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APPENDIX K: Twelve Strategic Goals of the Health Protection Agency 
1. To reduce the incidence and consequences of infection 
2. To anticipate and prevent the adverse effects of acute and chronic exposure to 
hazardous chemicals and other poisons 
3. To reduce the adverse effects of expose to ionising and non-ionising radiation 
4. To identify and respond to new and emerging diseases and other health threats 
5. To identify and develop appropriate responses to childhood diseases associated 
with infections, chemical or radiation hazards 
6. To improve preparedness of responses to health protection emergencies including 
those caused by deliberate release 
7. To strengthen information and communication systems for identifying and tracking 
diseases and exposures to infectious, chemical and radiological hazards 
8. To build and improve the evidence base through a comprehensive programme of 
research 
9. To develop a skilled and motivated workforce 
10. To manage knowledge and share expertise 
11. To build on and develop the intellectual assets of the organisation in partnership 
with industry and  other customers 
12. To raise the understanding of health protection and involvement of the public and 
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